





IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH COLEMAN, WINIFRED WILLIAMS
DAVID HEROUX, DAVID McKAY, ROY
JOSEPH, and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P

PETE WILSON, Governor of the State
of California, JOSEPH SANDOVAL,
Secretary of Youth and Corrections
Agency, JAMES GOMEZ, Director of
the California Department of
Corrections, NADIM KHOURY, M.D.,
Assistant Deputy Director for
Medical Services, JOHN S. ZIL, M.D.,
Chief, Psychiatric Services,

Defendants.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiffs are state prisoners proceeding with this class
action challenge to the delivery of mental health care at most
institutions within the California Department of Corrections.
Plaintiffs raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action was commenced as an individual action by plaintiff Ralph Coleman proceeding in propria persona. On June 25, 1991, plaintiff filed a request for substitution of counsel. On the same day, plaintiff and four other individuals, through counsel, filed a motion to amend the complaint and a motion for class certification. By order filed July 10, 1991, this court granted plaintiff's request for substitution of counsel and plaintiffs' present counsel were substituted in as counsel of record. By order filed August 12, 1991, plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint was granted and plaintiffs' motion for class certification was set for hearing on August 29, 1991. Following the hearing, this court recommended and the district court ordered certification of the following class:

[A]ll inmates with serious mental disorders who are now or who will in the future be confined within the California Department of Corrections (except the San Quentin State Prison, the Northern Reception Center at Vacaville and the California Medical Facility-Main at Vacaville).

(Class Certification Order, filed November 14, 1991, at 4-5.)

On August 1, 1991, following the heat and medication related deaths of three inmates receiving psychotropic medication at California Medical Facility (CMF) at Vacaville, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought a court order requiring defendants to "take all feasible measures necessary to implement within one week" temporary hot weather emergency plans at all state prisons covered by this action and to adopt a final comprehensive hot weather emergency plan. Plaintiffs

1 also sought appointment of a special master to monitor defendants'
2 compliance with the temporary and final plans. The motion for
3 preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on August 29, 1991.

4 At the time set for hearing, defendants filed a
5 memorandum, dated August 27, 1991, from the Deputy Director of the
6 Institutions Division of the California Department of Corrections
7 (CDC) and the Assistant Deputy Director of Health Care Services for
8 CDC addressed to wardens, chief medical officers and chief
9 psychiatrists at institutions within CDC. The title of the
10 memorandum was "Prevention of Heat-Related Pathologies Plan." The
11 memorandum directed all addressees to "initiate the subject plan at
12 your institution" and to incorporate enumerated policies into the
13 plan.

14 On the basis of that memorandum and the evidence of
15 defendants' apparent efforts to implement at least a temporary
16 emergency hot weather plan, the court continued the hearing on the
17 preliminary injunction for two weeks. At the hearing, plaintiffs
18 presented evidence that the temporary plan had not been implemented
19 at least at Folsom Prison in the time since the first hearing. The
20 court gave defendants five days to respond to plaintiffs' evidence.

21 In findings and recommendations filed October 22, 1991,
22 this court found that plaintiffs had "presented significant
23 evidence that there are many inmates throughout the California
24 prison system who are both on psychotropic medications and in
25 prisons which are subject to extreme heat conditions." (Findings
26 and Recommendations, filed October 22, 1991, at 4.) This court

1 found "evidence that defendants have not, in the past, been
2 adequately attentive to either the need for adequate cooling in the
3 face of extreme heat, or to the special needs of inmates on
4 psychotropic medications." (Id.) However, this court also found
5 that defendants were then taking steps to remedy the problem by
6 promulgating a temporary plan and "gathering information for the
7 preparation and promulgation of a systemwide permanent plan." (Id.
8 at 5.) The action was then set for trial on June 1, 1992, and this
9 court directed the parties to conduct discovery so that a hearing
10 on heat-related issues could be held on or before April 16, 1992,
11 if necessary. This court specifically found that "absent good
12 faith implementation of the August 27, 1991 memorandum and efforts
13 toward a permanent plan, the balance of hardships would tip
14 decidedly in favor of plaintiffs." (Id. at 7.) However,
15 defendants' efforts at the time led this court to find that
16 injunctive relief was not then warranted. (Id.) No objections to
17 the findings and recommendations were filed, and they were adopted
18 by the district court by order filed November 14, 1991.

19 On April 2, 1992, plaintiffs renewed their motion for
20 preliminary injunctive relief. The evidence tendered by plaintiff
21 at that time demonstrated that defendants had done almost nothing
22 about a permanent plan over the winter months. (See Declaration of
23 Katherine Sher, filed April 2, 1992, at paragraph 17.) On the eve
24 of the hearing, after settlement negotiations supervised by U.S.

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1 Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows, the parties agreed on the
2 terms of a stipulated preliminary injunction. The stipulated
3 injunction was entered on the record on May 11, 1992.

4 At the request of the parties, trial of this matter was
5 continued to March 1, 1993, so that they could pursue settlement
6 discussions concerning all of the issues raised in the action.
7 Those discussions were supervised and facilitated by Judge
8 Hollows.^{1/} The parties were unable to resolve the issues
9 presented by this litigation and trial commenced on March 1, 1993.
10 This court heard evidence for thirty-nine days. Trial concluded on
11 June 21, 1993, and the matter was thereafter submitted for
12 decision.

13 EXPERT WITNESSES

14 The court heard testimony from seven expert witnesses for
15 plaintiffs and four expert witnesses for defendants.^{2/} Following
16 is a brief summary of the expert testimony tendered to the
17 court.^{3/} The qualifications and background of each of these
18 experts is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion.

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21 ^{1/} This court is enormously indebted to Judge Hollows for his work
22 as settlement judge in this case.

23 ^{2/} Pursuant to court order, the direct testimony of expert witnesses
24 was received through signed declarations. The opposing party was
25 allowed to conduct extensive cross-examination of each expert witness,
and the party tendering the witness was given an opportunity to
conduct a redirect examination.

26 ^{3/} Plaintiffs also offered expert testimony from Terry Kupers, M.D.
The court has not considered Dr. Kupers' testimony in making these
findings and recommendations.

1 A. Plaintiffs' Experts

2 Dr. Stuart Grassian testified concerning the psychiatric
3 consequences of solitary or small group confinement. Dr. Grassian
4 also testified concerning mental health care issues at Pelican Bay
5 State Prison, including the prevalence of mental illness at the
6 prison and in the Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit (SHU) in
7 particular, staffing levels, screening for mental illness, access
8 to care, including access to inpatient and intensive outpatient
9 care, administration of medications, involuntary medication,
10 medical records, quality assurance/peer review, suicide prevention,
11 and the relationship between security issues and the mental health
12 needs of the inmate population.

13 To prepare for his testimony, Dr. Grassian toured Pelican
14 Bay State Prison, particularly the SHU. He conducted interviews
15 with twenty-nine inmates housed at the prison, twenty-four of whom
16 were housed in the SHU; each interview was approximately thirty or
17 forty minutes and Dr. Grassian reviewed whatever medical
18 information was made available for each of these inmates. He spoke
19 briefly with a staff psychiatrist, a staff psychologist, and
20 Pelican Bay's litigation coordinator during his tour. Dr. Grassian
21 also reviewed medical and central files of most of the inmates
22 interviewed, documents produced by defendants relating to the
23 provision of mental health care at Pelican Bay, and the deposition
24 testimony of six health professionals employed at Pelican Bay and
25 of Dr. John Zil, the Chief Psychiatrist for the CDC.

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1 Dr. Thomas Greenfield testified concerning the prevalence
2 of mentally ill inmates in the CDC based on his work as a
3 consultant in the preparation of the Stirling Report.^{4/} Dr.
4 Greenfield also testified concerning a reanalysis of the Stirling
5 Report prevalence data that he performed in 1991 for Scarlett Carp
6 & Associates, consultants hired by the CDC to evaluate mental
7 health care delivery in the prison system.^{5/} Dr. Greenfield also
8 testified concerning the adequacy of screening for mental illness
9 at institutions within the CDC and about inmates' self-reported
10 willingness to received mental health treatment in those
11 institutions. Finally, Dr. Greenfield offered testimony concerning
12 flaws in the method used by the CDC to seek resources for mental
13 health care.

14 Dr. Craig Haney offered testimony concerning the Stirling
15 Report, including the validity and quality of the methodology used
16 by the researchers who conducted the study and the reliability of
17 the prevalence data contained in the Report. Dr. Haney also
18 offered testimony regarding living conditions in the Pelican Bay
19 SHU and the Violence Control Unit (VCU) that is part of the SHU,
20 the psychological impact on mentally ill inmates subjected to those
21

22 ^{4/} The Stirling Report is discussed more fully in a later section of
23 this opinion. The report was a legislatively mandated study entitled
24 "Current Description, Evaluation, and Recommendations for Treatment
25 of Mentally Disordered Criminal Offender." The prevalence data are
26 contained Volume I of the report.

^{5/} The Scarlett Carp Report is a published report of a study
conducted by independent consultants hired by the CDC in 1991. The
report is discussed more fully in a subsequent section of this
opinion.

1 conditions, and the adequacy of the psychiatric services available
2 to such inmates. In preparation for his testimony Dr. Haney
3 observed the SHU and the VCU, interviewed inmates and staff, and
4 reviewed documents. Dr. Haney also offered testimony concerning
5 the psychological impact of other SHU units throughout the CDC.
6 This testimony was based on review of documents as well as
7 interviews with and observation of inmates in the Pelican Bay SHU
8 who had previously been housed in other SHU units.

9 Dr. Edward Kaufman testified concerning the delivery of
10 mental health care in the California Department of Corrections and
11 at six specific prisons in the class.^{6/} He also testified about
12 staffing, screening for mental illness, medical records,
13 evaluations for placement in a residential psychiatric program (so-
14 called "Category J" evaluations^{7/}), other outpatient psychiatric
15 programs, access to inpatient care, prescription, administration
16 and availability of psychotropic medications, housing of mentally
17 ill inmates in administrative segregation, suicide prevention,
18 mental health care training for custody staff, use of tasers and
19 other gun-fired projectiles on mentally ill inmates, treatment of
20 substance abuse in mentally ill inmates, and quality assurance/peer
21 review.

23 ^{6/} California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, California State
24 Prison/Corcoran, R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility, California Men's
25 Colony, California State Prison/Avenal, and the Correctional Training
Facility at Soledad.

26 ^{7/} The principal acute mental health category is Category J. Other
mental health categories include Category I, Category K and Category
U. (Petrella Declaration at 30.)

1 Dr. Kaufman's testimony was based on tours of four
2 institutions, where he interviewed staff and prisoners, reviewed
3 central and medical files and observed the facilities.^{8/} He also
4 reviewed other medical records for inmates in the CDC, including
5 reports of nine suicides at California Men's Colony and incident
6 reports regarding inmates restrained by tasers and 37mm guns. He
7 also reviewed deposition transcripts, exhibits, and documents from
8 the four institutions that he toured and from Avenal and Soledad.
9 He also reviewed documents produced by defendants regarding
10 systemwide policies and problems, including the Stirling Report,
11 the Scarlett Carp reports^{9/}, and major Budget Change Proposals.
12 Finally, Dr. Kaufman relied on literature in the fields of
13 psychiatry, mental health delivery systems, forensic mental health
14 and related fields.

15 Dr. V. Meenakshi offered testimony on numerous issues
16 relating to the provision of mental health care at six institutions
17 in the class.^{10/} Dr. Meenakshi's testimony addressed the following
18 issues: screening and referral, access to care, adequacy of
19 inpatient care, administrative and segregated housing units,
20 medical records, involuntary medication, tasers and restraints,

22 ^{8/} California Men's Colony, R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility,
23 California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, and California State
Prison/Corcoran.

24 ^{9/} The Scarlett Carp consultants published a series of reports before
25 their final report was published in February 1993.

26 ^{10/} California Institution for Women, Central California Women's
Facility, Northern California Women's Facility, Mule Creek State
Prison, California Correctional Center, and Sierra Conservation
Center.

1 staffing shortages and problems with recruitment, quality
2 assurance, informed consent, medication distribution and
3 monitoring, suicide prevention, and the effects of exposure to heat
4 on inmates taking psychotropic medications. Dr. Meenakshi's
5 testimony was based on tours of several prisons, interviews with
6 staff and prisoners, review of documents produced by defendants,
7 and review of numerous inmates' psychiatric and central files.

8 Dr. Russell Petrella testified regarding the necessary
9 elements of an adequate mental health care delivery system, the
10 adequacy of the management of mental health care and the adequacy
11 of mental health resources in the CDC. He also testified about
12 numerous mental health care issues at five institutions in the
13 class,^{11/} and the delays and backlog created in referring inmates
14 for Category J evaluation. Finally, he testified regarding care
15 for mentally retarded inmates.

16 Dr. Petrella toured four prisons in the class.^{12/} At
17 each institution he interviewed staff and prisoners, reviewed
18 medical files and observed the facilities. He also reviewed
19 additional medical records, deposition transcripts, exhibits and
20 other documents, including documents and reports describing
21 systemwide policies and problems.

22 In connection with his opinion on the backlog of inmates
23 waiting for referral for Category J evaluation, Dr. Petrella
24

25 ^{11/} California Men's Colony, California Institution for Men,
26 Calipatria, Chuckawalla Valley State Prison, and Wasco State Prison.

^{12/} California Men's Colony, Wasco State Prison, California
Institution for Men, and Calipatria.

1 reviewed deposition testimony, documents, and medical, psychiatric
2 and central files of a sample of inmates originally referred for
3 Category J evaluation who were subsequently reevaluated and
4 reclassified as general population inmates. He also reviewed
5 questionnaire responses and correspondence to plaintiff's counsel
6 from some of these inmates.

7 B. Defendants' Experts

8 Dr. Louis L. Beermann, the Chief Psychologist for the
9 CDC, testified concerning the development and implementation of the
10 suicide prevention program used by the CDC, as well as the
11 historical and current suicide rates in the Department.

12 Steven Cambra offered testimony concerning the training
13 required for new correctional employees in the CDC, the in-service
14 training provided at each institution in the CDC, and the on-the-
15 job training at institutions throughout the Department. He also
16 testified about the role of custody staff in the provision of care
17 to mentally ill inmates, placement of inmates in administrative
18 segregation and security housing units, and conditions of
19 confinement in such units. Mr. Cambra' testimony was based on his
20 personal experience and observation, as well as review of
21 Department policy and documents.

22 Dr. Joel A. Dvoskin testified concerning the mental
23 health care delivery system in the CDC. Dr. Dvoskin was one of the
24 consultants hired by Scarlett Carp and Associates to conduct the
25 1991 study of mental health care delivery in the CDC. He testified
26 about the services necessary for a mental health care delivery

1 system to function adequately, problems within the CDC system, the
2 Scarlett Carp consultants' recommendations for remedying those
3 problems, and the prevalence of inmates in the CDC needing
4 treatment for serious mental disorders on any given day. Finally,
5 he testified about placement of mentally ill inmates in
6 administrative segregation or security housing units, suicide
7 prevention, and the need for a management information system and
8 some form of quality assurance.

9 Dr. Dennis Koson testified concerning the definition of
10 serious mental disorder, the need for screening and the screening
11 procedures that are used at the reception centers at Wasco State
12 Prison and R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility. Dr. Koson also
13 offered testimony concerning organization of the CDC mental health
14 care delivery system and some of the problems that obtain in the
15 present structure. Finally, he testified about the placement of
16 mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation.

17 Dr. Koson's opinion was based on tours of nine prisons in
18 the class,^{13/} prior experience in other prison litigation, and on
19 his work as one of the consultants for the Scarlett Carp Study.

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25 ^{13/} California Institution for Women, Central California Women's
26 Facility, Northern California Women's Facility, California Men's
Colony, Mule Creek State Prison, Wasco State Prison, California
Institution for Men, Calipatria State Prison, and Richard J. Donovan
Correctional Facility.

STANDARDS^{14/}

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that defendants have violated and are continuing to violate their rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on convicted prisoners and applies to "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined." Helling v. McKinney, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993).

When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well being. . . . The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his

^{14/} As noted infra, this court is reserving findings and recommendations on plaintiffs' claims regarding treatment of mentally retarded inmates pending further briefing. For the reasons discussed below, this court finds the evidence of defendants' constitutional violation with respect to the treatment of mentally ill inmates so clear that the court need not reach plaintiffs' claim under the Rehabilitation Act at this time. Therefore, the only standards set forth in this section are those that apply to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim.

1 basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing,
2 shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety -
3 it transgresses the substantive limits on state
action set by the Eighth Amendment. . . .

