

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNIVERSAL MUSLIM ASSOCIATION)
OF AMERICA; JOHN DOE and JANE)
DOE,)

Plaintiffs,)

v.)

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity)
as President of the United States; U.S.)
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND)
SECURITY; U.S. CUSTOMS AND)
BORDER PROTECTION; U.S.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; U.S.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; JOHN)
KELLY, in his official capacity as Secretary)
of the Department of Homeland Security;)
KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, in his official)
capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S.)
Customs and Border Protection; REX W.)
TILLERSON, in his official capacity as)
Secretary of State; and JEFFERSON)
BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, in his)
official capacity as Attorney General of the)
United States;)

Defendants.)

Civil Case No.: _____

**DECLARATION OF DAVID J. WEINER IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION**

I, David J. Weiner, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testify.
2. I am an attorney at Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. This Declaration is submitted in support of Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed concurrently herewith.

3. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the New York Times dated March 15, 2017 titled "2 Federal Judges Rule Against Trump's Latest Travel Ban." Link: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html>.

4. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 2** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the Washington Post dated February 22, 2017 titled "A new travel ban with 'mostly minor technical differences'? That probably won't cut it, analysts say." Link: <http://wapo.st/2mmmECm>.

5. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 3** is a true and correct copy of a news article from Politico dated November 18, 2015, titled "Trump: 'Absolutely no choice' but to close mosques." Link: <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/trump-close-mosques-216008>.

6. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 4** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a press release published by the presidential campaign website of Donald J. Trump dated December 7, 2015, titled "Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration." Link: <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration>.

7. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 5** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a Twitter post posted by Donald J. Trump on his personal Twitter account at 2:32 PM on December 7, 2015. Link: <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/673993417429524480>.

8. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 6** is a true and correct copy of a printout of an article from Politifact dated January 28, 2016, titled "Christie says neighbors of San Bernardino shooters knew more than they did." Link: <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jan/28/chris-christie/christie-says-neighbors-san-bernardino-shooters-kn/>.

9. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 7** is a true and correct copy of a printout of the transcript of the January 14, 2016 Republican Debate in North Charleston, South Carolina. Link: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=111395>.

10. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 8** is a true and correct copy of a printout of the transcript of an interview by Anderson Cooper with Donald J. Trump that aired on March 9, 2016 on Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees and published by CNN. Link: <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/09/acd.01.html>.

11. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 9** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from Reuters dated June 14, 2016, titled "After Florida shooting, Trump hardens stance on Muslims." Link: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-clinton-idUSKCN0YZ1GE>.

12. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 10** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from Politico dated June 13, 2016, titled "Transcript: Donald Trump's national security speech," containing the transcript of then-candidate Mr. Trump's June 13 speech on national security and terrorism in the wake of the Orlando massacre. Link: <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/transcript-donald-trump-national-security-speech-224273>.

13. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 11** is a true and correct copy of a printout of the transcript of an interview by Chuck Todd with Donald J. Trump that aired on July 24, 2016 on Meet the Press and was published by NBC News. Link: <http://nbcnews.to/29TqPnp>.

14. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 12** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from Slate dated January 29, 2017, titled "Rudy Giuliani Admits Trump Asked How to Implement a Muslim Ban Legally." Link: <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316726-giuliani-trump-asked-me-how-to-do-a-muslim-ban-legally>.

15. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 13** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from ABC News dated November 18, 2016, titled "Donald Trump National Security Adviser Mike Flynn Has Called Islam 'a Cancer.'" Link: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-national-security-adviser-mike-flynn-called/story?id=43575658>.

16. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 14** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from CNN Politics dated November 22, 2016 titled "Michael Flynn in August: Islamism a 'vicious cancer' in body of all Muslims that 'has to be excised.'" Link: <http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/22/politics/kfile-michael-flynn-august-speech/>.

17. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 15** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from USA Today dated January 31, 2017, titled "Steve Bannon's own words show sharp break on security issues." Link: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/01/31/bannon-odds-islam-china-decades-us-foreign-policy-doctrine/97292068/>.

18. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 16** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the Guardian dated February 3, 2017, titled "Steve Bannon's Islamophobic film script just one example of anti-Muslim views." Link: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/03/steve-bannon-islamophobia-film-script-muslims-islam>.

19. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 17** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from USA Today dated February 9, 2017, titled "Bannon, Flynn and Sessions: How Trump's top advisers view Muslims, in their own word." Link: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/02/09/how-some-trump-advisors-see-islam-their-own-words/97662862/>.

20. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 18** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from CBS News dated January 27, 2017 titled "Brody File Exclusive: President Trump Says Persecuted Christians Will Be Given Priority as Refugees." Link: <http://bit.ly/2kCqG8M>.

21. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 19** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the New York Times dated January 31, 2017, titled "More People Were Affected by Travel Ban Than Trump Originally Said." Link:

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/trump-ban-immigrants-refugees.html>.

22. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 20** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a one page Department of State letter from the Deputy Assistant Visa Secretary for Visa Services dated January 27, 2017. Link: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3440712-DOS-letter.html>.

23. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 21** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a press release dated January 29, 2017 titled "Statement by Senators McCain & Graham on Executive Order on Immigration." Link: <http://bit.ly/2nkx3SW>.

24. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 22** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a Twitter post posted by Donald J. Trump on his personal Twitter account at 3:35 PM on February 9, 2017. Link: <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/829836231802515457>.

25. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 23** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from CNN dated January 30, 2017 titled "Inside the Confusion of the Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban." Link: <http://cnn.it/2kGdcZy>.

26. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 24** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a Department of Homeland Security Intelligence document published by the Associated Press on February 24, 2017. Link: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730-DHS-intelligence-document-on-President-Donald.html>.

27. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 25** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the New York Times dated January 31, 2017, titled "State Dept. Dissent Cable on Trump's Ban Draws 1,000 Signatures." Link: <https://nyti.ms/2jS5A6o>.

28. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 26** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a State Department Dissent cable titled "Dissent Channel: Alternatives to Closing Doors in Order to Secure Our Borders." Link: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3438487/Dissent-Memo.pdf>.

29. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 27** is a true and correct copy of a printout of the Joint Declaration of Madeleine K. Albright, Avril D. Haines, Michael V. Hayden, John F. Kerry, John E. McLaughlin, Lisa O. Monaco, Michael J. Morell, Janet A. Napolitano, Leon E. Panetta, and Susan E. Rice in *Washington v. Trump*, No. 17-35105, ECF 28-2. Link: <http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/02/06/17-35105%20opposition%20exhibit.pdf>.

30. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 28** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a letter dated January 30, 2017 from former national security officials to Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly, then-Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, and then-Acting Secretary of State Thomas Shannon. Link: <https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/finalrefugeeletter01302017.pdf>.

31. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 29** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the New York Times dated January 28, 2017, titled "Immigration Ban Is Unlikely to Reduce Terrorist Threat, Experts Say." Link: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/politics/a-sweeping-order-unlikely-to-reduce-terrorist-threat.html>.

32. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 30** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a research report dated January 26, 2017 titled "Muslim-American Involvement with Violent Extremism." Link: https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2017/01/FINAL_Kurzman_Muslim-American_Involvement_in_Violent_Extremism_2016.pdf.

33. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 31** is a true and correct copy of a printout of an opinion piece from CNN dated January 30, 2017 titled "Trump's travel ban wouldn't have

stopped these deadly terrorists.” Link: <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/opinions/travel-ban-wouldnt-have-stopped-these-deadly-terrorists-bergen-sterman/>.

34. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 32** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a publication from New America titled “Terrorism in America After 9/11, Part II: Who are the Terrorists?” Link: <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists/>.

35. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 33** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the New York Times dated March 11, 2017 titled “Trump’s Revised Travel Ban Is Denounced by 134 Foreign Policy Experts.” Link: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-denounced-foreign-policy-experts.html>.

36. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 34** is a true and correct copy of a printout of chapter 5 in a research report from the U.S. Department of State dated March 13, 2017 titled “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.” Link: <https://tinyurl.com/jap2fpf>.

37. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 35** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a letter from Senators Sessions and Cruz to President Obama dated June 14, 2016. Link: https://web.archive.org/web/20161109030307/http://www.sessions.senate.gov/public/_cache/file/s/f9d1d9f4-6ee8-42ff-a5f2-29a2518fe2f7/06.14.16-sens.-sessions-cruz-to-president-obama-on-terrorism-immigration.pdf.

38. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 36** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a publication from the Cato Institute dated January 25, 2017 titled “Little National Security Benefit to Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration.” Link: <https://www.cato.org/blog/little-national-security-benefit-trumps-executive-order-immigration>.

39. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 37** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the Oregonian dated March 7, 2017 titled "Trump Used Failed Portland Car Bomb Plot as Justification for New Travel Ban." Link: <http://bit.ly/2nt4aRV>.

40. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 38** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a research report from the Pew Research Center dated October 7, 2009 titled "Mapping the Global Muslim Population." Link: <http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/#footnotes>.

41. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 39** is a true and correct copy of a printout of an archived entry from the BBC dated August 19, 2008 titled "Sunni and Shi'a." Link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml.

42. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 40** is a true and correct copy of a printout of an analysis by the Washington Post dated November 21, 2016 titled "Shiites are participating in the world's largest pilgrimage today. Here's how they view the world." Link: <http://wapo.st/2g8oR4W>.

43. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 41** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article by the Independent dated January 17, 2017 titled "Yemen civil war: 10,000 civilians killed and 40,000 injured in conflict, UN reveals." Link: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-civilian-death-toll-10000-killed-40000-injured-conflict-un-reveals-a7530836.html>.

44. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 42** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from The Guardian dated January 16, 2017 titled "Yemen death toll has reached 10,000, UN says." Link: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/16/yemen-war-death-toll-has-reached-10000-un-says>.

45. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 43** is a true and correct copy of a printout of the country profiles of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from a CIA publication titled the "CIA World Factbook." Link: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.

46. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 44** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from Newsweek dated January 31, 2017 titled "Where Do Terrorists Come From? Not the Nations Named in Trump Ban." Link: <http://www.newsweek.com/where-do-terrorists-come-not-seven-countries-named-550581>.

47. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 45** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a research report from the Pew Research Center dated January 30, 2017 titled "Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S." Link: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/>.

48. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 46** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the New York Times dated March 6, 2017 titled "Don't Be Fooled, Trump's New Muslim Ban Is Still Illegal." Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/dont-be-fooled-trumps-new-muslim-ban-is-still-illegal.html?_r=0.

49. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 47** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a blog article dated March 10, 2017 titled "The Travel Ban Executive Order as Separation-of-Powers Test Case." Link: <https://www.justsecurity.org/38675/travel-ban-executive-order-separation-of-powers-test-case/>.

50. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 48** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a blog article from LawNewz dated March 6, 2017 titled "President Trump Signs New Travel Ban Executive Order." Link: <http://lawnewz.com/high-profile/breaking-president-trump-signs-new-executive-order-on-immigration-ends-indefinite-ban-on-syrian-refugees/>.

51. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 49** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the Washington Post dated February 24, 2017 titled "DHS Report Casts Doubt on Need for Trump Travel Ban." Link: <http://wapo.st/2lOkpKW>.

52. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 50** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch dated February 4, 2017 titled "Trump lashes Out at Federal Judge Over Ruling on Travel Ban." Link: http://www.stltoday.com/news/national/govt-and-politics/trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judge-over-ruling-on-travel/article_40fcf6cf-8dd3-5ff1-a561-d0897195aec0.html.

53. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 51** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from NBC News dated March 6, 2017 titled "Donald Trump Expected to Sign New Immigration Order: A Timeline." Link: <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/donald-trump-expected-sign-new-immigration-order-timeline-n729186>.

54. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 52** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from CNN dated March 1, 2017 titled "Trump Delays New Travel Ban After Well-Reviewed Speech." Link: <http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/28/politics/trump-travel-ban-visa-holders/>.

55. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 53** is a true and correct copy of a printout of Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States dated March 6, 2017. Link: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states>.

56. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 54** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a blog article from the Cato Institute dated January 26, 2017 titled "Guide to Trump's Executive Order to Limit Migration for 'National Security' Reasons." Link: <https://www.cato.org/blog/guide-trumps-executive-order-limit-migration-national-security-reasons>.

57. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 55** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a research report from Politifact dated January 29, 2017 titled "No terrorist attacks post 9/11 by people from countries in Trump's travel bans?" Link: <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/jan/29/erold-nadler/have-there-been-terrorist-attacks-post-911-countri/>.

58. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 56** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from ABC News dated January 29, 2017 titled "Trump Spars With Sens. McCain and Graham After They Criticize Travel Ban." Link: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/handful-gop-senators-representatives-criticize-trump-travel-ban/story?id=45121595>.

59. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 57** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the Washington Post dated January 29, 2017 titled "Trump's Travel Ban Is a Gift to Iran's Rulers." Link: <http://wapo.st/2kDw1NR>.

60. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 58** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from Al Jazeera dated January 16, 2017 titled "Death toll in Yemen conflict passes 10,000." Link: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/death-toll-yemen-conflict-passes-10000-170117040849576.html>.

61. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 59** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from BBC News dated December 8, 2015 titled "Trump's 'Muslim Lockdown': What Is the Center for Security Policy?" Link: <http://bbc.in/1U0yVr4>.

62. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 60** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a research report from the Bridge Initiative dated December 7, 2015 titled "Trump Calls for Ban on Muslims, Cites Deeply Flawed Poll." Link: <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/new-poll-on-american-muslims-is-grounded-in-bias-riddled-with-flaws/>.

63. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 61** is a true and correct copy of a printout of an article from Politifact dated December 9, 2015 titled "Trump cites shaky survey in call to ban Muslims from entering US." Link: <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/dec/09/donald-trump/trump-cites-shaky-survey-call-ban-muslims-entering/>.

64. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 62** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from The Washington Times dated June 9, 2009 titled "Gaffney: America's first Muslim president?" Link: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/9/americas-first-muslim-president/>.

65. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 63** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from CBS News dated July 17, 2016 titled "The Republican Ticket: Trump and Pence." Link: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-trump-pence-republican-ticket/>.

66. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 64** is a true and correct copy of a printout of the transcript of the October 9, 2016 Republican Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. Link: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119038>.

67. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 65** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from Talking Points Memo dated January 27, 2017 titled "Trump Signs Executive Order Laying Out 'Extreme Vetting.'" Link: <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/trump-signs-vetting-executive-order>.

68. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 66** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a Twitter post posted by Donald J. Trump on his personal Twitter account at 5:31 AM on January 30, 2017. Link: <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/826060143825666051>.

69. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 67** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a Twitter post posted by Donald J. Trump on his personal Twitter account at 4:50 AM on February 1, 2017. Link: <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/826774668245946368>.

70. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 68** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a Twitter post posted by Donald J. Trump on his personal Twitter account at 7:03 AM on January 29, 2017. Link: <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/825721153142521858>.

71. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 69** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a research report from the Pew Research Center dated October 6, 2016 titled "U.S. admits record number of Muslim refugees in 2016." Link: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/u-s-admits-record-number-of-muslim-refugees-in-2016/>.


72. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 70** is a true and correct copy of a news article from Politico dated February 21, 2017 titled "Trump: 'White House creates confusion about future of Trump's travel ban.'" Link: <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-travel-ban-confusion-235241>.

73. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 71** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from USA Today dated February 24, 2017 titled "DHS memo contradicts threats cited by Trump's travel ban." Link: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/02/24/dhs-memo-contradict-travel-ban-trump/98374184/>.

74. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 72** is a true and correct copy of a printout of a news article from the Washington Post dated March 16, 2017 titled "Federal judge in Hawaii freezes President Trump's new entry ban." Link: <http://wapo.st/2nlGRMY>.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 2nd day of March, 2017.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David J. Weiner', is written over a horizontal line. The signature is stylized with a large initial 'D' and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

David J. Weiner (D. # 499806)
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Washington, DC 20001
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EXHIBIT 27

Response to Emergency Motion Exhibit A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-35105

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs-Appellees,	)	
	)	JOINT DECLARATION OF
vs.	)	MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT,
	)	AVRIL D. HAINES
	)	MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
	)	JOHN F. KERRY
	)	JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN
DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the	)	LISA O. MONACO
United States, et al.,	)	MICHAEL J. MORELL
	)	JANET A. NAPOLITANO
Defendants-Appellants.	)	LEON E. PANETTA
	)	SUSAN E. RICE
	)	
	)	
	)	

We, Madeleine K. Albright, Avril D. Haines, Michael V. Hayden, John F. Kerry, John E. McLaughlin, Lisa O. Monaco, Michael J. Morell, Janet A. Napolitano, Leon E. Panetta, and Susan E. Rice declare as follows:

1. We are former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials in the United States Government:
 - a. Madeleine K. Albright served as Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. A refugee and naturalized American citizen, she served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1993 to 1997 and has been a member of the Central Intelligence Agency External Advisory Board since 2009 and the Defense Policy Board since 2011, in which capacities she has received assessments of threats facing the United States.
 - b. Avril D. Haines served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2013 to 2015, and as Deputy National Security Advisor from 2015 to January 20, 2017.
 - c. Michael V. Hayden served as Director of the National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009.
 - d. John F. Kerry served as Secretary of State from 2013 to January 20, 2017.

- e. John E. McLaughlin served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2000-2004 and Acting Director of CIA in 2004. His duties included briefing President-elect Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush.
- f. Lisa O. Monaco served as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013 to January 20, 2017.
- g. Michael J. Morell served as Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 2011 and from 2012 to 2013, Deputy Director from 2010 to 2013, and as a career official of the CIA from 1980. His duties included briefing President George W. Bush on September 11, 2001, and briefing President Barack Obama regarding the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden.
- h. Janet A. Napolitano served as Secretary of Homeland Security from 2009 to 2013.
- i. Leon E. Panetta served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2009-11 and as Secretary of Defense from 2011-13.
- j. Susan E. Rice served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2009-13 and as National Security Advisor from 2013 to January 20, 2017.

2. We have collectively devoted decades to combatting the various terrorist threats that the United States faces in a dynamic and dangerous world. We have all held the highest security clearances. A number of us have worked at senior levels in administrations of both political parties. Four of us (Haines, Kerry, Monaco and Rice) were current on active intelligence regarding all credible terrorist threat streams directed against the U.S. as recently as one week before the issuance of the Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order on "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" ("Order").

3. We all agree that the United States faces real threats from terrorist networks and must take all prudent and effective steps to combat them, including the appropriate vetting of travelers to the United States. We all are nevertheless unaware of any specific threat that would justify the travel ban established by the Executive Order issued on January 27, 2017. We view the Order as one that ultimately undermines the national security of the United States, rather than making us safer. In our professional opinion, this Order cannot be justified on national security or foreign policy grounds. It does not perform its declared task of "protecting the nation from foreign terrorist entry into the United States." To the contrary, the Order disrupts thousands of lives, including those of refugees and visa holders all previously vetted by standing procedures that the Administration has not shown to be inadequate. It could do long-term damage to our national security and foreign policy interests, endangering U.S. troops in the field and disrupting counterterrorism and national security partnerships. It will aid ISIL's propaganda effort and serve its recruitment message by feeding into the narrative that the United States is at war with Islam. It will hinder relationships with the very communities that law enforcement professionals need to address the threat. It will have a damaging humanitarian and economic impact on the lives and jobs of American citizens and residents. And apart from all of these concerns, the Order offends our nation's laws and values.

4. There is no national security purpose for a total bar on entry for aliens from the seven named countries. Since September 11, 2001, not a single terrorist attack in the United States has been perpetrated by aliens from the countries named in the Order. Very few attacks on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001 have been traced to foreign nationals at all. The overwhelming majority of attacks have been committed by U.S. citizens. The Administration has identified no information or basis for believing there is now a heightened or particularized future threat from the seven named countries. Nor is there any rational basis for exempting from the ban particular religious minorities (e.g., Christians), suggesting that the real target of the ban remains one religious group (Muslims). In short, the Administration offers no reason why it abruptly shifted to group-based bans when we have a tested individualized vetting system developed and implemented by national security professionals across the government to guard the homeland, which is continually re-evaluated to ensure that it is effective.

5. In our professional opinion, the Order will harm the interests of the United States in many respects:

- a. The Order will endanger U.S. troops in the field. Every day, American soldiers work and fight alongside allies in some of the named countries who put their lives on the line to protect Americans. For example, allies who would be barred by the Order work alongside our men and women in Iraq fighting against ISIL. To the extent that the Order bans travel by individuals cooperating against ISIL, we risk placing our military efforts at risk by sending an insulting message to those citizens and all Muslims.
- b. The Order will disrupt key counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security partnerships that are critical to our obtaining the necessary information sharing and collaboration in intelligence, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic channels to address the threat posed by terrorist groups such as ISIL. The international criticism of the Order has been intense, and it has alienated U.S. allies. It will strain our relationships with partner countries in Europe and the Middle East, on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism cooperation, undermining years of effort to bring them closer. By alienating these partners, we could lose access to the intelligence and resources necessary to fight the root causes of terror or disrupt attacks launched from abroad, before an attack occurs within our borders.
- c. The Order will endanger intelligence sources in the field. For current information, our intelligence officers may rely on human sources in some of the countries listed. The Order breaches faith with those very sources, who have risked much or all to keep Americans safe – and whom our officers had promised always to protect with the full might of our government and our people.
- d. Left in place, the Executive Order will likely feed the recruitment narrative of ISIL and other extremists that portray the United States as at war with Islam. As government officials, we took every step we could to counter violent extremism. Because of the Order's disparate impact against Muslim travelers and immigrants, it feeds ISIL's narrative and sends the wrong message to the Muslim community here at home and all over the world: that

the U.S. government is at war with them based on their religion. The Order may even endanger Christian communities, by handing ISIL a recruiting tool and propaganda victory that spreads their message that the United States is engaged in a religious war.

- e. The Order will disrupt ongoing law enforcement efforts. By alienating Muslim-American communities in the United States, it will harm our efforts to enlist their aid in identifying radicalized individuals who might launch attacks of the kind recently seen in San Bernardino and Orlando.
- f. The Order will have a devastating humanitarian impact. When the Order issued, those disrupted included women and children who had been victimized by actual terrorists. Tens of thousands of travelers today face deep uncertainty about whether they may travel to or from the United States: for medical treatment, study or scholarly exchange, funerals or other pressing family reasons. While the Order allows for the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to agree to admit travelers from these countries on a case-by-case basis, in our experience it would be unrealistic for these overburdened agencies to apply such procedures to every one of the thousands of affected individuals with urgent and compelling needs to travel.
- g. The Order will cause economic damage to American citizens and residents. The Order will affect many foreign travelers, particularly students, who annually inject hundreds of billions into the U.S. economy, supporting well over a million U.S. jobs. Since the Order issued, affected companies have noted its adverse impacts on many strategic economic sectors, including defense, technology, medicine, culture and others.

6. As a national security measure, the Order is unnecessary. National security-based immigration restrictions have consistently been tailored to respond to: (1) specific, credible threats based on individualized information, (2) the best available intelligence and (3) thorough interagency legal and policy review. This Order rests not on such tailored grounds, but rather, on (1) general bans (2) not supported by any new intelligence that the Administration has claimed, or of which we are aware, and (3) not vetted through careful interagency legal and policy review. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has developed a rigorous system of security vetting, leveraging the full capabilities of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. This vetting is applied to travelers not once, but multiple times. Refugees receive the most thorough vetting of any traveler to the United States, taking on the average more than a year. Successive administrations have continually worked to improve this vetting through robust information-sharing and data integration to identify potential terrorists without resorting to a blanket ban on all aliens and refugees. Because various threat streams are constantly mutating, as government officials, we sought continually to improve that vetting, as was done in response to particular threats identified by U.S. intelligence in 2011 and 2015. Placing additional restrictions on individuals from certain countries in the visa waiver program –as has been done on occasion in the past – merely allows for more individualized vettings before individuals with particular passports are permitted to travel to the United States.

7. In our professional opinion, the Order was ill-conceived, poorly implemented and ill-explained. The “considered judgment” of the President in the prior cases where courts have

deferred was based upon administrative records showing that the President's decision rested on cleared views from expert agencies with broad experience on the matters presented to him. Here, there is little evidence that the Order underwent a thorough interagency legal and policy processes designed to address current terrorist threats, which would ordinarily include a review by the career professionals charged with implementing and carrying out the Order, an interagency legal review, and a careful policy analysis by Deputies and Principals (at the cabinet level) before policy recommendations are submitted to the President. We know of no interagency process underway before January 20, 2017 to change current vetting procedures, and the repeated need for the Administration to clarify confusion after the Order issued suggest that that Order received little, if any advance scrutiny by the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security or the Intelligence Community. Nor have we seen any evidence that the Order resulted from experienced intelligence and security professionals recommending changes in response to identified threats.

8. The Order is of unprecedented scope. We know of no case where a President has invoked his statutory authority to suspend admission for such a broad class of people. Even after 9/11, the U.S. Government did not invoke the provisions of law cited by the Administration to broadly bar entrants based on nationality, national origin, or religious affiliation. In past cases, suspensions were limited to particular individuals or subclasses of nationals who posed a specific, articulable threat based on their known actions and affiliations. In adopting this Order, the Administration alleges no specific derogatory factual information about any particular recipient of a visa or green card or any vetting step omitted by current procedures.

9. Maintaining the district court's temporary restraining order while the underlying legal issues are being adjudicated would not jeopardize national security. It would simply preserve the status quo ante, still requiring that individuals be subjected to all the rigorous legal vetting processes that are currently in place. Reinstating the Executive Order would wreak havoc on innocent lives and deeply held American values. Ours is a nation of immigrants, committed to the faith that we are all equal under the law and abhor discrimination, whether based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. As government officials, we sought diligently to protect our country, even while maintaining an immigration system free from intentional discrimination, that applies no religious tests, and that measures individuals by their merits, not stereotypes of their countries or groups. Blanket bans of certain countries or classes of people are beneath the dignity of the nation and Constitution that we each took oaths to protect. Rebranding a proposal first advertised as a "Muslim Ban" as "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" does not disguise the Order's discriminatory intent, or make it necessary, effective, or faithful to America's Constitution, laws, or values.

10. For all of the foregoing reasons, in our professional opinion, the January 27 Executive Order does not further – but instead harms – sound U.S. national security and foreign policy.

Respectfully submitted,

s/MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT*

s/AVRIL D. HAINES

s/MICHAEL V. HAYDEN

s/JOHN F. KERRY

s/JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN

s/LISA O. MONACO

s/MICHAEL J. MORELL

s/JANET A. NAPOLITANO

s/LEON E. PANETTA

s/SUSAN E. RICE

*All original signatures are on file with Harold Hongju Koh, Rule of Law Clinic, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT. 06520-8215 203-432-4932

We declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. [Individual signature pages follow]

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017

Madeline Albright


MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

EXHIBIT 111 Filed 5th day of February, 2017





AVRIL D. HAINES

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017


MICHAEL V. HAYDEN

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017


JOHN F. KERRY


JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Lisa Monaco". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Lisa" and last name "Monaco" clearly distinguishable.

LISA O. MONACO

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Michael J. Morrell".

MICHAEL J. MORRELL

MORELL

Handwritten initials "mjw" enclosed within a hand-drawn circle.

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017

/s/

JANET A. NAPOLITANO

13

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017



LEONE E. PANETTA

13

EXECUTED this 5th day of February, 2017

/s/

SUSAN E. RICE

EXHIBIT 28

The Honorable John F. Kelly
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

January 30, 2017

The Honorable Sally Yates
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530

The Honorable Thomas A. Shannon
Acting Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Secretary Kelly, Acting Attorney General Yates, Acting Secretary Shannon:

As former cabinet Secretaries, senior government officials, diplomats, military service members and intelligence community professionals who have served in the Bush and Obama administrations, we, the undersigned, have worked for many years to make America strong and our homeland secure. Therefore, we are writing to you to express our deep concern with President Trump's recent Executive Order directed at the immigration system, refugees and visitors to this country. This Order not only jeopardizes tens of thousands of lives, it has caused a crisis right here in America and will do long-term damage to our national security.

In the middle of the night, just as we were beginning our nation's commemoration of the Holocaust, dozens of refugees onboard flights to the United States and thousands of visitors were swept up in an Order of unprecedented scope, apparently with little to no oversight or input from national security professionals.

Individuals, who have passed through multiple rounds of robust security vetting, including just before their departure, were detained, some reportedly without access to lawyers, right here in U.S. airports. They include not only women and children whose lives have been upended by actual radical terrorists, but brave individuals who put their own lives on the line and worked side-by-side with our men and women in uniform in Iraq now fighting against ISIL. Now, because of actions taken by this White House, their lives have been disrupted and they may even be in greater danger if they are sent home. Many more thousands going through the process will now be left behind. More broadly, tens of thousands of other travelers, including dual citizens and, at one point, legal U.S. residents face deep uncertainty about whether they may even travel to the United States or risk leaving and being barred reentry.