4 Id., quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services,
5 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d
6 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The Eighth Amendment requires that
7 prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate
8 medical care"). Access to adequate mental health care is a
9 necessary part of an adequate medical care system in prison. Id.
10 at 1253; Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F.Supp. 1558,
11 1576-77 (D. Idaho 1984), quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44
12 (4th Cir. 1977).

13 In Balla, the district court described six components
14 essential to a minimally adequate mental health care system. These
15 components are: (1) a systematic program for screening and
16 evaluating inmates to identify those in need of mental health care;
17 (2) a treatment program that involves more than segregation and
18 close supervision of mentally ill inmates; (3) employment of a
19 sufficient number of trained mental health professionals; (4)
20 maintenance of accurate, complete and confidential mental health
21 treatment records; (5) administration of psychotropic medication
22 only with appropriate supervision and periodic evaluation; and (6)
23 a basic program to identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk
24 for suicide. Balla at 1577.

25 Inadequate medical care in prison constitutes cruel and
26 unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment when the
inadequacies rise to the level of "deliberate indifference to

1 serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
2 (1976). An Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference
3 to medical needs is comprised of an objective component and a
4 subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct.
5 2321, 2324, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). The objective component
6 focuses on whether the deprivation of medical care is "sufficiently
7 serious," while the subjective component focuses on whether the
8 defendant officials "act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
9 mind." Id. As a general rule, the state of mind required for an
10 Eighth Amendment violation is one of "'obduracy and wantonness.'" Id.
11 Id. at 2324, quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). In
12 cases raising claims based on inadequate medical care, "wantonness"
13 is shown by proof of deliberate indifference on the part of
14 defendant officials. Wilson at 2326-27.

15 Deliberate indifference is shown where inmates are unable
16 to make their medical problems known to medical staff that is
17 competent to examine inmates and diagnose illnesses, as well as to
18 treat medical problems or provide referrals and access to those who
19 can provide treatment. Hoptowit at 1253. The Seventh Circuit has
20 held that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
21 prisoners may be demonstrated by proof of "such systemic and gross
22 deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment or procedures that
23 the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate
24 medical care." Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir.
25 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984).

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2 ANALYSIS

3 At the outset, this court finds that there is virtually
4 no dispute over the objective component of plaintiffs' claims. As
5 discussed in detail below, plaintiffs have clearly shown, and
6 defendants have effectively acknowledged, that the delivery of
7 mental health care within the California Department of Corrections
8 is, and for many years has been, grossly inadequate.

9 The remaining question is whether defendants have acted
10 with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
11 inmates with serious mental disorders. This court finds the
12 evidence of defendants' deliberate indifference manifest;
13 defendants have for years ignored the considered advice of their
14 own experts about the woeful deficiencies in their system. In the
15 interim, untold thousands of mentally ill inmates have gone
16 undiscovered, undiagnosed, and untreated while, at the same time,
17 being subjected to conditions that aggravate their illnesses.
18 Additionally, mentally ill inmates who do receive some forms of
19 treatment suffer needless, extended, and medically harmful delays
20 in access to necessary psychiatric care.^{15/}

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22 ^{15/} Plaintiffs presented compelling and tragic evidence at trial of
23 the suffering of mentally ill inmates in California's prisons, both
24 through the declarations of their expert witnesses, see, e.g.,
25 Declaration of V. Meenakshi, M.D., filed February 5, 1993, passim;
26 Declaration of Stuart Grassian, M.D., filed February 5, 1993, passim;
Declaration of Dr. Russell C. Petrella, filed February 5, 1993, at
160-183; Declaration of Edward Kaufman, M.D., filed February 5, 1993,
passim, and through the testimony of inmate witnesses at trial, see,
e.g., testimony of James Moore, March 5, 1993; James O'Donnal, March
5, 1993; Rahsson Bowers, March 5, 1993; Winifred Williams, March 19,
1993.

1 A. History

2 1. Workload Study

3 In 1984, management in the California Department of
4 Corrections recognized that the CDC and the California Department
5 of Finance had not established a staffing ratio of psychiatrists
6 and psychologists to inmates in the CDC. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 456
7 at vi, 1.) Defendant Khoury, then Chief of the Health Services
8 Unit for the California Department of Corrections, was directed to
9 develop such staffing ratios. Id.^{16/} A CDC Health Services Unit
10 task force was created and assigned the task of conducting a
11 workload study to develop these ratios. (Id.)

12 In the workload study, completed in May 1986 and
13 published in August 1986, the task force found, inter alia, that
14 the absence of a standardized staffing formula had led to staffing
15 patterns which had "almost doubled the average caseload for
16 psychiatrists and psychologists" over the preceding seven years.
17 (Id. at 1.) In addition, "the dramatic escalation in the number of
18 inmates,^{17/} [as well as] legislative changes, court orders, and

19 /////

21 ^{16/} Plaintiffs' Exhibit 456 shows that the Chief of the Health
22 Services Unit was directed to undertake this task "[d]uring the 1984-
23 85 Departmental budget hearing." (Id. at 1.) Defendant Khoury testi-
24 fied that he became Chief of the Health Services Unit in January 1985
and that he initiated the study. Testimony of Dr. Nadim Khoury, M.D.,
Reporter's Transcript (RT), March 29, 1993, at 14-56, 14-63, 14-64.

25 ^{17/} The task force found that the inmate population had increased
26 138% in the seven years preceding its study, while the number of
budgeted positions for psychiatrists and psychologists increased by
only 29%. It is not clear whether all the budgeted positions were in
fact filled. (See Exhibit 456 at 11.)

1 settlement agreements with the Department^{18/} . . . increased the
2 number of required evaluations and treatments done by the
3 psychiatric staff." (Id. at 2.)

4 The task force drew the following conclusions:

- 5 1. The practice of allocating Psychiatrist and
6 Psychologist positions without consideration of
7 population or workload is inappropriate.
8 2. Court orders and mandates are increasing
9 the workload demands of the psychiatric staff.
10 3. The current workload is clearly excessive
11 with the existing resources.

12 (Id. at vi.) The task force recommended adoption of the following
13 ratios of staff to inmates:

14 Reception Centers:	Psychologist	1:121
	Psychiatrist	1:278
15 Referral Centers:	Psychologist	1:666
	Psychiatrist	1:498
16 CIW ^{19/}	Psychologist	1:350
	Psychiatrist	1:559
17 Outpatient Facilities	Psychologist	1:2636
	Psychiatrist	1:2125

18 (Id. at vi.)

19 The workload study, though approved by defendant Khoury,
20 was not adopted by the CDC. (Testimony of Dr. Nadim Khoury,
21 Reporter's Transcript (RT), March 30, 1993, at 15-131, 132.) To
22 this day, ten years after formal recognition of the problem,
23

24 ^{18/} The task force noted an increase in litigation against CDC
25 involving psychiatric care issues. In so noting, the report states
26 that "[t]he contention of the courts is that inmates must be provided
with a comparable scope and quality of psychiatric care services as
found in the community at large." (Id. at 5.) (Emphasis added.)

^{19/} California Institution for Women.

1 defendants have not adopted a staffing ratio for either
2 psychiatrists or psychologists to the inmate population.
3 (Testimony of James Gomez, RT, May 17, 1993, at 74.) Instead, the
4 CDC still relies on the budget change proposal process criticized
5 in the 1986 workload study. (Id.; Plaintiff's Exhibit 456 at 1.)
6 Further, as will be discussed in greater detail infra, the CDC is
7 intolerably understaffed in the area of mental health care.

8 2. Stirling Report

9 In 1986, responding to a legislative mandate,^{20/} the
10 CDC undertook a "study of the prevalence of mental illness among
11 inmates and parolees" and a "systematic evaluation of mental health
12 service delivery in the correctional system." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
13 1 at ii-1.) The researchers were directed to focus on
14 the prevalence of Severe Mental Disorder (SMD)
15 among prisoners and parolees;^{21/} evaluate
16 available mental health services and facilities
for these populations and forecast program

17 ^{20/} 1984/1986 Assembly Bill 2390 (Stirling). (Plaintiff's Exhibit
18 1 at i-1.)

19 ^{21/} Severe mental disorder is defined in the legislation as "an
20 illness or disease or condition which substantially impairs the
21 person's thought, perception of reality, emotional process, or
22 judgement; or which grossly impairs behavior, or which demonstrates
evidence of an acute brain syndrome. . . . The term 'severe mental
23 disorder'. . . does not include a personality or adjustment disorder,
24 epilepsy, mental retardation or other developmental disabilities, or
addiction to or abuse of intoxicating substances." Cal. Penal Code
25 § 2962; (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, at i-1). The Stirling Report stated
26 that the disorders assessed in the prevalence survey included organic
brain syndrome, schizophrenia, affective (mood) disorders, obsessive
compulsive disorder, anxiety disorders (including phobias, generalized
anxiety disorder, panic disorders, and post traumatic stress
disorder), and somatization disorder. (Id. at ii-1.) The study also
went beyond the statutory definition of SMD and gathered data for
diagnosis of alcohol and substance abuse and/or disorders "because of
the importance of these disorders for service planning." (Id.)

1 needs; review and make recommendations
2 regarding screening proceedings; and design 'a
3 study of the effectiveness of treatment
programs in reducing the level of re-offending
among parolees with mental disorders.

4 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 at i-1.) The purpose of the Stirling study
5 was to remedy the "lack of systematic psychiatric epidemiological
6 data on the California prison population for use in projecting
7 mental health service needs." (Id. at ii-3.) The study noted that

8 [t]he intent of the Stirling legislation is to
9 strengthen the capabilities of CDC, through its
10 Office of Health Care Services, working in
11 concert with the State Department of Mental
12 Health (DMH), to provide effective mental
health treatment for the severely mentally
disordered (SMD) offender, during incarceration
and parole. . . .^{22/}

13 The prevalence study was conducted in July 1987 and
14 published in July 1989 as Volume I of the Stirling Report.

15 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.) The prevalence study divided inmates into
16 two groups. The first group was called the "unidentified" general
17 population group, i.e., inmates "who had not been assigned
18 psychiatric categories in the CDC inmate classification system."
19 (Id. at ii-3.) The second group was drawn from "psychiatrically
20 identified" inmates, i.e., those who in June 1987 had "specific
21

22 ^{22/} The primary goal of the legislation was "foremost, to find cost-
23 effective ways to reduce the damages to society incurred by releasing
SMD offenders to the community who, by dint of inadequate or
24 inappropriate treatment, or no treatment at all, would remain at risk
(perhaps increased risk) of re-offending, possibly violently."
25 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, at i-1.) Ultimately, the Technical Advisory
Committee concluded, however, that "a study to determine whether (and
26 to what degree) mental health intervention might reduce criminal
recidivism was premature, given the budget and feasible timeline."
(Id. at ii-1.) Therefore, that portion of the study was only designed
and was not conducted. (Id. at ii-2.)

1 psychiatric classifications and/or were located in specific
2 psychiatric facilities used by CDC." (Id. at ii-3.) These two
3 groups were assessed for lifetime diagnosed SMD and for SMD with
4 disorder-associated symptoms in the preceding month. (Id. at ii-
5 7.) The lifetime disorders included organic brain syndrome -
6 severe, schizophrenia, major depression, and the bipolar disorders.
7 (Id.)

8 The study found that approximately 13 percent of inmates
9 in the unidentified group and 35 percent of the psychiatrically
10 identified inmates, or 14 percent of the total population, suffered
11 from one of the major illnesses during their lifetime. (Id. at ii-
12 8, ii-9.) The study further found that 6.9 percent of inmates in
13 the unidentified group and 27.5 percent of inmates in the
14 psychiatrically identified group, or 7.9 percent of the total
15 population, had suffered disorder-associated symptoms in the
16 preceding month. (Id.)

17 In July 1987, at the time the study was conducted, the
18 inmate population was approximately 59,000 inmates. (Id. at ii-3,
19 ii-9.) Given that population size, the study found that "even the
20 small base-rate of 7% for the four serious disorders amounts to
21 over 4,000 undetected SMD individuals." (Id.)

22 The report found that "[t]he survey results imply that
23 there are somewhat over 5,000 . . . SMD inmates with some current
24 symptoms in 1988. This number is projected to more than double by
25

26 /////

1 the year 2,000." (Id. at ii-10.)^{23/} The study also found that,
2 given the scarcity of psychiatric resources in the CDC, "it is
3 likely that few of the psychiatrically unidentified group would
4 have access to desirable levels and durations of service." (Id.)

5 Volume II of the Stirling Report, called "Array and
6 Administration of Services," was published in November 1988.
7 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.) That portion of the study found
8 significant deficiencies in mental health services within the CDC,
9 particularly in the areas of screening and staffing. The
10 consultants made several recommendations relevant to this
11 litigation, including recommendations that CDC set adequate
12 staffing standards for all mental health professionals, determine
13 why there is a problem with recruitment and retention of mental
14 health professionals, adequately document mental health contacts
15 and develop a quality assurance program, conduct initial screenings
16 in an atmosphere more conducive to obtaining relevant information,
17 standardize mental health testing, evaluate time and criteria
18 involved in transfers for psychiatric care, and evaluate extending
19 inmates' length of stay at Reception Centers to provide additional
20 opportunities for psychiatric evaluation. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2
21 at iii-iv.)
22

23

24 ^{23/} In fact, with a total prison population of just over 118,000 today
25 (see Department of Corrections Weekly Report of Population as of
26 Midnight May 15, 1994, filed May 25, 1994), that number has likely at
least doubled already. Defendants' expert, Dr. Dvoskin, opined that
"the level of need in the California Department of Corrections for
treatment of serious mental disorder on any given day would be
approximately 11 to 15 percent of the total population." (Dvoskin
Declaration at 6.)

1 Defendants did not accept the prevalence data from the
2 Stirling Report, nor did they adopt the recommendations of the
3 report. (See Testimony of James Gomez, RT, May 17, 1993, at 52-
4 55.) The deficiencies described therein remain to this day, over
5 five years after issuance of Volume II of the Stirling Report.

6 3. The Scarlett Carp Report

7 In 1991, the CDC commissioned yet a third study of mental
8 health services in the Department.^{24/} (RT, May 17, 1993, at 90-
9 91.) The Department contracted with Scarlett Carp and Associates,
10 Inc. to conduct the study. Hereinafter, the study is referred to
11 as the Scarlett Carp study or the Scarlett Carp Report. The
12 purpose of the Scarlett Carp study was to "design three alternative
13 mental health service delivery systems" for the CDC. (Plaintiff's
14 Exhibit 96 at 1.) All three alternatives were to include
15 screening, follow-up evaluation, crisis care, inpatient psychiatric
16 hospital care, intermediate care, outpatient care, pre-release
17 services, and parolee outpatient services as component parts. (Id.
18 at 1-2.) The difference between each system was based on resources
19 underpinning a particular design; one was to be designed based on
20 existing resources, a second based on a potential 10 percent budget
21 cut, and a third based on "increased resources to the level
22 necessary to support an enhanced system." (Id.)

23 June 15, 1991 was designated as the official start date
24 for the Scarlett Carp study. (Id. at 1.) At the outset of the
25

26

24/ The workload study was done internally. Both the Stirling Report
and the Scarlett Carp Report were prepared by independent consultants.

1 study, the consultants interviewed twelve individuals identified as
2 "key stakeholders." (Id. at 3.) Six management officials within
3 the California Department of Corrections, including defendants
4 Khoury and Zil, were in the group.^{25/} (Id.) During June and
5 July 1991, the consultants interviewed these persons and others.
6 Several significant deficiencies in mental health care delivery
7 within CDC were noted by the interviewees and described in an
8 initial progress report dated June/July 1991. (Id. at 5.)

9 In September/October 1991, the consultants issued a
10 second progress report. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1398.) In that
11 progress report, the consultants indicated that a delivery system
12 designed around a 10% reduction in resources would not meet "a
13 constitutionally acceptable level of care;" therefore, discussion
14 of this alternative was omitted. (Id. at i, 38.)

15 The September/October 1991 progress report contained
16 several observations of problems with the current delivery system,
17 including the following:

18 Screening and follow-up evaluations not
19 formalized and staffing is inconsistent.

20 Inpatient Hospital Care is ill defined with
21 regard to CDC expectations and bed utilization.

22 Enhanced Outpatient Care is ill defined with
23 regard to treatment objectives and population
24 to be served.

25 ^{25/} Other CDC employees interviewed were David Tristan, the Deputy
26 Director for Institutions and John O'Shaughnessy, CDC Chief, Mental
Health Services Branch. Robert H. Denninger, CDC Chief Deputy
Director and Kyle McKinsey, Deputy Director, CDC Planning and
Construction Division, were to be interviewed during the month of
July, 1991. (Id.)

1 Crisis Care and Outpatient general population
2 services need formalization, and resources are
3 inconsistent.

4 The centralized/regional method of service
5 delivery does not provide equal access to care
6 for all inmates.

7 Services for women are not equal to those for
8 men.

9 There is an inadequate exchange of inmate
10 mental health clinical records, which reduces
11 the effectiveness and continuity of service
12 delivery systems. This is particularly
13 applicable regarding the transfer of prisoners
14 between institutions and of inmates to the
15 parolee outpatient clinics.

16

17

18

19 While professional services are generally
20 being provided by psychiatrists, psychologists,
21 and social workers, supplementary, lower level
22 clinicians are needed throughout the system to
23 assist in (1) mental health screening, (2)
24 crisis care, (3) housing management and care,
25 and (4) to provide supportive clinical work.

26 Recruitment and retention problems for mental
27 health professionals at institutions located in
28 rural areas is problematic.

29 There is a lack of routine mental health data
30 collection that (1) tracks and monitors inmate/
31 parolee patients, (2) analyzes inmate/parolee
32 mental health needs, and (3) evaluates mental
33 health services/programs/interventions.

34 (Id. at 32-33.)^{26/}

35 /////

36 ^{26/} Many of these findings were similar to findings in the June/July
1991 progress report drawn from the stakeholder interviews. (See
Plaintiff's Exhibit 96 at 5.)

1 The consultants found that only a delivery system based
2 on enhanced resources would satisfy constitutional requirements
3 after the inmate population expanded beyond the size of the 1991/92
4 population. (See id. at 36-37.)^{27/}

5 In February 1992, the consultants published a third
6 progress report. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 691.) Appended to that
7 report are several tables which compare staffing levels existing
8 within the CDC in 1991/92 with projected staffing needs for 1996/97
9 based on projected prison population for those years. In 1991/92,
10 the CDC had a total of 277.4 positions authorized for mental health
11 care. (Id. at Table B, Table E.) Two hundred eight and three
12 tenths of those positions were filled. (Id.) The consultants
13 projected a need for 732 staff positions by 1996/97. (Id.)

14 The final report from Scarlett Carp and Associates is
15 dated February 16, 1993. (Defendants' Exhibit D1338.) The final
16 report describes several deficiencies in the existing CDC mental
17 health delivery system. The consultants found, inter alia, that

18 [s]ervice delivery tends to be inconsistent,
19 informal, crisis-oriented, and largely
20 unmonitored. . . . Mentally ill inmates are as
21 likely as not to receive minimal treatment
22 until they decompensated [sic] to the point
23 where inpatient hospitalization or transfer to
24 an Enhanced Outpatient Program bed is the only
option. . . . There is also the perception and
belief among some institution staff that,
unlike medical conditions, treatment of
mentally ill inmates is not their
responsibility. Others express concern about

25 ^{27/} The consultants were of the opinion that the then current
26 resources "[might] minimally meet constitutional standards for the
1991/92 inmate population, but [would] be inadequate to meet future
needs." (Id. at 37.)

1 their inability to provide needed services due
2 to the lack of mental health resources.
3 Furthermore, the current system is
understaffed.

4 The level of service availability varies widely
5 from institution to institution, as does the
6 amount and type of staff providing services.
7 The current system of classifying mentally ill
8 inmates further hinders timely transfer of
9 inmates considered stable, or assessed as not
10 mentally ill, out of mental health beds.
Inmates so classified must wait to be
reclassified through the CDC classification
system (which is responsible for classification
of all inmates) before they can transfer, which
further renders an already strained system
inefficient.

11 (Id. at 34.) The final report again highlighted the deficiencies
12 noted in the 1991 progress reports. (Id.)

13 The final Scarlett Carp report includes data regarding
14 the prevalence of inmates within the CDC who suffer from mental
15 impairments; the consultants found that 11.07% of males committed
16 to the CDC suffer from serious mental impairments, and 9.47% suffer
17 from moderate mental impairments. while 15.21% of female inmates
18 suffer from serious mental impairments and 9.03% suffer from
19 moderate mental impairments. (Id. at ix, Table ES-1.) The report
20 recommends a delivery system based on a decentralized cluster model
21 described in the previous progress reports, and includes a finding
22 that 340.8 additional mental health positions and 183.5 new medical
23 positions will be required to implement the system.^{28/}

24 ^{28/} The recommendations of the Scarlett Carp Report are not
25 summarized in depth; this court makes no finding with regard to
26 whether defendants can satisfy the requirements of the injunctive
relief recommended herein by implementing the recommendations of that
report. The court does note, however, that the Scarlett Carp Report's
recommendations were based on a projected inmate population for

1 It is apparent from the three extensive studies
2 undertaken by the CDC in the last ten years that certain specific
3 problems which profoundly affect the availability of mental health
4 care for inmates in the CDC have been repeatedly described to
5 defendants. In particular, defendants have known for nine years
6 that their program for screening and identifying mentally ill
7 inmates is ineffectual, that their mental health care delivery
8 system is understaffed, that their recruitment program is
9 underresourced, that the mental health staff they do have is
10 significantly overworked, and that they lack necessary quality
11 assurance programs and sufficient inpatient and outpatient
12 resources to aid practitioners in the provision of appropriate
13 care. Despite this knowledge, defendants have failed to take any
14 significant steps to address the deficiencies and the problems
15 identified in the Stirling Report and the Scarlett Carp reports.

16 B. The Magnitude of the Problem

17 1. Introduction

18 At trial, experts for both plaintiffs and defendants
19 testified concerning the necessary elements of an adequate system
20 for delivery of mental health care in prison. These elements
21

22 1996/97 of "over 119,000." (Defendants' Exhibit 1338 at xi.) This
23 figure was based on a population sized at "150 percent of design bed
24 capacity." (Id. at xi, 16) This projection was significantly
25 underestimated; at the time of trial of this action in early 1993 the
26 inmate population was 113,000 and the CDC was operating at 186 percent
of capacity. (See Testimony of James Gomez, May 17, 1993, at 7, 14,
47.) On May 15, 1994, the inmate population was just over 118,000 and
the CDC was operating at 175% of capacity. Department of Corrections
Weekly Report of Population as of Midnight May 15, 1994, filed May 25,
1994.

1 include screening and identification of mentally ill inmates;
2 prompt access to mental health professionals for diagnosis and
3 treatment; patient access to necessary and appropriate levels of
4 care as determined by clinicians, including outpatient care,
5 residential care, crisis care, and inpatient care; medical records
6 and an information management system; and a quality assurance
7 system. (Declaration of Dr. Russell C. Petrella, filed February 5,
8 1993, at 13-22; Declaration of Joel A. Dvoskin, Ph.D., filed
9 February 17, 1993, at 2-3, 9.) This expert testimony closely
10 tracks the essential components described by the district court in
11 Balla; the court in Balla also noted that an adequate suicide
12 prevention program is constitutionally required and the parties
13 here have litigated the adequacy of the CDC's suicide prevention
14 program.

15 This court finds that the above components are essential
16 to a minimally adequate mental health treatment system. Each of
17 these components is necessary to insure that mental health care
18 needs of inmates will be known timely by medical staff competent to
19 provide necessary care. Hoptowit at 1253.

20 The mental health care delivery system in the California
21 Department of Corrections lacks each of these elements, either in
22 whole or in part. The result is a system charitably described by
23 defendants' expert, Dr. Dvoskin, as "inefficient in function."
24 (Dvoskin Declaration at 3.) In fact, it is a constitutionally

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26 /////

1 inadequate system which cannot and does not meet the serious
2 medical needs of mentally ill inmates incarcerated in California's
3 prisons.

4 The defendants have no system in place for screening and
5 identifying mentally ill inmates. As a result, thousands of
6 inmates suffering from mental illness remain unidentified as
7 needing care. These inmates either go undetected and without care,
8 or they come to the attention of staff only when they behave in
9 bizarre or inappropriate ways. Inmates in the latter category are
10 often dealt with solely in punitive fashion, without regard to the
11 impact of such punitive measures on their psychiatric condition.

12 The CDC is significantly and chronically understaffed in
13 the area of mental health care; even those inmates who are
14 identified as needing mental health care suffer lengthy waits for
15 necessary evaluation and treatment. The CDC has a profoundly
16 inefficient medical recordkeeping system. In some instances
17 records are not kept at all or are kept only haphazardly. Those
18 records that are kept are often inaccurate and incomplete. Those
19 medical records that are maintained do not travel with inmates when
20 they move from one facility to another.

21 The result of these and other inadequacies is a system
22 which causes terrible suffering for thousands of inmates afflicted
23 with severe mental illness. Defendants have known about the woeful
24 inadequacies in the delivery of mental health care within the
25 California Department of Corrections for over eight years.
26 Defendants have done little to rectify the egregious defects that

1 have repeatedly been brought to their attention by their own
2 consultants and employees. This court finds that defendants for
3 several years have been and still are in violation of the
4 requirements of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
5 Constitution by deliberately failing to provide a minimally
6 adequate mental health care delivery system within the California
7 Department of Corrections.

8 2. Screening and Identification of Mentally Ill
9 Inmates

10 In order to provide necessary mental health care to
11 prisoners with serious mental disorders, there must be a system in
12 place to identify those individuals, both at the time they are
13 admitted to the Department of Corrections and during their
14 incarceration. (Petrella Declaration at 14; Declaration of Dr.
15 Edward Kaufman, filed February 5, 1994, at 17.) The CDC lacks an
16 adequate mechanism for screening for mental illness, either at the
17 time of reception or during incarceration, and has lacked adequate
18 screening since at least 1987. (Petrella Declaration at 25-26;
19 Kaufman Declaration at 18; Declaration of Thomas Greenfield, Ph.D.,
20 filed February 5, 1994, at 19.)

21 At trial, Director Gomez testified that the CDC still did
22 not have a standardized mental health screening form. (RT, May 17,
23 1993, at 49; RT, June 21, 1993, at 39-25.) Director Gomez also
24 testified that there were no standardized procedures for screening
25 at reception centers. (RT, May 17, 1993, at 49.)

26 Defendants' expert Dr. Koson testified that the screening
process at the reception center at Wasco State Prison differed from

1 the screening process at the reception center at R.J. Donovan
2 Correctional Facility. (Declaration of Dr. Dennis Koson, filed
3 February 16, 1993, at 5-6.) Dr. Koson also opined that the
4 screening process at both these institutions "appears to function
5 appropriately." (Koson Declaration at 5.) This court finds that
6 the overwhelming weight of the evidence before the court
7 demonstrates that screening and identification of mentally ill
8 inmates throughout the CDC is inadequate. The court's conclusion
9 rests, in part, on the conclusions of the Scarlett Carp study, an
10 exhibit tendered by defendants. Dr. Koson was one of the
11 consultants on the Scarlett Carp study. (Koson Declaration,
12 Exhibit A at page 8.) The absence of formalized screening and
13 follow-up evaluations was a deficiency noted by the Scarlett Carp
14 consultants in several of their reports, including the final report
15 dated February 16, 1993 which was tendered as an exhibit by
16 defendants. (Defendants' Exhibit 1338 at 34.)

17 Plaintiff's experts observed a variety of inadequate,
18 haphazard screening efforts at various prisons across the state,
19 both on initial intake into the CDC and on transfer between
20 prisons. At California Institution for Women, inmates often
21 arrived without a psychiatric file from either the state prison or
22 the county jail from which they were transferred. (Declaration of
23 Dr. V. Meenakshi, filed February 5, 1994, at 33.) They were
24 screened by a Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) "who does not
25 necessarily have any formal training in recognizing mental
26 illness." (Id.) Dr. Meenakshi made similar findings at Central

1 California Women's Facility. (Id. at 41-42.) At Northern
2 California Women's Facility, some inmates were not screened at all.
3 (Id. at 67.) At Mule Creek State Prison, MTAs conducted general
4 intake interviews while inmates were in the holding tank within
5 earshot of other inmates and staff; screening questionnaires were
6 not designed to elicit all relevant information. (Id. at 92.) The
7 intake process at California Correctional Center did not include
8 psychiatric screening; inmates were identified only if they
9 reported that they were taking psychotropic medication. (Id. at
10 103.) Similarly, no psychiatric screening was performed at Sierra
11 Conservation Center. (Id. at 109.)

12 At California Institution for Men the only question asked
13 to screen for mental illness was whether the inmate had ever been
14 admitted to a psychiatric hospital. (Petrella Declaration at 25-
15 26.) The screening took place in a room that was crowded with
16 naked inmates, completely chaotic, and devoid of privacy. This
17 compounded the inadequacy of the minimal screening procedure and
18 destroyed any confidence in the self-reporting upon which this
19 screening procedure relied. (Id. at 26, 77-78.)

20 At Calipatria, inmates were interviewed by an MTA; often
21 the MTA lacked access to the medical file at the time of the
22 interview and the psychiatric screening that did take place was
23 inadequate. (Id. at 89-91.) At Chuckawalla Valley State Prison
24 inmates were screened via a record review conducted by a nurse or
25 an MTA. This record review did not always bring a mentally ill
26 inmate to the attention of medical staff. (Id. at 114-115.)

1 At Wasco State Prison, there was a two-level screening
2 process. (Id. at 139.) The first level was for individuals on
3 initial arrival at Wasco. (Id.) This level was reported to be
4 "largely appropriate," though comprised of only a limited series of
5 questions regarding psychiatric history, current medications and
6 past suicide attempts. (Id.) The second level of review was for
7 individuals identified at the first level as needing evaluation.
8 (Id.) The second level was described as very weak, with a very
9 weak referral system and little follow up for the evaluations.
10 (Id.)

11 At the receiving and releasing unit in California
12 Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, screening was based on a
13 single question about whether an inmate took medication. (Kaufman
14 Declaration at 37-38). The interviews were conducted by a sergeant
15 or an MTA in an environment that was not conducive to accurate
16 self-reporting. (Id.) Fifty to seventy-five percent of inmates
17 arrived with a list of medications they took. (Id.) Inmates
18 arriving from Los Angeles County Jail might arrive with a report
19 stating "psychiatric treatment" but containing no specific
20 information. (Id. at 37-38.) The receiving and releasing unit did
21 not get any medical records from the jail. (Id. at 38.)

22 Similarly, at California State Prison/Corcoran, screening
23 for mental illness was limited to screening which asked whether an
24 inmate was on psychotropic medication. (Id. at 72.) At R.J.
25 Donovan Correctional Facility, an MTA made an initial assessment of
26 an inmate's medical needs as soon as the inmate arrived. (Id. at

1 87.) Psychiatric screening was not a routine part of this initial
2 assessment, although referrals for evaluation were made "if the
3 inmate's history shows a need for psychiatric evaluation." (Id.)
4 At Pelican Bay State Prison, there was no organized system to
5 screen inmates for mental illness through late 1992. (Declaration
6 of Dr. Stuart Grassian, filed February 5, 1994, at 47.)

7 As a result of the absence of an adequate, systemized
8 screening program, a significant number of mentally ill inmates go
9 undetected. (Meenakshi Declaration at 33-35.) Only those inmates
10 who self-report or present with medical records demonstrating a
11 prior psychiatric history, those who exhibit bizarre behavior, or
12 those who ask to be seen by a psychiatrist will be identified as
13 needing psychiatric care.^{29/} (Id.) Other inmates with serious
14 mental illness in remission, with suicidal tendencies, or with a
15 serious mental illness the symptoms of which are not apparent to an
16 untrained observer are left unidentified and without access to
17 necessary care. (Id.)

18 As discussed above, mentally ill inmates who are not
19 identified at the time they are received into the CDC or when they
20 are transferred between institutions often only come to the
21 attention of staff when they exhibit bizarre behavior. At the
22 present time, new custody staff only receives three hours of
23 training in "Unusual Inmate Behavior." (Declaration of Steve
24

25 ^{29/} As is discussed in section 4(d), infra, inmates who act out as
26 a result of mental illness are often treated only as custody problems
and subjected solely to punitive measures rather than provided with
necessary care in conjunction with appropriate discipline.

1 Cambra, filed February 11, 1993, at 3.) The three hour mandatory
2 course covers "situations when an inmate should be referred for a
3 psychiatric evaluation, skills to use in dealing with a disturbed
4 inmate, actions to be taken with a suicidal inmate and the
5 importance of familiarizing the correctional officer with the
6 inmates in his or her assigned areas of supervision." (Id. at 3-
7 4.)