Many of us have worked for years to keep America safe from terrorists. Many of us were on the job working for our country on 9/11 and need no reminder just how vital it is to destroy terrorist networks and bring partners to our side in that global effort. Simply put, this Order will harm our national security. Partner countries in Europe and the Middle East, on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism cooperation, are already objecting to this action and distancing themselves from the United States, shredding years of

effort to bring them closer to us. Moreover, because the Order discriminates against Muslim travelers and immigrants, it has already sent exactly the wrong message to the Muslim community here at home and all over the world: that the U.S. government is at war with them based on their religion. We may even endanger Christian communities, by handing ISIL a recruiting tool and propaganda victory that spreads their horrific message that the United States is engaged in a religious war. We need to take every step we can to counter violent extremism, not to feed into it by fueling ISIL propaganda.

Perhaps the most tragic irony of this episode is that it is unnecessary. We do not need to turn America into a fortress to keep it secure. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has developed a rigorous system of security vetting, leveraging the full capabilities of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. This vetting is applied to travelers not once, but multiple times. Refugees receive even further scrutiny. In fact, successive administrations have worked to improve this vetting on a near continuous basis, through robust information sharing and data integration to identify potential terrorists. Since 9/11 not a single major terrorist attack has been perpetrated by travelers from the countries named in the Order.

The suddenness of this Order is also troubling. The fact that individuals cleared for admission were literally in the air as the Order went into effect speaks to the haste with which it was developed and implemented. We are concerned that this Order received little, if any scrutiny by the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security or the Intelligence Community. Now that some of these individuals are here in the United States, and thousands of others are stranded, our government's response has appeared disorganized and chaotic. As lawyers take steps to protect their clients who have been detained here or stranded at many other airports, the U.S. government will continue to face a flurry of legal challenges, which could have been avoided. Additionally, by banning travel by individuals cooperating against ISIL, we risk placing our military and diplomatic efforts at risk by sending a clear message to those citizens and all Muslims that the United States does not have their backs. Already, the international push-back has been immense, and threatens to jeopardize critical counterterrorism cooperation.

Fortunately, there is a way out of this self-made crisis. We know that your agencies did not create this situation and we particularly respect that many of you are working to mitigate its damage. Effective immediately, you can apply the discretion given to you under the President's Order to admit into the country the men, women and children who are currently still stranded in airports. The process for doing this is well known to the security professionals within your departments. We urge you to execute it. While it is good to see the withdrawal of the application of the Order to legal permanent residents of the United States, your Departments can immediately work to allow other classes of people into the country, and remove the discriminatory prioritization implicit within the Order. Most critically, we urge you to draw on the insight of the professionals in your departments to recommend that the President revisit and rescind this Order. Blanket bans of certain countries or classes of people is inhumane, unnecessary and counterproductive from a security standpoint, and beneath the dignity of our great nation.

Dr. Madeleine K. Albright
Former Secretary of State

Janet Napolitano
Former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security

Susan Rice
Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Dennis Blair
Former Director of National Intelligence
Admiral, USN, Retired

Michael Hayden
Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Samantha Power
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations

Bill Richardson
Former Governor of New Mexico and United States Ambassador to the United Nations

Tony Blinken
Former Deputy Secretary of State

William Burns
Former Deputy Secretary of State

Bruce Andrews
Former Deputy Secretary of Commerce

Richard Clarke
Former National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism
for the United States

Rudy DeLeon
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense

Heather Higginbottom
Former Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources

Thomas Nides
Former Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources

James Steinberg
Former Deputy Secretary of State

Michael Morrell
Former Acting Director, Central Intelligence
Agency

Matthew Olsen
Former Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center

Rand Beers

Former Acting Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security

James Miller

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

John B. Bellinger III

Former Legal Advisor to the Department of
State

Wendy Sherman

Former Under Secretary of State for Political
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Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns

Former Under Secretary of State for Political
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Suzanne Spaulding

Former Undersecretary for National Protection
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Elliott Cohen

Former Counselor, Department of State

Michael G. Vickers

Former Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence

Michele Flournoy

Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

Tara Sonenshine

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Retired United States Army
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Former United States
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Wendy Chamberlin
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Christopher Cole
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Department of Defense

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Coordinator for the Middle East,
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Gulf Region

Daniel Benjamin
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Counterterrorism, Department of
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Abe Denmark
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for East Asia

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Vice Admiral, USN, Retired

Charles Blanchard
Former General Counsel, United
States Air Force

Paul Eaton
Major General, USA, Retired

Caitlin Hayden
Former National Security
Council Spokesperson

Jarret Blanc
Former Deputy Special
Representative to Afghanistan
and Pakistan

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Major General, Retired, USA

Richard S. Haddad
Major General, USAF, Retired

Barbara Bodine
Former United States
Ambassador to Yemen

Dwayne Edwards
Brigadier General, USA, Retired

Gretchen Herbert
Rear Admiral, USN, Retired

Richard Boucher
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Robert Einhorn
Former Assistant Secretary of
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Mike Breen

Gerald M Feierstein

David Irvine

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Retired

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Former Deputy Chief of Staff,
Department of Homeland
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Former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs

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Former Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
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Randy Manner
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Rick Olson
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Leon Rodriguez
Former Director, U. S.
Citizenship and Immigration
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Former Chief of Staff to the
Deputy Secretary of State

Tommy Ross
Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
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Eric Schwartz

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Former United States
Ambassador to Yemen

Robert Silvers
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Cyber Policy, Department of
Homeland Security

Vikram Singh
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Secretary of Defense for South
and Southeast Asia

Elissa Slotkin
Former Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs

Jeffrey Smith
Former General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency

Julianne "Julie" Smith
Former Deputy National
Security Advisor to the Vice
President of the United States

Michael Smith
Rear Admiral, USN, Retired

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Former Deputy Assistant
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Andrew W. Steinfeld
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Advisor to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Seth M.M. Stodder
Former Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security for Border,
Immigration & Trade Policy

Jake Sullivan
Former National Security
Advisor to the Vice President of
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Antonio Taguba
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Defense for European and
NATO Policy

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General, USA, Retired
Tamara Cofman Wittes
Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State

Moira Whelan
Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Public
Affairs

Jon Brook Wolfsthal
Former Special Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs

Lee Wolosky
Former Special Envoy for
Guantanamo Closure

Stephen N. Xenakis, M.D.
Brigadier General, USA, Retired

CC: Secretary James Mattis, Department of Defense; General Joseph Dunford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

EXHIBIT 29

The New York Times | <https://nyti.ms/2jBTm40>

POLITICS | NEWS ANALYSIS

Immigration Ban Is Unlikely to Reduce Terrorist Threat, Experts Say

By SCOTT SHANE JAN. 28, 2017

Rarely does an executive order announce a more straightforward and laudable purpose than the one President Trump signed on Friday: “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” But the president’s directive is unlikely to significantly reduce the terrorist threat in the United States, which has been a minuscule part of the overall toll of violence since 2001.

Many experts believe the order’s unintended consequences will make the threat worse.

While the order requires the Department of Homeland Security to issue a report within 180 days providing detailed statistics on foreign nationals who commit acts of violence, terrorism researchers have already produced rich and revealing data. For instance, since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, no one has been killed in the United States in a terrorist attack by anyone who emigrated from or whose parents emigrated from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, the seven countries targeted in the order’s 90-day visa ban, according to Charles Kurzman, a sociology professor at the University of North Carolina.

Of Muslim Americans involved in violent extremism of any kind — for instance, charged with plotting terrorism or supporting a terrorist group — only 23 percent had family backgrounds in those countries, said Mr. Kurzman, who just published the latest of his annual studies of Muslim Americans and terrorism.

The larger point of experts is that jihadist attacks garner news attention that far outstrips their prevalence in the United States, and the president's order appears to address not a rational calculation of risks but the visceral fears that terrorists set out to inflame.

There was a random quality to the list of countries: It excluded Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the founders of Al Qaeda and many other jihadist groups have originated. Also excluded are Pakistan and Afghanistan, where persistent extremism and decades of war have produced militants who have occasionally reached the United States. Notably, perhaps, the list avoided Muslim countries where Mr. Trump has major business ventures.

Nor did the list include the European countries where disenfranchised Muslim communities have become hotbeds of militancy, leading to major attacks in Paris and Brussels in the name of the Islamic State. Because no visas are required for travel by most European citizens to the United States, and because of the volume of tourism and business, restricting travel from Europe would have been far more difficult and consequential than banning it from only the seven countries named.

By Mr. Kurzman's count, 123 people have been killed in the United States by Muslim terrorists since the 2001 attacks — out of a total of more than 230,000 killings, by gang members, drug dealers, angry spouses, white supremacists, psychopaths, drunks and people of every description. So the order addresses, at most, one-1,870th of the problem of lethal violence in America. If the toll of Sept. 11 is included, jihadists still account for just over 1 percent of killings.

"My advice to the new administration would be to declare victory," Mr. Kurzman said. For the average American, he added, "your odds of being victimized by a terrorist attack are infinitesimal."

But terrorists — the root of the word means "to cause to tremble" — do not operate in the realm of dry facts and statistics. Their purpose is to terrify, and they use random and spectacular violence to do it, with an invaluable assist from the saturation coverage on cable television and news websites that such outrages inevitably draw.

To the rational calculations of Mr. Kurzman, one might simply reply with the list of American cities where horrific jihadist attacks have occurred in recent years: Boston; San Bernardino, Calif.; and Orlando, Fla. — place names that conjure up images of ghastly wounds, bullet-ridden bodies and frightened people running for cover. In Gallup polls, the number of Americans “very worried” or “somewhat worried” about such attacks generally hovers between 30 and 50 percent, with understandable spikes after new attacks.

In the political realm, where emotions and symbols hold sway, Mr. Trump’s order may reassure some Americans that they are safer from terrorism, and more generally, from concerns that Muslim immigrants may bring an alien culture. (While ostensibly addressing terrorism, it also says that the United States should be protected against those with “hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles” or those “who do not support the Constitution.”)

The trouble with such reassurance, even if it is effective, is that it comes at a high cost, in the view of many experts on terrorism. That cost will be counted not just domestically but also abroad, where the United States relies on allies, including Muslim countries, for intelligence and other help against terrorism.

“In my opinion, this is just a huge mistake in terms of counterterrorism cooperation,” said Daniel Benjamin, formerly the State Department’s top counterterrorism official and now a scholar at Dartmouth. “For the life of me, I don’t see why we would want to alienate the Iraqis when they are the ground force against ISIS.”

At home as well, Mr. Benjamin said, the president’s order is likely to prove counterproductive. The jihadist threat in the United States has turned out to be largely homegrown, he said, and the order will encourage precisely the resentments and anxieties on the part of Muslims that fuel, in rare cases, support for the ideology of the Islamic State or Al Qaeda.

“It sends an unmistakable message to the American Muslim community that they are facing discrimination and isolation,” Mr. Benjamin said. That, he said, will “feed the jihadist narrative” that the United States is at war with Islam, potentially encouraging a few more Muslims to plot violence.

For an action aimed at terrorism, the order appeared to garner little or no support among experts and former officials of every political stripe with experience in the field. Jonathan Schanzer, the vice president for research at the conservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, said that if the temporary visa ban was used to review and improve immigration vetting procedures, it might be justified.

But he added that he knew of no obvious problems with those procedures, and no specific plans to address such issues during the temporary restrictions on visitors and refugees. “The order appears to be based mainly on a campaign promise,” he said.

Mr. Schanzer said he was frustrated that during the Obama administration, there had been inadequate attention to the ultimate driver of refugee flows and jihadist terrorism in the United States and elsewhere. “We have several bloody, complex and interlocking conflicts in the Middle East,” he said. “It’s the job of the new administration to come up with policies that address those conflicts. Admittedly, that is not easy.”

Much easier, clearly, is issuing an executive order with political appeal and a title that seems to smack of common sense. But as the Trump administration is finding out, such pronouncements from an American president have many consequences, not all of them intended, anticipated or desired.


Correction: January 31, 2017

A news analysis article on Sunday about the unlikelihood that President Trump’s executive order on immigration would reduce the terrorist threat misstated the length of the order’s ban on all visitors from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. It is 90 days, not 120 days. (All refugees — including from those seven countries — are subject to the 120-day ban.)

Follow Scott Shane on Twitter @ScottShaneNYT.

A version of this news analysis appears in print on January 29, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Visceral Fear, Dubious Cure.

EXHIBIT 30



Muslim-American Involvement with Violent Extremism, 2016

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JANUARY 26, 2017



Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security

Forty-six Muslim-Americans were associated with violent extremism in 2016, a 40 percent drop from 2015 but higher than the annual average since 9/11 (27 per year, for a total of 414 over more than 15 years). Almost half of the individuals identified in 2016 traveled (8 individuals) or attempted to travel (14 individuals) to join militant groups overseas. Twenty-three individuals were associated with plots against targets in the United States, and one case involved an unknown target (see Figure 1).

Few of these individuals (9 of 46, or 20 percent) had family backgrounds from the seven countries reportedly designated by the Trump administration for temporary immigration bans. Since 9/11, only 23 percent of Muslim-Americans involved with violent extremist plots had family backgrounds in these seven countries (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somali, Sudan, Syria, Yemen). Among plots directed at targets in the U.S., only 6 percent had family backgrounds in these seven countries. There have been no fatalities in the United States caused by extremists with family backgrounds in these countries.

The plots in 2016 were overshadowed by a

This is the eighth annual report on Muslim-American terrorism suspects and perpetrators published by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. These reports, and the data on which they are based, are available at <http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/annual-report>.

single attack, the mass shooting at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, on June 12, 2016, in which 49 people were killed, plus the shooter, and 53 were injured. This was the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since September 11, 2001, when approximately three thousand were killed. Five other attacks in 2016 accounted for five additional deaths, plus two of the attackers, and 53 injuries. The 54 fatalities caused by Muslim-American extremists in 2016 brought the total since 9/11 to 123. More than 240,000 Americans were murdered over the same period.¹ In 2016 alone, 188 Americans were killed in mass shootings.² This figure does not include the victims of Muslim-American extremists.

Rate of Cases Peaked in Early 2015

The number of Muslim-Americans associated with violent extremism peaked in the first half





Figure 2
Muslim-Americans Associated with Violent Extremism Since 9/11
Quarterly Totals



of 2015 (Figure 2). Over the year and a half since then, the rate of incidents and arrests has dropped to 14 or fewer per quarter.

This is more than double the average quarterly rate in the years preceding the rise of the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" in Syria in early 2014. At the same time, the rate is considerably lower than the scale of violent extremism described in statements by James B. Comey, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In October 2015, Comey stated that the FBI had "Islamic State"-related "investigations in all 50 states, over 900 of them."³ In September 2016, Comey told Congress, "We still have about a thousand open investigations on that ["Islamic State"-related extremism]. If there's any good news, and I don't want to squeeze it too hard for good news, it's that the rate of increase has slowed a little in recent months. Now my hope is that it's going to follow the same trajectory as the traveler numbers, and head downward, but it hasn't headed downward yet. We're still opening and closing [cases], and it's ticking up slightly."⁴

Over the past year, the number of indictments and acts of violent extremism was less than 5 percent of the number of investigations reported by FBI Director Comey.

During the 2016 election campaign, however, targets of investigation -- 95 percent of whom were not indicted -- were sometimes treated as proven terrorists. At the Republican National Convention, for example, Senator Joni Ernst of Iowa said, "According to the FBI, ISIS is present in all 50 states. Think about it for a moment. Terrorists from ISIS are in every one of our 50 states."⁵ Venturing even farther from the evidence, presidential candidate Donald Trump said after the mass shooting in Orlando, "You have thousands of shooters like this, with the same mentality, out there in this country, and we're bringing thousands and thousands of them back in to this country every year."⁶

Sixty-five Americans (listed in Figure 4) have been identified, by name or alias, as having traveled to join the Nusra Front or the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" in Syria, Iraq, or Libya, since the civil wars began in those countries in 2011. Of these, 27 have died

Figure 3. Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators, Plots Directed at U.S. Targets, 2016

Name	Location	Plot or alleged plot	Disrupted	Status of case
Edward Archer	Philadelphia, PA	Shot and wounded police officer	No	Trial pending
Samy Mohamed Hamzeh	Milwaukee, WI	Plan to attack Masonic temple	Early	Trial pending
Khalil Abu-Rayyan	Dearborn Heights, MI	Plan to shoot police and church	Early	Trial pending
Daniel Seth Franey	Montesano, WA	Plan to attack military base	Early	Trial pending
Safya Roe Yassin	Buffalo, MO	Threats on social media	Early	Trial pending
Abdul Raheem Ali-Skelton	Brooklyn Park, MN	Communication with "Islamic State"	Early	Pled guilty
James Gonzalo Medina	Miami, FL	Plan to bomb synagogue	Early	Trial pending
Alex Hernandez	State prison, MA	Threat to kill president	Early	Trial pending
Omar Mateen	Orlando, FL	Killed 49 people at nightclub	No	Killed in attack
Mohamed Bailor Jalloh	Sterling, VA	Plan to shoot people	Early	Trial pending
Mahin Khan	Tucson, AZ	Plan to bomb government office	Early	Pled guilty
Sebastian Gregerson	Detroit, MI	Gathered weapons	Late	Trial pending
Erick Jamal Hendricks	Charlotte, NC	Plot to create terrorist cell	Early	Trial pending
Marie Antoinette Castelli	Maysville, KY	Threats on social media	Early	Trial pending
Dahir Adan	St. Cloud, MN	Stabbed people at mall	No	Killed in attack
Ahmad Khan Rahami	Seaside Park, NJ; New York, NY; Elizabeth, NJ	Injured 31 people with explosives	No	Trial pending
Arkan Cetin	Oak Harbor, WA	Killed 5 people at mall	No	Trial pending
Nelash Mohamed Das	Prince George, MD	Plan to kill member of military	Early	Trial pending
Thomas Bastian	State prison, AZ	Plan to bomb prison	Early	Trial pending
Marlonn Hicks	Crown Point, IN	Plan with explosives	Early	Pled guilty
Abdul Razak Ali Artan	Columbus, OH	Drove into and stabbed people	No	Killed in attack
Derrick Thompson	Phoenix, AZ	Plan to purchase firearm	Early	Trial pending
Lionel Williams	Suffolk, VA	Plan with firearms	Late	Trial pending

Early disruption is defined here as coming to the attention of authorities prior to the gathering of weapons or explosives.

overseas; seven are in U.S. custody, including two who defected from the "Islamic State"; and 31 may still be living in "Islamic State" territory.⁷

Attempts to Identify Extremist Motivations

The 23 individuals who engaged in or planned violence in the United States are listed in Figure 3. Six of the individuals engaged in violence, and 17 confided in undercover law enforcement officers or informants and were arrested before engaging in violence.

Thirteen of the arrests took place before any weapons or explosives had been gathered for an attack; the cases of Safya Roe Yassin and Marie Antoinette Castelli involved threats and

distribution of addresses over social media. In the case of Sebastian Gregerson, weapons were gathered but no target had been selected. In one case, Lionel Williams had gathered weapons and suggested via social media that he may have been ready to engage in violence.

All of the disrupted plots appear to have been inspired at least in part by the ideology of the "Islamic State," according to comments made by the suspects that were quoted by law enforcement officers in legal documents. The motivations of the six individuals who engaged in violence are not equally clear. The most straightforward instance of ideological extremism may have been Ahmad Khan Rahami, who injured 31 people with

Figure 4. Muslim-Americans Allegedly Joining Nusra Front or "Islamic State," By Year of Travel

2012 or earlier			
Ahmad Abousamra	Died in Syria in 2015	Third roommate of "Abdul Aliy"*	Possibly living in Syria*
"Abdul Aliy" (@maitrevee)*	Possibly living in Syria*	"Abu Qaqaa"	Possibly living in Syria
First roommate of "Abdul Aliy"*	Died in Syria by 2015*	Russell (Abdullah) Dennison	Possibly living in Syria
Second roommate of "Abdul Aliy"*		*May not be American, according to a reporter in contact with "Abdul Aliy" in 2016	
2013			
Bilal Abood	Arrested in U.S. in 2015	John Georgelas (Yahya Abu Hassan)	Possibly living in Syria
"Abu Dujana al-Amriki"	Died in Syria in 2013	Eric Harroun	Arrested in U.S. in 2013
"Abu Khalid al-Amriki"	Died in Syria in 2015	Amiir Farouk Ibrahim	Died in Syria in 2013
"Abu Muhammad al-Amriki"	Died in Syria in 2015	Omar Kattan	Died in Syria in 2014
Aws Mohammed Younis Al-Jayab	Arrested in U.S. in 2016	Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati	Arrested in U.S. in 2015
Adnan Fazeli	Died in Lebanon in 2015	Nicole Mansfield	Died in Syria in 2013
2014			
Ahmad Abdul Aziz (Abu Bakr Alsinawi)	Possibly living in Syria	Douglas McAuthur McCain	Died in Syria in 2014
"Abu Abdullah al-Amriki"	Died in Iraq in 2015	Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim	Died in Syria in 2014
"Abu Muhammad al-Amriki"	Died in Syria in 2015	Abdirahman S. Mohamud	Arrested in U.S. in 2015
Moner Abusalha	Died in Syria in 2014	Abdirahmaan Muhumed	Died in Syria in 2014
Ridwan al-Haymar	Possibly living in Syria	Hoda Muthana (Umm Jihad)	Possibly living in Syria
Sari Abdullah al-Kambodi (Abu Latifa al-Kambodi)	Possibly living in Syria	Zakia Nasrin	Possibly living in Syria
Erius Alliu	Possibly living in Syria	Reza Niknejad	Possibly living in Syria
Mohimanul Bhuiya (Saleh Muhammad)	Defected in 2014	Abdi Mohamud Nur	Possibly living in Syria
Ariel Bradley	Possibly living in Syria	Abdullah Ramo Pazara	Died in Syria in 2014
Yusra Ismail	Possibly living in Syria	Talmeezur Rahman (Abu Salman al-Hindi)	Possibly living in Syria
Yusuf Jama	Died in Syria in 2014	Rasel Raihan (Abu Abdullah al-Amriki)	Died in Syria in 2015
Jaffrey Khan	Possibly living in Syria	Alberto Renteria (Abu Hudhayfa al-Mexiki)	Possibly living in Syria
Rahmo Kodaimati	Possibly living in Syria	Mohamed Roble	Possibly living in Syria
Father of Kodaimaiti brothers	Possibly living in Syria	"Umar" (@onthatpath3)	Possibly living in Syria
2015			
"Abu Bara al-Mexiki"	Died in Syria in 2015	Muhammad Jamal Khweis	Defected in 2016
Samy El-Goarany	Died in Syria in 2015	Mohammad Maleeh Masha	Possibly living in Syria
Sixto Ramiro Garcia	Died in Syria in 2015		
2015 or earlier			
"Abu Dawoud al-Amriki"	Died in Iraq in 2015	"Chloe"	Possibly living in Syria
"Abu Huraira al-Amriki"	Possibly living in Syria	Khaled ad-Dusarii	Died in Syria in 2015
"Abu Usama al-Amriki"	Died in Iraq in 2015	Executioner of Christians	Possibly living in Libya
"Abu Zeyd"	Possibly living in Syria		
2016 or earlier			
"Abu Asma' al-Amriki" (@al_amriki7964)	Possibly living in Syria	"Abu Zubair as-Somali"	Died in Syria in 2016
"Abu Isma'il al-Amriki"	Possibly living in Iraq	Yusuf Rodriguez (Abu Maria al-Mexiki)	Possibly living in Syria
"Abu Talha al-Amriki"	Possibly living in Libya	David Yambasu (Dawud Qatal al-Amriki)	Died in Libya in 2016

Note: Two individuals who traveled prior to 2016 came to public attention in the past year and are included in the total of 46 Muslim-Americans associated with violent extremism in 2016.

explosives in New York and New Jersey in September 2016. Rahami allegedly wrote in a notebook, which he had with him when he was arrested, "I looked for guidance and Alhumdulillah [thank God] guidance came. Sheikh Anwar [al-Awlaqi of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and] Brother [Abu Muhammad] Adnani [of the] Dawla ["Islamic State"] said it clearly[:] attack the kuffar [unbelievers] in their backyard."⁸ Al-Qaeda and the "Islamic State" are military rivals in Syria, but both have called for Muslims to engage in violence in the United States.

Omar Mateen, who died after killing 49 people in Orlando, Florida, in June 2016, called a local television station during his attack to say, "I did it for ISIS. I did it for the Islamic State."⁹ Months later, however, FBI Director Comey said that "further investigation is needed to determine if this attack was inspired by a foreign terrorist organization. We are spending a tremendous amount of time trying to understand every moment of the killer's path, to understand his motives, and to understand the details of his life."¹⁰

Edward Archer, who shot and wounded a police officer in Philadelphia in January 2016, also claimed ideological inspiration for his attack. Archer told police after his arrest, "I pledge my allegiance to the Islamic State, and that's why I did what I did." No contact with known terrorist suspects was found in his Internet activity.¹¹

Dahir Adan, who stabbed 10 people at a mall in St. Cloud, Minnesota, in September 2016, made no statements about his motivations, but asked at least one victim whether he was Muslim. An "Islamic State" news agency claimed Adan as a "soldier of the Islamic State" in a Twitter post 12 hours after the attack.¹²

The "Islamic State" also took credit for the

actions of Abdul Razak Ali Artan, who drove a car into pedestrians and stabbed several people in Columbus, Ohio, in November 2016. Just before his attack, Artan posted a vague threat on Facebook: "By Allah, we will not let you sleep unless you give peace to the Muslims. You will not celebrate or enjoy any holiday."¹³

Arkan Cetin, who allegedly shot and killed five people at a mall in Burlington, Washington, in September 2016, fits the definition of violent extremism least well. In 2015, a blog featuring his photograph called Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the "Islamic State," "my main dude." Two weeks later, though, the blog called Ali Khamene'i, leader of Iran and an enemy of the "Islamic State," "my other dood."¹⁴ In 2016, another blog featuring Cetin's photograph quoted an anti-"Islamic State" commentary: "Calling to ban all Muslims because of Daesh ["Islamic State"] is the same thing as calling to ban all Catholics because of the IRA [Irish Republican Army]. ... no one should judge and prescribe all of a religion's followers by the actions of an extremist minority. And lest you forget, most of the fighting against Daesh is being done by other Muslims...."¹⁵ Cetin had been institutionalized after a suicide attempt in late 2015.¹⁶ His inclusion in this report, like the inclusion of other marginal cases over the years, should not be taken as a judgment that his motivations reflect an extremist ideology.

This report does not include Suleiman Bengeharsa of Clarksburg, Maryland, among the cases of violent extremism. His extremist comments on social media and linkages with other suspects brought him under federal investigation in 2016, but he has not been charged with any crime.¹⁷ The report also excludes Yusuf Wehelie of Fairfax County, Virginia, who was arrested in 2016 for possession of firearms that he was paid by an undercover agent to transport in a cigarette-

trafficking sting operation. According to the agent, Wehelie allegedly spoke about a desire to attack a military recruitment office in the U.S., but was not accused of making any preparations for an attack.¹⁸

The list of Muslim-American violent extremists also excludes four individuals who were charged with material support for terrorism but were not themselves involved with violence: Azizjon Rakhmatov of Brooklyn, New York, who contributed part of \$2,400 for a friend to attempt to travel to join militants overseas; Nicholas Young of Fairfax, Virginia, who donated \$245 to an undercover agent he thought was in Syria; Robert Blake Jackson of Pensacola, Florida, who lied to federal agents about statements he made on social media in support of "Islamic State"; and Haris Qamar of Burke, Virginia, who also made statements on social media in support of "Islamic State."


These individuals are included on a separate list of non-violent support for terrorism, which has dwindled over the past five years to an annual average of 9 individuals, as compared with an average of 44 per year in the decade after 9/11.

Failure of Demographic Profiling

Over the past year, observers have noted that the Orlando shooter, the New Jersey/New York bomber, and several other Muslim extremists were young adults – either born in the United States or brought to the country as children -- who were raised in the United States by immigrant parents. The children of immigrants form part of "a rich recruiting pool for Al Qaeda and the Islamic State," *The New York Times* reported, because "the uncomfortable in-between status can be especially acute for those with recent immigrant roots." "You have a message at home that's very conservative, and a completely different message from the society around you when you're growing up," according to one expert.¹⁹

However, the children of immigrants do not appear to be overrepresented among Muslim-Americans involved with violent extremism, as compared with their prevalence in the Muslim-American population as a whole.

Figure 5. Comparing Demographic Profiles



According to survey data from the Pew Research Center, 20 percent of Muslim-Americans are converts who did not grow up in Muslim households.²⁰ Among Muslim-Americans involved with violent extremism since 9/11, converts constitute a higher proportion, 36 percent.²¹ This suggests that generational conflict within Muslim immigrant families is not generating a disproportionate level of violent extremism.

In sum, it is not accurate to suggest that Muslim-American violent extremists have a distinct demographic profile. This confirms the conclusion of previous studies²² and of law enforcement agencies. Violent extremists, FBI director Comey testified to Congress in 2014, "do not share a typical profile; their experiences and motives are often distinct."²³

In addition, it is worth noting that several dozen cases per year does not represent a "rich recruiting pool." The annual average (27 cases) is fewer than one in 100,000 of the estimated 3 million Muslims in the United States,²⁴ and fewer than one in 10,000 young adult male Muslims.²⁵

About the author:

Charles Kurzman is a professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and a specialist on Islamic movements. His book, *The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists*, was published by Oxford University Press in 2011. He can be contacted through his website, <http://kurzman.unc.edu>.