8 In-service training is offered at institutions in the
9 class. (Id. at 5.) One of the in-service training courses offered
10 at California Men's Colony is a two hour course called "The
11 Skillful Observer." (Id.) This course includes refresher training
12 on when mental health referral is required. (Id.)

13 Dr. Kaufman testified that a minimum of twelve hours of
14 training for new custody staff should be required. (Kaufman
15 Declaration at 28.) Dr. Kaufman also opined that a more in-depth
16 course should be required for correctional officers who work with
17 mentally ill inmates. (Id.) As will be discussed in further
18 detail, infra, inmates who exhibit bizarre behavior or other
19 psychiatric symptoms are often dealt with solely in punitive
20 fashion by custody staff. This court finds that the training for
21 custody staff to recognize the signs and symptoms of mental illness
22 is inadequate.

23 3. Access to Competent Staff

24 a. Staffing

25 There is no dispute that the CDC is seriously and
26 chronically understaffed in the area of mental health care. The

1 workload study, undertaken almost a decade ago, found that the need
2 for psychiatric services was far in excess of the staffing
3 resources available. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 456 at vi.) The two
4 subsequent studies confirmed this. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (Volume
5 II of the Stirling Report); Defendants' Exhibit 1338 at, e.g., 34
6 (Scarlett Carp Final Report).)

7 The Scarlett Carp consultants found that 732 staff
8 positions would be necessary to adequately staff mental health care
9 for an inmate population of 119,000 inmates. (Defendants' Exhibit
10 1338 at xi; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 691 at Table B.) The fiscal year
11 1992/93 budget for CDC contained 376.6 authorized mental health
12 care positions to serve an inmate population of 113,000.
13 (Defendants' Exhibit 1338 at 36; RT, May 17, 1993, at 7.)^{30/}

14 Mentally ill inmates are housed at all institutions
15 throughout the CDC, and the significant and chronic understaffing
16 problem obtains systemwide. (See Meenakshi Declaration at 30-32
17 (California Institution for Women); 40, 63-65 (Central California
18 Women's Facility); 67, 85-87 (Northern California Women's
19 Facility); 91, 100-101 (Mule Creek State Prison); 102-103
20 (California Correctional Center); 108-109 (Sierra Conservation
21 Center); Kaufman Declaration at 33-36, 38, 40-41 (California
22 Correctional Institution at Tehachapi); 69-72 (California State
23 Prison/Corcoran); 86 (R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility); 104-107
24

25 ^{30/} The CDC had a twenty-five percent vacancy rate in mental health
26 care positions for fiscal year 1991/92. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 691 at
Table E.) There was no evidence that this vacancy rate had changed
significantly at the time of trial.

1 (California Men's Colony); 144-146 (Avenal State Prison); 154-155
2 (Soledad); Petrella Declaration at 73, 78-80 (California
3 Institution for Men); 88-89, 107-110 (Calipatria); 114, 117
4 (Chuckawalla Valley State Prison); 119-122 (Wasco State Prison);
5 Grassian Declaration at 17, 45 (Pelican Bay State Prison).)

6 Defendants offered no evidence to rebut plaintiffs'
7 testimony in this regard. To the contrary, defendant Gomez
8 testified that psychiatric staffing has "lagged behind" the
9 staffing for other key positions within the Department for the past
10 twelve years. (RT, May 17, 1993, at 73-74.) Defendant Khoury's
11 testimony confirmed that departmental requests for mental health
12 care staffing are based on percentages of outdated or
13 underestimated inmate populations. For example, he testified that
14 the request for mental health care staffing for the 1992/93 fiscal
15 year was derived by adding to the total number of outpatient beds
16 authorized for the 1989/90 budget a percentage increase equal to
17 the percentage increase of all male inmates in the system between
18 the fall of 1988 and July of 1991. (RT, March 30, 1993, at 15-
19 170.) The 1993/94 budget request was based on the same formula,
20 except that the formula relied on a projected male inmate
21 population by June 1994 of 103,971. (*Id.* at 15-171, 15-172.)^{31/}
22 In fact, it appears that the male inmate population was at or above
23 that figure at the time of trial of this action in May 1993.
24 (See RT, May 17, 1993, at 7 (Director Gomez' testimony that total
25

26 ^{31/} This request was not approved for inclusion in the budget in any
event. (RT, March 30, 1993, at 15-172.)

1 inmate population at time of trial was 113,000); RT, March 30, 1993
2 at 15-173 (Defendant Khoury's estimate that total population at
3 time of trial was 109,000, with the female population comprising
4 approximately 8,000 or 9,000 of the total number of inmates).)

5 While these concessions by defendants are significant,
6 even they must be viewed as efforts to portray years of
7 indifference in a favorable light. It is clear from the evidence
8 that defendants have deliberately ignored years worth of
9 substantial, competent evidence about what is required to
10 adequately staff their mental health care delivery system.

11 There are several reasons for the understaffing. First,
12 despite the studies done by and for the CDC since 1984, defendants
13 have not adopted a method for determining necessary mental health
14 staffing ratios. (RT, May 17, 1993, at 14.) As a result,
15 defendants have perpetuated a vicious circle for over a decade:
16 they fail adequately to screen and identify the number of mentally
17 ill inmates in the CDC, so they claim they have no method for
18 adequately assessing staffing needs.^{32/} At the same time, the
19 failure to adequately screen and identify mentally ill inmates is
20 attributable to the chronic understaffing that has plagued the
21 Department. The dilemma is, of course, illusory. The Department

22
23 ^{32/} At trial, Director Gomez, while acknowledging that he was not a
24 psychiatrist or a clinician, explained that he rejected the prevalence
25 data contained in the Stirling Report because "[i]t didn't reconcile
26 with what [he] felt was going on in the institutions" and because
"[s]taff were not capable of explaining to me, whether it be Dr. Zil
or Dr. Khoury or John O'Shaughnessy [the top mental health care
officials in the department], they were not capable of providing me
the kind of answers I felt I needed." (RT, May 17, 1993, at 52, 54,
55.)

1 has already conducted three studies to address prevalence of mental
2 illness and staffing needs, and the information needed to
3 appropriately determine staffing needs is well developed and
4 readily available.

5 Problems with recruiting and retaining staff contribute
6 to the chronic understaffing. In 1991/92 approximately 25% of the
7 positions authorized for mental health care were unfilled.

8 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 691, Tables B and E.) Defendants do not offer
9 competitive salaries to psychiatrists and psychologists. (RT,
10 March 29, 1993, at 14-142, 14-170, 14-171.) Defendants have
11 institutions in remote areas of the state where it is difficult to
12 recruit psychiatric professionals and they continue to house
13 mentally ill inmates at those institutions. (See, e.g., RT, March
14 29, 1993, at 14-135.) Defendant Khoury testified that it is more
15 difficult to recruit physicians to work with inmate populations,
16 and that other incentives such as "safety retirement" and improved
17 working conditions are a necessary part of an adequate recruitment
18 program. (RT, March 29, 1993, at 14-143.)

19 This court finds that defendants are violating the Eighth
20 Amendment by their present level of staffing. Defendants do not
21 employ a number of trained mental health professionals sufficient
22 to meet the constitutionally mandated minimum needs of mentally ill
23 inmates incarcerated in the State of California, and they know that
24 they do not.

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1 assurance." (Dvoskin Declaration at 9.) At this point, defendants
2 have no effective method for insuring the competence of their
3 mental health staff, and, hence, for insuring that mentally ill
4 inmates in the department have access to competent care. In this
5 regard, they are violating the class members' Eighth Amendment
6 right of access to adequate mental health care.

7 4. Care of Mentally Ill Inmates

8 a. Introduction

9 Mentally ill inmates within the CDC do not have
10 constitutionally adequate access to necessary care. There are
11 significant delays in, and sometimes complete denial of, access to
12 necessary medical attention, multiple problems with use and
13 management of medication, and inappropriate use of involuntary
14 medications. In addition, the mental health status of class
15 members is adversely impacted by inappropriate use of punitive
16 measures without regard to the impact of such measures on their
17 medical condition.

18 In large measure, these deficiencies are attributable to
19 the problems in screening, evaluation, and staffing already
20 described. However, the existing system for delivering care uses a
21 referral and classification system that facilitates unconscionable
22 delays and sometimes results in a complete denial of care even for
23 those persons this inadequate system has identified as needing
24 treatment.^{33/} Finally, this system does not give sufficient
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26 ^{33/} Dr. Khoury described the referral and classification system
described infra as resulting in "bus therapy" -- inmates traveling on
buses back and forth between institutions without adequate determina-

weight to medical opinion in decisions regarding access to medical care and does not allow sufficient consultation with and consideration of medical opinion in decisions regarding discipline and/or behavior control.

b. Delays in Access to Care

The September/October 1991 Scarlett Carp progress report described the existing structure of the mental health care delivery system in the CDC as comprised of the following:

Screening at intake/diagnostic.

Follow-up evaluations.

Inpatient Hospital Care - provided predominantly at CMF and ASH^{34/} by DMH^{35/} (708 beds). 18 inpatient beds, staffed by CDC personnel, are located at CIM.^{36/}

Enhanced Outpatient Care - provided at CMF, CMC^{37/}, and CWI [sic]^{38/} (2,421 beds). Services provided in this program range from acute care to sheltered outpatient care, but exact bed designations for each are not official. A 60-bed day treatment program is also provided at CMF by DMH.

Crisis Care - informal, provided within each institution with existing resources, which are variable. The use of infirmary beds for crisis care is estimated at 30 to 40 percent of the total available infirmary beds in the institutions.

tions regarding the need for care. (RT, March 30, 1993, at 15-15.)

^{34/} Atascadero State Hospital.

^{35/} California Department of Mental Health.

^{36/} California Institution for Men.

^{37/} California Men's Colony.

^{38/} California Institution for Women.

1 Outpatient Care - informal, limited to
2 medication only for the most part. Some
3 psychological services available depending on
4 the institution's staffing.

5 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1398 at 32.)

6 There are significant and unacceptable delays at each
7 level of care. (Petrella Declaration at 39.) These delays at each
8 stage cause significant pain and suffering to inmates in need of
9 mental health care. (Id. at 40.) Frequently, such inmates receive
10 no care at all or only medication; they are often housed in
11 administrative segregation or security housing units while awaiting
12 care. (Id.)

13 Dr. Petrella stated that he was informed by a physician
14 at Calipatria that inmates on antipsychotics were seen within a
15 week of arrival and inmates on tranquilizers were seen within a
16 month of arrival; Dr. Petrella's review of the medical records
17 showed delays of several weeks. (Petrella Declaration at 91-92.)
18 The physician at Calipatria reported to Dr. Petrella that he was
19 not able to provide follow-up care to any inmate on a regular
20 basis; inmates at Calipatria reported that their requests to see a
21 psychiatrist were ignored for days and weeks. (Id. at 92.)

22 At Chuckawalla Valley State Prison, inmates referred for
23 psychiatric evaluation often had to wait several weeks to see a
24 psychiatrist. (Id. at 114.) In some cases, such inmates were
25 placed in administrative segregation during this wait, even where
26 the symptoms requiring the evaluation included self-harming
27 behavior. (Id. at 115.)

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1 At Wasco State Prison, the demands on psychiatric staff
2 were so acute that the majority of their attention was focused on
3 crisis patients. (Id. at 122.) Inmates referred by physicians for
4 further diagnostic interviews had to wait several weeks for such
5 evaluation. (Id. at 123.)

6 At Tehachapi, delays of over five months for routine
7 psychological evaluations were "not unusual." (Kaufman Declaration
8 at 36.) At R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, inmates experienced
9 significant delays in access to a clinician. (Id. at 90.) New
10 evaluations were performed in approximately 20 to 25 minutes, which
11 was an insufficient amount of time to perform an adequate
12 evaluation. (Id.) Follow-up visits were even shorter and less
13 frequent. (Id. at 91.)

14 At Central California Women's Facility, inmates on
15 psychotropic medications often waited months to see a psychiatrist;
16 some mentally ill inmates there reported never having seen a
17 psychiatrist. (Meenakshi Declaration at 47-49.) Dr. Meenakshi
18 testified that inmates at Northern California Women's Facility who
19 were taking psychotropic medications "have had virtually no access
20 to a psychiatrist." (Id. at 70.) Seven inmates that she
21 interviewed there reported that their repeated requests for access
22 to a psychologist or psychiatrist had been ignored. (Id.)

23 At Mule Creek State Prison, inmates with serious mental
24 illness were seen by a psychiatrist only once or twice a year.
25 (Id. at 93.) The visits lasted only 5-15 minutes. (Id.)

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1 In addition to the delays in access to care within each
2 institution, delays in access to enhanced outpatient or inpatient
3 care, which generally require transfer to another facility, were
4 substantial. When an inmate at a general population institution
5 was found to be in need of enhanced outpatient care or inpatient
6 care, the clinician making that determination could not simply
7 refer the inmate to one of the enhanced outpatient facilities or to
8 an inpatient hospital for necessary care. Instead, the clinician
9 had to refer the inmate to the receiving institution for evaluation
10 to see whether the inmate fit into one of approximately four ill-
11 defined classification categories. (Petrella Declaration at 30;
12 RT, March 30, 1993, at 15-11, 15-13.)

13 This referral system has historically resulted in a
14 backlog of inmates waiting for acceptance of the referral to the
15 appropriate institutions for further determination as to whether or
16 not they are eligible for care. (RT, March 30, 1993, at 15-16;
17 see discussion infra.) In addition to the fact that there is
18 insufficient staff to complete the evaluations, the CDC system is
19 also structured so that an inmate must go through the custody
20 classification process before he or she can be transferred.
21 (Defendants' Exhibit 1338 at 34.) This builds in additional
22 delays. (Id.)

23 In November 1991, the Department had a backlog of
24 approximately 400 inmates waiting for transfers to California
25 Medical Facility or California Men's Colony for psychiatric
26 evaluations. (Petrella Declaration at 151; Testimony of Louis L.

1 Beermann, Ph.D., RT, April 14, 1993, at 22-6.) A special clinical
2 assessment team was formed to travel to reception centers to
3 reevaluate inmates who were waiting for such transfers. (Petrella
4 Declaration at 151; Testimony of Louis L. Beermann, Ph.D., RT,
5 April 14, 1993, at 22-3.) The team was comprised mostly of
6 psychologists, and included a psychiatrist and a classification
7 service representative. (RT, April 14, 1993, at 22-3 - 22-6.)^{39/}
8 This first team rejected 60% of the inmates who had been referred
9 for psychiatric evaluation. (Petrella Declaration at 153.) This
10 rejection rate was double the historical rejection rate of inmates
11 who were evaluated for a week or two in the intake unit at either
12 CMC or CMF. (Id.)

13 By July or August of 1992, the backlog of inmates
14 awaiting psychiatric evaluation was again up to 300 inmates.
15 (Petrella Declaration at 156.) A special assessment team headed by
16 Dr. Beermann went out again in December 1992 in an effort to reduce
17 the backlog, and again rejected a large percentage of inmates.
18 (Id.) At trial in April 1993, Dr. Beermann testified that the
19 backlog of inmates awaiting transfer for evaluation was "under 200,
20 perhaps 180 something." (RT, April 14, 1993, at 22-9.)

21 The delays in transfer for evaluation were unacceptably
22 lengthy. Inmates waited for transfer for several weeks or months,
23 during which time they often received no psychiatric care other
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25 ^{39/} The classification service representative was included "so that
26 he or she could make the -- put their stamp of approval on" the
clinical recommendation that the inmate be transferred to CMC or CMF,
or returned to general population. (RT, April 14, 1993, at 22-6.)

1 than medication. (See, e.g., Kaufman Declaration at 20; Petrella
2 Declaration at 40, 146.) These were inmates who manifested
3 severe psychiatric symptoms to a clinician. The delays are
4 constitutionally unacceptable.

5 Similarly, when a clinician in the CDC determines that an
6 inmate is in need of inpatient hospitalization, the inmate must
7 generally be referred to a facility operated by the California
8 Department of Mental Health (DMH), either Atascadero State Hospital
9 or the DMH facility at California Medical Facility. DMH clinicians
10 evaluate the referred inmates to determine whether they will be
11 accepted for care. (Kaufman Declaration at 9; Petrella Declaration
12 at 31.) The rejection rate from Atascadero State Hospital is
13 approximately 50%. (Kaufman Declaration at 9.) Delays in transfer
14 to Atascadero can be several months. (Id.) Since these persons
15 are inmates exhibiting symptoms deemed by a staff physician to
16 require inpatient hospitalization for psychiatric illness, the
17 delays are egregious.

18 c. Medication Management

19 As noted in the Scarlett Carp report, outpatient care is
20 limited primarily to medication. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1398 at 32.)
21 Use of psychotropic medications is not properly monitored.
22 (Kaufman Declaration at 11.) Inmates experience delays in
23 receiving their medication when they are transferred to another
24 institution, when placed on lockdown status, and when their
25 prescriptions expire. Numerous other problems in medication
26 management were observed by plaintiffs' experts. (See, e.g.,

1 Meenakshi Declaration at 36 (some medications unavailable in CDC;
2 prescriptions changed too frequently), 55 (no system in place at
3 Central California Women's Facility to alert staff when
4 prescription expires), 72 (at Northern California Women's Facility,
5 medications were prescribed and discontinued in an "erratic
6 manner," medications were prescribed and/or renewed without
7 evaluation and/or mental status examination, and medications were
8 prescribed in dosages too low to have therapeutic effect), 95-96
9 (no system in place at Mule Creek State Prison to alert physician
10 when prescription expires, no monitoring for inmates on Lithium and
11 Tegretol, lack of proper informed consent for use of such
12 medications, inadequate monitoring of inmates on other medications,
13 no system to prevent hoarding of medication); Petrella Declaration
14 at 132 (significant problems with monitoring medication and
15 providing follow-up care at Wasco State Prison, no formal mechanism
16 for notifying staff when a prescription expired); Kaufman
17 Declaration at 24 (new, very efficacious drugs for treatment of
18 schizophrenia and depression, which drugs would require close
19 monitoring of patients, not available to inmates in CDC); 147-148
20 (backlog of patients at Tehachapi such that physician could only
21 see patients every eight weeks, even though inmates might need
22 prescriptions refilled after only a month).)

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1 Many of the problems with medication management are
2 attributable, once again, to the severe staffing problem in the
3 CDC.^{40/} In addition, problems are attributable to the shockingly
4 inadequate development and use of medical records at most
5 institutions in the class. (See Section 5, infra.)

6 The court further finds, however, that the present
7 practices with regard to medication management are constitutionally
8 unacceptable. As noted above, the Eighth Amendment requires that
9 psychotropic medication be administered only with appropriate
10 supervision and periodic evaluation. Defendants' supervision of
11 the use of medication is completely inadequate; prescriptions are
12 not timely refilled, there is no adequate system to prevent
13 hoarding of medication, there is no adequate system to ensure
14 continuity of medication, inmates on psychotropic medication are
15 not adequately monitored, and it appears that some very useful
16 medications are not available because there is not enough staff to
17 do necessary post-medication monitoring.

18 Finally, the issues with regard to regulating heat
19 exposure for inmates on psychotropic medication are presently the
20 subject of a preliminary injunction issued by the district court.
21 This court will recommend that the preliminary injunction be made a

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23 ^{40/} Plaintiffs presented a great deal of testimony suggesting that
24 psychotropic medications should only be prescribed by a psychiatrist.
25 Under California law, any licensed physician may prescribe medication.
26 California Business & Professions Code § 2051. Defendants' mental
health care system must provide for the administration of such
medication in a manner consistent with the requirements of the federal
constitution; that is, psychotropic medication must be administered
only with appropriate supervision and periodic evaluation. Balla, 595
F.Supp. at 1577.

1 permanent injunction to remain in effect for a period of three
2 years. The principal obstacle in this regard was motivating
3 defendants to develop the heat management plans that are the
4 subject of that injunction; now that the plans are developed and in
5 use, defendants have little reason to abandon them and good reasons
6 to keep them in place.

7 d. Use of Disciplinary/Behavior Control
8 Measures Against Mentally Ill Inmates

9 As noted above, many inmates do not come to the attention
10 of either medical or custody staff until they exhibit bizarre or
11 inappropriate behavior. Defendants make no effort to determine
12 when this behavior is the result of decompensation as a result of
13 mental illness.

14 Custody staff within CDC lack sufficient training to
15 differentiate between an inmate who is acting out as a result of
16 mental illness and an inmate who is acting out for other reasons.
17 (Kaufman Declaration at 28.) As a result, mentally ill inmates who
18 act out are typically treated with punitive measures, without
19 regard to their mental status. (Petrella Declaration at 33;
20 Kaufman Declaration at 28-29.)

21 At some institutions administrative segregation is used
22 as a substitute for hospitalization, as an overflow for the
23 outpatient program, as housing following treatment in the infirmary
24 for an acute psychiatric episode, and to house inmates awaiting
25 transfer for psychiatric evaluation. (See, e.g., Meenakshi
26 Declaration at 19 (California Institution for Women), 94 (Mule
Creek State Prison); Kaufman Declaration at 44 (Tehachapi), 95-96

1 (R.J. Donovan).) In all institutions, placement in segregated
2 housing occurs as a result of disciplinary proceedings. In either
3 event, placing mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation
4 or segregated housing exacerbates the underlying mental illness,
5 induces psychosis, and increases the risk of suicide. (Kaufman
6 Declaration at 25; Grassian Declaration at 5-15).

7 Plaintiffs' experts reported on the denial of access to
8 necessary care and the suffering caused by placement and retention
9 of mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation or segregated
10 housing throughout the CDC. (See, e.g., Meenakshi Declaration at
11 19-24, 50-54, 94-95; Grassian Declaration at 18-42; Petrella
12 Declaration at 60-61, 62-63, 81-82, 92-94, 142-144; Kaufman
13 Declaration at 44-45, 78-79, 95-99, 107-110.)

14 Dr. Grassian described the particular types of
15 psychological symptoms and injury caused by housing in the security
16 housing unit (SHU) at Pelican Bay State Prison. Dr. Grassian
17 described a group of psychiatric symptoms which have come to be
18 identified with isolation, both in prison settings and in prisoner
19 of war camps. (Grassian Declaration at 6-12.) These symptoms
20 include overt paranoia, hyperresponsivity to external stimuli,
21 perceptual distortions and hallucinations, panic attacks,
22 difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory, emergence of
23 primitive, aggressive fantasies, and problems with impulse control.
24 (Id. at 6-8.)

25 Dr. Grassian interviewed twenty-four inmates in the
26 Pelican Bay SHU. (Grassian Declaration at 17.) He testified that

1 [o]f these, at least seven were actively
2 psychotic and urgently in need of acute
3 hospital treatment. Nine others suffered
4 serious psychopathological reactions to SHU
5 confinement, including in several cases a
6 history of periods of psychotic
7 disorganization. Of the remaining eight, five
8 gave a history of psychiatric problems not
9 clearly exacerbated by SHU, two others appeared
10 to be free of psychiatric difficulties, and in
11 one a language barrier prevented adequate
12 evaluation. I also interviewed two inmates in
13 general population who had a history of prior
14 SHU incarceration. Both had a history of
15 psychotic disorders which were significantly
16 worsened during their past incarceration in
17 SHU.

18 (Id. at 17-18.) Dr. Grassian testified that seven inmates he
19 interviewed were too ill to discuss whether housing in SHU had
20 exacerbated their illness, though it appeared that it had. (Id. at
21 33.) Nine others, however, had developed psychiatric problems
22 while in SHU that were "strikingly consistent" with the group of
23 symptoms described earlier. (Id.) Dr. Grassian also testified
24 that while the acute symptoms experienced by these individuals
25 would likely subside upon release from SHU, "many of these inmates
26 will likely suffer permanent harm as a result of their confinement
in SHU." (Id. at 43.)

Defendants and their employees recognize the danger to
mentally ill inmates from housing in segregated housing units,
particularly Pelican Bay SHU. (See RT, March 29, 1993, at 14-77;
Grassian Declaration at 44 (discussing deposition testimony of Dr.
Zil).) Nonetheless, defendants continue to house mentally ill
inmates in these units. Defendants' use of administrative
segregation and segregated housing at Pelican Bay SHU and statewide

1 to house mentally ill inmates violates the Eighth Amendment
2 because mentally ill inmates are placed in administrative
3 segregation and segregated housing without any evaluation of their
4 mental status, because such placement will cause further
5 decompensation, and because inmates are denied access to necessary
6 mental health care while they are housed in administrative
7 segregation and/or segregated housing.

8 Inmates who act out are also subjected to the use of
9 tasers and 37mm guns, without regard to whether their behavior was
10 caused by a psychiatric condition and without regard to the impact
11 of such measures on such a condition.

12 The Department of Corrections calls tasers and 37mm guns
13 "non-lethal weapons." (Kaufman Declaration at 159.) Both are
14 projectile-type weapons. A taser is a weapon that fires a needle-
15 like dart attached to a wire through which the victim receives an
16 electric shock. (Id.) The 37mm gas gun is used to fire rubber
17 bullets or wooden blocks. (Id.)

18 Dr. Kaufman cited fourteen examples of mentally ill
19 patients who were tasered and/or shot with the 37mm gun. Each
20 confrontation commenced with a conflict between inmates or between
21 and inmate and staff. In each situation, Dr. Kaufman testified,
22 custody staff escalated the conflict by demanding compliance to
23 orders. When the inmate refused to comply, the staff (custody and
24 medical) suited up in gloves, masks, goggles and raincoat-like
25 suits. (Kaufman Declaration at 162.) If it was deemed necessary
26 (and typically it was) to physically remove the inmate from his

1 cell, the "cell extraction team" suited up in protective vests
2 (flack jackets), helmets, face guards, heavy gloves and large
3 plastic shields. (Kaufman Declaration at 162.) These staff
4 members then approached the inmate with the weapon and spoke
5 through masks and shields. (Id.)

6 Tasering a person using psychotropic medications may
7 "result in heart beat irregularity or death." (Id. at 159.) In
8 many of the incidents described by Dr. Kaufman, inmates sustained
9 physical injuries from the use of these weapons. (Id. at 163.) In
10 addition, use of these weapons could, and often did, cause further
11 damage to and deterioration of the inmate's mental condition.
12 (Id.; Petrella Declaration at 34.) It also reduced the possibility
13 that future mental health treatment would be successful. (Kaufman
14 Declaration at 163.)

15 Dr. Petrella stated that in all his experience he has yet
16 to see a situation where the use of tasers or 37mm guns on a
17 mentally ill patient was warranted. (Petrella Declaration at 34.)
18 Dr. Kaufman agreed that the use of either tasers or 37mm guns on
19 any mentally ill inmate was inappropriate. (Kaufman Declaration at
20 12, 29.)

21 At Wasco, Dr. Petrella found that inmates are "tasered
22 simply after refusing custody staff orders, without any
23 professional mental health intervention." (Petrella Declaration at
24 128.) This can have grave consequences for the medicated inmate.
25 One inmate at Wasco was tasered after refusing to take medication;
26 he was then involuntarily medicated. (Id. at 129.) In another

1 example, an inmate was "tasered, forcibly medicated, and placed in
2 restraints" as a result of the inmate's attempt to self-mutilate.
3 (Id. at 126.)

4 Strict guidelines for the use of tasers on inmates taking
5 psychotropic medication were issued to all Wardens by directive
6 dated September 29, 1992. (Meenakshi Declaration at 98.) It is
7 clear from the evidence that this directive was not adequately
8 communicated to staff. Some of the doctors were unaware of the
9 directive at the time of their depositions, (Id. at 97, 106, 110),
10 and some were unaware that the use of tasers on persons using
11 psychotropic medications could have adverse effects. (Kaufman
12 Declaration at 47.)

13 Other measures which may be required for proper
14 management of mentally ill inmates are used inappropriately
15 throughout the CDC. There was uncontradicted evidence that
16 mechanical restraints are necessary in some instances for proper
17 management of a mentally ill inmate, but that such restraints
18 should only be used when physical assault, by the mentally ill
19 inmate against others or against him or herself, is imminent or has
20 just occurred, and that such restraints should only be used in
21 accordance with strict guidelines. (Petrella Declaration at 35;
22 Meenakshi Declaration at 82.) Since the use of mechanical
23 restraints is only appropriate when a psychological emergency has
24 occurred, it is necessary to provide follow-up psychiatric care to
25 the mentally ill inmate after restraints have been used. (Petrella
26 Declaration at 128.) Procedures for use of these restraints vary

1 from institution to institution within the class, and there is no
2 systemwide review in place to ensure appropriate use of such
3 restraints. (Id. at 36.)

4 Similarly, involuntary medication is in certain instances
5 a necessary treatment modality for a mentally ill inmate. (See,
6 e.g., Kaufman Declaration at 142.) In Washington v. Harper, 494
7 U.S. 210, 227 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that
8 prison officials may administer psychotropic medications to an
9 inmate against his or her will. However, the Court held that an
10 inmate has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
11 of the Fourteenth Amendment in refusing such medication unless the
12 inmate has a serious mental illness, the inmate is dangerous to
13 self or others, and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
14 interest. (Id.)

15 An inmate is entitled to certain procedural protections
16 before he or she is involuntarily medicated. (Id. at 228, 233.)
17 First, the decision to medicate must be made by medical
18 professionals. (Id. at 231.) Second, the inmate is entitled to
19 review of that medical decision at an administrative hearing. (Id.
20 at 235.) The inmate is entitled to notice of the hearing, the
21 right to present at the hearing, and the right to present and
22 cross-examine witnesses. (Id.)

23 The purpose of the hearing is principally to review a
24 medical treatment decision made by a medical professional. (Id. at
25 232.) The issues for review are (1) whether the inmate suffers
26 from a mental disorder; (2) whether as a result of that disorder

1 the inmate is dangerous to self or others; and (3) the type and
2 dosage of medication. (Id. at 232.) Under the policy at issue in
3 Washington v. Harper, the type and dosage of medication was
4 reviewed on a "regular basis. (Id.)

5 In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court approved a
6 policy which mandated that the hearing committee be composed of a
7 psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a prison administrator. (Id. at
8 229.) The policy also provided that "[n]one of the committee
9 members may be involved, at the time of the hearing, in the
10 inmate's treatment or diagnosis; members are not disqualified from
11 sitting on the committee, however, if they have treated or
12 diagnosed the inmate in the past." (Id.) The committee's decision
13 was also subject to review by the Superintendent of the facility.
14 (Id.)

15 There are several deficiencies in the use of involuntary
16 medications throughout the California Department of Corrections and
17 at particular institutions in the class.

18 At California Men's Colony, in an emergency the
19 psychiatric officer of the day can make a telephone order for
20 involuntary medication of an inmate without examining the inmate;
21 the medication is then administered by a nurse or medical technical
22 assistant. (Kaufman Declaration at 141-142.) In addition, Dr.
23 Kaufman testified that involuntary medication is underutilized at
24 CMC; when inmates refuse medication, involuntary medication is not
25 considered as an option until the inmate has decompensated so
26 severely that emergency involuntary medication is required. (Id.)

1 at 142.) This underutilization has two vices. First, it causes
2 harm to the inmate who is decompensating instead of being treated.
3 Second, it results in the de facto denial of the procedural
4 safeguards to which mentally ill inmates are entitled.

5 It appears that custody staff can and does play a
6 significant role in recommending the use of involuntary medication.
7 Dr. Petrella cited an example in which a decision was made to
8 involuntarily medicate an inmate based solely on the report of
9 custody staff; medical staff were consulted but apparently did not
10 evaluate the inmate. (Petrella Declaration at 129.) Dr. Meenakshi
11 described an incident at Mule Creek State Prison where an inmate
12 was involuntarily medicated after he assaulted custody staff and
13 then refused medication. (Meenakshi Declaration at 99.) In that
14 case, the involuntary medication was ordered by a medical doctor,
15 but was not authorized by either the Chief Medical Officer or the
16 institutions' contract psychiatrist as is theoretically required by
17 the institution. (Id.)

18 Custody staff are also allowed to veto clinical decisions
19 concerning the use of involuntary medication. (Meenakshi
20 Declaration at 3.) At California Institution for Women, the warden
21 must approve all orders for involuntary medication, and custody
22 administrators outnumber psychiatric staff two to one on the
23 hearing panel that decides whether to involuntarily medicate an
24 inmate.^{41/} (Meenakshi Declaration at 29.) While the

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26 ^{41/} Dr. Meenakshi also testified that this violates a state court
injunction filed in Keyhea v. Rushen (Solano Co. Sup. Ct. No. 67432,
filed October 13, 1986) prohibiting an employee of the CDC from

1 requirement that the warden approve all orders for involuntary
2 medication does not run afoul of the federal constitution, a
3 predominance of custody staff in the decisionmaking process
4 regarding use of involuntary medication, or a system which allows
5 custody staff to unilaterally veto a medical decision that the use
6 of such medication is required, does. See Washington v. Harper,
7 supra.