Acknowledgments:

I thank the researchers and reporters who responded to my inquiries and shared their research about Muslim-American involvement in violent extremism: Anat Agron, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI); Amarnath Amarasingam and Seamus Hughes, George Washington University Program on Extremism; Jeffrey Breinholt, U.S. Department of Justice; Adam Goldman, New York Times; Veryan Khan, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC); and Peter Neumann, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR).

Notes:

¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States*, 2015, Table 1, "Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1996-2015." The estimate for 2016 is extrapolated from trends in preceding years.

² Mass Shooting Tracker, "U.S. Mass Shootings, 2016," <https://massshootingtracker.org>, January 2017. The figure of 188 fatalities counts only attacks causing four or more deaths, and does not include the 54 deaths caused by Muslim-American extremists. Mass Shooting Tracker counts 476 attacks with four or more deaths or injuries in 2016; Gun Violence Archive (<http://gunviolencearchive.org>) counts 385 such attacks; and Vice News's "Mass Shootings in the United States in 2016" (https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mass-shootings-in-the-united-states-and-europe-in-2016) counts 392 such attacks.

³ James B. Comey, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, speech to counterterrorism experts, Chicago, Illinois, October 23, 2015, audio minute 8:50.

⁴ James B. Comey, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 27, 2016, C-SPAN.org.

⁵ Joni Ernst, speech at the Republican National Convention, Cleveland, Ohio, July 18, 2016, transcribed at <http://www.whatthefolly.com>.

⁶ Donald J. Trump, speaking on "Fox and Friends," Fox News, June 13, 2016.

⁷ These figures include 15 Americans identified in several thousand "Islamic State" intake forms from 2013-2014 that were leaked to journalists in early 2016. Richard Engel, Ben Plessner, Tracy Connor and Jon Schuppe, "The Americans: 15 Who Left the United States to Join ISIS," NBC News, May 16, 2016.

⁸ A photograph of one page of the notebook was published by numerous media outlets on September 21, 2016.

⁹ Omar Mateen quoted by Matthew Gentili, a television producer who answered Mateen's phone call during the nightclub attack, in Scott Fais, "Mateen to News 13 Producer: 'I'm the Shooter. It's Me,'" News 13 (Orlando, Florida), June 15, 2016.

¹⁰ James B. Comey, "Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs," September 27, 2016, FBI.gov.

¹¹ Aubrey Whelan, Mari A. Schaefer, Jeremy Roebuck, and Stephanie Farr, "Police: Gunman Who Shot Cop Pledged Allegiance to the Islamic State," *The Inquirer* (Philadelphia), January 8, 2016.

¹² "Daher Adan: What We Know," *StarTribune* (Minneapolis), September 22, 2016.

¹³ Tracy Connor, Pete Williams and Stephanie Gosk, "Ohio State Attack: Friend says Abdul Razak Ali Artan 'Loved America,'" NBC News, November 29, 2016.

¹⁴ Posts of June 30 and July 13, 2015, <http://meowfraulein.tumblr.com>.

¹⁵ Posted between March 22 and September 23, 2016, <http://arcanmotherussiaavodkaandak47.tumblr>.

¹⁶ Jessie Stensland, "Records Document Mall Shooting Suspect's Tormented Past," *Whidbey* (Washington) *News-Times*, October 4, 2016.

¹⁷ Robert Snell, "FBI Probes Md. Terror Link in Detroit Case," *Detroit News*, September 21, 2016; Scott Shane and Adam Goldman, "Extremist Imam Tests F.B.I. and the Limits of the Law," *New York Times*, September 30, 2016; Robert Snell, "Detroit Terror Suspect Part of Broader Group, Feds Say," *Detroit News*, December 22, 2016.

¹⁸ Rachel Weiner, "Detained Six Years Ago in Egypt and Arrested Now on a Weapons Charge," *Washington Post*, July 13, 2016.

¹⁹ Scott Shane, Richard Pérez-Peña And Aurelien Breeden, "'In-Betweeners' Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists," *New York Times*, September 22, 2016.

²⁰ Calculated from the Pew Research Center's "2011 Muslim American Survey" dataset (downloaded from <http://www.people-press.org/category/datasets/?download=20050837>).

²¹ The dataset of Muslim-Americans associated with violent extremism does not have information on parents' birthplace. According to Pew's "2011 Muslim American Survey" dataset, 7 percent of the Muslim population was born in the United States to non-immigrant Muslim parents. The Pew survey does not include detailed information on the respondents' age at migration to the United States, so no comparison can be made about immigrants who arrived as children.

²² Charles Kurzman, "Muslim-American Terrorism: Declining Further," Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, February 1, 2013; Karen J. Greenberg, "Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States, March 1, 2014-June 30, 2016," Center on National Security, Fordham Law School, July 2016, page 24.

²³ James B. Comey, "Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee," June 11, 2014, FBI.gov. Comey's predecessor as director of the FBI, Robert S. Mueller III, offered the same conclusion, using almost the same wording, in Congressional hearings on October 6, 2010; April 7, 2011; May 9, 2012; September 19, 2012; March 19, 2013; and May 16, 2013.

²⁴ Besheer Mohamed, "A New Estimate of the U.S. Muslim Population," Pew Research Center, January 6, 2016.

²⁵ This rate is based on the proportion of Muslims age 18-29, which is estimated at 36 percent of adult Muslims, according to two separate surveys: Gallup, "Muslim Americans: A National Portrait," 2009, page 22; Pew Research Center, "Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism," August 2011, page 14. I have estimated the percent of adults in the Muslim population at 40 percent, based on the number of children reported in the Pew Research Center's "2011 Muslim American Survey" dataset.

EXHIBIT 31

Trump's travel ban wouldn't have stopped these deadly terrorists

 cnn.com/2017/01/30/opinions/travel-ban-wouldnt-have-stopped-these-deadly-terrorists-bergen-sterman/

1/30/2017

Story highlights

- None of those who have conducted lethal jihadist terror attacks in the US since 9/11 emigrated from a country that is under the Trump travel ban, authors write

"Peter Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, a vice president at New America and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. He is the author of "United States of Jihad: Investigating America's Homegrown Terrorists." David Sberman is a policy analyst at New America's International Security Program."

(CNN)Twelve terrorists have conducted deadly jihadist terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11, killing a total of 94 people. None of those twelve -- who are all American citizens or legal residents -- emigrated from or were born into a family that emigrated from a country that is the subject of the Trump administration's travel ban.

Indeed, seven of the twelve terrorists are native-born U.S. citizens, hailing from cities such as Memphis and Arlington, Virginia, according to research by New America. And none of the 9/11 attackers came from any of the seven countries listed by Trump's executive order.

New America also found that three potentially serious attacks in the US since 9/11 that did not end up killing anyone were perpetrated by terrorists from countries that are covered by Trump's ban, two from Somalia and one from Iran.

Of the almost 400 individuals accused of jihadist terrorism crimes since 9/11 in the United States -- ranging from crimes such as murder to less serious crimes such as sending small sums of money to a terrorist organization -- almost half are native-born American citizens, and more than 80 percent are US citizens or legal permanent residents.

Half of the deadly attackers in the US since 9/11 come from families that trace their origins either to the United States or to Pakistan, which is not included on Trump's travel ban list.

President Donald Trump on Friday issued an executive order banning travel to the United States from seven majority Muslim countries -- Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia, which had all been identified as "countries of concern" by the Obama administration.

Of the twelve lethal terrorists in the United States since 9/11:

- Three are African-Americans
- Three are from families that hailed originally from Pakistan
- Two came from Russia as children
- One was US-born and descended from family that emigrated from the Palestinian Territories
- One emigrated from Egypt and carried out an attack a decade after arriving
- One each had families that originally came from Kuwait and Afghanistan

None of these countries are on the travel ban list.

The only lethal terrorist to immigrate to the United States as an adult and conduct an attack shortly after arriving is Tashfeen Malik, who was born in Pakistan. She entered the United States on a K-1 visa for spouses of American citizens in July 2014 and obtained her green card a year later, only a few months before she and her husband killed 14 people attending an office meeting in San Bernardino, California.

Tashfeen Malik's entry provides no basis for Trump's travel ban as she was born in Pakistan, a country not covered by the ban. And she was only able to enter the United States on her visa because she married Syed Rizwan Farook, an American citizen born in the United States, who conducted the attack with her.

According to a criminal complaint, Farook obtained firearms and explosives and planned terrorist attacks in California with another alleged co-conspirator years before his wife entered the country.

In addition to the 12 terrorists who carried out lethal attacks in the United States there are also 15 jihadist terrorists since 9/11 that intended to carry out lethal attacks inside the country, but were foiled. One such case involved the Nigerian "underwear bomber" who tried to blow up an American passenger jet over Detroit in 2009.

What Trump said about travel ban is false



Three of these foiled attacks were perpetrated by terrorists from countries that are covered by Trump's ban, two from Somalia and one from Iran.

Mohammed Taheri-Azar, a naturalized US citizen hailing from Iran, crashed his SUV into a crowd at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2006, injuring nine people.

Abdul Razak Ali Artan, a Somali who entered the United States as a refugee, similarly plowed his car into a crowd at Ohio State in November. He was killed by police before he could kill anyone.

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While there is scant national security justification for Trump's executive order, the order has taken its own toll on American national security.

It has played into ISIS' narrative of a West at war with Islam.

It has undermined the trust of locals supporting American counterterrorism missions abroad by denying entry to US military translators who have been promised visas.

The ban also risks upsetting relations with Iraq at a time when the United States is relying upon the Iraqi government to help defeat ISIS.

And while it remains in effect, it wreaks havoc on those now stuck in detention, sometimes split from their families.

EXHIBIT 32

In Depth
Terrorism in America After 9/11

Part II. Who are the Terrorists?

Part II. Who are the Terrorists?

Part II. Who are the Terrorists?

They are as “American as Apple Pie”


In the post-9/11 era, conventional wisdom holds that the jihadist threat is foreign. The conventional wisdom is understandable; after all it was 19 Arab hijackers who infiltrated the United States and conducted the 9/11 attacks. Yet today, as Anwar al-Awlaki, the American born cleric who became a leader in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, put it in a 2010 post, “Jihad is becoming as American as apple pie.” Far from being foreign infiltrators, the large majority of jihadist

terrorists in the United States have been American citizens or legal residents. Moreover, while a range of citizenship statuses are represented, every jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or legal resident.

Far from being foreign infiltrators, the large majority of jihadist terrorists in the United States have been American citizens or legal residents.

Citizenship Status at Time of Charge or Death

Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.



The Trump Travel Ban and Lethal Attacks

On January 27, 2017 President Donald Trump issued an executive order banning entry from seven majority Muslim countries (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia) citing national security reasons. None of the deadly attackers since 9/11 emigrated or came from a family that emigrated from one of these countries nor were any of the 9/11 attackers from the listed countries. Eight of the lethal attackers were born American citizens. On March 6, 2017, the Trump administration issued a new executive order that dropped Iraq from the travel ban among other changes.


Of the thirteen lethal jihadist terrorists in the United States since 9/11:

- three are African-Americans
- three are from families that hailed originally from Pakistan
- one was born in Kuwait to Palestinian-Jordanian parents
- one is a White convert born in Texas.
- two came from Russia as children
- one emigrated from Egypt and conducted his attack a decade after coming to the United States
- and one each had families that originally came from Kuwait and Afghanistan

Origins of Lethal Jihadist Terrorist Attackers Since 9/11

0 Fatal Attacks in the U.S. Committed by Jihadist Terrorists from Trump Visa Restricted Countries

13 U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents of the United States Responsible for Fatal Jihadist Attacks in U.S.



*Note that on March 6, the Trump administration issued a new executive order, which did not include Iraq in the list of visa restricted countries.

What About Non-Lethal Attacks?

When the data is extended to include individuals who conducted attacks inside the United States that were foiled or otherwise failed to kill anyone, there are only three cases that the travel ban could have applied to. However, in two of those cases, the individual entered the United States as a child.


On March 3, 2006, **Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar**, a naturalized citizen from Iran, drove a car into a group of students at the University of North Carolina, injuring nine people. However, Taheri-Azar, though born in Iran, came to the United States at the age of two. As a result his radicalization was homegrown inside the United States.

On September 17, 2016 **Dahir Adan**, a 20-year-old naturalized citizen from Somalia, injured ten people while wielding a knife at a mall in Minnesota. However, like Taheri-Azar, Adan had come to the United States as a young child.

On November 28, 2016 **Abdul Razak Ali Artan**, an 18-year-old legal permanent resident who came to the United States as a refugee from Somalia in 2014 -- having left Somalia for Pakistan in 2007 -- injured eleven people when he rammed a car into his fellow students on the campus of Ohio State University and then proceeded to attack them with a knife. However, it is not clear that the attack provides support for Trump's travel ban. Artan left Somalia as a pre-teen, and if he was radicalized abroad, it most likely occurred while in Pakistan, which is not included on the travel ban. Furthermore, it is far from clear that Artan

radicalized abroad rather than inside the United States, and in a Facebook posting prior to his attack, he cited Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric born in the United States, whose work -- which draws largely upon American culture and history -- has helped radicalize a wide range of extremists in the United States including those born in the United States.

Origins of Non-Lethal Jihadist Terrorist Attackers Since 9/11



Part II. Who are the Terrorists?


Many are converts

A large proportion of jihadists in the United States since 9/11 have been converts. This is not entirely surprising as one in five American Muslims are converts according to a 2011 study by the Pew Research Center though converts do appear to be over-represented among jihadists. In addition a small number of cases involve non-Muslims, including those convicted in the Liberty City Seven case who were followers of the Moorish Science Temple, a syncretic religion combining aspects of Islam and other religions.

The large number of converts and even non-Muslims among those accused of jihadist terrorism challenges visions of counterterrorism policy that rely on immigration restrictions or focus almost entirely on second generation immigrant populations.

Religious Affiliation and Conversion Status at Time of Charging

Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.



Part II. Who are the Terrorists?

They're not all young hot heads


Another misconception is that jihadist extremism is the province of only young hotheaded loners. Such individuals certainly exist, yet in the United States, participation in jihadist terrorism has appealed to individuals ranging from young teenagers to those in their advanced years. Many of those involved have been married and even had kids – far from the stereotype of the lone, angry youngster.

Jihadists by Age and Marital Status

Far from being young hotheads, jihadists in the United States range across ages, with the average age in the late 20s, and many are or have been married. Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.



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Part II. Who are the Terrorists?

They're mostly men, but women are increasingly involved

Political violence broadly, and jihadist terrorism more specifically given the misogyny of the ideology, has long tended to be dominated by men. Unsurprisingly, jihadist terrorists in United States have fit this pattern, but more women have been accused of jihadist terrorism crimes in recent years.


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Jihadists, by Year and Gender

Illustration of gender of individuals who are charged with or died engaging in jihadist terrorism or related activities inside the United States, and Americans accused of such activity abroad. Years indicate the year that individuals were charged or if they were not charged, the year that they died. Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.

Male 93%
Female 7%



Previous Section

Part I. Terrorism Cases: 2001-Today

Next Section

Part III. Why do they Engage in Terrorism?

In Depth

Terrorism in America After 9/11

About this Project

A comprehensive, up-to-date source of online information about terrorist activity in the United States since 9-11.

Authors

Peter Bergen is a journalist, documentary producer, vice president at New America, CNN national security analyst, professor of practice at Arizona State University, and the author or editor of seven books, three of which were *New York Times* bestsellers and four of which were named among the best non-fiction books of the year by *The Washington Post*.

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Project Outline

Terrorism in America After 9/11 Home Page

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Part IV. What is the Threat to the United States Today?

Dataset

Download as CSV

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EXHIBIT 33

The New York Times | <https://nyti.ms/2mck8ix>

POLITICS

Trump's Revised Travel Ban Is Denounced by 134 Foreign Policy Experts

By LARA JAKES MARCH 11, 2017

WASHINGTON — More than 130 members of America's foreign policy establishment denounced President Trump's revised travel ban on Friday as just as damaging to the United States' interests and reputation as his original order that halted refugees and froze travelers from predominantly Muslim countries.

In a letter to Mr. Trump, the former government officials and experts said even the scaled-back order will “weaken U.S. security and undermine U.S. global leadership.” And they said it continues to signal to Muslim allies that — as the Islamic State and other extremist propaganda profess — the United States is an enemy of Islam.

Several of the 134 signatories served in both Republican and Democratic administrations, including R. Nicholas Burns, who was on the National Security Council staff and a senior diplomat during President Bill Clinton's administration before becoming under secretary of state for President George W. Bush; Richard A. Clarke, the National Security Council counterterrorism coordinator for Mr. Bush and Mr. Clinton; and John E. McLaughlin, the deputy C.I.A. director for Mr. Clinton and acting C.I.A. director for Mr. Bush.

But the vast majority of those who signed the letter — including Madeleine Albright and John Kerry, the former secretaries of state; Michèle A. Flournoy, the former under secretary of defense; and Susan E. Rice, the former national security adviser — rose to senior security jobs in government under Democratic presidents.

Their argument mirrors one also being made by states that claim the revised travel ban discriminates against Muslims and will hurt businesses and universities.

A week after taking office, Mr. Trump issued an executive order to suspend the nation's refugee program as well as travel from seven predominantly Muslim countries to give the government time to install rigid security vetting of immigrants. The order created chaos at American airports nationwide and was blocked by a federal appeals court.

This week, the Trump administration issued a new order that slightly scaled back the original ban but is still considered a significant hardening of American immigration policy.

"Bans like those included in this order are harmful to U.S. national security and beneath the dignity of our great nation," said the letter, which also was sent to Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly and Michael P. Dempsey, the acting director of national intelligence.

"The revised executive order is damaging to the strategic and national security interests of the United States," the letter said.

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The New York Times

EXHIBIT 34

Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

state.gov/jfcr/rls/cr/2015/257522.htm

Chapter 5

Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.

As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the term "terrorist sanctuary" or "sanctuary" excludes the territory of a country the government of which is subject to a determination under section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to Title 50; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section 2780(d) of Title 22—the state sponsors of terrorism. Accordingly, information regarding Iran, Sudan, and Syria can be found in Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism.

TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

AFRICA

Somalia. In 2015, terrorists used many primarily rural sections of south-central Somalia as safe havens. Terrorists continued to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate with relative ease in these areas due to inadequate security, justice, and governance capacity at all levels.

Al-Shabaab's capacity to rebound from counterterrorism operations is due in large part to its ability to maintain control of large swaths of rural areas and routes in parts of Somalia. In 2015, al-Shabaab lost a number of safe havens in south-central Somalia, many of which provided access to funds and other resources the group extorted from local communities. Despite the success of coordinated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operations that drove al-Shabaab from former strongholds in Baardheere and Dinsoor, the terrorist organization managed to establish new safe havens from where it planned and launched attacks against government officials, AMISOM bases, and soft targets in Kenya and other parts of the region. The Federal Government of Somalia and its regional administrations lacked the capacity and resources to fill security voids left in the wake of AMISOM's operations with civilian law enforcement. These gaps allowed al-Shabaab to retain the freedom of movement necessary to establish new safe havens and re-infiltrate areas that AMISOM cleared but could not hold.

As seen in previous years, al-Shabaab used smaller towns in the Jubba River Valley such as Jilib and Saakow as bases for its operations. These areas allowed the group's operatives to continue exploiting the porous border regions between Kenya and Somalia and launch deadly cross-border attacks. Kenya suffered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in its history when in April, al-Shabaab operatives assaulted the Garissa University College using light arms and suicide vests and killed more than 145 Kenyans, most of whom were students. Al-Shabaab also used villages along major coastal routes in southern Somalia, namely Kunyo Barow and Tortorow, to facilitate access to areas just outside of major population centers in Mogadishu and Kismaayo. These and other routes throughout southern Somalia serve as lifelines for al-Shabaab as low-level fighters established illegal checkpoints to collect taxes and tolls from locals. Although the group continued to generate funds from the illicit trade of charcoal and other commodities, al-Shabaab leveraged tax collection to compensate for declining revenues after losing access to the port in Baraawe in 2014.

The Federal Government of Somalia remained committed to regional counterterrorism efforts that aim to eliminate al-Shabaab's access to safe haven in Somalia. Though progress on this front was uneven in 2015, these efforts provided the Somali government with enough space and time to focus on the federalism process and advance its political objectives.

According to independent sources and NGOs engaged in demining activities on the ground, there was little cause for concern for the presence of WMD in Somalia.

The Trans-Sahara. There are ungoverned, under-governed, and ill-governed areas of Mali that terrorist groups have used to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security, despite Malian authorities willingness and responsiveness as counterterrorism partners, a UN peacekeeping mission, and French forces in the region. The Malian government has reestablished its political presence in the cities of Timbuktu and Gao, with some local government officials returning to their posts in 2015. The military, in conjunction with the French and UN forces, worked to eliminate terrorist safe havens in Mali.

The Malian government does not support or facilitate the flow of foreign terrorist fighters through its territory, but the lack of government control across large portions of its territory and porous borders makes preventing the flow very difficult.

The Malian government does not support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking of WMD in and through its territory.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral. The number of islands in the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago make it a difficult region to secure. Cooperation by all states bordering this region remained strong with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved efforts to control their shared maritime boundaries—including through U.S.-funded efforts to enhance domain awareness in the waters south and southwest of Mindanao—the expanse remained difficult to control. Surveillance improved but remained partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups have provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, including the movement of personnel, equipment, and funds. Kidnappings for ransom remained an ongoing threat.

Southeast Asia is vulnerable to exploitation by illicit traffickers and proliferators given the high volume of global trade transiting the region as well as the existence of smuggling and proliferation networks. Weak strategic trade controls, legal and regulatory frameworks, inadequate maritime law enforcement and security capabilities, and emerging and re-emerging infectious disease and burgeoning bioscience capacity, make Southeast Asia an area of concern for WMD proliferation and transit. Other than Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, strategic trade control laws that include controls over dual-use and end-use or "catch-all" controls are lacking in Southeast Asia. Assisting these countries to develop strong laws that meet international standards and effective targeting and risk management systems are major goals of the Export Control and Related Border Security program over the next few years.

The Southern Philippines. The geographical composition of the Philippines, spread out over 7,100 islands, makes it difficult for the central government to maintain a presence in all areas. Counterterrorism operations, however, have been successful at isolating the geographic influence and constraining the activities of transnational terrorist groups. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and other militant groups were present in areas on Mindanao, and especially across the islands of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The New People's Army (NPA) maintained a presence across the Philippines, particularly in rural and mountainous areas. Continued pressure from Philippine security forces made it difficult, however, for terrorists to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate outside their base locations.

The Philippines and the United States have strong counterterrorism cooperation. In 2015, the United States continued to work with the Government of the Philippines to monitor and investigate groups engaged in or supporting terrorist activities in the Philippines. The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, under Operation Enduring Freedom, was concluded in June 2015 after more than a decade. The government launched numerous operations, particularly in the Southern Philippines, against organizations like the ASG, JI, BIFF, and NPA, and prosecuted terrorist suspects and organizations. In 2015, the Philippines also continued coordinating with U.S. law enforcement authorities, especially regarding wanted U.S. fugitives and suspected terrorists.

In November, the Philippines passed the Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA), which allows it to control the import and export of dual-use items. At year's end, the Philippines was working to implement the provisions of the STMA, including setting up a licensing office within the Department of Trade and Industry that will issue licenses required to import and export controlled dual-use commodities and technology. Early implementation progress has been slow, however, due to a number of factors, including a lack of funding, and risks missing the deadlines set by the STMA.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Egypt. Portions of Egypt's Sinai region were a safe haven for terrorist organizations in 2015. The Government of Egypt views terrorism as one of the country's greatest threats and has dedicated significant military resources to combat indigenous and transnational terrorist groups. The Egyptian government continued its extensive security campaign focused on Northern Sinai against ISIL Sinai Province (ISIL-SP), launching Operation Right of the Martyr in September. The Northern Sinai was closed off to tourists, journalists, U.S. government officials, and NGOs in 2015.

ISIL-SP has claimed responsibility for increasingly frequent and sophisticated terrorist attacks against Egyptian forces, such as the simultaneous attack on multiple police and security installations in Sinai's Sheikh Zuewid on July 1; and high profile targets, for example downing a Metrojet airliner, killing all 200 passengers and seven crew members on October 31.

Through its Export Control and Related Border Security Program, the United States is working with the Government of Egypt to enhance Egypt's border security capabilities through the provision of land, air, and maritime border enforcement and targeting and risk management training for Egyptian Customs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Transportation, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

officials. In addition, since 2009, the Department of State's Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund has assisted Egypt with the provision of passenger and cargo vehicle x-ray detection equipment with the capability to inspect vehicular and truck traffic at fixed transportation checkpoints for WMD-related materials, conventional weapons, and other illicit items.

Iraq. Portions of Iraq remained under the control of ISIL during 2015, including the city of Mosul. However, after ISIL took control of large swaths of Iraqi territory in 2014, the Government of Iraq made steady, significant progress in retaking terrain from ISIL throughout 2015. Supported by the 66-member Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, the Government of Iraq retook more than 40 percent of Iraqi territory once controlled by ISIL by the end of 2015, including several key cities. In April, an Iraqi-led military effort retook the city of Tikrit, and by the end of the year 80 percent of internally displaced persons had returned to the city. In November, Peshmerga forces retook the town of Sinjar, a city that came to the world's attention in the summer of 2014 when ISIL committed atrocities against the Yazidi community.

At the end of 2015, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), accompanied by local Sunni fighters and police, liberated large parts of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province and a strategically important hub.

ISIL used the territory under its control in 2015 to produce sulfur mustard and IEDs filled with chlorine. The United States has been proactively working with our allies to dismantle this chemical weapons capability, as well as deny ISIL access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise through interdictions and strengthening the ability of regional governments to detect, disrupt, and respond effectively to suspected CBRN activity.

Due to security conditions in Iraq, the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has had difficulty implementing outreach activities. EXBS priorities previously included working with the Government of Iraq to develop and implement regulations and procedures related to The Act of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority on WMD Non-Proliferation No. 48 of 2012 (INMA Act), adopt and implement a control list, and to enhance Iraq's border security capabilities related to the inspection and detection of WMD-related goods and technologies. However, these activities are largely on pause. Instead, the EXBS program is assessing equipment and training needs for security forces in the newly liberated regions, as they seek to consolidate gains and reclaim territory from ISIL.

The United States and Iraq strengthened their bilateral partnership to counter nuclear terrorism in September 2014 by concluding the "Joint Action Plan between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Government of the United States of America on Combating Nuclear and Radioactive Materials Smuggling." The arrangement expresses the intention of the two governments to work together to enhance Iraq's capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents, and ultimately prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear and radiological materials.

Lebanon. The Lebanese government does not control all regions of the country or its borders with Syria and Israel. Hizballah controls access to parts of the country, including restricting Lebanon's security services, which allows Hizballah to operate with relative impunity. The government took no action in 2015 to disarm Hizballah, to eliminate its safe havens within Lebanese territory, or to prevent the flow of Hizballah members to Syria or Iraq. Ungoverned areas along the un-demarcated Lebanese-Syrian border also served as safe havens for Nusrah Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and other Sunni terrorist groups in 2015, which operate in mountainous, mostly uninhabited zones where the government has limited reach. The Government of Lebanon has made attempts to eradicate these safe havens, however, and is engaged in sustained military operations to rid Lebanon of these Sunni terrorist groups. Palestinian refugee camps were also used as safe havens by Palestinian and other armed groups to house weapons, shelter wanted criminals, and plan terrorist attacks.

The United States works closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces to combat terrorist threats along the Syrian border by providing counterterrorism training, military equipment, and weaponry.

Lebanon is not a source country for WMD components, but its porous borders make the country vulnerable for use as a transit and transshipment hub for proliferation-sensitive transfers, particularly with the conflict in Syria. The LAF Engineer Regiment partners with U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent proliferation and trafficking of WMD along the Syrian border.

The Export Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS) is providing robust commodity identification training for items that can be used in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, in order to keep these items from transiting through Lebanon. EXBS was also launching a frontier border security interdiction training program, in partnership with the Department of Defense, to strengthen LAF and ISF border security and interdiction capabilities.

Libya. Libya's porous borders, fragmented security forces, and vast ungoverned territory have made it a permissive environment for terrorist groups such as Ansar al-Shari'a Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari'a Darnah, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Due to the inability of the Libyan government to effectively administer its territory, terrorist organizations have found safe havens primarily in Sirte, Darnah, Benghazi, and Sabratha, although violent extremist groups operate with impunity throughout Libya. While the Libyan National Army launched a military operation in 2014 with the stated goal of removing violent extremists from Benghazi, it has not succeeded in fully liberating Benghazi from the control of terrorist groups. The government failed to eliminate terrorist safe havens in Libya in 2015, and has been unable to prevent flows of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of its territory. Terrorist training camps and facilitation networks exist throughout Libya; local tribes and minority groups frequently serve as facilitators, although this appears largely due to economic rather than ideological motivations. Libya serves as a major source and transit country for foreign fighters en route to Syria and Iraq. There are indications that foreign terrorist fighters are beginning to return to Libya or choosing to stay in Libya to fight there, increasing concerns that Libya has become a battlefield for violent extremist groups such as ISIL.

In 2013, the United States signed an agreement with the Libyan government to cooperate on destroying Libya's stockpile of legacy chemical weapons in accordance with its obligations as an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) member state. Libya successfully completed operations for the disposal of its remaining mustard gas filled in artillery projectile and aerial bombs in January 2014. Libya also completed the disposal of its remaining bulk mustard in 2013. However, Libya retains a stockpile of natural uranium ore concentrate (yellowcake), stored in a former military facility near Sebha in Libya's south. This material represents a limited risk of trafficking and proliferation due to the bulk and weight of the storage containers and the need for extensive additional processing before the material would be suitable for weapons purposes.

Yemen. Throughout 2015, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIL-Yemen exploited the political and security vacuum to strengthen their foothold and expand recruiting inside the country. The Yemeni government has operated in exile for much of 2015, greatly diminishing its ability to focus on counterterrorism efforts. AQAP and ISIL-Yemen have portrayed the unrest in Yemen as part of a broader Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict. By exploiting this sectarian divide, these groups have increased their support base in Sunni communities and enabled ISIL-Yemen, in particular, to gain a foothold in the country.

AQAP benefitted during 2015 from the conflict in Yemen by expanding its presence in the southern and eastern governorates. Establishing deeper tribal and familial relationships in these areas allowed AQAP to expand the territory it controlled during 2015 to Abyan, Taiz, and its largest safe haven in the port city of Mukalla. Access to the port enabled AQAP to increase its finances. AQ also maintains a presence in Aden.

While AQAP remains the predominant Sunni Islamist terrorist group in the country, there are seven known *wilayat* (province) pro-ISIL groups operating in 10 of Yemen's provinces, including Sa'ada, Sana'a, al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz, Ibb, Lahij, Aden, Shahwah, and Hadramawt. ISIL-Yemen's "*wilayat*" are beginning to exert more influence by competing to obtain support from Sunni tribes and militias in the same areas. While the exact composition of the group is still unknown, its numbers are considerably smaller than AQAP's despite it having likely drawn members from some of the same disillusioned Yemeni AQAP members who previously supported ISIL in Iraq and Syria. While ISIL-Yemen has demonstrated a violent operational pace, it has yet to occupy significant territory.

Yemen's political instability continued to hinder efforts to enact or enforce strategic trade controls, leaving the country vulnerable as a transit point for WMD-related materials.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan. The border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an under-governed area that terrorists exploit to conduct attacks in both countries. Terrorist networks active in Afghanistan, such as al-Qa'ida (AQ), the Haqqani Network, and others, operate in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIL Khorasan (ISIL-K) is largely based in Afghanistan, but its support network also reaches into Pakistan's tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Afghan government has struggled to assert control over this remote terrain where the population is largely detached from national institutions. Afghanistan cooperates with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Since taking office in September 2014, President Ghani has pursued cross-border security cooperation with the Pakistani government, including the prospect of joint operations to reduce safe havens on both sides of the border.

The potential for WMD trafficking and proliferation remains a concern in Afghanistan because of its porous borders and the presence of terrorist groups. The United States and Afghanistan continued to work to finalize a bilateral framework to facilitate closer cooperation to counter nuclear terrorism and enhance Afghanistan's capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents. The Afghanistan and U.S. governments also continued to work to implement comprehensive strategic trade controls and strengthen Afghanistan's border security system.

The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program contributes to strengthening Afghanistan's border enforcement capacity by providing border interdiction trainings to Afghan Customs Department and the Afghan Border Police. EXBS also sponsors regional cross-border collaboration through trainings with its Central Asian neighbors through the OSCE and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime – World Customs Organization's Container Control Program. To increase the Government of Afghanistan's strategic trade control awareness and capacity, EXBS sponsored training for an Afghan delegation, which included representatives from the Afghan Atomic Energy High Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the University of Georgia, Center for International Trade Security.

The United States continued to assist the Afghan government in building capacity to secure potentially dangerous biological materials and infrastructure housed at Afghan facilities, promote surveillance capabilities to detect and identify possibly catastrophic biological events, and engage Afghan scientists and engineers that have WMD or WMD-applicable expertise.

Pakistan. In 2015, an assortment of terrorist groups, to include the Haqqani Network, attempted to hide in or operate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, a mountainous region along Pakistan's northwest border with Afghanistan. The National Action Plan (NAP) calls upon the government to "ensure that no armed militias are allowed to function in the country," although claims about the NAP's uneven implementation was a frequent feature in Pakistani media. As in 2014, Pakistan launched military operations to eradicate terrorist safe havens, although their impact on all terrorist groups was uneven. The government administered an Exit Control List (ECL) intended to prevent terrorists and criminal actors from traveling abroad. In August, September, and November, the government announced its intention to remove thousands of people from the ECL on grounds of their wrongful or unsubstantiated addition. Some UN-designated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) affiliates Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Falaah-e-Insaniyat Foundation, were able to fundraise and hold rallies in Pakistan. LeT/JuD leader, Hafiz Saeed, who is also a UN-designated terrorist, was able to make frequent public appearances in support of the organization's objectives, which were covered by the Pakistani media, for much of the year. In September, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Agency prohibited media coverage of LeT and affiliated groups, although the groups continued to recruit and operate around the country. Despite JuD and FIF's proscription under UN sanctions regimes, the Pakistani government affirmed in December that neither organization was banned in Pakistan.

To combat the trafficking of items that could contribute to WMDs and their delivery systems, Pakistan continued to work towards harmonizing its national control list with items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group, as well as taking positive moves such as adding catch-all provisions to its export licensing procedures. Along with list development, Pakistan developed industry internal compliance guidelines and an industry outreach program for strategic technology sectors, which regularly shares information with these industries. The U.S. government seeks to partner more closely with Pakistan on a further enhanced outreach campaign for industry to fully understand and implement Pakistan's export control requirements, as well as to begin a dialogue on controls on conventional weapons and related dual-use technologies. In addition to industry outreach, Pakistan also participated, developed, and delivered a series of technical trainings to responsible government licensing and enforcement officials for the proper identification of dual-use commodities that could be used to create WMDs and/or their delivery systems. Overall, Pakistan was a committed partner that undertook great efforts to build its export control capabilities.

Pakistan is a constructive and active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and has worked to strengthen its strategic trade controls, including updating its national export control list. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program increased the Government of Pakistan's enforcement capacity by sponsoring training for Pakistani Customs and Strategic Export Control Division officials on how to properly identify strategic commodities of concern. These commodity identification and advanced interdiction trainings were implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy. EXBS also sponsored regional collaboration through nonproliferation fellowships and cross-border coordination with Afghanistan through the UN Office and Drugs and Crime – World Customs Organization's Container Control Program (CCP). Under the CCP, training was provided to enhance the targeting of skills of port control unit officials at the Torkham and Jalalabad border-crossings.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Colombia. Rough terrain and dense forest cover, coupled with low population densities and historically weak government presence have defined Colombia's borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, and historically have allowed for safe havens for terrorist groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The Government of Colombia has not only maintained pressure on these groups to deny safe haven, disrupt terrorism financing efforts, and degrade terrorist groups' logistics infrastructure, but it also has continued to conduct operations to combat their ability to conduct terrorist attacks. Coupled with ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC and two FARC unilateral cease fire declarations, Colombia experienced an overall decline in the total number of terrorist incidents in 2015. Despite these successes, illegal armed groups, primarily known as "Bandas Criminales," continued to use the porous border, remote mountain areas, and jungles to maneuver, train, cultivate and transport narcotics, operate illegal mines, "tax" the local populace, and engage in other illegal activities.

Improved relations with neighboring Ecuador have led to some increased cooperation on law enforcement issues. Colombia also continued to cooperate and share information with the Panamanian National Border Service. Additionally, Brazil began implementing its Integrated Border Monitoring System in an effort to monitor its entire border, and along with continued cooperation with the Government of Colombia, addressed potential safe haven areas along their shared borders.

Venezuela. Venezuela's porous border with Colombia has made the country attractive to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, who use it to transit in and out of its territory. There were credible reports that Venezuela maintained a permissive environment that allowed for support of activities that benefited known terrorist groups.

COUNTERING TERRORISM ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

In 2015, the Department of State designated one new Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and amended two existing designations. In addition, the Department designated 37 organizations and individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, and amended two existing designations. The Department also revoked the designations of two organizations and two individuals.

The Department of the Treasury also designated organizations and individuals under E.O. 13224. For a full list of all U.S. designations, see the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control website at <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx>.

2015 Foreign Terrorism Organization/Executive Order 13224 group designations:

- On September 3, the Department of State revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation of the Revolutionary Organization 17 November.
- On September 29, the Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 designation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to include the alias Islamic State, and amended the FTO designation on September 30. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ISIL.)
- On September 29, the Department of State designated Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) under E.O. 13224 and as an FTO. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on JRTN.)
- On September 29, the Department of State amended the FTO and E.O. 13224 designation of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis to include the alias ISIL Sinai Province as its primary name. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ISIL-Sinai Province.)
- On December 9, the Department of State revoked the FTO designation of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

2015 Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 designations:

- On January 14, the Department of State designated 'Abdallah al-Ashqar. Al-Ashqar is a leadership figure and member of the military committee of the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC). Al-Ashqar is known to have purchased missiles and other materials to attack Israel.
- On February 9, the Department of State designated German national Denis Cuspert. Cuspert was a recruiter and propagandist for ISIL. He was allegedly killed in an airstrike near al-Raqqah, Syria, in October 2015.
- On March 25, the Department of State designated Aliashkhab Kebekov, who was the leader of Russia-based terrorist group Caucasus Emirate, until his death during a battle with Russian Special Forces in April 2015.
- On April 14, the Department of State designated Syrian-based Tunisian national Ali Ouni Harzi. Harzi was also added to the UN 1267/1989 al-Qaida Sanctions List. Harzi joined Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) in 2011. He was a high-profile member known for recruiting volunteers, smuggling weapons and explosives into Tunisia, and facilitating the travel of AAS-T fighters to Syria. Harzi was killed in an air strike in June 2015.
- On April 21, the Department of State designated Ahmed Diriye and Mahad Karate. Diriye became the leader of al-Shabaab in September 2014, following the death of former leader Ahmed Abdi Godane. Prior to assuming leadership of the group, Diriye served as Godane's assistant, the deputy governor of Lower Juba region and al-Shabaab's governor of the Bay and Bakool regions. By 2013 he had become a senior advisor to Godane and oversaw the group's domestic activities. Karate plays an important role in al-Shabaab's intelligence wing, the Amniyat.
- On April 21, the Department of State designated Christodoulos Xiros and Nikolaos Maziotis. Xiros is a chief assassin of 17 November. He was most recently arrested in January 2015 by Greek police while planning to carry out armed assaults in Greece, possibly with the intent to free prisoners. It is believed that at the time of his arrest, Xiros was working with members of the Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei. Maziotis is the leader of the Greece-based Revolutionary Struggle. Under his leadership, the group claimed responsibility for the April 2014 bombing in central Athens outside the offices of the Greek central bank.
- On April 28, the Department of State designated Meliad Farah, Hassan el-Haji Hassan, and Hussein Atris. Farah and Hassan have been publicly identified as key suspects in a July 2012 bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which targeted Israeli tourists and killed six people. The bombing has been attributed to Hizballah. Atris is a member of Hizballah's overseas terrorism unit. In 2013, Atris was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison by a Thai court for illegally possessing materials to manufacture explosives. He was released in September 2014 and is believed to reside in Lebanon.
- On August 25, the Department of State designated Abdul Aziz Haqqani. Aziz Haqqani is a senior member of the Haqqani Network (HQN) and brother to HQN leader Sirajuddin Haqqani. For several years, Aziz Haqqani has been involved in planning and carrying out IED attacks against Afghan government targets, and assumed responsibility for all major HQN attacks after the death of his

brother, Badruddin Haqqani.

- On September 8, the Department of State designated Lebanese born Samir Kuntar. In April 1979, Kuntar participated in the attempted kidnapping of an Israeli family in Israel that resulted in the deaths of five Israelis, including two young children. Kuntar was convicted in an Israeli court for the murders; he was released from prison in 2008 as part of a prisoner exchange. Kuntar later emerged as one of the most visible spokesmen for Hizballah. With the assistance of Iran and Syria, Kuntar played an operational role in building Hizballah's terrorist infrastructure in the Golan Heights. He was killed on December 19, 2015 in Jaramana, Syria.
- On September 8, the Department of State designated Hamas operatives Muhammed Deif, Yahya Ibrahim Hassan Sinwar, and Rawhi Mushtaha. Sinwar and Mushtaha are known for their role in founding the Hamas military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade. Deif is a top commander of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade.
- On September 9, the Department of State designated Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, a senior leader of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb. In an April 2013 video, al-Anabi called on violent extremists to initiate armed conflict against French interests worldwide, presumably in response to France's intervention in Mali.
- On September 29, the Department of State designated 10 individuals and five groups connected to foreign terrorist fighters in Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen:
 - Rustam Aselderov is a former commander of the Caucasus Emirate, and the current leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Caucasus Province (ISIL-CP). Aselderov defected from Caucasus Emirate and swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in early December 2014. A spokesman for al-Baghdadi accepted this pledge of allegiance and appointed Aselderov as the "emir" of ISIL-CP.
 - French citizen Peter Cherif is a foreign terrorist fighter and member of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2004, he was captured while fighting for al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) near Fallujah, Iraq. He was convicted in Baghdad in July 2006 for illegally crossing the border and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He escaped in March 2007 after an insurgent attack and prison break and traveled to Syria. He was later arrested in Syria, extradited, and served 18 months in jail in France. He was released pending trial and fled to Yemen. Cherif was sentenced to five years in prison, in absentia, for being a member of a terrorist organization.
 - Tarkhan Ismailovich Gaziyeu is a North Caucasian warlord, who has been involved in the Chechen insurgency since 2003. In 2007, Gaziyeu became the Caucasus Emirate Commander of the Southwestern Front of the Province of Chechnya and carried out numerous attacks in this role. Gaziyeu split from the group in 2010 and travelled to Turkey. He now leads a group in Syria, known as "Tarkhan Jamaat," which is part of ISIL, and has participated in fighting in Latakia, Syria.
 - French national Boubaker Hakim was once a member of Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia. Hakim claimed responsibility for the assassination of two Tunisian politicians in 2013. He is now a member of ISIL.
 - Maxime Hauchard is a French national who traveled to Syria to join ISIL in August 2013. Hauchard was identified among the ISIL fighters appearing in the November 2014 execution video, which depicted the beheadings of several Syrian soldiers and showed the severed head of an American hostage.
 - Shamil Izmaylov is a Russian militant currently fighting in Syria. Before traveling to Syria in 2012, Izmaylov trained in and later set up his own terrorist training center in Egypt. In mid-2013, Izmaylov established a Russian-speaking ISIL faction in Raqqa that has been fighting as a distinct unit. In addition to participating in combat in Syria, Izmaylov has been associated with the Caucasus Emirates.
 - British citizen Sally Jones traveled from the UK to Syria in 2013 to join ISIL and fight alongside her husband, deceased ISIL hacker Junaid Hussain. Jones and Hussain targeted American military personnel through the publication of a "hit list" online encouraging lone-offender attacks. Jones has used social media to recruit women to join ISIL. In August 2015, she offered guidance to individuals aspiring to conduct attacks in Britain on how to construct homemade bombs.
 - Tajikistan citizen Gulmurod Khalimov – a former Tajikistan special operations colonel, police commander, and military expert – is a Syria-based ISIL member and recruiter. Khalimov appeared in a propaganda video confirming he fights for ISIL.
 - French citizen Emilie Konig traveled to Syria in 2012 to join and fight for ISIL. While in Syria, Konig directed individuals in France to attack French government institutions. In a video posted on May 31, 2013, Konig was shown training with weapons in Syria.
 - British citizen Nasser Muthana travelled to Syria from Cardiff, UK in November 2013 to fight for ISIL. In June 2014, Muthana was featured in an ISIL propaganda video in which he and two other English-speaking individuals attempt to persuade Muslims in the West to join the fight. In the video, Muthana admitted to participating in battles in Syria and expressed his plans to travel to Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan to continue the fight. Muthana has also used social media to threaten the British government about returning to the UK to test new skills he has gained in Syria.
 - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Caucasus Province (ISIL-CP) became ISIL's newest regional group on June 23, 2015, when the spokesman for ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio recording accepting the allegiance of the fighters of four Caucasus regions – Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. On September 2, 2015, ISIL-CP claimed responsibility for an attack on a Russian military base in Magaramkent, southern Dagestan, which killed and wounded a number of Russian citizens. In December 2015, the group also claimed responsibility for a shooting near the citadel of Derbent in Dagestan, Russia that killed one and left 11 others injured.
 - Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria (JAK-A) is an ISIL-affiliated group operating in Algeria. The group emerged in September 2014 when top military commanders of AQIM's central region broke away from AQIM and announced allegiance to ISIL. JAK-A became notorious following its September 2014 abduction and beheading of French national Herve Gourdel.
 - Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN) aims to overthrow the Government of Iraq and implement a Ba'athist or similar regime. It first announced insurgency operations against Coalition Forces in Iraq in December 2006 in response to Saddam Hussein's death. More recently, the group has played an important role in some of ISIL's most significant military advances, including the seizure of Mosul.
 - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) was announced in an online video in January 2015. ISIL-K is led by former Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan commander Hafiz Saeed Khan and consists of former Pakistani and Afghan Taliban commanders.
 - The Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT) is an ISIL-linked terrorist group operating in Indonesia. MIT members have ties to other Department of State designated FTOs, including Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid and Jemaah Islamiya. In July 2014, MIT's leader, Abu Warda Santoso, pledged allegiance to ISIL. MIT has become increasingly bold in its attacks on security forces.
 - The Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 designation of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) to include the alias ISIL Sinai Province as its primary name. ABM has used ISIL Sinai Province as its primary name since pledging allegiance to ISIL in November 2014. The group has since continued attacking Egyptian targets. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ISIL Sinai Province.
 - The Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 designation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to include the alias Islamic State. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ISIL.)
- On November 13, the Department of State designated Maghommed Maghommedzakirovich Abdurakhmanov. Abdurakhmanov is believed to have beheaded three individuals in Syria. He was arrested in July 2013, and in July 2015 was sentenced by a Turkish court to seven-and-a-half years in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization.
- On December 9, the Department of State designated Emrah Erdogan. Erdogan is a German-national known to have joined in combat, recruited, and fundraised as a member of al-Qa'ida and al-Shabaab. Erdogan was sentenced to seven years in prison in January 2014 in Germany for these activities and for phoning in false terrorist threats against the parliament in Berlin in November 2010.

MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM

In 2015, the United States continued to work through multilateral organizations to strengthen regional and international efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism, including by developing and promoting global norms and building the capacities of states to implement them.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Since its launch in September 2011, the GCTF has mobilized more than US \$300 million to support national and regional efforts to strengthen civilian institutions to counter terrorism and violent extremism. This includes support for the development and implementation of GCTF framework documents at both the regional and country levels. The GCTF is working with partners around the globe to change how states – particularly those emerging from authoritarian rule – respond to the challenges of terrorism and the violent extremist ideologies that underpin it. The GCTF, with its 30 founding members (29 countries and the EU), regularly convenes counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners, as well as experts from the UN and other multilateral and regional bodies, to identify urgent CT needs, devise solutions, and mobilize expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation.

With its primary focus on countering violent extremism (CVE) and strengthening civilian criminal justice and other rule of law institutions that deal with terrorism, the GCTF aims to diminish terrorist recruitment and increase countries' capacity for dealing with terrorist threats within their borders and regions.

In the past year, the GCTF launched two new initiatives:

- The International CT and CVE Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM):** Operating as a project under the auspices of the GCTF, the ICCM will develop and manage an up-to-date database of recent and ongoing counterterrorism and CVE capacity-building assistance. The ICCM will assist pilot countries and donors to mobilize and coordinate donor resources to address identified needs,

especially regarding key aspects of UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions related to counterterrorism and CVE. This initiative initially will focus on three pilot countries – Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia.

- **The Initiative to Address the Lifecycle of Radicalization to Violence:** This initiative is developing tools that can be applied across the full life cycle of radicalization: from the front end, where governments and communities are attempting to prevent susceptible individuals from being attracted to the ideologies promoted by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other terrorist groups; to the back end, where governments and communities need to assess the risk posed by violent, radicalized individuals and determine their long-term disposition and possible rehabilitation and reintegration into society, either in or out of the criminal justice system. The purpose of the GCTF cross-working group initiative is to expand on existing GCTF good practices and develop additional tools needed to address the full life cycle of radicalization from prevention to intervention to rehabilitation and reintegration.

The GCTF has also inspired the establishment of three independent institutions that provide platforms for delivering sustainable training and resources in support of CVE and strengthening rule of law.

- Based in Abu Dhabi, **Hedayah**, the first international center of excellence on CVE, hosted a number of training and capacity-building courses focusing on community policing and community engagement, CVE and education, and CVE and communications. Hedayah developed *Guidelines and Good Practices for Developing National CVE Strategies* which is a document that offers guidance for national governments interested in developing or refining a national CVE strategy, or CVE components as part of a wider counterterrorism strategy or framework.
- The **International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IJJ)**, based in Malta, was inaugurated in June 2014 as a center dedicated to providing police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, lawmakers, and other criminal justice actors with the training and tools required to address terrorism and related transnational criminal activity. During 2015, the IJJ trained more than 450 judges, prosecutors, investigators, parliamentarians, and other criminal justice professionals and experts from more than 30 countries. Some of the activities supported by the IJJ during the last year included programs directed at: dismantling terrorist facilitation networks; building informal and formal legal cooperation networks; combating kidnapping for ransom; fostering the rule of law while developing counterterrorism policies; supporting border security; bringing foreign terrorist fighters to justice; strengthening mutual legal assistance efforts; supporting senior judicial officials in developing criminal justice responses to terrorism; hosting the GCTF Criminal Justice-Rule of Law Working Group Plenary Meeting; and developing a parliamentary program in the area of counterterrorism.
- In June 2014, the **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)** became fully operational in Geneva as a foundation under Swiss law, with its first Board meeting held in November of that same year. Pilot countries include Bangladesh, Mali, and Nigeria. In 2015, each of the pilot countries set up a "country support mechanism" which brings government, civil society, and the private sector together to develop needs assessments and oversee development of grant applications. An Independent Review Panel was established to review and make recommendations on grant applications. Grants will be focused on programs that strengthen resilience against violent extremism. In December 2015, the Governing Board approved Burma, Kenya, and Kosovo as additional beneficiary countries and reviewed the pilot countries' draft national applications.

The UN is a close partner of, and participant in, the GCTF and its activities. The GCTF serves as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the universally-agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and, more broadly, to complement and reinforce existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, starting with those of the UN. The GCTF also partners with a wide range of regional multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the AU, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The United Nations (UN). Sustained and strategic engagement at the UN on counterterrorism issues is a priority for the United States. Throughout 2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) remained engaged with stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters by promoting implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178 (2014), a Chapter VII binding resolution that requires all states to "prevent and suppress the recruiting, organization, transporting, or equipping" of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the financing of foreign terrorist fighter travel and activities." Lithuania, Spain and the United States chaired ministerial meetings during their respective UNSC presidencies that focused specifically on measures to enhance border security; criminalize and prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters, counter violent extremism (CVE), and counter-ISIL financing. In 2015, the UNSC adopted several other counterterrorism-related resolutions, including: UNSCR 2199 to degrade ISIL, al-Nusrah Front, and other al-Qa'idā (AQ)-associated groups' financial support networks, paying particular attention to halting oil smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, and the illicit trade of antiquities from Syria; UNSCR 2250 to emphasize the role of youth in countering terrorism and countering violent extremism leading to terrorism; and UNSCR 2253 to further disrupt AQ and ISIL's sources of revenue. In addition, the United States engaged with a wide range of UN actors on counterterrorism, which included:

- **The Counter-Terrorism Committee Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED).** The United States supported CTED efforts to analyze capacity gaps of Member States to implement UNSCRs 1373, 1624, and 2178, and facilitate training and other technical assistance to UN member states. This included participating in the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) thematic debates on a range of issues including stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; the role of women in countering violent extremism; and preventing terrorists from exploiting the Internet and social media to recruit terrorists and incite terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- **The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).** The United States supported CTITF efforts to create a capacity-building plan to assist Member States' implementation of UNSCR 2178 and improve implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, including by serving on the Advisory Board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), which delivers training and technical assistance. In 2015, the United States funded a range of UNCCT and CTITF activities including: promoting effective use of advance passenger information to stem the flow of Foreign terrorist fighters; capacity building for Mali's security and justice sectors; a training initiative to secure open borders; implementing good practices on addressing and preventing terrorist kidnapping for ransom; and supporting community engagement through human rights-led policing.
- **The UNSC 1267/1989/2253 Committee.** On December 17, 2015, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew chaired a special UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting with finance ministers on countering ISIL finance and all forms of terrorist financing to bolster international efforts to further disrupt ISIL's sources of revenue and isolate it from the international financial system. At the finance ministers meeting, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSCR 2253, which updated the UN sanctions on al-Qa'idā to recognize the increasing prominence of ISIL as a global threat by renaming the 1267/1989 al-Qaida Sanctions Regime and List to the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qaida Sanctions Regime and List. The United States worked closely with the UN Sanctions Committee and its Monitoring Team in 2015 by proposing listings and de-listings, providing amendments, engaging the Committee's Ombudsperson in de-listings, and providing input to the Committee to enhance its procedures and implementation of sanctions measures. The United States also assisted the Monitoring Team with information for its research and reports. There are 215 individuals and 72 entities listed on the list. In 2015, 35 individuals and four entities were added to the list. The Committee also worked to ensure the integrity of the list by conducting regular reviews and by endeavoring to remove those individuals and entities that no longer met the criteria for listing. In 2015, 21 individuals were de-listed, of which eight individuals were de-listed following the submission of a petition through the Office of the Ombudsperson.
- **The UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC/TPB).** The Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), in conjunction with the UNODC's Global Program against Money Laundering, continued to provide assistance to countries seeking to ratify and implement the universal legal instruments against terrorism. The United States provided funding to UNODC/TPB for a vast array of counterterrorism programming focused on strengthening the criminal justice system's response to terrorism. In 2015, the United States provided funding for several new TPB programs aimed at strengthening the legal regime against terrorism within a rule of law framework in Morocco and improving the criminal justice response to foreign terrorist fighters in the Balkans and Central Asia.
- **The UN Inter-Regional Crime Research Institute (UNICRI).** The United States has provided financial support to a UNICRI-led global effort to strengthen the capacity of countries to implement the good practices contained in the GCTF's *Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders*. In addition, in 2015, the United States provided funding to UNICRI to launch a pilot diversion program aimed at potential foreign terrorist fighters and others at risk of recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism. This pilot effort seeks to address the challenges presented by youths who have come to the attention of law enforcement as a result of having come under the influence of violent extremist ideologies or terrorist recruiters.
- **The UNSC 1540 Committee.** The Committee monitors and fosters implementation of the obligations and recommendations of UNSCR 1540, which establishes legally binding obligations on all UN Member States related to the establishment of and enforcement of appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials to non-state actors, including terrorists. The 1540 Committee's program of work focuses on four main areas: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations, including the UNSC committees established pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373; and transparency and media outreach. The Committee submitted its annual report on implementation to the UNSC in December 2015, which also described preparations for the 2nd Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 in 2016. The Committee's Group of Experts also participates as part of the CTITF, and cooperates with INTERPOL, UNODC, FATF, and other bodies involved in counterterrorism efforts.
- **The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).** ICAO's Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) continued to contribute directly to U.S. security by ensuring that each of ICAO's 191 member states conducts regular security audits that comply with aviation security standards. In 2015, ICAO continued to transition to the USAP-Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) to enable greater focus of resources on states requiring more assistance in meeting the Standards. ICAO has begun to pilot the process and certify auditors accordingly. USAP conducted assistance missions to help states correct security problems revealed by surveys and audits. ICAO, in partnership with the UN's CTED, has assisted member states in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on counterterrorism, including border control. The two entities have conducted assessment visits and organized workshops focused on countering terrorism and the use of fraudulent travel documents, and promoting good practices on border control and aviation security. ICAO is also working with member states to encourage incorporation of advance passenger information and Passenger Name Record in the travel decision process and with priority countries on implementation of ICAO's public key directory program, as a means to validate e-passports at key ports of entry. Also, ICAO with the World Customs Organization is working to establish standard practices for enhanced screening of cargo. Together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ICAO and CTED have encouraged member states to ratify and implement international counterterrorism treaties.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA continued to implement its Nuclear Security Plan (2014-2017) for countering the threat of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material. The United States was actively involved in IAEA efforts to enhance security for vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities, and to reduce the risk that terrorists could gain access to or use such materials or expertise.