8 There is no protocol in place at Pelican Bay State Prison
9 for involuntary administration of medication. (Grassian
10 Declaration at 51.) Sierra Conservation Center does not have a
11 written policy governing use of involuntary medications, although
12 inmates have been involuntarily medicated at that institution.
13 (Meenakshi Declaration at 111.)

14 In addition, inmates are often involuntarily medicated
15 in inappropriate settings. At CIW inmates are involuntarily
16 medicated in the East Wing of the Support Care Unit. (Id. at 28.)
17 This unit has no provision for emergency medical care. This care
18 is necessary because the inmate may have physical reactions to the
19 involuntary medication that require immediate medical attention.
20 (Id.) Dr. Kaufman opined that administration of involuntary
21 medication at CMC is also done in an inappropriate setting.
22 (Kaufman Declaration at 142.)

23 Once again, the above-described deficiencies flow in
24 large part from the failure of defendants to have an adequate
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serving as a hearing officer in the certification hearing, and that
it violates CDC regulations as well. Compliance with state court
injunctions is not, of course, before this court.

1 program in place for screening and identifying mentally ill
2 inmates. The deficiencies are also attributable to a lack of
3 adequate training of custody staff to recognize signs and symptoms
4 of mental illness. Finally, the deficiencies are attributable to
5 policies which permit custody staff to use these measures in the
6 absence of consultation with, or against the considered advice of,
7 medical and/or mental health professionals.

8 This court finds that use of tasers and 37mm guns upon
9 mentally ill inmates without regard to the impact of such measures
10 on an underlying mental illness violates the Eighth Amendment. The
11 court further finds that defendants present practices concerning
12 the use of mechanical restraints and involuntary medication violate
13 the requirements of the federal constitution.^{42/}

14 5. Medical Records

15 The medical records system within the California
16 Department of Corrections is extremely deficient. (Testimony of
17 James Gomez, RT, March 29, 1993, at 47-48.) A medical record
18 should describe the patient, assess the problem, and track the
19

20 ^{42/} Section 3364 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations
21 sets forth guidelines for the administration of involuntary
22 medication. The regulation contains several requirements, including
23 a requirement that the decision to involuntarily medicate an inmate
24 must be made by a physician based on personal examination of the
25 inmate with a follow-up medical opinion three days later, guidelines
26 for the location of administering such medication as well as notice
by medical staff to custody staff of such administration, a
requirement of formal consultation where such treatment is continued
beyond ten days, notification to next of kin, and standards for
charting and recording each incident of involuntary medication. Id.
The regulation does not cover the procedural protections for inmates.
The evidence before the court demonstrated that defendants have not
complied with their own regulation.

1 course of treatment. (Petrella Declaration at 134.) An adequate
2 record is necessary to provide continuity of care, particularly
3 with respect to mental illness. Since mental illness is often
4 recurrent, the prior treatment records help determine future
5 treatment decisions. (Petrella Declaration at 20.) At most of the
6 prisons in the class there are serious deficiencies in medical
7 recordkeeping, including disorganized, untimely and incomplete
8 filing of medical records, insufficient charting, and incomplete or
9 nonexistent treatment plans. To complicate the situation beyond
10 all reason, inmates are typically transferred between prisons
11 without even such medical records as might exist.

12 Dr. Meenakshi observed that medical records at the
13 California Institution for Women (CIW) were "abysmal." (Meenakshi
14 Declaration at 24.) The records were incomplete, lacked lab
15 reports and complete evaluations of the inmate's mental illness,
16 and were often illegible. (Id.) When inmates were transferred to
17 CIW, their charts did not usually accompany them. Sometimes there
18 would be more than one chart for one patient; sometimes the
19 patient's chart could not be located for the psychiatrist to review
20 prior to evaluation and treatment. Often documents at CIW were
21 misfiled, either within the patient's chart or in another patient's
22 chart. Frequently documents were not filed in chronological order.
23 (Id. at 25.) Prior records were often missing from the patient's
24 file. In addition, patient notes did not reflect that medication
25 had been adjusted to treat the patient's current needs or "to
26 respond to the escalation of psychotic symptoms." (Id.) This

1 precluded the clinician from having benefit of a treatment and
2 diagnostic history, and forced the clinician to rely solely on the
3 information provided by the patient, which was often incomplete or
4 inaccurate. (See id. at 26-27.)

5 The medical records that did exist at CIW were
6 underutilized by clinicians. Dr. Meenakshi did not find a single
7 reference in any of the records that she reviewed at CIW that the
8 patient's medical chart had been reviewed prior to "making a
9 diagnosis or prescribing treatment." (Id.) The clinicians did not
10 attempt to obtain medical records from a patient's prior hospital
11 stay. In addition, the medical records at CIW did not contain
12 adequate treatment plans. In fact, until last year, CIW did not
13 have treatment plans at all. (Id.)

14 Similar deficiencies existed at Central California
15 Women's Facility (CCWF). Inmates transferred to CCWF frequently
16 arrived without their medical records. The records were usually
17 incomplete; Dr. Meenakshi found "significant information . . .
18 missing in almost every file" at CCWF. (Meenakshi Declaration at
19 65.) The medical records at CCWF did not show that physicians and
20 doctors reviewed the patient's chart before treating the patient.
21 Medication sheets were absent from some files at CCWF. The medical
22 charts at CCWF were disorganized and were not promptly updated;
23 signatures on consent forms were obtained late. (Id.)

24 Record-keeping at Northern California Women's Facility
25 (NCWF) was also deficient. Medical records were often misfiled,
26 either within the patient's own chart or in another patient's

1 chart. Frequently, filing at NCWF was not in chronological order.
2 Important lab reports, medication sheets, consent forms and
3 discharge summaries were often missing. (Meenakshi Declaration at
4 86-87.) When a patient was admitted to the infirmary at NCWF, a
5 separate medical file was established. Often there was no
6 correlation between the inpatient file and the outpatient file --
7 no mention in the outpatient file that the patient was going to be
8 hospitalized or that the patient had been discharged and might need
9 follow-up outpatient care. (Id. at 88.)

10 Charting at NCWF was also insufficient. (Id. at 87.) No
11 reference to a review of the patient's prior medical record was
12 found. Often no diagnosis was recorded. In one set of records,
13 rather than delineate specific information, the physician simply
14 wrote the acronym SOAP^{43/} followed by the prescription issued.
15 (Id.) This offered no insight for the next clinician who reviewed
16 the file. Dr. Meenakshi cited other examples of deviances in
17 treatment that were not explained within the medical record at
18 NCWF. (Id.)

19 In addition, NCWF did not have adequate treatment plans.
20 An adequate plan "should be based upon a competent psychiatric
21 evaluation . . . [and] should include prescription of appropriate
22 medications and other forms of therapy, as well as a statement of
23 goals for treatment." (Id. at 86.) A doctor at NCWF testified
24

25 ^{43/} "The acronym SOAP is a tool to help the clinician remember to
26 record the following information: the patient's subjective
description of the problem, the clinician's objective evaluation, his
or her assessment of the patient's condition, and a plan for
treatment." (Id. at 87.)

1 that his treatment plan consisted solely of orders for medications
2 and follow up care. (Id.)

3 Dr. Meenakshi described the documentation of psychiatric
4 care at Mule Creek as "grossly inadequate." (Meenakshi Declaration
5 at 100.) The medical records were disorganized and misfiled, and
6 many were missing lab reports. Medical files were mixed in with
7 psychiatric files. (Id.)

8 There was also evidence of insufficient charting at Mule
9 Creek. Some files contained no reference to a review of the
10 patient's prior medical record. "In some, it [was] impossible even
11 to determine the source of recommendations for Category J
12 evaluations, psychotropic medication or psychiatric assessments" at
13 Mule Creek. (Id.)

14 Inmates sent to Mule Creek frequently arrived without
15 their medical records. It usually took two weeks for the records
16 to arrive. (Id.)

17 Medical records received at Pelican Bay were often
18 incomplete and sometimes even failed to contain information on
19 prior psychiatric hospitalizations. (Grassian Declaration at 52.)
20 Sometimes pertinent psychiatric records were misfiled in the
21 patient's central file.

22 At Pelican Bay, infirmary records were kept separately
23 from medical records. Suicide watch records were made in the
24 infirmary record, and Psychiatric Services did not receive
25 infirmary records. (Id.) Dr. Grassian also found that clinicians
26 at Pelican Bay were not reviewing patient records prior to

1 evaluation and treatment. He observed: "Records are of use only if
2 they are read." (Id.)

3 Medical records at California Institution for Men (CIM)
4 were disorganized and Dr. Petrella reported that "there [was] no
5 audit or quality assurance program to determine whether records
6 were properly kept." (Petrella Declaration at 86.) Consent forms
7 were sometimes missing from the medical records at CIM.

8 Inmates often arrived at CIM without their medical
9 records, or with only a description of their medication. This made
10 it difficult to adequately treat suicidal patients. (Id. at 85.)

11 A review of medical records at CIM revealed insufficient
12 charting. Dr. Petrella testified that "[i]t was not possible to
13 review a record and discern the nature of the inmate's problem, the
14 assessment of the problem, the plan for treating it and the
15 implementation of the plan." (Id. at 86.) Although some entries
16 recommended the inmate be seen in "psych line," there was little
17 evidence that this recommendation was followed.

18 Medical records at Calipatria were disorganized and
19 incomplete. Progress notes and discharge summaries were missing.
20 (Petrella Declaration at 109-10.) Medical files were not updated
21 in a timely manner. A shortage of medical transcribers contributed
22 to the delay in properly updating files. (Id. at 111.) Infirmary
23 files were kept separately from psychiatric files at Calipatria.
24 This made it difficult to provide continuity of care because the
25 clinician had no easy access to the separate file or did not know
26 it existed. (Id. at 110.)

1 Charting at Calipatria was insufficient as well. Dr.
2 Petrella cited one example where medication was prescribed, but the
3 clinician's notes did not explain why, and another example where
4 the clinician's notes recommended no medications, yet the
5 medications chart showed the patient continued to receive
6 medications. (Id.)

7 Inmates at Calipatria were sometimes examined without
8 their medical records. Dr. Millan admitted this had a negative
9 impact on the quality of care he was able to provide. (Id.)

10 Medical files at Wasco were disorganized and incomplete.
11 "Dr. Lewengood stated that he had recently found a stack of unfiled
12 medical records that [were] taller than him." (Petrella
13 Declaration at 135.) Wasco had difficulty with timely
14 transcription of medical records as well. (Id. at 136.) Infirmary
15 files were kept separately from psychiatric files, and updates were
16 not made simultaneously. (Id. at 135.)

17 There was insufficient charting at Wasco. The mental
18 health staff did not document their patient assessment or
19 treatment. Dr. Petrella called their record-keeping "vague."
20 (Id.) He observed the record of an inmate placed on suicide watch
21 at Wasco in which the record did not show who placed the inmate on
22 suicide watch or why the watch was instituted. (Id.)

23 He also testified that record-keeping problems were
24 compounded because ninety-five percent of all inmates received at
25 Wasco had no medical or mental health documentation with them when
26 they arrived. (Id. at 136.)

1 Dr. Petrella found the medical records at California
2 Men's Colony (CMC) generally acceptable. (Petrella Declaration at
3 71.) Often the files were disorganized and some of the files
4 lacked treatment plans, but most of the files contained the
5 necessary information. (Id.)

6 Dr. Kaufman found the medical records inadequate at
7 Tehachapi. The files were illegible and incomplete. The charting
8 was insufficient, with no evidence of full psychiatric evaluations,
9 treatment plans, or quality assurance reviews. (Kaufman
10 Declaration at 46.)

11 Psychiatric records at Avenal were separated behind a
12 divider in the inmate's medical file. Dr. Kaufman found evidence
13 of insufficient charting, including inadequate detail in evaluating
14 inmates and failure to use consent forms. (Kaufman Declaration at
15 152-53.) Sometimes inmates arrived at Avenal without their medical
16 records. (Id. at 151.)

17 As a result of the serious deficiencies in the overall
18 medical records system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
19 provide effective mental health care. (Petrella Declaration at
20 20.) It is crucial to have a complete and legible record for the
21 next clinician to review before evaluating and treating the inmate.
22 Inmates have often been misdiagnosed based on an absent or
23 incomplete record, which can result in life-threatening situations.
24 (Meenakshi Declaration at 24.)

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1 At trial, defendant Gomez acknowledged the deficiencies
2 in medical recordkeeping. (RT, May 17, 1993, at 47-48.) Defendant
3 Gomez also acknowledged that there is a problem with inmates being
4 transported between prisons and returning to custody without their
5 medical files. (RT, May 17, 1993, at 87.) An essential element of
6 a constitutionally adequate mental health care delivery system in
7 prison is the maintenance of accurate, complete and confidential
8 mental health treatment records. The mental health records in the
9 CDC, such as they are, have none of these qualities. Defendants
10 are in violation of the Eighth Amendment in this regard. Further,
11 those records must be readily available to a clinician at the time
12 an inmate presents for necessary care. Defendants do not have an
13 adequate system for transporting and retrieving inmate mental
14 health records and they are well aware of this deficiency; this,
15 too, constitutes deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
16 in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

17 6. Suicide Prevention

18 Plaintiffs' experts testified concerning at least twelve
19 suicides at institutions in the class, plus an additional suicide
20 at the San Quentin Reception Center, between 1988 and 1992.
21 (Petrella Declaration at 69-70, 158; Kaufman Declaration at 47,
22 132-141.) Plaintiffs also provided evidence that suicide attempts
23 were frequent at some institutions in the class. For example, Dr.
24 Petrella testified that there were approximately ten suicide
25 attempts at Calipatria each month; two to three of these occurred
26 in administrative segregation. (Petrella Declaration at 100.) Dr.

1 Petrella also testified that there were two suicide attempts "or
2 other psychiatric emergencies" each week at Wasco State Prison.
3 (Id. at 145.)

4 Dr. Meenakshi described four suicide attempts that took
5 place at California Institution for Women between March and October
6 1992. (Meenakshi Declaration at 36-38.) She described five cases
7 of inmates admitted to the infirmary on suicide watch at Central
8 California Women's Facility during 1992. (Id. at 58-59.)
9 She also described three suicide attempts by women at Northern
10 California Women's Facility during the same year. (Id. at 79-81.)
11 Dr. Meenakshi testified that the staff psychiatrist at California
12 Conservation Center "estimates that she is called to the prison to
13 see an attempted suicide approximately 2-3 times per year." (Id.
14 at 106.)

15 There was also evidence that suicide attempts are not as
16 frequent at other institutions. (See, e.g., Kaufman Declaration at
17 151 (Suicide attempts are "infrequent" at Avenal).)

18 Dr. Louis L. Beermann testified that the suicide rate in
19 the CDC had declined from a high of 77 per 100,000 inmates in 1982
20 to 14 per 100,000 inmates in 1992.^{44/} (Declaration of Dr. Louis
21 L. Beermann, Ph.D., filed February 11, 1993, at 6; see also
22 Beermann Declaration at Attachment 1.) The suicide rate for male
23 inmates in the CDC appears to be lower than that the rate in the
24 general population; in 1992, the suicide rate for male inmates in
25

26 ^{44/} There were 24 suicides in the CDC in 1982; that year the average
daily population was 31,142 inmates. (Beermann Declaration at
Attachment 1.)

1 the CDC was 14 per 100,000 inmates, while the rate for non-
2 imprisoned males was 20 per 100,000. (Id. at 6.)^{45/}

3 The CDC has a Suicide Prevention Program in place.
4 (Beermann Declaration at 4.) The program was standardized and
5 enhanced in 1990. (Id.) The program consists of three major
6 components: staff education, prevention, and assessment. (Id.)
7 Each prison has a suicide prevention coordinator to implement the
8 suicide prevention program, heighten staff awareness of suicide
9 prevention measures, and report any suicide to the central Mental
10 Health Services Branch within twenty-four hours. (Id. at 3-4.)

11 As part of staff education, the Department has published
12 a "Suicide Prevention Handbook" prepared by Dr. Beermann for use in
13 in-service training for correctional officers. (Id. at 4.)
14 Approximately 25,000 copies of the Handbook have been distributed
15 to correctional officers and other CDC personnel. (Id.) A suicide
16 prevention videotape is also available and has been shown at in-
17 service training. (Id.) Dr. Beermann testified that 80 to 100
18 percent of all correctional officers at all institutions have now
19 received suicide prevention training. (Id. at 4-5.) Dr. Beermann
20 also testified that suicide prevention training is now included as
21 part of the curriculum at the Department of Corrections Training
22 Academy and that all new correctional officers are required to
23 participate in the training. (Id.)