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Through its secure I-24/7 global police communications system, INTERPOL connects its member countries' law enforcement officials to its array of investigative and analytical databases, as well as its system of messages, diffusions, and notices. Following the example of the U.S. National Central Bureau, a number of member countries are now integrating INTERPOL's information sharing resources and capabilities into their respective national border security and law enforcement infrastructure to help monitor and interdict the international transit of foreign terrorist fighters and other transnational criminals. With financial and staffing support from the United States, the INTERPOL Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre's Foreign Terrorist Fighter project represents a multinational fusion cell that manages an analytical database containing identity particulars that supports law enforcement and border control authorities' abilities to determine the terrorist threat posed by subjects located in, or attempting to enter, their respective jurisdictions. More than 50 countries now contribute to INTERPOL's foreign terrorist fighters database, and information shared through its channels has increased six-fold in the last year, growing to some 5,000 foreign terrorist fighters identities. From these records, dedicated analysis has been delivered to INTERPOL's membership to combine, evaluate, and share intelligence on the capabilities, means and emerging trends of foreign terrorist fighters to ensure that the right piece of data reaches the right officer on the frontlines. In this respect, more than 2,000 INTERPOL alerts intended to disrupt foreign terrorist fighter mobility were issued by member countries in the last year.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs). The United States supported FATF plenary activities on a number of countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) issues including guidance on, and vulnerabilities of, emerging terrorist financing risks, preventing terrorist financing abuse of the non-profit sector, and countering the financing of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; and participated in the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) work to strengthen the implementation of FATF CFT standards. In particular, the United States continued to stress the importance of targeted sanctions and Recommendation 6, a provision to freeze and confiscate assets. The United States also continued to stress Recommendation 5, a provision to criminalize terrorist financing for any purpose, including, as clarified in a newly-revised interpretive note, the financing of foreign terrorist fighters.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Under the 2015 Serbian Chairman in-Office, the OSCE focused on counterterrorism, culminating in the adoption of declarations on countering violent extremism (CVE) and strengthening OSCE efforts to counter ISIL/DAESH at the OSCE Belgrade Ministerial Council meeting in December 2015. Throughout the year, the OSCE conducted numerous CVE initiatives in line with the February White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, such as launching a robust CVE communications campaign, hosting a counterterrorism conference that joined together a broad array of stakeholders on sharing best practices to counter the incitement and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, and developing a capacity-building program for community leaders to thwart violent extremists. These CVE-related initiatives were bolstered by other OSCE activities, such as an expert workshop on Media Freedom and Responsibilities in the Context of Counterterrorism Policies in Bucharest in October 2015 and a conference on foreign terrorist fighters in Southeastern Europe in September 2015. On border security, U.S. funding to the OSCE's Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe contributed to building the capabilities of border and customs officials to counter transnational threats in Central Asia. The United States also funded a border security training seminar focused on the OSCE's Mediterranean Partners (North Africa and the Middle East) in Spain. Through the OSCE's Action against Terrorism Unit, the United States also supported initiatives aimed at addressing effective criminal justice system responses to terrorism, travel document security, cyber security, and nonproliferation.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's counterterrorism efforts focus on improving awareness of the threat, developing response capabilities, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and organizations. In 2015, the North Atlantic Council and working level NATO committees hosted representatives from the UN, GCTF co-chairs Turkey and the United States, and NGOs for discussions on the foreign terrorist fighter threat and lessons learned in countering violent extremist content online. The NATO Headquarters' Intelligence Unit now benefits from increased information sharing between member services and the Alliance, and produces analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.

Building partner capacity and developing innovative technologies are part of NATO's core mission, and methods that address asymmetric threats like terrorism are of particular relevance. Much of this work is conducted through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW), which aims to protect troops, civilians, and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks, including suicide bombers, IEDs, rockets against aircraft, and chemical, biological and radiological materials. The DAT POW supports the implementation of NATO's spearhead force – the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force – by developing projects to improve troop readiness and preparedness. To complement counter-ISIL coalition efforts, NATO has continued to develop a Defense and Related Security Capacity Building package to assist Iraq in building more effective security forces.

European Union (EU). In 2015, the EU's work with the United States included efforts to curb terrorist financing, strengthen cooperation on countering violent extremism, shut down foreign terrorist fighter networks, and build counterterrorism capacity in partner countries. Much of this work is completed through regular senior-level and working-level consultation and collaboration, including the U.S.-EU Consultation on Terrorism and the U.S.-EU Political Dialogue on Counterterrorism Financing. In the aftermath of the November 13 terrorist attacks in Paris, the EU committed during in December to several counterterrorism actions, including improving data entry of foreign terrorist fighters in various EU information data bases, approving a Passenger Name Record directive to help identify and track terrorist travelers, and pursuing closer cooperation with key partners such as the United States.

Group of Seven (G-7). Within the context of the G-7 Roma-Lyon Group (RLG) meetings on counterterrorism and counter-crime, the United States helped develop a policy toolkit of measures to address the foreign terrorist fighter problem and generated support for the newly established International Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM), which the G-7 supports under the auspices of the GCTF. The United States also sought to advance projects through the RLG's expert groups on counterterrorism, transportation security, high-tech crime, migration, criminal legal affairs, and law enforcement.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Counterterrorism activities of the 27-member ARF countries included the annual meeting on counterterrorism and transnational crime (CTTC) and supported capacity building through ARF institutions. In 2015, the United States provided funding for an ARF Workshop for First Response Support for Victims of Terrorism and Other Mass Casualty Events, which was hosted by the Government of Philippines in Manila on September 22-23. The workshop brought together policymakers, practitioners, and first responders across the ASEAN region from the domains of (natural) disaster preparedness and management and those responsible for managing and coordinating responses to terrorist attacks. Participants included a total of 63 policymakers, practitioners, and first responders from 16 countries. The meeting took stock of national and regional efforts on these fronts in Southeast Asia as well as international good practices in the area of first responder support to victims of terrorism and other mass casualty events. Additionally, the United States encouraged information sharing and supported the CTTC work plan, which focused on illicit drugs; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism; cybersecurity; counter-radicalization; the sponsorship of a regional transnational crime information sharing center; and a workshop on migration.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In 2015, APEC continued to implement its comprehensive Consolidated Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy. The Strategy, adopted in 2011, endorsed the principles of security, efficiency, and resilience, and advocated for risk-based approaches to security challenges across its four cross-cutting areas of supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. The United States sponsored a workshop that highlighted the threat that foreign terrorist fighter travel poses to the Asia-Pacific region and explained why advance passenger information systems are effective at helping mitigate that threat. The United States also sponsored a workshop on countering terrorists' use of new payment systems (NPS) that helped reinforce the capacities of APEC members to promote the legal and transparent use of NPS while effectively countering their illicit uses.

Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE). In 2015, the CICTE Secretariat conducted 62 activities, training courses, and technical assistance missions that benefited more than 3,687 participants in five thematic areas: border control; critical infrastructure protection; counterterrorism legislative assistance and terrorist financing; strengthening strategies on emerging terrorist threats (crisis management); and international cooperation and partnerships. The United States is a major contributor to CICTE's training programs and has provided funding and expert trainers for capacity-building programs focused on aviation security, travel document security and fraud prevention, cybersecurity, legislative assistance and counterterrorism financing, supply chain security, and customs and immigration.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS

A matrix of the ratification status of 18 of the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism can be found here: https://www.unodc.org/ldb/universal_instruments_NEW.html

LONG-TERM PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO COUNTER TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS AND RECRUITMENT

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE). CVE refers to proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence; and efforts to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence.

President Obama convened the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015. More than 60 countries, 12 multilateral bodies, and representatives from civil society, business, and the faith community participated and launched a global "whole-of-society" effort to tackle the broad range of factors fueling violent extremism.

The Summit underscored the need for a comprehensive approach that seeks to both limit the growth of active violent extremist groups and prevent new ones from emerging. Summit participants outlined a concrete action agenda with nine pillars related to preventing and countering violent extremism:

1. Promote local research and information-sharing on the drivers of violent extremism;
2. Empower civil society;
3. Strengthen relations between at-risk communities and security and police forces;
4. Promote counter-narratives and weaken the legitimacy of violent extremist messaging;
5. Promote educational approaches to build resilience to violent extremism;
6. Enhance access to mainstream religious knowledge;
7. Prevent radicalization in prisons and rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremists;
8. Identify political and economic opportunities for at-risk communities; and
9. Strengthen development assistance and stabilization efforts.

Governments in Albania, Algeria, Australia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mauritania, and Norway hosted regional CVE summits to engage additional states, municipal governments, and civil society and private sector participants in preventive approaches to violent extremism. A number of countries developed National CVE Action Plans charting their way forward.

On the margins of UNGA 71, mayors from around the world launched a new Strong Cities Network to identify and share community-level best practices for building social cohesion and resilience against violent extremism.

Young people gathered at the first-ever Global Youth CVE Summit to showcase innovative tools for countering the appeal of violent extremism among their peers. Researchers and practitioners with the support of State and USAID launched the RESOLVE Network (Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism) to connect with policy institutes and methodologists around the world to better understand the community-level factors fueling violent extremism and the best evidence-based approaches to address them. Civil society organizations joined in all of these events and initiatives, further amplifying the chorus of voices to counter violent ideologies on the ground.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development sponsored a new CVE Center for Excellence and Counter Messaging for the East Africa region. The Government of Albania is spearheading an initiative to build regional capacity and cooperation around CVE, for example by supporting CVE-related research and counter-messaging.

In line with the Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on CVE, State and USAID leverage a range of available diplomatic, development, and foreign assistance tools and resources to have a demonstrable impact to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism.

The following five objectives guide our CVE assistance and engagement:

1. Expand international political will, partnerships, and expertise to better understand the drivers of violent extremism and mobilize effective interventions.
2. Encourage and assist partner governments to adopt more effective policies and approaches to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism, including changing unhelpful practices where necessary.
3. Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas or put particular segments of a population at high risk of violent extremist radicalization and recruitment to violence.
4. Empower and amplify locally credible voices that can change the perception of violent extremist groups and their ideology among key demographic segments.
5. Strengthen the capabilities of government and non-governmental actors to isolate, intervene with, and promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals caught in the cycle of radicalization to violence.

State and USAID are pursuing a range of programs to assist partners around the world to prevent and counter radicalization and recruitment to violence. Key areas of programming include the following:

- **Supporting the Development and Implementation of National CVE Action Plans:** The United States is providing technical support and assistance to governments as they design and implement national CVE action plans, in partnership with civil society and the private sector. To reinforce these national action plan efforts, the United States is supporting Hedayah, the CVE Center of Excellence in Abu Dhabi, in providing capacity building and technical expertise to governments on CVE policy and practice.
- **Researching Drivers of Violent Extremism and Effective CVE Interventions:** The United States is supporting innovative regional, country-based, and thematic research on the drivers of violent extremism and on programming approaches designed to inform targeted CVE policy and programming. The United States is supporting the Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Network, which connect academics and researchers to study the dynamics of CVE in specific, local contexts and identify effective CVE interventions. At the same time, the United States is also working with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) to develop an expanded toolkit for addressing the life cycle of radicalization to violence.
- **Building the CVE Capacity of Criminal Justice Actors and Institutions:** The United States is supporting programs, especially in the Horn, Sahel, and Maghreb regions of Africa to strengthen the CVE capacity of law enforcement, including police deployed to peace and stabilization operations, prison management and justice sector actors, and to help address drivers of violent extremism such as corruption and human rights abuses. The United States is also supporting programs to train and assist corrections officials to counter radicalization to violence in prison settings and promote rehabilitation, including addressing returning foreign terrorist fighters.
- **Strengthening CVE Efforts by Sub-National, City, and Local Partners:** The United States is supporting the Strong Cities Network, a global network of municipal and other sub-national leaders and local government practitioners involved in building community resilience and social cohesion to counter violent extremism in their local communities. The United States is also contributing to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, the first multilateral fund supporting community-based projects that counter local drivers of recruitment and radicalization to violence.
- **Enhancing Civil Society's Role in Countering Violent Extremism:** Recognizing that youth play a vital role in preventing the spread of violent extremism, the United States is supporting programs that empower youth as change agents in preventing violent extremism in their communities. The United States is also supporting programs that elevate the role of women in preventing the spread of violent extremism in their countries, communities, and families.
- **Countering Violent Extremist Messaging and Promoting Alternative Narratives:** With the leadership of the announced Interagency Global Engagement Center, the United States is supporting efforts to help government and non-governmental partners to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) messaging and promote alternative narratives. The United States is supporting the Sawab Center in Abu Dhabi, the first-ever joint online messaging program, to counter ISIL propaganda by directly exposing its criminal nature, challenging its doctrine of hate and intolerance, and highlighting Coalition successes. The United States is also supporting efforts to mobilize and build the capacity of civil society actors and other influential voices who can credibly challenge violent extremist narratives, including through the Peer-to-Peer: Challenging Extremism Program (P2P).

CIVILIAN COUNTERTERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS. As the terrorist threat has evolved and grown more geographically diverse in recent years, it has become clear that our success depends in large part on the political will and capabilities of our partners to counter terrorism. To succeed over the long term, we must have partners who can not only militarily disrupt threats and degrade networks in a way that comports with international laws and norms, but who have strong civilian capabilities, as well. We need law enforcement, justice sector, and corrections partners, who can disrupt attacks and investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorists and their facilitation networks.

The United States uses various funding authorities and programs to build the capacity of law enforcement, justice, and corrections officials to counter terrorism. The Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism oversees the following capacity-building programs: Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), Counterterrorism Financing (CFT), Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies (CTE), the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). For further information on these programs, we refer you to the Annual Report on Assistance Related to International Terrorism, Fiscal Year 2014: <http://www.state.gov/j/c/rls/other/rpt/221544.htm>.

In his speech at West Point in May 2014, President Obama called for the United States to develop more effective partnerships in countries and regions where terrorist networks seek a foothold and announced the **Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF)** to provide significant, flexible resources to build "a network of partnerships from South Asia to the Sahel."

Congress has appropriated significant additional funding for the **Department of State's Counterterrorism Partnership Fund**. This funding will enable us to significantly expand civilian counterterrorism capacity-building activities with key partner nations in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and South and Central Asia, and other regions as required to mitigate the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, prevent and counter terrorist safe havens and recruitment, and counter Iranian-sponsored terrorism.

REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVE (RSI). Terrorist groups often take advantage of porous borders and ungoverned areas between countries. The RSI program enables flexible civilian responses to rapidly evolving threats and builds the partner capacity and cooperation necessary to counter the most serious threats facing the United States. Current RSI efforts focus on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq, countering terrorist safe havens, counter-ISIL messaging, and countering Hizballah's activities.

In 2015, RSI supported a wide variety of projects focused on regional law enforcement cooperation and effectiveness against transnational threats. Examples include the counterterrorism rapid response project, which allows the Department of State to quickly deploy advisors and experts to provide immediate assistance to partner nations in various technical areas. In 2015, the rapid response fund mechanism was used to assist Kosovo in processing foreign terrorist fighter cases and taking them to trial; training for Tanzanian Police in improving their skills in dismantling explosive devices, including IEDs; and a central authorities-focused project in India that targeted information sharing in counterterrorism cases. Other RSI projects in 2015, included a series of global engagements geared at building partner nations' domestic and regional capacity to counter Hizballah criminal activities by using legal and law enforcement tools; as well as activities aimed to assist in the implementation of the Global Counterterrorism Forum good practices, including the *Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon* (*Hague-Marrakech Memorandum*).

Programs to Counter Foreign Terrorist Fighters

During the period 2012-2015, significant numbers of foreign terrorist fighters traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside a number of violent extremist groups, most prominently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Nusrah Front. While some of these individuals have been killed in the fighting, thousands have returned home and more will certainly follow. Many of these fighters are returning home with battlefield experience and can pose a direct and immediate threat to their home countries and regions. Amplified by social media, and fueled by local factors, new fighters continue to be attracted to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and to other regions where ISIL affiliates are active and emerging. North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe remain key source regions for foreign terrorist fighters. There is also increasing concern regarding ISIL's presence in Libya, and the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to that conflict zone.

The Department of State has played a pivotal role in the creation of an international framework for addressing the threat from foreign terrorist fighters. In 2014, the Department of State worked with partners to establish a Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group and adopt *The Hague-Marrakesh Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon* under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). This memorandum gave practical effect to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178, which was adopted on September 24, 2014, during a high-level UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting chaired by President Obama. Additionally, the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL established an ISIL-focused Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group co-led by Turkey and the Netherlands.

In part as a result of our efforts, at least 45 countries have passed or updated existing laws to more effectively identify and prosecute foreign terrorist fighters. Thirty-five countries have arrested foreign terrorist fighters, and 12 have successfully prosecuted at least one foreign terrorist fighter. The United States has information-sharing arrangements with 50 international partners to identify and track the travel of suspected terrorists, and at least 50 countries, plus the UN, now contribute foreign terrorist fighter profiles to INTERPOL, a four hundred percent increase over a two-year period. Several countries have also developed new action plans and programs to counter foreign terrorist fighter radicalization and recruitment in their countries, for example in the Western Balkans.

Strategic Objectives: Looking forward, the Department of State will continue to expand and deepen bilateral and multilateral engagement to counter the foreign terrorist fighters threat and related radicalization and recruitment to violence. We have identified the following six strategic objectives, which the Department pursues in close partnership with other U.S. government agencies.

- **Work with partners to identify, monitor, and address the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to and from Iraq and Syria and new areas affected by ISIL expansion, such as Libya.** The Department continues to prioritize bilateral engagement with key source and transit countries. Our approach brings together partner countries' homeland security, law enforcement, justice sector, intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity building, and information sharing efforts. These engagements facilitate increased cooperation and, where appropriate, technical assistance. Such cooperation takes the form of information-sharing arrangements, provision of hardware and software to improve border security and management, financial intelligence exchanges, and support in law enforcement investigations, amongst others. Over the course of the last three years, the Department of State has led interagency delegations to countries in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In the past six months, the Department has prioritized engagement with Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands to increase cooperation to counter foreign terrorist fighters. Following the November Paris attacks, the Department is leading efforts to deploy interagency expert teams to broaden and deepen cooperation with European partners to combat terrorist travel and help reduce the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across their borders. These teams will provide tailored advice in areas such as information sharing, watchlisting, and border security.
- **Encourage and assist top foreign terrorist fighter source and transit countries to employ more robust border and aviation security procedures to identify and interdict potential foreign terrorist fighters and those returning.** The Department funds a variety of programming that is implemented by our interagency and multilateral partners, including the Department of Homeland Security, to bolster partner nation capacity to secure borders and prevent foreign terrorist fighters travel onward to conflict zones and back home to countries of origin. Trainings focus on aviation security, to include traveler screening and airport security practices; maritime security, which encompasses training to deter and interdict materiel to support ISIL (illicit funds, weapons and people) and a variety of border security courses aimed at improving controls at land borders.
- **Enable top foreign terrorist fighter source and transit countries to track and interdict travel by foreign terrorist fighters through more robust information sharing, watchlisting, and traveler screening both with the United States and between top foreign terrorist fighter source and transit countries.** The United States now has information-sharing arrangements with 50 countries. Under these arrangements, the United States and foreign partners exchange screening information on known and suspected terrorists, which serves to disrupt and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to ISIL and other terrorist groups. The United States has expanded information sharing with several countries, including Malaysia, Turkey, and some Gulf Cooperation Council countries – many of which were traditionally reluctant to create formal arrangements. Additionally, the Department, working in partnership with the Department of Justice (DOJ) INTERPOL Washington, has launched a new effort in Southeast Asia to enhance law enforcement and border security agencies' access to INTERPOL data, develop protocols and expertise to leverage INTERPOL data, and encourage best practices for interagency and international collaboration to combat the flow of foreign terrorist fighters from the region.
- **Encourage and assist top foreign terrorist fighter source and transit countries to establish and employ the necessary legislative, administrative, policy and criminal justice frameworks, capabilities, tools and programs to investigate, interdict, divert, prosecute, adjudicate and incarcerate aspirant or returning foreign terrorist fighters.** The Department works with a full range of implementers to help partners develop or improve their criminal justice systems to deal with terrorism cases within a rule of law framework. For example, State funds the DOJ to help governments draft new legislation where necessary and to assist partner countries to enforce laws designed to address the foreign terrorist fighter problem. As a result, countries in the Western Balkans – including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia – have recently adopted counterterrorism legislation. Though it did not receive assistance from the DOJ, Croatia also recently adopted counterterrorism legislation. In addition, the Department is working within the UN system and with regional and sub-regional organizations to develop technical assistance programs that advance the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNSCR 2178, and GCTF Good Practices to Counter the Global Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon.
- **Encourage and assist top foreign terrorist fighter source and transit countries to counter violent extremism and prevent radicalization to violence, including through community resilience programs and counter-messaging.** Our CVE efforts are guided and shaped by a developing understanding of the local geography, demography, and drivers of recruitment and radicalization to violence: where the hotspots are; who is most susceptible; and why they may be motivated to join. We support a range of foreign terrorist fighters-relevant CVE programming including, but not limited to: building the capacity of credible third parties to deliver CT messaging and to develop positive alternatives to the messaging of violent extremists; engaging youth at-risk of radicalization to violence with positive alternatives; empowering women, religious leaders, and civil society more broadly as constructive CVE advocates and activists; amplifying the voices of victims and survivors of terrorism as well as returned/rehabilitated foreign terrorist fighters and other violent extremists; and supporting rehabilitation and reintegration in prisons and beyond. The Department's CVE programming funds counter-recruitment and counter-messaging efforts. For example, in Southeast Asia, we currently support a series of training workshops to share good practices, approaches, and tools for effective counter-narratives with regional governments and civil society; there is a particular thematic focus on ISIL. In the Western Balkans and Southeast Asia, we support local law enforcement engagement with at-risk communities and civil society groups to raise awareness of radicalization to violence, and design collaborative initiatives to provide positive alternatives in places where there has been some foreign terrorist fighter flow.
- **Encourage and assist top foreign terrorist fighter source and transit countries to develop comprehensive diversion and rehabilitation and reintegration programs for aspirant and returning foreign terrorist fighters, both inside and outside the prison setting.** The Department supports rehabilitation and reintegration programs, which are essential elements to assist foreign terrorist fighters in disengaging from violent behavior. We have taken a number of steps over the past several years to promote rehabilitation and reintegration programs in prisons. For instance, the Department is supporting a DOJ and UN project at high-level security prisons in East Asia that focuses on training correction officials on proper management of terrorist inmates. Since prisons can be places where radicalization to violence can occur, we are also supporting efforts to promote a full range of criminal justice sector tools that can be used in lieu of sentencing an offender to prison. For example, we are supporting a pilot diversion program aimed at potential foreign terrorist fighters and others at risk of recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism. This pilot effort seeks to address the challenges presented by youths who have come to the attention of law enforcement as a result of having come under the influence of violent extremist ideologues or terrorist recruiters. Other programs target returning foreign terrorist fighters to help them reintegrate into society and avoid becoming a source of enduring threat. To help partner countries deal with returning foreign terrorist fighters that may be outside of the criminal justice system, we are supporting an initiative being implemented by Hedayah and the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law. This effort, launched in January 2016, is designed to assist countries develop or refine their rehabilitation and reintegration programs, strategies, policies and procedures.

SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN

In 2015, the United States continued to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan, as we believe that a stable, secure, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan is in the long-term U.S. national security interest. To support this partnership, the United States has allocated civilian and security assistance totaling more than US \$9 billion since 2009. U.S. security assistance to Pakistan is designed to build Pakistan's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity. In addition, since 2001, the Department of Defense has reimbursed nearly US \$14 billion in Coalition Support Funds for Pakistani expenditures in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Account	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015 653(a)	*figures in millions, USD
Total Foreign Assistance	1,237.1	853.4	787.8	Since the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (commonly referred to as Kerry-Lugar-Berman, or "KLB") was enacted in October 2009, and with funding made available in annual appropriations legislation, the United States has committed more than US \$5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan, in addition to more than US \$1 billion for humanitarian assistance. The United States continued to focus on five sectors determined in consultation with the Pakistani government in 2011: energy; economic growth including agriculture, stabilization of areas vulnerable to violent extremism; education; and health. Emphasis on improving democracy, governance, and gender equity are integrated into programming across the five sectors.
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	826.3	456.5	468.0	Since the passage of this major authorization and annual appropriations legislation, U.S. assistance has made almost 2,300 megawatts available to Pakistan's electricity grid, benefiting some 23 million Pakistanis and helped Pakistan take steps to reform the troubled sector; funded the refurbishment or construction of nearly 1,000 kilometers of roads, enabling trade, security, and mobility; trained more than 5,600 police and 1,000 prosecutors across Pakistan; provided scholarships to approximately 12,000 Pakistanis to attend Pakistani universities, 50 percent of whom were women; and supplied better access to comprehensive family planning services to more than 100,000 women.
Intl. Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	47.4	55.4	40.0	
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining (NADR)	8.4	5.6	10.0	Energy: Chronic energy shortages severely limit Pakistan's economic development. As such, energy is our top assistance priority, supporting the goal of job creation, security, and political stability in Pakistan. U.S. assistance has helped Pakistan improve governance and management systems, and increase the country's distribution companies' revenue collection by more than US \$400 million in 2015, as well as provide commercial opportunities for U.S. businesses. The United States continued to fund infrastructure rehabilitation projects, especially in clean energy, and provided technical assistance to Pakistani energy institutions, including distribution companies, to increase power generation and improve performance. The new U.S.-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership will help the private sector add at least 3,000 megawatts of clean power generation infrastructure to Pakistan's national electricity system by 2020.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	280.2	269.9	265.0	
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	5.0	4.9	4.8	
Food for Peace Title II (FFP)	69.9	61.1	—	Economic Growth: Through a range of programs and public-private partnerships in agriculture and other sectors of Pakistan's economy, U.S. assistance helped Pakistan create jobs and foster economic growth. In 2014, the United States made awards for the Pakistan Private Investment Initiative, a public-private program in

which U.S. capital, matched equally by private sector funding, committed to provide equity to small- and medium-sized Pakistani enterprises to provide much needed liquidity. During U.S.-Pakistan Economic Partnership Week in Islamabad in March 2015, U.S. Secretary Penny Pritzker and Pakistani Finance Minister Ishaq Dar hosted the third U.S.-Pakistan Business Opportunities Conference. The U.S. Department of Commerce is providing technical assistance in the areas of trade facilitation, intellectual property reform, competition and telecommunications law, and commercial law education. The Pakistani participants attend trade shows and hear from U.S. companies and business associations about best practices and the underpinnings of U.S. success, including the free market and rule of law. The Department of Commerce also trains private sector professionals in a variety of industries, including supply chain, packaging, and gems and jewelry. To promote private investment, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) facilitated US \$800 million in financing and insurance for projects in Pakistan. Trade and investment assistance was provided under the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. The United States supported implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. The United States has contributed US \$15 million to the development of the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) project, which will transmit 1,300 megawatts of electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and supports the CASA-1000 Secretariat.

Stabilization: The United States supported Pakistan's efforts to make its territory inhospitable to violent extremists by strengthening governance and civilian law enforcement capacity and promoting socioeconomic development, particularly in areas bordering Afghanistan and other targeted locations vulnerable to violent extremism. U.S. efforts included road construction, small community-based grants, police and governance training, and providing equipment to civilian law enforcement.

Education: Pakistan's ability to educate its youth is critical to its economic growth and future trajectory. U.S. education programs focused on increasing the number of students who enroll in and complete courses in primary and tertiary educational institutions; and improving the quality of that education – with a specific focus on reading – to prepare Pakistani students for the workforce. Pakistan is the recipient of the largest U.S. government-funded Fulbright Program in the world, and, since 2009, the Fulbright Program has funded more than 800 Masters and 200 PhD candidates and nearly 100 Senior Scholars from Pakistan. Through the Merit- and Needs-Based Scholarship Program and predecessor projects, the United States has funded more than 12,000 total scholarships for underprivileged students to attend university in Pakistan and financed a new dormitory for women at Forman's Christian College in Lahore. The United States funds 23 partnerships between Pakistani and U.S. universities to facilitate professional development for faculty, curriculum reform, joint research, and peer-to-peer interaction. In June 2015, USAID, in collaboration with Pakistan's Higher Education Commission, launched the U.S.-Pakistan Centers for Advanced Studies, which established three centers in Pakistan through partnerships between four Pakistani and three U.S. universities in energy, water, and agriculture and food security. Under a U.S.-Pakistan Basic Education Initiative, the United States funded reading programs to improve the reading skills of 1.9 million primary grade students. The United States has also funded the rebuilding or renovation of almost 600 schools, and provided English language training to 9,400 underprivileged Pakistani teenagers countrywide.

Health: The provision of basic health services in Pakistan is inadequate for much of the population, particularly for rural populations. U.S. health programs supported the Government of Pakistan's efforts to deliver healthcare, particularly in the areas of maternal and child health. U.S. assistance was also used to support Government of Pakistan initiatives to construct health clinics and hospitals, fund the acquisition of medical materials, and provide critical family planning and reproductive health care. Since 2010, USAID has trained more than 29,000 health care workers, who served more than 3.5 million community members throughout Pakistan.

Humanitarian Assistance: Since October 2009, more than US \$1 billion of emergency humanitarian assistance has been provided to Pakistan in response to floods and conflict, above and beyond bilateral assistance. During the historic floods in 2010, funding from the American people helped 10 million flood-affected citizens, who received rescue services, food, emergency shelter, cash grants, and even seeds to replant crops. During his January 2015 visit to Pakistan, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry pledged US \$250 million to facilitate the return of 1.6 million Internally Displaced Persons to the FATA. The pledge consists of humanitarian aid, early recovery assistance, and post-conflict development assistance.

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: Pakistan took important steps to counter violent extremists operating in the areas bordering Afghanistan during 2015. These steps included intensifying support to civilian law enforcement and border security agencies. The United States directly supported Pakistan's efforts to build the capacity of its civilian law enforcement and border security agencies by providing training, equipment, infrastructure, and aviation assistance. U.S. assistance helped build capacity in law enforcement agencies responsible for holding areas cleared by Pakistan's military, protecting local populations from militant attacks, and maintaining law and order. Collectively, these efforts enhanced the counterinsurgency, law enforcement, and counter-narcotics capacities of Pakistan's civilian law enforcement and border security agencies. Improved security will, in turn, facilitate economic development, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR): The United States provided assistance to strengthen Pakistan's export control system to prevent transfer of WMD and related technology. NADR/Export Control and Related Border Security funds were used for nonproliferation export control training, national control list harmonization, and customs enforcement, general inspection, and WMD detection training for border control personnel. The United States also provided targeted assistance to build Pakistani law enforcement capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): FMF promotes the development of Pakistan's long-term counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism capabilities to enable security and stability throughout the country, particularly in the conflict-affected areas bordering Afghanistan, and to improve Pakistan's ability to lead and participate in maritime security operations that support counterterrorism aims. The United States continued to focus FMF towards seven core capabilities: precision strike; air mobility/combat search and rescue; battlefield communications; night operations; survivability and countering IEDs; border security; and maritime security.

International Military Education and Training (IMET): The IMET program supported professional military education for Pakistan's military leaders, emphasizing respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, including civilian control of the military. IMET also supported effective management of Pakistan's defense establishment through training in logistics, defense acquisition, and resource management. A significant portion of this funding supported training related to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan. To build capacity and cooperation between our security forces, Pakistan received the largest amount of IMET of any of our global partners, at nearly US \$5 million annually. Since 2009, the United States has trained more than 2,300 members of the Pakistan military.

Measures to ensure that assistance has the greatest long-term positive impact on the welfare of the Pakistani people and their ability to counter terrorism: More than a quarter of U.S. civilian assistance is implemented via Pakistani partners, including the Government of Pakistan and private sector actors, when practicable. This is done to strengthen local capacity and increase sustainability, providing the greatest possible long-term impact of U.S. assistance. Increasingly, the Administration is also implementing public-private partnerships to engage the private sector as a long-term partner in Pakistan's development.

COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA

The United States and Saudi Arabia have a strong bilateral relationship. Multiple high-level visits in 2015 deepened this relationship at the personal and institutional level and provided senior officials from both countries the chance to discuss means of improving counterterrorism coordination.

During 2015, the Government of Saudi Arabia, working with the United States, continued to build and augment its capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies, including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Saudi Arabia continued to maintain a robust counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of U.S. and Saudi citizens in both countries, and to enhance the security of infrastructure in Saudi Arabia critical to the global economy. Saudi Arabia continued its long-term counterterrorism strategy to track and halt the activities of terrorists and terror financiers, dismantle the presence or reconstitution of al-Qa'ida (AQ)-affiliates, impede the ability of militants to operate from or within Saudi Arabia, and to implement laws against supporting terrorist groups and travel to conflict zones. Saudi Arabia welcomed UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178, expanding existing counterterrorism programs and rhetoric to address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, and leveraged terrorist finance provisions of its Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (CT Law) to combat funding of violent extremist groups operating throughout the region. Saudi Arabia continued to cooperate with the United States to prevent acts of terrorism both through engagement in bilateral programs and through information exchange agreements with the United States. During 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its public designations of individuals and entities for violating the Kingdom's laws criminalizing terrorist financing and support. Saudi Arabia in April designated the Pakistan-based al-Furqan Foundation for providing financial support to groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including AQ, and in May and November sanctioned more than 12 individuals and entities acting on behalf of Hizballah.

Saudi Arabia sought to expand economic and civic opportunities for its people. Nearly half of the Saudi populace is under 25 years of age. The late King Abdullah promoted an economic development agenda, and Saudi Arabia has sought to address economic sources of social discontent, such as housing scarcity and the need to create jobs for millions of Saudis. During his September 2015 visit to Washington, King Salman announced a US \$4 trillion investment plan to diversify the Saudi economy away from oil and provide employment to Saudi youth. In December 2015, for the first time, women were allowed to vote in and run as candidates for municipal elections.

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to train and regulate imams, prohibiting them from inciting violence, and continued to monitor mosques and religious education. The King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue continued to promote tolerance and respect for diversity through its dialogue and awareness-raising programs. The Ministry of Interior continued to operate its flagship de-radicalization program (the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue). Some religious figures not directly associated with the establishment, however, reportedly made statements that promoted intolerant views.

The United States continued to support Saudi Arabia in reforms it is undertaking by facilitating Saudi nationals studying in the United States and promoting educational exchanges; encouraging increased bilateral trade and investment; urging Saudi Arabia to take actions necessary to attract job-creating partnerships with U.S. companies; and supporting programming in such areas as judicial reform and women's entrepreneurship, as well as the Ministry of Interior's well-developed extremist rehabilitation program, the Mohammed bin Naif Counseling and Care Center, to reduce recidivism among former fighters charged with crimes related to terrorism.

Throughout 2015, Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities in its territory by tracking, arresting, and prosecuting terrorist suspects. Neighborhood police units engaged and worked directly with community members in Saudi Arabia, encouraging citizens to provide tips and information about terrorist activity. The government offered rewards for information on terrorists, and Saudi security services made several announcements throughout the year pertaining to the arrest of hundreds of AQAP and ISIL members and supporters.

Saudi security professionals regularly participated in joint programs and information exchange agreements around the world in 2015, including in the United States and Europe. The Saudi Arabian government has continued to provide specialized training programs to combat terrorism financing for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies. In 2008, the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments concluded a Technical Cooperation Agreement, and a year later established the joint Office of Program Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) to implement it, institutionalizing a Saudi-funded bilateral program of technical assistance focused on the protection of critical infrastructure and the Saudi public. Through the OPM-MOI program, U.S. agencies are helping Saudi Arabia improve its ability to thwart terrorists before they act and to respond to terrorist attacks if they occur. In April 2014 and August 2015, the Saudi Arabian government participated in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum Task Force on counterterrorism and border security. Saudi officials have issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, and the Saudi Arabian government has hosted international counterterrorism conferences on combating extremist ideology and countering terrorist financing. In May 2015, the Saudi government hosted the second meeting of the Counter ISIL Finance Group (CIFG).

U.S.-Saudi collaboration was not confined to bilateral issues. With political upheaval across the region throughout the year, the United States consulted closely with the Saudi government on regional stability, including in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Working both bilaterally and multilaterally through the GCC and the Arab League, the Saudi government provided leadership in promoting peaceful transitions. Saudi Arabia has cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism issues as demonstrated by its participation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Saudi Arabia is a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. As part of its strategy to promote stability throughout the region, the Saudi government increased the scope of its economic and development assistance. On the humanitarian front, Saudi Arabia pledged a US \$500 million grant to the UN for Iraq humanitarian assistance in July 2014, US \$60 million in Syria humanitarian assistance at the International Pledging Conference in Kuwait, and US \$104 million in humanitarian assistance to the World Food Program for refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Syria.

Saudi Arabia has been an important partner in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, participating in Coalition airstrikes against ISIL in Syria, and offering to host a train and equip program for the moderate Syrian opposition. In addition, Saudi Arabia has enacted tough criminal penalties for those traveling to fight in foreign conflicts and has enforced those penalties. The Government of Saudi Arabian and religious leaders have issued many public statements against ISIL. Saudi Arabia, along with Italy and the United States, co-leads the Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG), which coordinates the Coalition's efforts to disrupt and dismantle ISIL's financial infrastructure.

On December 14, 2015, the Saudi government announced the formation a 34-state Islamic Counterterrorism Coalition to be headquartered in Riyadh that will focus on countering violent extremism and coordinating military efforts against all terrorist threats – including ISIL – in Muslim countries.

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS INITIATIVES: OUTREACH TO FOREIGN MUSLIM AUDIENCES

This section is provided by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

Four of the five broadcast entities under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) provided programming for countries with large Muslim populations in 2015: the Voice of America (VOA), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa, and Afia Darfur), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA).

- Eighteen of RFE/RL's broadcast languages – almost two-thirds of the total – were directed to regions with majority-Muslim populations, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Additional broadcasting regions in the Russian Federation included the majority Muslim populations of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and the North Caucasus.
- VOA has been particularly successful in reaching non-Arabic-speaking Muslim audiences, with strong performances in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tanzania, among other places.
- The Middle East Broadcasting Networks broadcast throughout the region to more than 340 million people.
- VOA and RFE/RL provided news and information to Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in Dari and Pashto. Together, RFE/RL and VOA reached nearly 53 percent of Afghan adults each week.
- Radio Free Asia broadcast to the more than 16 million mainly ethnic Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of northwestern China and Central Eurasia.
- The BBG, in partnership with Radio Free Asia, launched the online news operation Benar News to reach predominantly Muslim audiences in India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. These communities often lack access to accurate and balanced journalism, but at the same time are exposed to a proliferation of violent extremist narratives supporting the ideology of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Benar News counters those narratives by publishing credible domestic news, features, analysis, and commentary in multiple formats – text, video, and pictures – and in five languages – Bahasa Indonesia, Bahasa Malaysia, Thai, Bengali, and English. Among its inaugural coverage in 2015, Benar News launched the series "Torn Lives," which profiles people affected by the rise of ISIL and violent extremist groups.

The BBG used the latest communications technologies to avoid jamming of its signals and to reach audiences through digital and other communications tools, such as web chats and blogs.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Arabic: Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) has seven bureaus/production centers in the region, in addition to its main studios in Virginia, and a network of regional correspondents. MBN broadcast to a population that includes an estimated 317 million Muslims or about 23 percent of the world's Muslim population. MBN takes a diverse approach to reaching the largest potential audience, using three platforms: television (Alhurra TV, Alhurra-Iraq TV), radio (Radio Sawa, Radio Sawa Iraq and Afia Darfur), and digital (Alhurra.com, RadioSawa.com and Irfasaatak.com). The networks provided a unique, local perspective of breaking news, current events, and balanced coverage on topics such as freedom of speech, religion, and the role of women in society and politics. Alhurra also produced programs encouraging freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and non-violence.

Iraq: Every week, 36 percent of Iraqi adults – some 6.3 million people – listened to or watched one of the three BBG broadcasters serving the country: Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa, and VOA Kurdish. One in three Iraqis say Alhurra-Iraq is their most important source of information. Radio Sawa Iraq is one of the top radio stations among adults. In August 2015, the resources of RFI were merged with Sawa to provide the audience extensive Iraq-specific news informational programming. VOA Kurdish reached three percent of Kurdish-speaking Iraqis weekly.

In 2015, MBN created **Raise Your Voice**, a multi-platform initiative for Iraqi audiences across television, radio, and digital, composed of five television programs, one radio program, an interactive website, and a digital team to engage audiences on "Raise Your Voice" social media properties. This initiative, entirely in Arabic, is designed as a non-sectarian platform to encourage citizens to speak out and be a part of the discussion about the fight against violent extremism.

These television programs air on Alhurra-Iraq, targeting Iraqi audiences, and the radio program is broadcast over Radio Sawa Iraq. These programs are also available to the entire region via satellite and digital distribution, through YouTube and social media properties.

Television

- **Delusional Paradise:** A 30-minute, weekly mini-documentary series composed of firsthand accounts, obtained through original interviews, of families and communities that have suffered at the hands of ISIL. The program covers families that have lost loved ones both due to ISIL recruitment and attacks, including an interview with the Jordanian pilot's family. The program was launched on Sept. 26, 2015 and airs on Alhurra, as well as Alhurra-Iraq. MBN has licensed the program to LBC, so that Delusional Paradise also airs on the popular Lebanese channel.
- **From Irbil:** Kurdistan is not well represented in the major Arabic-language satellite television networks. Launched on November 28, 2015, "From Irbil" is a weekly program in Arabic that reports from the streets of Kurdistan and will focus on the plurality of Iraq, discussing issues that are important to Kurds, Shia, and Sunni. It airs on Alhurra-Iraq, targeting Iraqi audiences, but is also available to the entire region via satellite and online.
- **Light Among Us:** A weekly mini-documentary series coming from the streets of Iraq, it will be dedicated to stories of Iraqis who have overcome challenges and obstacles to better their lives and their country despite the current crisis. The program started airing on Alhurra-Iraq November 8, 2015.

Radio

- **What's Your Opinion:** Launched in August 2015, this daily interactive program on Radio Sawa's Iraq streams during the evening drive. The program's two Iraqi hosts field calls and interact with social media throughout the program. This program features topics that tie into MBN's "Raise Your Voice" digital properties.

Digital

- **Irfasaatak.com:** An interactive website, with a corresponding Facebook page, that provides a platform for essayists, reporters, and community-members to productively discuss violent extremism. The website has a weekly theme, such as "Children in Danger: How to protect children from extremist ideology" and "Reform in Arab countries: How the lack of reforms has contributed to extremism." The website posts six to seven daily articles on the topic that are either commissioned articles, selected audience posts, or pieces of MBN journalism.

VOA is providing news coverage of ISIL activities in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and the region on all platforms – radio, television, online, and social media – as well as providing information on U.S. policies and activities to address the ISIL threat. In 2015, VOA established the Extremism Watch Desk to acquire content in eight different languages focused on ISIL and its extremist activities. That content is translated into English, video is added when available, and it is shared with VOA's 45 language services, the VOA News Center, and BBG colleagues at MBN and RFE/RL, multiplying the amount of material available for broadcast across the BBG.

Kurdish: The Kurdish Service covered counterterrorism on a daily basis by conducting interviews and increasing stringer reporting from the region, including audio and video reports from the front lines. Much of this content has been broadcast on affiliate NRT TV in northern Iraq, on the BBG FM network in northern Iraq, and on numerous radio affiliates in Iraq. VOA Kurdish has conducted many interviews with the people on the ground including Yazidi girls who were taken by ISIL and were able to escape.

Persian: VOA's Persian Service provided relevant global and regional news relating to Iran and crucial information about U.S. policy toward Iran and the region. VOA Persian delivered original television programming for six hours per day. In addition, VOA and RFE/RL's Radio Farda each produced one hour of Radio-on-TV (ROT), starting with VOA Persian's ROT Tamasha, and followed by Radio Farda's ROT "Sobhane Ba Khabar." As of June 2015, Radio Farda was also providing live, five-minute TV newscasts online and on VOA's Persian video stream at the top of the hour from 7am to 1pm Tehran time.

- VOA Persian became the first international broadcaster into Iran during the P5+1 talks to start live news updates at the top of every hour and to provide 11 hourly live five-minute news bulletins to the Iranian viewers throughout the day that resulted in increasing delivery of combined VOA Persian – Radio Farda live news content by 62 percent during a 24-hour cycle.
- VOA Persian implemented a sharp increase – by 60 percent – of live breaking news broadcasts focusing on major speeches and statements by President Obama and Secretary Kerry, key Congressional hearings, and major international events. In most cases, VOA Persian was the only broadcaster in Farsi in Iran to go live.
- VOA Persian launched "Tablet," a new, edgy weekly current affairs talk show with a youthful, energetic feeling.

RFE/RL's Radio Farda broadcast newscasts at the top of each hour, followed by reports, features, interviews, and regular segments on youth, women, culture, economics, and politics.

- Radio Farda live coverage from Vienna of the P5+1 negotiations over Iran's nuclear program served as a primary source of information for Iranians, with a record one million page views logged on July 14, 2015 – the day the deal was announced.
- Radio Farda's comprehensive human rights monitoring is unique inside Iran. It is listened to by prison inmates who rely on it for accurate reporting on their cases.
- Radio Farda's online community continued to increase. Its main Facebook page has a fan base of 1.5 million.
- Radio Farda's circumvention strategies to fight internet blockage by the Iranian regime remained successful, with nearly 286 million page views logged in 2015.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghan: VOA's Afghan Service and RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan covered all aspects of the conflict in Afghanistan and the border region on radio, TV, and digital platforms. In addition, VOA and RFE/RL provided extensive coverage of the emergence of ISIL in eastern Afghanistan since January 2015, dispatching reporting teams to the region and collaborating with VOA's News Center. The coverage included exclusive interviews with two ISIL defectors, a profile of a counter-ISIL commander and reports on a pro-ISIL rally on a university campus that led to the arrest of several ISIL sympathizers.

- VOA's Afghan Service covered the Afghan government's peace initiatives with interviews with High Peace Council officials, former Taliban officials, and ordinary citizens as well as original reports and analysis.
- Research shows that RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan is one of the most popular and trusted media outlets in Afghanistan. One of the leading news sources inside the country, its programs provided reliable information on the war on terrorism.
- Radio Azadi has covered the emergence of ISIL in Afghanistan from its beginning, and was the first media outlet in the country that reported on the threat.

Urdu: VOA Urdu reporters in Washington and stringers in five major Pakistani cities reported on terrorism-related activities and provided updates on all major developments in the target area. VOA Urdu particularly highlighted the ongoing Pakistani military operation in Pakistan's volatile tribal areas with close coordination between Islamabad, Kabul, and Washington. Another issue of focus has been Pakistan's efforts to facilitate the Afghan peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

The Pakistan/Afghanistan Border Region: VOA Deewa and RFE/RL Radio Mashaal broadcasts go directly to Pakistan-Afghanistan border regions to cover the terrorism threat, which includes ISIL sympathizers, the Haqqani Network, AQ, and the Taliban. Broadcasting highlights included:

- The Nobel peace laureate Malala Yousafzai chose VOA Deewa to connect with girls and women in the region.

- VOA Deewa has a daily 'Radio on TV' broadcast targeted toward women called 'Bibi Shereen' (Darling Woman). Violent extremists believe it is forbidden for women to raise their voices but VOA Deewa empowers women in communities where there are violent extremists to raise their voice against violence and radical views.
- Radio Mashaal continues to offer audiences programming that is an alternative to the extremist rhetoric in the region. Mashaal launched a weekly program, *Towards Peace*, aimed at promoting dialogue and democracy as a means of conflict resolution in the tribal regions of Pakistan. The program talks to experts, tribal leaders, and other relevant stakeholders to examine ways to achieve political goals, settle disputes, and solve problems through non-violent means.

Bangla: The VOA Bangla Service continuously broadcasts the following on multimedia platforms: interview based reports, features, roundtable discussions, and popular call-in shows on terrorism, human rights themes, and security issues.

CENTRAL ASIA

In September 2015, RFE/RL started producing a version of its Russian-language "Current Time" video program for the Central Asian market. The show is on domestic stations in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, and provides audiences with unique video-reporting tailored to their needs.

RFE/RL launched an experimental wire service directed at Central Asia, which provides news in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Russian languages to more than 900 subscribers, including a large number of Central Asian media professionals. This allows RFE/RL to help foster a positive, pluralistic media environment.

RFE/RL's English-language Mejlis experts' roundtable regularly reports on Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and ISIL terrorism throughout the region, and is among RFE/RL's most popular online features.

Kazakhstan: RFE/RL's Kazakh Service content was delivered via its internet website, mobile site, and social media platforms. The web strategy attracted a younger audience to this bilingual (Kazakh and Russian) site, providing opportunities for interactivity and exploring new genres such as video reporting. The Service's reporting on Kazakh terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq was widely quoted in local Kazakh media and sparked many discussions on Kazakh language web forums.

Kyrgyzstan: RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service is the second most trusted radio news source in Kyrgyzstan, according to a July 2015 survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys Ltd./The Gallup Organization, SIAR Research and Consulting, and USAID. The weekly reach of the Service rose in 2015 to 36.2 percent of the population. The Kyrgyz Service's weekly television news programs – the political talk show "Inconvenient Questions" and youth-oriented "Azattyk+" – reach one in four Kyrgyz every week.

Tajikistan: RFE/RL's Tajik Service served as a reliable source of news and information in Tajikistan. An international conference on combating extremism in Dushanbe was opened with a Tajik Service video report about Tajiks who had joined ISIL.

Uzbekistan: The VOA Uzbek Service's weekly 30-minute TV feature program, daily six-minute TV News Brief and a daily 30-minute radio broadcast featured interviews with U.S. and international sources on topics including religious extremism, terrorism, and U.S.-Uzbekistan and U.S.-Central Asian relations. VOA Uzbek regularly covers the Fergana valley. The Service distributed original stories to mobile phone subscribers. Reports were also accessible on Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, SoundCloud, and Russia based Odnoklassniki, MoMir, and VKontakte. VOA Uzbek has FM radio affiliates in Northern Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, and a TV affiliate in Southern Kyrgyzstan and Northern Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan: RFE/RL's Turkmen Service is the only international media company under supervision of the BBG providing regular multi-media reporting from inside the country, with original video reporting and photojournalism on such issues as homelessness, housing conditions, and travel restrictions on Turkmen citizens, while its reporting on human rights cases has brought critical attention to cases of activists and journalists imprisoned or detained. A variety of foreign stringers, such as those of AP, Reuters, and RIA Novosti, also contribute reporting on Turkmenistan.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

China: VOA delivers news, including religious and local issues affecting more than 23 million Chinese Muslims, to China via satellite television, radio, internet, social media, and mobile channels in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Tibetan. VOA provided extensive coverage of Chinese government policies and treatment of ethnic Uighurs and Tibetans. There were also reports about Muslim migrants traveling through Southeast Asia and their alleged involvement in terrorist activities.

- Radio Free Asia's Uighur language service broadcast two hours daily, seven days a week, and was the only international radio service providing impartial news and information in the Uighur language to the potential audience of more than 16 million Uighur Muslims in northwestern China and Central Eurasia. Consistent with RFA's mandate, the Uighur service acted as a substitute for indigenous media reporting on local events in the region. Its programs included breaking news, analysis, interviews, commentary, a weekly news review, and feature stories. RFA's Uighur service first reported on a knife attack at a coal mine that left dozens dead in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. RFA's reports were cited by global media outlets and human rights groups worldwide including CNN, *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, BBC, *Le Obs*, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.
- RFA Uighur also closely covered the arrest and trial of Uighur economics scholar Ilham Tohti, who was sentenced to life in prison for his blogging activity. Tohti was considered a moderate Uighur voice. RFA interviewed Tohti's colleagues, friends, and family.

Indonesia: About 89 percent of Indonesians are Muslim making it the country with the single largest Muslim population. VOA Indonesian's weekly audience reach stands at more than 33 million people or 18.9 percent of the adult population as last measured in 2015. The VOA Indonesian Service routinely covered all terrorist developments in Indonesia and the Indonesian government's and civil society's response. The Indonesian Service also reported to Indonesia on ISIL and violent extremism developments in the Middle East as well as the U.S. and world response.

Thailand: VOA's Thai Service has 11 affiliate radio stations in southern Thailand. VOA Thai broadcast news and information eight hours and 30 minutes per week to all of its affiliates; it also produced a weekly video report for placement with TV networks in Thailand. The programs emphasized the U.S.-Thailand relationship, religious and cultural diversity, and education. VOA Thai broadcasts via six radio affiliates to the three southern provinces and also Songkhla, an adjacent province.

Burma: VOA's Burmese Service closely monitored and reported on relations between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Burma, particularly in Arakan State, while reporting on events and ways to promote mutual trust, tolerance, and understanding. VOA weekly call-in discussion programs provided effective fora to discuss national elections and sensitive issues and to stimulate further dialogue. VOA Burmese broadcast daily radio and television programs via domestic affiliates and via satellite and with popular web and mobile sites. The VOA Burmese Bureau in Yangon participated in local, ethnic media seminars to discuss professional journalism standards and to identify and counter hate messages.

- RFA's Burma Service closely covered the ongoing plight of Burma's minority Muslim Rohingyas, who have often had to bear the brunt of anti-Muslim communal violence and have been forced in many cases to live as refugees.
- The service also continued to cover the humanitarian crisis resulting from the Burmese government's policies in Rakhine state.

EUROPE AND EURASIA

The Russian Federation and Ukraine: In 2015 the BBG expanded "Current Time," its daily 30-minute Russian-language television news program, jointly produced by VOA and RFE/RL. Airing in nine countries via 25 media outlets and available to digital audiences worldwide, weekend editions of the program were launched. A version of "Current Time" produced for the Central Asian market aired in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In support of the "Current Time" brand, RFE/RL launched a social media-driven digital reporting and engagement service (DIGIM), tasked with disseminating and producing innovative cross-platform digital content and engaging with Russian-language audiences on social media.

VOA's Russian and Ukrainian Services regularly addressed terrorism-related issues and threats in the United States, Europe, and other key areas of interest to the target audience. Journalist Fatima Tilsova provided VOA Russian with enterprise reporting related to the trial of Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, which began in March 2015. The Service also provided extensive coverage of ISIL's growing influence in the North Caucasus and Russia's military intervention in Syria.

Tatarstan/Bashkortostan: The Tatar and Bashkir communities are the two largest Muslim communities in Russia. RFE/RL's Tatar/Bashkir Service was the only major international media producing content in the Tatar and Bashkir languages and provided listeners with objective news and analysis on issues such as Russia's policy toward ethnic and religious minorities, centralization, corruption, the role of Islam in predominantly Muslim regions, and gender issues. The Service's webpage, the most technologically advanced state-of-the-art web source in Tatar, remained a virtual meeting place for people to discuss these and other issues.

North Caucasus: Broadcasting in the Avar, Chechen, and Circassian languages, RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service reported the news in a region where media freedom and journalists remained under severe threat.

Turkey: The VOA Turkish Service produced 2.5 hours of original television content per week, and had a strong presence in Turkey on TV and on the internet. Content was distributed nationwide via affiliate TGRT Haber TV and online on affiliate Mynet. Turkish stringers in Ankara and Istanbul have been covering Turkey's security operations against suspected ISIL militants and recruiters inside Turkey. Stringers in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and Syria covered ISIL-related stories as well. Coverage of Turkey-Syria-U.S.-ISIL issues and interviews were often picked up by many Turkish media outlets with full attribution to VOA Turkish.

The Balkans: VOA's Balkan Services provided extensive coverage of the rise of violent extremism in the region's countries with sizeable Muslim populations – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia. More than 4.7 million adults weekly consumed VOA content across broadcast and digital platforms throughout the Balkans. VOA coverage highlighted the threats posed by international terrorist networks that recruit foreign terrorist fighters for ISIL and for al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. VOA's Balkan Services also focused on U.S.-sustained efforts to work with western Balkans nations to confront the terrorists and reduce their capacity to recruit in the region.

RFE/RL's Balkan Service is the only inclusive source of news in a region where genuine media freedom remains elusive and many outlets reflect ethnic divisions. The Service provided comprehensive coverage of the worsening refugee crisis situation, as tens of thousands fleeing Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, made their way through Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia in the hopes of reaching Germany.

Azerbaijan: VOA's Azerbaijani Service delivered daily TV and web programming focused on the country's political dynamics. Due to its aggressive social media campaign, VOA Azerbaijan's multimedia content now receives half a million views per month on Facebook. VOA Azerbaijan remained a leading authoritative source of news regarding the large Azeri population in northern Iran.

Despite the December 2014 raid by Azerbaijani authorities on RFE/RL's Baku bureau, which led to the bureau's formal closure in May 2015, the Azerbaijani Service has continued to provide vital coverage of under-reported events in the country. The Service's "Korrupsiometr" web portal features the latest laws and regulations, along with Azerbaijani lawyers responding to audience questions.

AFRICA

Hausa: VOA's Hausa Service continued to provide comprehensive, multimedia coverage of Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Northern Nigeria and neighboring countries through its daily news programming, interactive call-in shows, and audio streaming and postings on its website.

- The Service also launched its first television program in September 2015. The new half-hour weekly magazine show, "Taskar," combines original reporting from across the United States and from Hausa Service reporters not only in Nigeria, but also in Niger and Cameroon.

Somali: VOA Somali continues to cover an area heavily affected by terrorism and violent extremism. Somalia has seen relentless attacks by the terrorist group al-Shabaab. VOA Somali regularly interviewed Somali government officials, Islamic scholars, and independent experts to give perspectives and context on the terrorist threat.

- In April 2015, VOA Somali interviewed a former high-level al-Shabaab intelligence official who had surrendered to the Federal Government of Somalia in the months prior. His interview provided an insider's view of al-Shabaab's foreign terrorist fighter recruitment, relationship with al-Qa'ida affiliates, and prospects of aligning with ISIL.
- In November 2015, VOA Somali launched a daily youth show called "Today's Youth" that gives the latest updates on music, technology, and news, about employment and arts to youth who have been affected by years of war.
- In addition, VOA Somali's weekly "Islamic Affairs" show, which focuses on major issues affecting Muslims, continued to attract lots of interest among the listeners. In one program, Islamic scholars discussed the causes of violent extremism among youth.

Swahili: VOA's Swahili Service broadcast to large Muslim populations in Tanzania and Kenya, and smaller Muslim communities in Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since 2014, the Service has increased its efforts to reach the Muslim communities in Kenya's Indian Ocean coastline, where the city of Mombasa was rocked by several terrorist attacks. To improve its coverage in the area, VOA Swahili is opening a reporting center in Mombasa. In 2015, Swahili service programming on the security situation in the city has played a significant role in initiating a conversation in Mombasa exploring how older people, religious leaders, and matriarchal leaders can reclaim the moral authority they used to enjoy before vocal radical voices silenced them in recent years.