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25
26 ^{45/} The suicide rate for female inmates appears to be relatively low;
of the 181 suicides reported in the CDC from 1980 to 1990, 179 were
male and 2 were female. (Beermann Declaration at Attachment 1.)

1 The second component of the program is the prevention
2 component. As described by Dr. Beermann, this part of the program
3 consists of identification of inmates who are potential suicide
4 risks and "suicide watch." (Id. at 5.) Suicide watch is ordered
5 by a clinician and may involve the confinement of an inmate
6 considered seriously suicidal in an observation cell,
7 removal of items from the cell with which the inmate could harm
8 himself or herself, and recording observations every fifteen
9 minutes. (Id.)

10 The suicide assessment component of the program consists
11 of preparation of a psychological autopsy on each inmate who does
12 commit suicide. (Id.) These autopsies are conducted in order to
13 improve the Suicide Prevention Program. (Id.) Each autopsy
14 includes a description of how the suicide was accomplished, as well
15 as specific recommendations on how to prevent a similar occurrence
16 and time-lines for implementation of the specific recommendations.
17 (Id.) All autopsies are sent to the CDC-Mental Health Services
18 Branch for review and follow-up; the warden of the institution
19 where the suicide occurred is required to submit a signed follow-up
20 memorandum describing the actions taken to implement the
21 recommendations. (Id.)

22 The presence of a suicide prevention coordinator and in-
23 service training at least some institutions was acknowledged by
24 plaintiffs' experts. (See Meenakshi Declaration at 39 (suicide
25 prevention coordinator and in-service training program at CIW), 82
26 (suicide prevention protocol claimed to exist at CCWF but doctor at

1 the prison unable to describe what it entails); Kaufman Declaration
2 at 48 (training implemented at California Correctional Institution
3 at Tehachapi by December 1992).) The presence of either a
4 coordinator or staff training at other institutions was disputed.
5 (See Meenakshi Declaration at 79 (staff at Northern California
6 Women's Facility not properly trained to respond to suicide
7 attempts), 97 (staff at Mule Creek is not trained in suicide
8 prevention), 105-106 (as of April 1992, no training information had
9 been distributed to staff at California Correctional Center and
10 staff doctor did not know of suicide prevention program); Kaufman
11 Declaration at 151 (doctor at Avenal had not received any suicide
12 prevention training, had only received the department manual on the
13 morning of his deposition, and had not trained any staff).) Dr.
14 Meenakshi also questioned the long-term commitment of California
15 Institution for Women to the Suicide Prevention Program, and she
16 testified that the program was halted for a period of time in
17 August 1990 to save money. (Meenakshi Declaration at 39.)
18 Dr. Grassian testified that there has been in-service training and
19 distribution of the pamphlet at Pelican Bay, but that the
20 psychiatric staff at the prison has not provided the custody or the
21 medical staff with formal training in suicide prevention.
22 (Grassian Declaration at 53.) Dr. Grassian also testified to a
23 suggestion that the in-service training has not made a difference
24 in the way staff handles potentially suicidal inmates. (Id.)

25 Plaintiffs' experts challenged the adequacy of the
26 suicide watch program at several prisons. Dr. Meenakshi testified

1 that, at CIW, women known to be high suicide risks were placed in
2 segregation or confined to quarters rather than being properly
3 monitored or observed after suicide attempts, and that charting of
4 the suicide attempts was wholly inadequate. (Meenakshi Declaration
5 at 36-39.) Dr. Meenakshi reported similar inadequacies in the
6 suicide watch program at Central California Women's Facility (id.
7 at 58-59), Northern California Women's Facility (id. at 80-81),
8 Mule Creek State Prison (id. at 96), California Correctional Center
9 (id. at 106), and Sierra Conservation Center (id. at 110).

10 Dr. Petrella testified that the monitoring for suicide
11 risk was inadequate at California Men's Colony. (Petrella
12 Declaration at 69.) Dr. Petrella also testified that some good
13 suicide prevention procedures existed at CMC; he testified that the
14 Locked Observation Unit provided good supervision for inmates on
15 suicide watch. (Id. at 70.) In other instances, the suicide watch
16 program at CMC was, in his opinion, inadequate; use of certain
17 cells in another part of the institution for suicide watch happened
18 and was, he stated, "grossly inappropriate." (Id.) Dr. Petrella
19 found the suicide watch program, including ready access to a
20 psychiatrist, observation, monitoring and charting, at Calipatria
21 to be inadequate. (Id. at 100-103.) Dr. Petrella also testified
22 that at Wasco delays in access to psychological help have resulted
23 in suicide attempts. (Id. at 144.) Finally, he found that
24 charting of inmates on suicide watch was inadequate, as was follow-
25 up monitoring and care after suicide attempts. (Id. at 144-146.)

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1 This court finds that defendants have designed an
2 adequate suicide prevention program and have taken many of the
3 steps necessary to implement that program. This court also finds
4 that the program has not yet been fully implemented, and that some
5 of the failure to fully implement the program is due to the severe
6 understaffing in mental health care. Accordingly, the court will
7 recommend that the special master recommended below be ordered to
8 report to the court on the adequacy of suicide prevention in the
9 CDC twelve months after the order of the district court.

10 C. Deliberate Indifference

11 The evidence of defendants' deliberate indifference to
12 the deficiencies in mental health care was not seriously contested.
13 Defendants have known of the serious problem with understaffing at
14 least since they undertook the interdepartmental workload study in
15 1985. That study concluded, inter alia, that the then current
16 workload was "clearly excessive." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 456 at vi.)
17 Defendants have known that there were thousands of mentally ill
18 inmates incarcerated in the state of California who were not even
19 identified as needing care, let alone being provided necessary
20 care, at least since the publication of the Stirling Report in
21 July, 1989. The inadequacies in the mental health care delivery
22 system were confirmed in 1991 when the Scarlett Carp consultants
23 commenced their study, and they remain today.

24 Defendants repeatedly acknowledged that they were grossly
25 understaffed in the area of mental health care, that their medical
26 recordkeeping system was woefully outdated and inadequate, and that

1 they did not have a mechanism in place for screening and
2 identifying mentally ill inmates.

3 Even without the historical facts found above, the
4 grossly inadequate mental health care provided in the California
5 Department of Corrections, by itself, would be sufficient evidence
6 of deliberate indifference to warrant injunctive relief. Wellman
7 v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d at 272. The fact that defendants have known
8 about these deficiencies for over eight years without taking any
9 significant steps to correct them is additional evidence of
10 deliberate indifference. Injunctive relief is required.

11 D. Remedies

12 The district court has "broad discretion to fashion
13 remedies once constitutional violations are found." Hoptowit v.
14 Ray, 639 F.2d at 1245 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
15 Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)). Indeed, when constitutional
16 violations are found "a federal court must order effective relief."
17 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
18 denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1989).

19 The relief "must be no broader than necessary to remedy
20 the constitutional violation." Id. at 1086. "A defendant's
21 history of noncompliance with prior court orders is a relevant
22 factor in determining the necessary scope of an effective remedy."
23 Id. at 1087 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978)
24 (additional citations omitted)).

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26 /////

1 As described above, this court finds that defendants are
2 in violation of the Eighth Amendment with respect to screening and
3 identification of mentally ill inmates, staffing for mental health
4 care, access to care, use and monitoring of psychotropic
5 medication, placement and retention of mentally ill inmates in
6 administrative segregation and segregated housing units, use of
7 tasers, 37mm guns, mechanical restraints, and involuntary
8 medication, and maintenance of mental health records. This court
9 will recommend that defendants be required to develop and implement
10 forms, protocols, and plans necessary to remedy these violations as
11 set forth below.

12 E. Appointment of Special Master

13 The court may appoint a special master in a non-jury case
14 on a showing that "exceptional conditions" require such
15 appointment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b). In the instant case,
16 appointment of a special master will be necessary. This court will
17 recommend to the district court that defendants be ordered to
18 remedy the constitutional violations found in their mental health
19 care delivery. Monitoring compliance with this order will be a
20 significant task. This court will recommend that the district
21 court appoint a special master to monitor defendants' compliance
22 with court ordered injunctive relief with defendants to pay the
23 cost of the master.

24 F. Mental Retardation

25 This court has determined that further briefing is
26 required concerning the claims raised on behalf of mentally

1 retarded inmates and has separately issued a further briefing
2 order. Accordingly, findings and recommendations on said claims
3 are deferred at this time.

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

5 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED
6 that the district court order as follows:

7 1. The district court appoint a special master for a
8 term of three years to perform the following duties:

9 a. Consult with the court concerning the appointment of
10 experts to develop the protocols and plans required by the district
11 court's order;

12 b. Monitor compliance with court-ordered injunctive
13 relief;

14 c. Report to the court in twelve months on the adequacy
15 of suicide prevention at all institutions in the class; and

16 d. Perform such additional tasks as the court may deem
17 necessary.

18 Defendants shall pay the cost of the special master.

19 2. Within thirty (30) days of the order of the district
20 court, defendants shall develop and use standardized mental health
21 screening forms and protocols to be used at all institutions in the
22 class upon the admission, readmission or transfer of any inmate.
23 Said forms and protocols shall be developed in consultation with an
24 expert to be designated by the court after consultation with the
25 special master, with defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

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1 3. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
2 court, defendants shall implement a training program to train all
3 medical technical assistants, nurses, correctional officers, and
4 other personnel who work with inmates on a regular basis in the
5 recognition and identification of the signs and symptoms of mental
6 illness. Said training program shall be developed in consultation
7 with an expert to be designated by the court after consultation
8 with the special master, with defendants to pay the cost of the
9 expert.

10 4. Within thirty (30) days of the order of the district
11 court, defendants shall develop and implement medication protocols
12 to establish an adequate formulary, to ensure timely refilling of
13 prescriptions, to maintain continuity of medication delivery, to
14 require adequate monitoring of the medical condition, including
15 blood levels where appropriate, of inmates receiving psychotropic
16 medications, and to avoid hoarding of medications. Said protocols
17 shall be developed in consultation with an expert to be designated
18 by the court after consultation with the special master, with
19 defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

20 5. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
21 court, defendants shall develop and implement a plan to use
22 transfer notes and to transfer medical records with inmates when
23 they are transferred from one institution to another within the
24 California Department of Corrections. At the same time, defendants
25 shall develop a plan for obtaining medical records from county
26 jails for inmates on their initial admission to the California

1 Department of Corrections. Said plan shall be developed in
2 consultation with an expert to be designated by the court after
3 consultation with the special master, with defendants to pay the
4 cost of the expert.

5 6. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
6 court, defendants shall develop and implement a formula for mental
7 health care staffing ratios at all institutions within the class.
8 Said formula shall be developed in consultation with an expert to
9 be designated by the court after consultation with the special
10 master, with defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

11 7. Within (90) days of the order of the district court,
12 defendants shall develop and implement a recruitment program,
13 including but not limited to provision of adequate compensation,
14 for the recruitment of mental health staff at every institution in
15 the class. Said program shall be developed in consultation with an
16 expert to be designated by the court after consultation with the
17 special master, with defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

18 8. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
19 court, defendants shall fill those positions presently authorized
20 for the provision of mental health care services. Within one
21 hundred eighty (180) days of the order of the district court,
22 defendants shall fill those positions determined to be necessary
23 under the formula developed in paragraph 7, supra.

24 9. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
25 court, defendants shall develop and implement a system for quality
26 assurance and peer review of mental health care services. Said

1 system shall be developed in consultation with an expert to be
2 designated by the court after consultation with the special master,
3 with defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

4 10. Within sixty (60) days of the order of the district
5 court, defendants shall develop and implement a protocol, as well
6 as any contractual arrangement that may be necessary, to guarantee
7 prompt access to inpatient psychiatric hospitalization for every
8 class member in need of such hospitalization. Said protocol shall
9 be developed in consultation with an expert to be designated by the
10 court after consultation with the special master, with defendants
11 to pay the cost of the expert.

12 11. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
13 court, defendants shall develop and implement a protocol to govern
14 placement and retention of mentally ill inmates in any
15 administrative segregation or segregated housing unit, and to
16 govern care of any mentally ill inmate who is so housed. Said
17 protocol shall be developed in consultation with an expert to be
18 designated by the court after consultation with the special master,
19 with defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

20 12. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
21 court, defendants shall develop and implement protocols to govern
22 use or non-use of tasers, 37mm guns, mechanical restraints,
23 involuntary medication and other measures on class members. Said
24 protocols shall specifically address coordination and consultation
25 between mental health staff and custody staff and, in the case of
26 involuntary medications, use of federal due process protections.

1 Said protocols shall be developed in consultation with an expert to
2 be designated by the court after consultation with the special
3 master, with defendants to pay the cost of the expert.

4 13. Within ninety (90) days of the order of the district
5 court, defendants shall develop and implement a standardized
6 protocol for completion and maintenance of adequate mental health
7 records at every institution in the class. Said protocol shall be
8 developed in consultation with an expert to be designated by the
9 court after consultation with the special master, with defendants
10 to pay the cost of the expert. Defendants shall also take any and
11 all additional steps necessary to insure that adequate mental
12 health records are kept for all inmates in the class.

13 14. The preliminary injunction regarding heat plans
14 presently in existence in this action be made permanent to remain
15 in effect for three years.

16 15. Defendants' motion for judgment pursuant to Federal
17 Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), made at the close of plaintiffs'
18 case in chief, be denied.

19 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the
20 United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the
21 provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty days
22 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any
23 party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy
24 on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to
25 Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the
26 objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service

1 of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
2 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal
3 the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th
4 Cir. 1991).

5 DATED: June 6, 1994.

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8 JFM:hg:cw
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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1
2 APPENDIX

3 EXPERTS' BACKGROUNDS^{46/}

4 Plaintiff's Experts

5 Stuart Grassian, M.D.

6 Dr. Stuart Grassian is a board certified psychiatrist.
7 He received his medical degree from New York University Medical
8 School in 1973 and completed his psychiatric residency training at
9 Beth Israel Hospital/Harvard Medical School in Boston,
10 Massachusetts in 1977. He received his Board certification in
11 1979.

12 He has been a clinical instructor of psychiatry at the
13 Harvard Medical School since completing his residency, was on the
14 active teaching staff of the Tufts University School of Medicine as
15 an Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry from 1978 to 1981,
16 and has been on the teaching staff at Beth Israel Hospital in
17 Boston continuously since 1977.

18 Dr. Grassian has published two articles on the subject of
19 the psychological effects of solitary confinement. He has been
20 retained as an expert concerning the psychological effects of
21 imprisonment generally and solitary confinement specifically in
22 class action lawsuits in Massachusetts, New York, Kentucky, and
23 California.

24 Thomas Greenfield, Ph.D.

25 Dr. Thomas Greenfield is a psychologist licensed in the
26 State of Washington. Dr. Greenfield was one of the consultants who
conducted the prevalence study ultimately published as the Stirling
Report. In 1991, he was asked to, and did, reanalyze the
prevalence data published in the Stirling Report for use by
Scarlett Carp & Associates; these results were used in subsequent
reports published by Scarlett Carp & Associates.

Dr. Greenfield obtained his doctoral degree in clinical
psychology from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in 1977.
From 1968 to 1970, he was a predoctoral intern in the department of
psychology at Ypsilanti State Hospital in Ypsilanti, Michigan,
where he conducted psychological testing and provided psychotherapy
to severely disabled patients. He did a second predoctoral
internship at the Counseling Center, Bureau of Psychological
Services at the University of Michigan from 1970 to 1971.

26 ^{46/} The following information is drawn from the declarations and
curriculum vitae of the expert witnesses filed by the parties.

1 He has been a psychological counselor from 1971 to 1986,
2 first at University of Michigan and then at Washington State
3 University. From 1986 to 1988, he was a National Institute of
4 Mental Health postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Psychiatry,
5 University of California, San Francisco, in the Clinical Services
6 Research Program. He worked as a research psychologist in the same
7 department from 1988 to 1989. From 1989 to 1991, he was an
8 Associate Director for Research at the Marin Institute for
9 Prevention of Alcohol and Other Drug Problems.

10 He is currently Senior Scientist at the Alcohol Research
11 Group, Institute for Epidemiology and Behavioral Medicine, Medical
12 Research Institute of San Francisco, and served as the director of
13 that institute during 1992. He has also provided psychiatric
14 research consultation services to several organizations and has
15 held a number of university appointments. Dr. Greenfield has been
16 involved in several psychometric studies, i.e., studies which
17 measure psychological variables such as depression or client
18 satisfaction, in a given population as well as other prevalence and
19 investigative studies. Many of the studies have been published in
20 journals, presented at professional meetings, or presented to
21 agencies such as the California Department of Corrections.