French to Africa: VOA's French-to-Africa Service broadcast to Muslims throughout Francophone Africa. Via FM transmitters in Bamako, Niamey, Abidjan, and Ouagadougou, VOA provided extensive coverage of the peace process in Mali. VOA also provided reports about terrorist attacks in Mali and in Paris. In 2015, VOA continued to broadcast to the entire region in French and to Mali in Bambara, the most widely spoken local language of Mali. The service also reaches Muslims through Sahel Plus, a 25-minute weekly French program with news and features about issues of common concern to people in the Sahel region. French-to-Africa's weekly program *Dialogue des Religions* also offered discussions with Muslim scholars and experts on a variety of topics, including Islam.

ENGLISH

On September 10, VOA English joined with VOA Central News to produce a 90-minute Radio/TV/Web simulcast around President Obama's speech on ISIL, complete with analysis and Congressional reaction.

VOA English provided extensive, timely and in-depth coverage on conflicts in the Middle East and parts of Africa to a global audience on multimedia platforms, and special reports to affiliate stations.

- In October 2015, VOA English and the Newseum Institute coproduced a television special that took an in-depth look at ISIL and its use of propaganda. *ISIL and the Digital War* featured analysts Michael Weiss and Lorenzo Vidino.
- VOA English current affairs program *Press Conference, USA* interviewed U.S. Representative Ed Royce, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- In 2015, VOA English provided in-depth analysis and perspective on the war in Syria with newsmakers, such as former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Edward Djerejian and Mideast and strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman.

EXHIBIT 35

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 14, 2016

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Obama:

On August 12, December 3, and January 11 we sent letters to the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State, requesting basic information regarding the immigration histories of individuals in the United States recently implicated in terrorism, and prior actions taken to protect our nation from individuals associated with terrorism. To date, we have yet to receive information responsive to these inquiries.

Instead, the Department of State sent a letter partially responsive to two out of fifteen questions asked, the Department of Justice sent a copy of a very rudimentary list it already maintains of individuals convicted of offenses related to terrorism between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2014 (deferring to the Department of Homeland Security to provide immigration information), and the Department of Homeland Security sent a letter on December 31 stating only that a response to our original inquiry would be forthcoming.

Since our last letter in January, we have identified 18 additional individuals who have been implicated in terrorism since early 2014 - bringing the total to 131. Because your Administration has thus far refused to comply with our request for basic information about these individuals, we have continued our search for immigration information about those we identify using publicly available sources. At least 54 of these individuals were born abroad, at least 16 were initially admitted to the United States as refugees, and at least 17 are the natural-born citizen children of first generation immigrants.

We went through the list prepared by the Department of Justice - which provided the names of individuals convicted of terrorism or

Page 2

June 14, 2016

terrorism-related offenses between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2014.

Because the Department of Homeland Security failed to provide us with immigration information on the 580 individuals on the Department of Justice's list, we have attempted to obtain information about the immigration history for each individual using publicly available sources. Out of the 580 names on the Department of Justice's list, at least 380 individuals were born abroad, at least 24 were initially admitted to the United States as refugees, and at least 33 had overstayed their visas. Out of the 198 U.S. citizens we were able to identify, at least 100 were naturalized citizens who initially came to the United States through one of our immigration programs. Of those born abroad, at least 62 were from Pakistan, 28 were from Lebanon, 22 were Palestinian, 21 were from Somalia, 20 were from Yemen, 19 were from Iraq, 16 were from Jordan, 17 were from Egypt, and 10 were from Afghanistan.

Because we lack complete information for either list, the numbers are likely much higher. And it is clear that these lists do not include cases that are sealed, have otherwise not been made public, or that have been handled strictly through civil immigration proceedings. Nevertheless, these data make clear that the United States not only lacks the ability to properly screen individuals prior to their arrival, but also that our nation has an unprecedented assimilation problem.

When compared with your Administration's immigration policies, and bearing in mind the four major terrorist attacks in the United States in the last year alone, this inability to properly screen individuals from abroad and assimilate those we admit paints a striking picture. Between Fiscal Years 2009 and 2014, the United States granted green cards to approximately 832,000 individuals from Muslim-majority countries, including approximately 102,000 from Iraq, 102,000 from Pakistan, 85,000 from Iran, nearly 18,000 from Syria, and nearly 20,000 from Yemen. For Fiscal Year 2016, as of June 10, the United States had admitted approximately 19,625 Muslim refugees from across the world, out of approximately 44,340 total refugees. It has also only managed to admit 3,887 Syrian refugees, of whom only 23 were not Muslim.

With your Administration's goal of admitting 10,000 Syrian refugees and a total of 85,000 refugees this fiscal year, your Administration will fall short unless it admits approximately 10,165 refugees in each of the four remaining months, of which approximately

Page 3
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
1,528 would have to be from Syria. Given that we have already identified at least 40 individuals who were initially admitted to this country as refugees and who were subsequently convicted or implicated in terrorism – including an Iraqi refugee who was just admitted to the United States in 2012 and arrested in January of this year – it is clear that ensuring the proper screening of refugees is of the utmost importance.

Sunday's terrorist attack in Orlando was the deadliest our nation has experienced since the attacks on September 11, 2001. As we honor and remember the victims of the attacks, we must be vigilant in our defense of our nation, and cognizant of the threats we face. Obtaining the information that we requested is essential.

Therefore, we request that you direct the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State to immediately coordinate and complete the attached charts and respond to our initial inquiries. Additionally, please ensure that they update the attached charts with information regarding any cases not included, and please ensure that the list is updated through the date of your reply with any new cases that may arise.

We appreciate your prompt attention to this serious matter. Please contact our staffs if you have any questions regarding this request.

Very truly yours,



Jeff Sessions
United States Senator



Ted Cruz
United States Senator

EXHIBIT 36



JANUARY 25, 2017 3:31PM

Little National Security Benefit to Trump's Executive Order on Immigration

By ALEX NOWRASTEH

Tomorrow, President Trump is expected to sign an executive order enacting a 30-day suspension of all visas for nationals from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Foreigners from those seven nations have killed zero Americans in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1975 and the end of 2015. Six Iranians, six Sudanese, two Somalis, two Iraqis, and one Yemini have been convicted of attempting or carrying out terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Zero Libyans or Syrians have been convicted of planning a terrorist attack on U.S. soil during that time period.

Many other foreigners have been convicted of terrorism-related offenses that did not include planning a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. One list released by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) details 580 terror-related convictions since 9/11. This incomplete list probably influenced which countries are temporarily banned, and likely provided justification for another section of Trump's executive order, which directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to release all information on foreign-born terrorists going forward, and requires additional DHS reports to study foreign-born terrorism.

I exhaustively evaluated Senator Sessions' list of convictions based on publicly available data and discovered some startling details.

First, 241 of the convictions (42 percent) were not for terrorism offenses. Senator Sessions puffed his numbers by including "terrorism-related convictions," a nebulous category that includes investigations that begin due to a terrorism tip but then end in non-terrorism convictions. My favorite examples of this are the convictions of Nasser Abuali, Hussein Abuali, and Rabi Ahmed. An informant told the FBI that the trio tried to purchase a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, but the FBI found no evidence supporting the accusation. The three individuals were instead convicted of receiving two truckloads of stolen cereal. That is a crime but it is not terrorism.

Second, only 40 of the 580 convictions (6.9 percent) were for foreigners planning a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Seeking to join a foreign terrorist group overseas, material support for a foreign terrorist, and seeking to commit an act of terror on foreign soil account for 180 of the 580 convictions (31 percent). Terrorism on foreign soil is a crime, should be a crime, and those convicted of these offenses should be punished severely but the government cannot claim that these convictions made America safe again because these folks were not targeting U.S. soil.

Third, 92 of the 580 convictions (16 percent) were for U.S. born citizens. No change in immigration law, visa limitations, or more rigorous security checks would have stopped them.

The executive order includes national security exemptions to be made on a case-by-case basis. The President reserves the option to ban the entry of nationals from additional countries in the future based on a national security risk report written by DHS. Furthermore, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security can recommend visa bans for nationals from additional countries at any time.

refugee program to 50,000 annually, indefinitely blocks all refugees from Syria, and suspends all refugee admissions for 120 days. This is a response to a phantom menace. From 1975 to the end of 2015, 20 refugees have been convicted of attempting or committing terrorism on U.S. soil, and only three Americans have been killed in attacks committed by refugees—all in the 1970s. Zero Americans have been killed by Syrian refugees in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. The annual chance of an American dying in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee is one in 3.6 *billion*. The other 17 convictions have mainly been for aiding or attempting to join foreign terrorists.

President Trump tweeted earlier this week that executive orders were intended to improve national security by reducing the terrorist threat. However, a rational evaluation of national security threats is not the basis for Trump's orders, as the risk is fairly small but the cost is great. The measures taken here will have virtually no effect on improving U.S. national security.

Topics: [International Economics, Development & Immigration](#)

Tags: [Trump](#), [executive order](#), [terrorism](#), [immigration](#), [immigrants](#), [ban](#), [Muslim](#), [refugees](#)



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EXHIBIT 37

Trump used failed Portland car bomb plot as justification for new travel ban

 oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/03/trump_used_failed_portland_car.html

1. Politics & Elections

Posted on March 7, 2017 at 11:53 AM



President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with House and Senate leadership in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, Wednesday, March 1, 2017, in Washington. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci) (*Evan Vucci*)

719 shares

By Gordon R. Friedman

gfriedman@oregonian.com

SALEM -- President Donald Trump signed a new version of his controversial travel ban Monday, and in justifying the revised policy cited a foiled bomb plot in Oregon.

Trump's executive order temporarily shuts down the U.S. refugee program and bans travel into the country from six majority-Muslim nations. Its first section outlines the administration's reasoning for the ban and singles out a Somali-American's failed 2010 plot to detonate a car bomb at a Christmas tree-lighting ceremony in Portland as a reason some immigrants "proved to be threats to our national security."

Mohamed Mohamud, who was born in Somalia, brought to the U.S. as a child refugee and later attained citizenship, was convicted in 2014 of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his ill-fated bombing plot. The car he thought was packed with explosives was in reality full of dummy bombs given to him by undercover federal agents. Mohamud was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison.

"Given the foregoing, the entry into the United States of foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism remains a matter of grave concern," the order says.

Former U.S. Attorney Dwight Holton, who prosecuted Mohamud, told Patch.com that Mohamud's "radicalization had precisely nothing to do with his refugee status" and went on to say that the refugee community assisted federal investigators.

Mohamed Mohamud (*Multnomah County Sheriff's Office*)

After describing Mohamud's case, Trump's executive order goes on to say that some 300 people who entered the U.S. as refugees are the subjects of federal counterterrorism investigations.

The order then revokes Trump's first travel ban and supplants it with a narrower one. It forgoes banning travel into the U.S. from Iraq, but affects would-be travelers from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. A 90-day travel restriction from those countries does not apply to people with already approved visas or U.S. green cards.

Trump's order also halts the U.S. refugee program for 120 days, but allows entry to refugees already approved for travel into the country.

Oregon's Democratic members of Congress and the state Legislature reacted to the executive order much as they had when the first one was signed: with contempt.

"Just like the old ban, the new ban makes our country less safe," said U.S. Sen. Jeff Merkley. "Giving ISIS propaganda while 'solving' a problem that the Department of Homeland Security itself says doesn't exist is, to put it diplomatically, unwise."

U.S. Sen Ron Wyden said the new order is "little more than a warmed-over rehash of the original."

"It remains a barely disguised religious ban that will do absolutely nothing to protect our country," Wyden said.

Trump's new travel ban is "immoral, xenophobic and dangerous" and "a betrayal of American and Oregonian values," said Rep. Alissa Keny-Guyer, D-Portland, during a speech to the state House on Tuesday.

Gov. Kate Brown issued her own executive order following Trump's first travel ban, which strengthened the state's legal protection of immigrants. Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum also made the state a partner in

lawsuits challenging the ban. No such actions have been taken again in response to Trump's new executive order, which comes into effect on March 16.

-- Gordon R. Friedman

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EXHIBIT 38



PewResearchCenter


Religion & Public Life

MENU

RESEARCH AREAS

OCTOBER 7, 2009

Mapping the Global Muslim Population



A comprehensive demographic study of more than 200 countries finds that there are 1.57 billion Muslims of all ages living in the world today, representing 23% of an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion.

While Muslims are found on all five inhabited continents, more than 60% of the global Muslim population is in Asia and about 20% is in the Middle East and North Africa. However, the Middle East-North Africa region has the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, more than half of the 20 countries and territories¹ (#footnotes) in that region have populations that are approximately 95% Muslim or greater.

More than 300 million Muslims, or one-fifth of the world's Muslim population, live in countries where Islam is not the majority religion. These minority Muslim populations are often quite large. India, for example, has the third-largest population of Muslims worldwide. China has more Muslims than Syria, while Russia is home to more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined.

Of the total Muslim population, 10-13% are Shia Muslims and 87-90% are Sunni Muslims. Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.

These are some of the key findings of *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, a new study by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life. The report offers the most up-to-date and fully sourced estimates of the size and distribution of the worldwide Muslim population, including sectarian identity.

Previously published estimates of the size of the global Muslim population have ranged widely, from 1 billion to 1.8 billion.² (#footnotes) But these commonly quoted estimates often have appeared without citations to specific sources or explanations of how the figures were generated.

The Pew Forum report is based on the best available data for 232 countries and territories. Pew Forum researchers, in consultation with nearly 50 demographers and social scientists at universities and research centers around the world, acquired and analyzed about 1,500 sources, including census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys, to arrive at these figures – the largest project of its kind to date. (See Methodology for more detail.)

The Pew Forum's estimate of the Shia population (10-13%) is in keeping with previous estimates, which generally have been in the range of 10-15%. Some previous estimates, however, have placed the number of Shias at nearly 20% of the world's Muslim population.³ (#footnotes) Readers should bear in mind that the figures given in this report for the Sunni and Shia populations are less precise than the figures for the overall Muslim population. Data on sectarian affiliation have been infrequently collected or, in many countries, not collected at all. Therefore, the Sunni and Shia numbers reported here are expressed as broad ranges and should be treated as approximate.

These findings on the world Muslim population lay the foundation for a forthcoming study by the Pew Forum, scheduled to be released in 2010, that will estimate growth rates among Muslim populations worldwide and project Muslim populations into the future. The Pew Forum plans to launch a similar study of global Christianity in 2010 as well. The Pew Forum also plans to conduct in-depth public opinion surveys on the intersection of religion and public life around the world, starting with a 19-country survey of sub-Saharan Africa scheduled to be released later this year. These forthcoming studies are part of a larger effort – the Global Religious Futures Project, jointly funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation – that aims to increase people's understanding of religion around the world.

Map: Distribution of Muslim Population by Country and Territory

Only countries with more than 1 million Muslims are shown


2009 Muslim population, the percentage of its population that is Muslim and the percentage of the world Muslim population it represents.

* Indicates the use of a source with a small enough sample size to make these estimates somewhat less reliable. Due to this greater margin of error, percentages are rounded to the nearest integer rather than to the first decimal place and are therefore more approximate (~). The only exception to this rule is the display of Turkey's percentage of world population as 4.7% rather than ~ 5%.

“–” indicates that the number of Muslims is too small to be reliably estimated.

Map: World Distribution of Muslim Population

This “weighted” map of the world shows each country's relative size based on its Muslim population. Figures are rounded to the nearest million. **Click to enlarge.**



(<http://pewresearch.org/assets/pewforum-muslim-project/weighted-map.htm>)

Download the map (<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2009/10/weightedmap.pdf>)

Asia Predominates

Two-thirds of all Muslims worldwide live in the 10 countries shown below. Of the 10 countries, six are in Asia (Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey), three are in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria and Morocco) and one is in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria).

Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims

	Estimated 2009 Muslim Population	Percentage of Population that is Muslim	Percentage of World Muslim Population
Indonesia	202,867,000	88.2%	12.9%
Pakistan	174,082,000	96.3	11.1
India	160,945,000	13.4	10.3
Bangladesh	145,312,000	89.6	9.3
Egypt	78,513,000	94.6	5.0
Nigeria	78,056,000	50.4	5.0
Iran	73,777,000	99.4	4.7
Turkey*	73,619,000	~98	4.7
Algeria	34,199,000	98.0	2.2
Morocco*	31,993,000	~99	~2


* Data for Turkey and Morocco come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in these two countries is rounded to the nearest integer.

The bulk of the world's Muslim population – more than six-in-ten (62%) – is located in Asia, a region that, for the purposes of this report, includes not only East Asian countries such as China but also countries as far west as Turkey. (For a complete breakdown of countries by region, see World Muslim Population by Region and Country (/docs/? DocID=468) .)

Muslim Population by Region

	Estimated 2009 Muslim Population	Percentage of Population that is Muslim	Percentage of World Muslim Population
Asia-Pacific	972,537,000	24.1%	61.9%
Middle East-North Africa	315,322,000	91.2	20.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	240,632,000	30.1	15.3
Europe	38,112,000	5.2	2.4
Americas	4,596,000	0.5	0.3
World Total	1,571,198,000	22.9	100.0

Note: The list of countries that make up each region can be found in the section titled "World Muslim Population by Region and Country."



Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Living as Majorities and Minorities

While 80% of the world's Muslims live in countries where Muslims are in the majority, significant numbers – about one-fifth of the world's Muslim population – live as religious minorities in their home countries. Of the roughly 317 million Muslims living as minorities, about 240 million – about three-quarters – live in five countries: India (161 million), Ethiopia (28 million), China (22 million), Russia (16 million) and Tanzania (13 million). Two of the 10 countries with the largest number of Muslims living as minorities are in Europe: Russia (16 million) and Germany (4 million).

These minority populations are often quite large. For example, India, a Hindu-majority country, has the third-largest population of Muslims worldwide. The Muslim population of Ethiopia is about as large as that of Afghanistan. China has more Muslims than Syria; Russia is home to more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined; and Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon.

Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims Living as Minorities

	Estimated 2009 Muslim Population	Percentage of Population that is Muslim	Percentage of World Muslim Population
India	160,945,000	13.4%	10.3%
Ethiopia	28,063,000	33.9	1.8
China	21,667,000	1.6	1.4
Russia	16,482,000	11.7	1.0
Tanzania	13,218,000	30.2	0.8
Ivory Coast	7,745,000	36.7	0.5
Mozambique	5,224,000	22.8	0.3
Philippines	4,654,000	5.1	0.3
Germany*	4,026,000	~5	<1
Uganda	3,958,000	12.1	0.3

* Data for Germany come in part from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in Germany is rounded to the nearest integer.

Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Of the 232 countries and territories included in this study, 50 are Muslim-majority. Out of these, however, more than six-in-ten (62%) have a smaller Muslim population than do Russia and China individually.

The Middle East-North Africa region contains the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries compared with other regions. Of the 20 countries and territories in the region, 17 have a population that is more than 75% Muslim, with Israel, Lebanon and Sudan being the only exceptions. In comparison, only 12 of 61 countries in Asia, 10 of 50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and two of 50 countries in Europe (Kosovo and Albania) are 75% or more Muslim.

Sunni and Shia Populations

An overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunnis, while an estimated 10-13% are Shias. This report estimates that there are between 154 million and 200 million Shia Muslims in the world today.

Between 116 million and 147 million Shias live in Asia, representing about three-quarters of the world's Shia population (note that Iran is included in the Asia-Pacific region). Meanwhile, nearly a quarter of the world's Shias (36 million to 44 million) live in the Middle East-North Africa.⁴ (#footnote4) Looked at in a different way, 12-15% of the Muslim population in the Asia-Pacific region is Shia, as is 11-14% of the Muslim population in the Middle East-North Africa region. The figures for Shias are generally given as a range because of the limitations in the secondary-source data (see Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates).

Quick Definition: Sunnis and Shias

Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims (also known as Shiites) comprise the two main sects within Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed around a dispute over leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Over time, however, the political divide between the two groups broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices as well. While the two sects are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad's descendants, for example. For readers seeking more detail on the categories used in this report, Sunnis include followers of the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the Wahhabi or Salafi movement. Shias include Ithna Asharis (Twelvers), Ismailis, Zaydis, Alevis and Alawites.

There also are a few Muslim groups that are difficult to classify as either Sunni or Shia. These include Kharijites in Oman and the Nation of Islam movement in the United States, as well as the Druze, who are located primarily in and around Lebanon. Given the relatively small numbers of people associated with such groups, this report does not provide separate figures for them, but they are included in the overall Muslim population statistics.

Readers should also note that there is no separate estimate for Sufis, whose spiritual and mystical practices have a following among both Sunnis and Shias. There are no reliable figures on the proportion of Muslims worldwide who follow Sufi practices.

Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq. Iran has 66 million to 70 million Shias, or 37-40% of the world's total Shia population. Iraq, India and Pakistan each are home to at least 16 million Shias.

Sizeable numbers of Shias (1 million or more) are found in Turkey, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Nigeria and Tanzania. Shias constitute a relatively small percentage of the Muslim population elsewhere in the world. About 300,000 Shias are estimated to be living in North America, including both the U.S. and Canada, constituting about 10% of North America's Muslim population.

In four countries – Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Iraq – Shia Muslims make up a majority of the total population.

Map: More Than a Third of the World's Shia Muslims Live in Iran

Roll over a country bubble to see the percentage of its Muslim population that is Shia and the percentage of the world Shia population it represents.

Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Countries with More Than 100,000 Shia Muslims

	Estimated 2009 Shia Population	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia	Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population
Iran	66 – 70 million	90 – 95%	37 – 40%
Pakistan	17 – 26 million	10 – 15	10 – 15
India	16 – 24 million	10 – 15	9 – 14
Iraq	19 -22 million	65 – 70	11 – 12
Turkey	7 – 11 million	10 – 15	4 – 6
Yemen	8 – 10 million	35 – 40	~5

	Estimated 2009 Shia Population	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia	Approximate Percentage of World Shia Population
Azerbaijan	5 – 7 million	65 – 75	3 – 4
Afghanistan	3 – 4 million	10 – 15	~2
Syria	3 – 4 million	15 – 20	~2
Saudi Arabia	2 – 4 million	10 – 15	1 – 2
Nigeria	<4 million	<5	<2
Lebanon	1 – 2 million	45 – 55	<1
Tanzania	<2 million	<10	<1
Kuwait	500,000 – 700,000	20 – 25	<1
Germany	400,000 – 600,000	10 – 15	<1
Bahrain	400,000 – 500,000	65 – 75	<1
Tajikistan	~400,000	~7	<1
United Arab Emirates	300,000 – 400,000	~10	<1
United States	200,000 – 400,000	10 – 15	<1
Oman	100,000 – 300,000	5 – 10	<1
United Kingdom	100,000 – 300,000	10 – 15	<1
Bulgaria	~100,000	10 – 15	<1
Qatar	~100,000	~10	<1
World Total	154 – 200 million	10 – 13	100

Note: Countries with an estimated Shia population of less than 1% of the country's Muslim population are not listed. The figures for Shias are generally given in a range because of the limitations of the secondary-source data (see Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates). Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009

Footnotes

1 For a definition of "territories," see the methodology (<http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population19/>).

2 See, for example, CIA World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html>); *Foreign Policy* magazine, May 2007 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3835); *Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, 2008 (http://www.gallup.com/press/104206/WHO_SPEAKS_ISLAM.asp); Adherents.com (http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html); and IslamicPopulation.com (http://www.islamicpopulation.com/world_general.html).

3 See, for example, IslamicWeb.com (http://www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/cults/shia_population.htm); "Shia Muslims in the Middle East," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006 (<http://www.cfr.org/publication/10903/>); and "The Revival of Shia Islam," Vali Nasr speaking at a Pew Forum event, July 2006 (<http://www.pewforum.org/2006/07/24/the-revival-of-shia-islam/>).

⁴ The three-quarters figure for Asia was calculated by comparing the middle of the range of the estimates for Asia's Shia population (about 132 million) with the middle of the range of the estimates for the world's Shia population (about 177 million). The figure for the Middle East-North Africa was calculated by comparing the middle of the range of the estimates for the Middle East-North Africa's Shia population (about 40 million) with the middle of the range of the estimates for the world's Shia population (about 177 million).

EXHIBIT 39

Sunni and Shi'a

 bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml

British Broadcasting Corporation

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Religions

Last updated 2009-08-19

The division between Sunnis and Shi'a is the largest and oldest in the history of Islam. This article compares the similarities and differences between the two.

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Introduction

Mosaic tiled columns in a mosque ©

The words *Sunni* and *Shi'a* appear regularly in stories about the Muslim world but few people know what they really mean. Religion permeates every aspect of life in Muslim countries and understanding Sunni and Shi'a beliefs is important in understanding the modern Muslim world.

Introduction

The division between Sunnis and Shi'as is the largest and oldest in the history of Islam.


They both agree on the fundamentals of Islam and share the same Holy Book (The Qur'an), but there are differences mostly derived from their different historical experiences, political and social developments, as well as ethnic composition.

These differences originate from the question of who would succeed the Prophet Muhammad as leader of the emerging Muslim community after his death. To understand them, we need to know a bit about the Prophet's life and political and spiritual legacy.

The Prophet Muhammad

When the Prophet died in the early 7th century he left not only the religion of Islam but also a community of about one hundred thousand Muslims organised as an Islamic state on the Arabian Peninsula. It was the question of who should succeed the Prophet and lead the fledgling Islamic state that created the divide.

The larger group of Muslims chose Abu Bakr, a close Companion of the Prophet, as the Caliph (politico-social leader) and he was accepted as such by much of the community which saw the succession in political and not



spiritual terms. However another smaller group, which also included some of the senior Companions, believed that the Prophet's son-in-law and cousin, Ali, should be Caliph. They understood that the Prophet had appointed him as the sole interpreter of his legacy, in both political and spiritual terms. In the end Abu Bakr was appointed First Caliph.

Leadership claims

Both Shi'as and Sunnis have good evidence to support their understanding of the succession. Sunnis argue that the Prophet chose Abu Bakr to lead the congregational prayers as he lay on his deathbed, thus suggesting that the Prophet was naming Abu Bakr as the next leader. The Shi'as' evidence is that Muhammad stood up in front of his Companions on the way back from his last Hajj, and proclaimed Ali the spiritual guide and master of all believers. Shi'a reports say he took Ali's hand and said that anyone who followed Muhammad should follow Ali.

Muslims who believe that Abu Bakr should have been the Prophet's successor have come to be known as Sunni Muslims. Those who believe Ali should have been the Prophet's successor are now known as Shi'a Muslims. It was only later that these terms came into use. Sunni means 'one who follows the Sunnah' (what the Prophet said, did, agreed to or condemned). Shi'a is a contraction of the phrase 'Shiat Ali', meaning 'partisans of Ali'.

The use of the word "successor" should not be confused to mean that those leaders that came after the Prophet Muhammad were also prophets - both Shi'a and Sunni agree that Muhammad was the final prophet.

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The division

Seeds of division

Ali did not initially pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr. A few months later, and according to both Sunni and Shi'a belief, Ali changed his mind and accepted Abu Bakr, in order to safeguard the cohesion of the new Islamic State.

The Second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, was appointed by Abu Bakr on his death, followed by the third Caliph, Uthman ibn 'Affan, who was chosen from six candidates nominated by Umar.

Ali was eventually chosen as the fourth Caliph following the murder of Uthman. He moved the capital of the Islamic state from Medina to Kufa in Iraq. However, his Caliphate was opposed by Aisha, the favoured wife of the Prophet and daughter of Abu Bakr, who accused Ali of being lax in bringing Uthman's killers to justice. In 656 CE this dispute led to the Battle of the Camel in Basra in Southern Iraq, where Aisha was defeated. Aisha later apologised to Ali but the clash had already created a divide in the community.

Widening of the divide

Islam's dominion had already spread to Syria by the time of Ali's caliphate. The governor of Damascus, Mu'awiya, angry with Ali for not bringing the killers of his kinsman Uthman to justice, challenged Ali for the caliphate. The famous Battle of Siffin in 657 demonstrates the religious fervour of the time when Mu'awiya's soldiers flagged the ends of their spears with verses from the Qur'an.

Ali and his supporters felt morally unable to fight their Muslim brothers and the Battle of Siffin proved indecisive. Ali and Mu'awiya agreed to settle the dispute with outside arbitrators. However this solution of human arbitration was unacceptable to a group of Ali's followers who used the slogan "Rule belongs only to Allah", justified by the Qur'anic verse:

The decision is for Allah only. He telleth the truth and He is the Best of Deciders

Qur'an

This group, known as the Kharijites, formed their own sect that opposed all contenders for the caliphate. In 661 the Kharijites killed Ali while he was praying in the mosque of Kufa, Iraq. In the years that followed, the Kharijites were defeated in a series of uprisings. Around 500,000 descendants of the Kharijites survive to this day in North Africa, Oman and Zanzibar as a sub-sect of Islam known as the Ibadiyah.