22 Craig Haney, J.D., Ph.D.

23 Craig Haney, J.D., Ph.D., is a Professor of Psychology
24 and Director of the Program in Legal Studies at the University of
25 California at Santa Cruz, where he has taught graduate and
26 undergraduate courses in social psychology, research methodology,
psychology and law, forensic psychology, and institutional analysis
for fifteen years.

Dr. Haney received his Ph.D. in Social Psychology and his
Juris Doctor degree from Stanford University in 1978. He has
published over thirty articles and book chapters on topics in law
and psychology, including encyclopedia and handbook chapters on
conditions of confinement and the psychological effects of
incarceration. He has also served as a consultant to several
organizations, including the National Judicial College, the
California Legislature, and the United States Justice Department.

For over twenty years, Dr. Haney has studied the effects
of living and working in maximum security prisons. During that
time he has done numerous interviews with correctional officers,
guards and prisoners to assess the impact of prison adjustment, and
has analyzed data to examine the effects of overcrowding and other
conditions on the quality of prison life and prisoner adjustment.
He has toured maximum security state prisons in Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Georgia, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington; maximum security federal prisons at McNeil

1 Island and Marion, Illinois; and prisons in Canada, England, and
2 Mexico. For the last fifteen years, he has also studied the
3 backgrounds and social histories of persons accused and convicted
4 of violent crime and assessed the effects of prior periods of
5 incarceration on such persons.

6 Dr. Haney has testified as an expert in state and federal
7 courts in California, including the Superior Courts of Lake, Los
8 Angeles, Marin, Orange, Placer, Sacramento, San Diego, San
9 Francisco and Ventura Counties, and the federal courts in the
10 Northern, Southern, and Eastern Districts of California. He has
11 also testified in federal district courts in the Eastern District
12 of Washington and the Southern District of Illinois. His testimony
13 in California has concerned conditions of confinement at several
14 institutions in the California Department of Corrections. He has
15 also evaluated conditions of confinement and the quality of care
16 provided at Atascadero State Hospital for the United States
17 Department of Justice.

18 Edward Kaufman, M.D.

19 Dr. Edward Kaufman is a clinical professor in the
20 psychiatry department at the University of California, Irvine. He
21 is Board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and
22 Neurology and is a Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association.
23 Dr. Kaufman graduated from Jefferson Medical College in 1960,
24 completed his residency in psychiatry in 1964 at the New York State
25 Psychiatric Institute at the Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,
26 and received his Psychoanalytic Certificate in 1970. He received
Board certification in psychiatry in 1971. In 1980, he was made a
fellow of the American Psychiatric Association. In 1987 he was
certified in Alcohol and Other Drug Dependencies by the American
Society of Addiction Medicine.

Dr. Kaufman was Chief of Psychiatric Services at
Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary in Pennsylvania from 1964 to 1966.
From 1966 to 1967 he was the Senior Research Psychiatrist and
Director of An Inpatient Unit at New York State Psychiatric
Institute's Washington Heights Community Mental Health Services.
From 1967 to 1971 he was Chief of Emergency Psychiatric Services at
St. Luke's Hospital Center in New York City. From 1971 to 1973,
Dr. Kaufman was the first Director of Psychiatry for Prison Mental
Health Services of the City of New York, where he developed
regionalized treatment programs at each jail in the city as well as
an inpatient unit at Riker's Island Prison. From 1973 to 1977, Dr.
Kaufman was the Chief Psychiatrist and Medical Director of the
Lower East Side Service Center in New York City, where he directed
services for over 1000 narcotics addicts. In 1977, he also served
on the Standards and Advisory Panel for Juvenile Justice of the New
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services.

1 In 1977, Dr. Kaufman moved to California. From 1977 to
2 1978, Dr. Kaufman was a psychiatric consultant to the Orange County
3 Department of Mental Health and to the Metropolitan State Hospital
4 in Norwalk, California. From 1977 to 1979, he was the Medical
5 Director for the Venice Drug Abuse Coalition. From 1978 to 1983,
6 he served as Chief of Clinical Psychiatric Services at the
7 University of California, Irvine (UCI) Department of Psychiatry.
8 From 1979 to the present he has served as Director of Family
9 Therapy Training at UCI Medical Center. From 1986 to 1990, he
10 served as Executive Director of the Family Center in San
11 Bernardino, and from 1988 to 1991, he served as Director of UCI's
12 Chemical Dependency Program at Capistrano-By-The-Sea Hospital.
13 From 1983 to 1991, he was also the Director of Psychiatric
14 Education at UCI Medical Center.

15 Dr. Kaufman has held several professorships and has
16 worked extensively with individuals with problems with drug abuse
17 and alcoholism. He has written several articles on the subject of
18 mental health care in prisons, including an article entitled
19 "Violation of Psychiatric Standards of Care In Prison," which was
20 reproduced in part by the California Department of Corrections in
21 the 1986 workload study.

22 V. Meenakshi, M.D.

23 Dr. V. Meenakshi is a psychiatrist licensed to practice
24 medicine in the State of California. She received her medical
25 degree from the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in February
26 1963. She completed her residency at the Yale Psychiatric
Institute at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut in 1971.
From 1971 to 1974, she was a Senior Fellow and then Assistant
Medical Director at the Yale Psychiatric Institute. In 1975, she
was an Advanced Fellow in Forensic Psychiatry at the University of
Southern California. She has held teaching positions at the
University of California campuses at Los Angeles and Davis. She is
a Diplomate in Psychiatry of the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology.

Dr. Meenakshi has been a staff psychiatrist at the Napa
State Hospital, the Los Angeles County Crisis and Evaluation Unit
stationed at Metropolitan State Hospital in Norwalk, California,
the Drug Abuse Program and the Alcohol Program at the Veterans
Administration Hospital at Sepulveda, California. From 1979 to
1985, she was in private practice with the Northridge Psychiatric
Medical Group in Northridge, California; from 1982 to 1985 she was
Co-Chairperson of Adolescent Psychiatry at Northridge Hospital.
She has also served as a consultant to the Superior Court of Los
Angeles, Atascadero State Hospital, Penny Lane Placement Home for
Children, the United States Public Health Service, the Los Angeles
Residential Community Clinic, the Criminal Justice Committee for

1 the State Bar of California, the Burbank Municipal Court, and the
2 Hillside Children's Home in Pasadena, California. She is
3 currently employed part-time as a psychiatrist at the Sutter-Yuba
Mental Health Center and as a private practitioner.

4 Dr. Meenakshi worked as a psychiatrist at California
5 Medical Facility from 1986 to 1990. During her tenure at CMF, she
6 served as Chief Psychiatrist, Chairperson of the Department of
7 Psychiatry, Chief of Inpatient and Outpatient Psychiatry, and Chief
8 Psychiatrist of the Outpatient Program. From 1990 to 1992, Dr.
Meenakshi was Medical Director of Inpatient Psychiatry at the
Sacramento County Jail. She also was a member of the Task Force on
Mentally Ill Sex Offenders and Mentally Ill Offenders sponsored by
the Conference of Mental Health Directors and the California
Psychiatric Association.

9 Russell C. Petrella, Ph.D.

10 Dr. Russell Petrella is the Director of Mental Health
11 Services for the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental
12 Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, a position he has held
13 since 1990. In his present position, he is responsible for
14 planning, developing, directing and monitoring the delivery of
15 mental health services throughout the state of Virginia. He is
also responsible for overseeing the provision of inpatient services
to female prisoners transferred from the Department of Corrections
as well as all male inmates transferred from local jails for
inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.

16 Dr. Petrella received a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from
17 Washington University in 1978. In 1975 and 1976, he trained at the
18 Medical Services Division of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City in
19 Baltimore, Maryland, performing pre-trial and pre-sentencing
20 evaluations of offenders, providing consultation to judges and
21 probation officers, and providing individual psychotherapy to
offenders. In 1976, he worked for the Special Offenders Clinic in
Baltimore, providing group therapy for violent offenders and sexual
offenders. In 1977, he served as a consultant to the Missouri
Department of Probation and Parole. From 1977 to 1978, he worked
as a Clinical Assistant in the Behavior Therapy Clinic of
Washington University Psychological Service Center.

22 In 1978, Dr. Petrella started his own consultation and
23 clinical practice, which continues to the present. The practice
24 includes, inter alia, evaluation and testing in criminal cases,
25 consultation to mental health and corrections systems, review of
26 service delivery systems and consultations in litigation. In the
same year, he also became a staff psychologist in the Department of
Psychology for the Center for Forensic Psychiatry in Ann Arbor,

1 Michigan. He became Associate Director of the Center's Evaluation
2 Unit in 1979, and Director/Chairman of the Department of Psychology
3 in 1991. He also provided direct services to inmates transferred
4 from the Michigan Department of Corrections to an inpatient unit.
5 From 1979 to 1981, he also served as a consultant to the Federal
6 Correctional Institute in Milan, Michigan, where his work included
7 conducting treatment groups for inmates.

8 From 1985 to 1989, Dr. Petrella was Director of Forensic
9 Services for the Virginia Department of Mental Health. While in
10 that position, he participated in the planning, development and
11 implementation of a mental health system for the Virginia
12 Department of Corrections. Prior to the reorganization, inmates in
13 need of inpatient services had been referred to Department of
14 Mental Health facilities; the reorganization included development
15 of a licensed correctional psychiatric hospital run by the Virginia
16 Department of Corrections. Dr. Petrella also worked on the
17 development of legislation concerning mental health transfers from
18 jails to hospitals; a hospital staffing study; and study of the
19 clinical and security aspects of forensic inpatient programs.

20 In 1989, Dr. Petrella was appointed the Chairman of the
21 Governor's Special Advisory Panel on Forensic Mental Health in
22 Boston, Massachusetts. The Panel was established by the
23 Massachusetts legislature to evaluate and make recommendations
24 regarding mental health and substance abuse services for men and
25 women in the criminal justice system, including development of
26 policy and evaluation of budgetary, resource, or statutory changes
27 necessary to implement the recommendations. The Panel ultimately
28 sent a comprehensive report to the Governor. In 1991, he served as
29 Associate Commissioner of Community/Facility Services in the
30 Virginia Department of Mental Health in addition to his present
31 position.

32 Dr. Petrella has held several University appointments,
33 and has made numerous presentations and written several articles on
34 the subjects of forensic mental health and mental retardation. He
35 has also had extensive prior experience as an expert witness on
36 mental health legal matters. He has served as an expert witness in
37 three cases involving systemic issues regarding mental health care
38 in jails and/or prisons.

39 In 1987, he was retained jointly by plaintiffs and
40 defendants to evaluate the quality of care at Bridgewater State
41 Hospital, a corrections operated psychiatric facility in
42 Massachusetts. He made numerous recommendations regarding program
43 type and design, staffing numbers and organization,
44 seclusion/restraint, medical records and other aspects of treatment
45 programming. The case resolved by settlement.

1 In 1988, he was retained by the Pennsylvania Attorney
2 General's office in a case brought by an individual inmate. Dr.
3 Petrella concluded that the inmate did not need to be hospitalized
4 in a mental health hospital and that the correctional programs and
services were adequate for the inmate. The federal judge in that
case agreed with Dr. Petrella's recommendations and ruled in favor
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

5 In 1989, Dr. Petrella was retained as an expert for
6 plaintiffs in a lawsuit against New York City regarding the mental
7 health care services in the corrections psychiatric wards at
8 Bellevue Hospital and Elmhurst Hospital. Again, he made several
findings regarding problems with the quality of services including
poor continuity of care, insufficient staff and delays in
treatment. The case resolved by settlement.

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Defendants' Experts

Louis L. Beermann, Ph.D.

Louis L. Beermann, Ph.D., is the chief psychologist for the California Department of Corrections. He has worked for the CDC since 1990.

Dr. Beermann received his doctoral degree in psychology from the University of Oregon in 1974, and he completed a postdoctoral internship in clinical psychology. He became licensed to practice psychology in California in 1982. From 1974 to 1977, he was the chief of psychological services for the Nevada Division of Mental Hygiene and Mental Retardation. He was the director of the Sierra Developmental Center for the Mentally Retarded from 1977 to 1979.

From 1979 to 1980, Dr. Beermann was a service area director for the California Department of Mental Health (DMH), and from 1980 to 1981 he was the chief of forensic services for the same agency. From 1981 to 1983, he served as a special assistant to the Deputy Director for Clinical Services for DMH. From 1984 to 1989 he served as chief of research for DMH. In that capacity, he designed and implemented a research program to study mental illness in California. The program was replicated by the National Institute of Mental Health and is currently known as the "Public Academic Liaison" research program. During this same period, he also worked as a clinical consultant to the DMH Inpatient Program at California Medical Facility and subsequently as the chief of the Northern California Conditional Release Program.

Steve Cambra

Steve Cambra is the Regional Administrator of the Central Region of the Institutions Division of the California Department of Corrections. He has been in that position since 1992. He is responsible for nine prisons in the region; he supervises the wardens of those nine prisons, as well as the Classification Services Unit, the Correctional Case Records Unit, the Transportation Unit and the Program Support Unit in the Institutions Division. He has worked for the CDC since 1970 and has extensive experience in line and staff positions. He has worked at several prisons as well as in headquarters.

Joel Dvoskin, Ph.D.

Dr. Joel Dvoskin is a clinical psychologist employed as the Associate Commissioner for Forensic Services, New York State Office of Mental Health. In this position, he is responsible for inpatient services at three large forensic hospitals and two

1 regional forensic units, including services to civil, forensic, and
2 correctional patients. He is also responsible for all mental
3 health services in New York State Prisons, and he has other
community and local jail responsibilities.

4 In 1991, Dr. Dvoskin was hired as a consultant by
5 Scarlett Carp & Associates. He worked with Henry Steadman, Ph.D.
6 and Dennis Koson, M.D., to develop the mental health delivery
7 system proposed in the Scarlett Carp report. He has acted as a
consultant to approximately eighteen jurisdictions regarding the
provision of mental health care to incarcerated persons.^{47/}

8 Dennis F. Koson, M.D.

9 Dennis F. Koson, M.D. is a medical doctor licensed in
10 Florida. He also has inactive medical licenses in Michigan,
11 Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Dr. Koson received his medical
12 degree from the University of Michigan Medical School in 1972. He
13 completed his residency in psychiatry at the University of
14 Pennsylvania in 1975. In 1974-75, he was a Fellow in Law and
15 Psychiatry at the Center for Studies in Social-Legal Psychiatry at
16 the University of Pennsylvania as well as a registered auditor at
17 the law school there. He is certified by the American Board of
18 Psychiatry and Neurology and by the American Board of Forensic
19 Psychiatry.

20 Dr. Koson has held several teaching positions, including
21 a consultant position for the National Institute of Corrections,
22 National Academy of Corrections for a course in suicide prevention
23 in jails at the Nova Law Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He
24 has also held positions as a research assistant and as the Director
25 of Research at the State of Michigan Center for Forensic
26 Psychiatry.

27 From 1973 to 1975, Dr. Koson was a part-time psychiatrist
28 at Haveford State Hospital in Haveford, Pennsylvania. From 1974 to
29 1975, he was the Co-Director and Director of Training at the
30 Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania. From
31 1979 to 1980, he was the Assistant Medical Director at Bridgewater
32 State Hospital in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. From 1979 to 1981,
33 he was also an assistant psychiatrist at the Institute of
34 Psychiatry and Law at McLean Hospital in Belmont, Massachusetts.
35 From 1981 to 1982 he was a senior forensic psychiatrist at South
36 Florida State Hospital in Hollywood, Florida.

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47/ Dr. Dvoskin indicated that his curriculum vitae was appended to
his declaration; it was not, so the court is unable to address his
qualifications further.

1 Dr. Koson has served as an expert for special masters and
2 on behalf of parties in four class action lawsuits involving mental
3 health services in corrections departments. In connection with a
4 class action law suit in Puerto Rico he assessed the correctional
5 mental health system, created a remedial system, and has since been
6 monitoring compliance with the plan and serving as a consultant to
7 the federal monitor. He is serving the same role in litigation in
8 Florida. He also served as an expert during similar litigation in
9 Texas. Finally, he served as a federal monitor overseeing
10 compliance with a consent decree and providing consultation and
11 technical assistance in a federal class action in New York State
12 involving mental health services to female prisoners in
13 administrative segregation. He has also had extensive experience
14 treating inmate patients in prisons and jails.
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United States District Court
for the
Eastern District of California
June 6, 1994

day

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* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE * *

2:90-cv-00520

Coleman

v.

Reagan

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California.

That on June 6, 1994, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

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
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