Shortly after the death of Ali, Mu'awiya, assumed the Caliphate of the Islamic state, moving the capital from Kufa to Damascus. Unlike his predecessors who maintained a high level of egalitarianism in the Islamic state, Mu'awiya's Caliphate was monarchical. This set the tone for the fledgling Ummayyad dynasty (c.670-750 CE) and in 680 on the death of Mu'awiya, the Caliphate succeeded to his son Yazid.

Shi'a Muslims in London commemorate Ashura ©

About the same time, Hussein, Ali's youngest son from his marriage to Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, and the third Shi'a Imam, was invited by the people of Kufa in Iraq to become their leader. Hussein set off for Kufa from his home in Medina with his followers and family, but was met by Yazid's forces in Karbala before reaching his destination.



Despite being hopelessly outnumbered, Hussein and his small number of companions refused to pay allegiance to Yazid and were killed in the ensuing battle. Hussein is said to have fought heroically and to have sacrificed his life for the survival of Shi'a Islam.

The Battle of Karbala is one of the most significant events in Shi'a history, from which Shi'a Islam draws its strong theme of martyrdom. It is central to Shi'a identity even today and is commemorated every year on the Day of Ashura. Millions of pilgrims visit the Imam Hussein mosque and shrine in Karbala and many Shi'a communities participate in symbolic acts of self-flagellation.

Top

Expansion

Sunni and Shi'a expansion

As Islam expanded from the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula into the complex and urban societies of the once Roman and Persian empires, Muslims encountered new ethical dilemmas that demanded the authority of religious answers.

Sunni expansion and leadership

Sunni Islam responded with the emergence of four popular schools of thought on religious jurisprudence (*fiqh*). These were set down in the 7th and 8th centuries CE by the scholars of the Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and Shaafii schools. Their teachings were formulated to find Islamic solutions to all sorts of moral and religious questions in any society, regardless of time or place and are still used to this day.

The Ummayyad dynasty was followed by the Abbasid dynasty (c. 758-1258 CE). In these times the Caliphs, in contrast to the first four, were temporal leaders only, deferring to religious scholars (or *uleama*) for religious issues.

Sunni Islam continued through the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties to the powerful Mughal and Ottoman empires of the 15th to 20th centuries. It spread east through central Asia and the Indian sub-continent as far as the Indonesian

archipelago, and west towards Africa and the periphery of Europe. The Sunnis emerged as the most populous group and today they make up around 85% of the one billion Muslims worldwide.

Shi'a expansion and leadership

Meanwhile, the leadership of the Shi'a community continued with 'Imams' believed to be divinely appointed from the Prophet's Family. Unlike the Sunni Caliphs, the Shi'a Imams generally lived in the shadow of the state and were independent of it. The largest sect of Shi'a Islam is known as The Twelvers, because of their belief that twelve divinely appointed Imams descended from the Prophet in the line of Ali and Hussein, led the community until the 9th century CE.

Shi'a imams according to the Twelve are shown in blue

Muhammad al-Muntazar al-Mahdi was the Twelfth Imam. The Shi'a believe that as a young boy, he was hidden in a cave under his father's house in Samarra to avoid persecution. He disappeared from view, and according to Shi'a belief, has been hidden by God until he returns at the end of time. This is what Shi'as call the Major Occultation. The Shi'a believe this Twelfth Imam, or Mahdi or Messiah, is not dead and will return to revive the true message of Islam. His disappearance marked the end of the leadership of the direct descendants of the Prophet.


(Note: While the information provided is the position of the largest Shi'a subdivision, that of The Twelvers, other Shi'a groups, such as the Ismailis, hold differing views.)

In the absence of the Mahdi, the rightful successor to the Prophet, the Shi'a community was led, as it is today, by living scholars usually known by the honourable title Ayatollah, who act as the representatives of the Hidden Imam on earth. Shi'a Muslims have always maintained that the Prophet's family are the rightful leaders of the Islamic world.

There are significant differences between scholars of Shi'a Islam on the role and power of these representatives. A minority believe the role of the representative is absolute, generally known as Wilayat Faqih. The majority of Shi'a scholars, however, believe their power is relative and confined to religious and spiritual matters.

Although the Shi'a have never ruled the majority of Muslims, they have had their moments of glory. The 9th century Fatimid Ismaili dynasty in Egypt and North Africa, when Cairo's prestigious Al-Azhar University was founded and the 16th century CE Safavid Dynasty which engulfed the former Persian Empire and made Shi'a Islam the official religion.

Significant numbers of Shi'as are now found in many countries including Iraq, Pakistan, Albania and Yemen. They make up 90% of the population of Iran which is the political face of Shi'a Islam today.



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Differences

How do Sunnis and Shi'as differ theologically?

Hadith and Sunnah

Initially the difference between Sunni and Shi'a was merely a question of who should lead the Muslim community. As time went on, however, the Shi'a began to show a preference for particular Hadith and Sunnah literature.

Interpretation of the Hadith and Sunnah is an Islamic academic science. The Shi'a gave preference to those credited to the Prophet's family and close associates. The Sunnis consider all Hadith and Sunnah narrated by any of twelve thousand companions to be equally valid. Shi'as recognise these as useful texts relating to Islamic jurisprudence, but subject them to close scrutiny. Ultimately this difference of emphasis led to different understandings of the laws and practices of Islam.

The Mahdi

The concept of the Mahdi is a central tenet of Shi'a theology, but many Sunni Muslims also believe in the coming of a Mahdi, or rightly guided one, at the end of time to spread justice and peace. He will also be called Muhammad and be a descendant of the Prophet in the line of his daughter Fatima (Ali's wife). The idea has been popular with grassroots Muslims due to the preaching of several Sufi or mystical trends in Islam.

Over the centuries a number of individuals have declared themselves the Mahdi come to regenerate the Muslim world, but none has been accepted by the majority of the Sunni community. However, some more Orthodox Sunni Muslims dispute the concept of the Mahdi because there is no mention of it in the Qur'an or Sunnah.

Shrines

The Wahabi movement within Sunni Islam views the Shi'a practice of visiting and venerating shrines to the Imams of the Prophet's Family and other saints and scholars as heretical. Most mainstream Sunni Muslims have no objections. Some Sufi movements, which often provide a bridge between Shi'a and Sunni theologies, help to unite Muslims of both traditions and encourage visiting and venerating these shrines.

Practical differences

Prayer

All Muslims are required to pray five times a day. However, Shi'a practice permits combining some prayers into three daily prayer times. A Shi'a at prayer can often be identified by a small tablet of clay from a holy place (often Karbala), on which they place their forehead whilst prostrating.

Leadership

Today there are significant differences in the structures and organisation of religious leadership in the Sunni and the Shi'a communities. There is a hierarchy to the Shi'a clergy and political and religious authority is vested in the most learned who emerge as spiritual leaders. These leaders are transnational and religious institutions are funded by religious taxes called Khums (20% of annual excess income) and Zakat (2.5%). Shi'a institutions abroad are also funded this way.

There is no such hierarchy of the clergy in Sunni Islam. Most religious and social institutions in Sunni Muslim states are funded by the state. Only Zakat is applicable. In the West most Sunni Muslim institutions are funded by charitable donations from the community at home and abroad.

How do Sunni and Shi'a view each other?

The persecution of the Prophet's family and the early Shi'as provide a paradigm of martyrdom which is repeated throughout Shi'a history. The relationship between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims through the ages has been shaped by the political landscape of that period.

As the Sunni Ottoman Empire expanded into the Balkans and central Asia and the Shi'a Safavid dynasty spread through the Persian Empire from the 16th century CE, tensions arose in Sunni-Shi'a relations.

The majority of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims do not allow their theological differences to divide them or cause hostility between them. For example, Shaikh Mahmood Shaltout of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the oldest institution of Islamic learning in the world, considers Shi'a Islam to be of equal status to the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence.

However, current global political conditions mean there has been a degree of polarisation and hostility in many Muslim societies. The term Rafidi (meaning "Rejecter") has been applied by radical Sunnis to disparage Shi'as. In turn the Shi'as will often use the label Wahabi, which refers to a particular sectarian movement within Sunni Islam, as a term of abuse for all those who disagree with Shi'a beliefs and practices.

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EXHIBIT 40

The Washington Post

Monkey Cage • Analysis

Shiites are participating in the world's largest pilgrimage today. Here's how they view the world.

By Fotini Christia, Elizabeth Dekeyser and Dean

Knox

November 21, 2016

Millions of Shiite Muslims traveled from across the Muslim world to walk in procession to the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala, Iraq, today for the world's largest, yet largely unknown, annual pilgrimage. This *ziyara*, or visit, to the shrine in southern Iraq is known as the Arbaeen. It marks the end of 40 days of mourning for the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, a central moment in Shiite tradition. More than 10 times the size of the hajj — because Iraq does not limit the number of pilgrims — it was restricted for years during the rule of Saddam Hussein because of its potential for sectarian collective action.

Last November, we used this pilgrimage as an opportunity to survey religious Shiites from Iran and Iraq, an important but largely understudied population. Using both traditional survey instruments and experimental methods, the survey covered a wide range of issues, including religion and politics, democracy, women's rights, regional conflict and Iran's nuclear agreement. In a recent [article](#), we reported key findings from this survey, including the broad support among respondents for Iranian regional policy and for the nuclear agreement with the West.

Why it's hard to survey religious Shiites

The survey demonstrates a novel approach to research on the views of religious Shiites in Iran and Iraq. Regime restrictions in countries such as Iran limit both the ability to conduct surveys and the permissible questions within them; conflicts in Iraq, Yemen and Syria make carrying out nationally representative surveys nearly impossible.

Conducting a survey of religious Shiites is an even greater challenge than surveying Shiite populations as a whole. Western interventions often assume that these devout individuals make up the support base for their governments. Yet little data exists on their prevalence, geographic distribution, or religious practice and beliefs. Clustered sampling at places of worship is one potential corrective to this knowledge gap, but national data on mosques are not readily available. This would also under-sample important groups like women and dissenting individuals who choose to worship from home.

However, the Arbaeen pilgrimage provides a unique opportunity to sample religious Shiites from across Iran and Iraq, as the visit to Imam Hussein's shrine is considered an ultimate expression of one's piety and devotion. We focused on securing a regionally representative sample based on Shiite distribution in each country, rather than pursuing a representative sample of all the pilgrims.

This was also a unique opportunity to sample practicing religious women outside their homes, as religious women are active participants in the procession.

Why we survey pilgrims

The pilgrimage's unique processional nature facilitated this regional targeting during the survey process. Able-bodied Iraqi pilgrims walk from their homes across Iraq to Karbala, with some traveling as far as about 300 miles from Basra in the south. Iranians usually travel via bus to the city of Najaf, 50 miles south of Karbala, then walk from there. During the procession, tents, or *mawakib*, stationed beside the path provide rest and refreshment for pilgrims. For Iraqis, these *mawakib* are unofficially organized by region. Iranian *mawakib* are less specifically targeted but still often have broader regional trends. By visiting different tents, we were able to gain a geographically representative sample.

Because our survey asked about sensitive topics, we used experimental methods to try to measure latent perspectives on sectarian tensions, Iran's nuclear program, and attitudes toward the West, China and Russia. In addition to conjoint analysis, endorsement primes and memory primes, we also examined non-response as a way to understand topic sensitivity and knowledge.

When no response can be an important response

On the issue of sectarianism, respondents were quick to give inclusive answers to direct survey questions. About 90 percent stated they supported Sunni-Shiite dialogue to mitigate conflict and would support Sunnis and Shiites praying together in the same mosque. Yet when given choices between hypothetical neighbors and spouses in a conjoint experiment, sect was more important than religiosity, race and even prior marital status. Only alcoholism was viewed less favorably than Sunni neighbors or spouses.

Participation in the survey hovered at about 85 percent, with the primary reason for declining being that individuals were traveling with a group and did not have time. Though the median rate for question-level non-response was in the single digits, it jumped as high as 50 percent for some questions.

This variation in non-response creates an alternative method of measuring sensitivity to certain topics. The highest non-response rate was for a question asking whether Sunnis and Shiites had similar interpretations of the role of violence in Islam, to which nearly half of Iranians and Iraqis did not respond. Other topics with high non-response rates included democracy and the relationship between government and religion, as well as regional politics and Iran's foreign policy.

While women were more likely, on average, to have higher non-response rates than men, women were relatively more likely to speak up on issues of gender. Contrary to what Western news and analysis often suggests, this trend highlights religious women's role in supporting gender norms, rather than merely blindly following male dogma.

Religious Shiites are not monolithic. This is important.

We find that even these devout individuals express surprisingly diverse views on the proper relationship between religion and the state and are nearly divided on the perceived costs and benefits of democratic regimes.

Despite strong perceptions of U.S. bias in favor of Sunni countries, the majority of respondents favored continued engagement with the United States on topics of mutual interest but oppose U.S. military intervention. Most support the Iranian nuclear agreement and share relatively liberal views on women's rights in government and the workplace, but less so within the family. Although overwhelmingly supportive of both Iran's interventions and Shiite causes throughout the Middle East, we also found that many respondents were optimistic about democracy and did not necessarily see theocracy or religious political parties as the ideal political system.

The full results of the survey, as well as a detailed background on the pilgrimage and further discussion of the sampling can be found [here](#). This approach presents a unique template for surveying hard-to-reach populations in an increasingly mobile world. The gaps between our findings from direct questions and experimental survey methods, along with the observed patterns of non-response, highlight the importance of the continued use of creative tools to gauge latent beliefs on sensitive topics.

Fotini Christia is an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She carried out this research while an inaugural Andrew Carnegie fellow. Elizabeth Dekeyser and Dean Knox are PhD candidates in political science at MIT.

EXHIBIT 41

Yemen civil war: 10,000 civilians killed and 40,000 injured in conflict, UN reveals

 [independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-civilian-death-toll-10000-killed-40000-injured-conflict-un-reveals-a7530](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-civilian-death-toll-10000-killed-40000-injured-conflict-un-reveals-a7530)

Ahmed al-Haj

1/17/2017



Newly recruited Houthi fighters parade before heading to the frontline to fight against government forces in Sanaa Khaled Abdullah/Reuters

The United Nations' humanitarian aid official in Yemen said Monday that the civilian death toll in the nearly two-year conflict has reached 10,000, with 40,000 others wounded.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Jamie McGoldrick told reporters the figure is based on lists of victims gathered by health facilities and the actual number might be higher. This announcement marks the first time a UN official has confirmed such a high death toll in Yemen, the Arab world's poorest nation. Earlier, the UN reported 4,200 civilians were killed in the war.

"This once more underscores the need to resolve the situation in Yemen without any further delay," UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq said in New York. "There's been a huge humanitarian cost."

Read more

The Yemen conflict pits Shiite Houthi rebels and allied forces against a Saudi-led coalition. The coalition began an

air campaign in March 2015 to restore the internationally recognised government that fled the country after Houthis seized the capital.

McGoldrick's remarks come as UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in the southern city of Aden, which the government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi has turned into a temporary capital, officials said.

According to Yemeni officials, Ahmed will present an amended peace deal to Hadi, who rejected the last initiative. That proposal was supported by the US because it largely recognised the rebels and sidelined Hadi. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak to the media.

Haq, the UN spokesman, confirmed that Ahmed is scheduled to meet Hadi on Monday "and he will try to present him with the latest peace proposals."

World news in pictures

World news in pictures

"This is something he's been developing in dialogue with the various parties and that dialogue will continue," he said, adding that he couldn't provide any details.

Peace efforts have stalled because of disagreements over a timeline. Hadi is pressing for an implementation to a UN Security Council resolution that stipulates the Houthis' withdrawal from all cities and the handover of weapons. The Houthis are pressing for a political deal in which they would get a share of power for giving up land and arms.


AP

EXHIBIT 42

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Yemen death toll has reached 10,000, UN says

United Nations seeks to draw world's attention to 'huge humanitarian cost' of war that has also displaced 3 million people

Kareem Shaheen

Monday 16 January 2017 14.56 EST

At least 10,000 people have been killed in the war in Yemen, according to the United Nations, which is urging both sides to come together to end nearly two years of conflict.

The UN's humanitarian affairs office said the figure, which is a low estimate, was reached using data from health facilities that have kept track of the victims of the war, which has largely been ignored by the international community.

The figure does not include those recorded by hospitals and health centres as having died, which is likely to be most of the combatants on both sides of the conflict.

“This once more underscores the need to resolve the situation in Yemen without any further delay,” Farhan Haq, deputy spokesman for the UN general secretary, said in New York. “There’s been a huge humanitarian cost.”

The war has devastated Yemen, which was already the Arab world’s poorest country. UN officials estimate that nearly 19 million people – 80% of the population – are in need of humanitarian aid, and more than 3 million have been displaced.

Saudi Arabia launched the war in Yemen in March 2015 after the Houthis, rebels backed by Iran, took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and overthrew President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi in a coup. The Saudi-backed president fled to the southern city of Aden and then to Riyadh. The Saudi campaign is backed by the US and the UK.

But the Saudis have not achieved their objectives and the war has dragged on, leading to a humanitarian catastrophe. Large numbers of child soldiers have been recruited, there have been outbreaks of cholera and many attacks on schools, hospitals and civilian areas.

The Saudi-led coalition has been blamed for most of the civilian casualties. The devastation has also drawn attention to the role of western powers who have continued to provide Riyadh with weapons, logistical support and intelligence. The Houthis have also been accused of human rights violations.

Yet the destruction of Yemen has garnered little international attention compared with other regional conflicts such as that in Syria, or the battle against Isis in Iraq.

The war has dragged on despite efforts by a UN mediator to broker a peace deal. While the Saudis are apparently eager to reach a settlement that would end an expensive war that has damaged its image worldwide, Hadi and his Houthi rivals have yet to agree to a deal.

Hadi is demanding that the Houthis give up their arms and control of Sana’a, while the Houthis wish to see a national unity government formed in which they are included.

Topics

Yemen

Saudi Arabia Middle East and North Africa United Nations news

EXHIBIT 43

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

Washington, DC 20505

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The World Factbook



Middle East :: Iran

Introduction :: Iran

Background:

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 86-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostages until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world and remains subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and its nuclear weapons ambitions. Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, through control of unelected institutions, prevented reform measures from being enacted and increased repressive measures. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud. The UN Security Council has passed a number of resolutions calling for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and comply with its IAEA obligations and responsibilities. In mid-February 2011, opposition activists conducted the largest antiregime rallies since December 2009, spurred by the success of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Protester turnout probably was at most tens of thousands and security forces were deployed to disperse protesters. Additional protests in March 2011 failed to elicit significant participation largely because of the robust security response, although discontent still smolders. Deteriorating economic conditions due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions prompted at least two major economically based protests in July and October 2012.

Geography :: Iran

Location:

Middle East, bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Pakistan

Geographic coordinates:

32 00 N, 53 00 E

Map references:

Middle East

Area:

total: 1,648,195 sq km

country comparison to the world: 18

land: 1,531,595 sq km

water: 116,600 sq km

Area - comparative:

slightly smaller than Alaska

Land boundaries:

total: 5,440 km

border countries: Afghanistan 936 km, Armenia 35 km, Azerbaijan-proper 432 km, Azerbaijan-Naxcivan exclave 179 km, Iraq 1,458 km, Pakistan 909 km, Turkey 499 km, Turkmenistan 992 km

Coastline:

2,440 km; note - Iran also borders the Caspian Sea (740 km)

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 12 nm

contiguous zone: 24 nm

exclusive economic zone: bilateral agreements or median lines in the Persian Gulf

continental shelf: natural prolongation

Climate:

mostly arid or semiarid, subtropical along Caspian coast

Terrain:

rugged, mountainous rim; high, central basin with deserts, mountains; small, discontinuous plains along both coasts

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: Caspian Sea -28 m

highest point: Kuh-e Damavand 5,671 m

Natural resources:

petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur

Land use:

arable land: 10.05%

permanent crops: 1.08%

other: 88.86% (2011)

Irrigated land:

87,000 sq km (2009)

Total renewable water resources:

137 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 93.3 cu km/yr (7%/1%/92%)

per capita: 1,306 cu m/yr (2004)

Natural hazards:

periodic droughts, floods; dust storms, sandstorms; earthquakes

Environment - current issues:

air pollution, especially in urban areas, from vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents; deforestation; overgrazing; desertification; oil pollution in the Persian Gulf; wetland losses from drought; soil degradation (salination); inadequate supplies of potable water; water pollution from raw sewage and industrial waste; urbanization

Environment - international agreements:

party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation

Geography - note:

strategic location on the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, which are vital maritime pathways for crude oil transport

People and Society :: Iran

Nationality:

noun: Iranian(s)

adjective: Iranian

Ethnic groups:

Persian 61%, Azeri 16%, Kurd 10%, Lur 6%, Baloch 2%, Arab 2%, Turkmen and Turkic tribes 2%, other 1%

Languages:

Persian (official) 53%, Azeri Turkic and Turkic dialects 18%, Kurdish 10%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 7%, Luri 6%, Balochi 2%, Arabic 2%, other 2%

Religions:

Muslim (official) 98% (Shia 89%, Sunni 9%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i) 2%

Population:

79,853,900 (July 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 19

Age structure:

0-14 years: 23.8% (male 9,733,762/female 9,251,929)

15-24 years: 19.8% (male 8,116,169/female 7,671,139)

25-54 years: 45.3% (male 18,380,525/female 17,766,409)

55-64 years: 6.1% (male 2,383,360/female 2,472,140)

65 years and over: 5.1% (male 1,902,743/female 2,175,724) (2013 est.)

Dependency ratios:

total dependency ratio: 41 %

youth dependency ratio: 33.6 %

elderly dependency ratio: 7.5 %

potential support ratio: 13.4 (2013)

Median age:

total: 27.8 years

male: 27.5 years

female: 28.1 years (2013 est.)

Population growth rate:

1.24% (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 95

Birth rate:

18.4 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 106

Death rate:

5.94 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 167

Net migration rate:

-0.1 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 115

Urbanization:

urban population: 69.1% of total population (2011)

rate of urbanization: 1.25% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

Major urban areas - population:

TEHRAN (capital) 7.19 million; Mashhad 2.592 million; Esfahan 1.704 million; Karaj 1.531 million; Tabriz 1.459 million (2009)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

0-14 years: 1.05 male(s)/female

15-24 years: 1.06 male(s)/female

25-54 years: 1.03 male(s)/female

55-64 years: 0.96 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.89 male(s)/female

total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2013 est.)

Maternal mortality rate:

21 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)

country comparison to the world: 138

Infant mortality rate:

total: 40.02 deaths/1,000 live births

country comparison to the world: 56

male: 40.54 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 39.48 deaths/1,000 live births (2013 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 70.62 years

country comparison to the world: 149

male: 69.09 years

female: 72.24 years (2013 est.)

Total fertility rate:

1.86 children born/woman (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 146

Contraceptive prevalence rate:

73.3% (2002)

Health expenditures:

6% of GDP (2011)

country comparison to the world: 110

Physicians density:

0.89 physicians/1,000 population (2005)

Hospital bed density:

1.7 beds/1,000 population (2009)

Drinking water source:

improved:

urban: 97% of population

rural: 92% of population

total: 96% of population

unimproved:

urban: 3% of population

rural: 8% of population

total: 4% of population (2010 est.)

Sanitation facility access:

improved:

urban: 100% of population

rural: 100% of population

total: 100% of population

unimproved:

urban: 0% of population

rural: 0% of population

total: 0% of population (2010 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

0.2% (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 99

HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:

92,000 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 43

HIV/AIDS - deaths:

6,400 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 33

Major infectious diseases:

degree of risk: intermediate

food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea

vectorborne diseases: Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever

note: highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among US citizens who have close contact with birds (2013)

Obesity - adult prevalence rate:

19.4% (2008)

country comparison to the world: 99

Children under the age of 5 years underweight:

4.6% (2004)

country comparison to the world: 91

Education expenditures:

4.7% of GDP (2010)

country comparison to the world: 88

Literacy:

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 85%

male: 89.3%

female: 80.7% (2008 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):

total: 14 years
male: 14 years
female: 14 years (2011)

Unemployment, youth ages 15-24:

total: 23%
country comparison to the world: 44
male: 20.2%
female: 33.9% (2008)

Government :: Iran

Country name:

conventional long form: Islamic Republic of Iran
conventional short form: Iran
local long form: Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran
local short form: Iran
former: Persia

Government type:

theocratic republic

Capital:

name: Tehran
geographic coordinates: 35 42 N, 51 25 E
time difference: UTC+3.5 (8.5 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
daylight saving time: +1hr, begins fourth Tuesday in March; ends fourth Thursday in September

Administrative divisions:

31 provinces (ostanha, singular - ostani); Alborz, Ardabil, Azarbaijan-e Gharbi (West Azerbaijan), Azarbaijan-e Sharqi (East Azerbaijan), Bushehr, Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari, Esfahan, Fars, Gilan, Golestan, Hamadan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorasan-e Jonubi (South Khorasan), Khorasan-e Razavi (Razavi Khorasan), Khorasan-e Shomali (North Khorasan), Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh va Bowyer Ahmad, Kordestan, Lorestan, Markazi, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Qom, Semnan, Sistan va Baluchestan, Tehran, Yazd, Zanzan

Independence:

1 April 1979 (Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed); notable earlier dates: ca. 625 B.C. (unification of Iran under the Medes); ca. A.D. 1501 (Iran reunified under the Safavids); 12 December 1925 (modern Iran established under the Pahlavis)

National holiday:

Republic Day, 1 April (1979).

Constitution:

previous 1906; latest adopted 24 October 1979, effective 3 December 1979; amended 1989

Legal system:

religious legal system based on sharia law

International law organization participation:

has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt

Suffrage:

18 years of age; universal

Executive branch:

chief of state: Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-KHAMENEI (since 4 June 1989)

head of government: President Hasan Fereidun RUHANI (since 3 August 2013); First Vice President Mohammad Reza RAHIMI (since 13 September 2009)

cabinet: Council of Ministers selected by the president with legislative approval; the Supreme Leader has some control over appointments to the more sensitive ministries
(For more information visit the [World Leaders website](#))

note: also considered part of the Executive branch of government are three oversight bodies: 1) Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khoebregan), a popularly elected body charged with determining the succession of the Supreme Leader, reviewing his performance, and deposing him if deemed necessary; 2) Expediency Council or the Council for the Discernment of Expediency (Majma-ye- Tashkhis-e -Maslahat-e- Nezam) exerts supervisory authority over the executive, judicial, and legislative branches and resolves legislative issues when the Majles and the Council of Guardians disagree and since 1989 has been used to advise national religious leaders on matters of national policy; in 2005 the Council's powers were expanded to act as a supervisory body for the government; 3) Council of Guardians of the Constitution or Council of Guardians or Guardians Council (Shora-ye Negban-e Qanon-e Asasi) determines whether proposed legislation is both constitutional and faithful to Islamic law, vets candidates in popular elections for suitability, and supervises national elections

elections: supreme leader appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts; president elected by popular vote

for a four-year term (eligible for a second term and additional nonconsecutive term); election last held on 14 June 2013 (next presidential election to be held in June 2017)

election results: Hasan Fereidun RUHANI 50.7%, Mohammad Baqer QALIBAF 16.6%, Saeed JALILI 11.4%, Mohsen REZAI 10.6%, Ali Akber VELAYATI 6.2%, other 4.5%

Legislative branch:

unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majles-e Shura-ye Eslami or Majles (290 seats; members elected by popular vote from single and multimember districts to serve four-year terms)

elections: last held on 2 March 2012 (first round); second round held on 4 May 2012; (next election to be held in 2016)

election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA

Judicial branch:

highest court(s): Supreme Court (consists of a president and NA judges)

judge selection and term of office: Supreme Court president appointed by the head of the Supreme Judicial Council in consultation with judges of the Supreme Court; president appointed for a 5-year term; other judge appointments and tenure NA

subordinate courts: Penal Courts I and II; Islamic Revolutionary Courts; Courts of Peace; Special Clerical Court (functions outside the judicial system and handles cases involving clerics); military courts

Political parties and leaders:

note: formal political parties are a relatively new phenomenon in Iran and most conservatives still prefer to work through political pressure groups rather than parties; often political parties or coalitions are formed prior to elections and disbanded soon thereafter; a loose pro-reform coalition called the 2nd Khordad Front, which includes political parties as well as less formal groups and organizations, achieved considerable success in elections for the sixth Majles in early 2000; groups in the coalition included the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), Executives of Construction Party (Kargozaran), Solidarity Party, Islamic Labor Party, Mardom Salari, Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO), and Militant Clerics Society (MCS; Ruhaniyun); the coalition participated in the seventh Majles elections in early 2004 but boycotted them after 80 incumbent reformists were disqualified; following his defeat in the 2005 presidential elections, former MCS Secretary General and sixth Majles Speaker Mehdi KARUBI formed the National Trust Party; a new conservative group, Islamic Iran Developers Coalition (Abadgaran), took a leading position in the new Majles after winning a majority of the seats in February 2004; ahead of the 2008 Majles elections, traditional and hardline conservatives attempted to close ranks under the United Front of Principlists and the Broad Popular Coalition of Principlists; several reformist groups, such as the MIRO and the IIPF, also came together as a reformist coalition in advance of the 2008 Majles elections; the IIPF has repeatedly complained that the overwhelming majority of its candidates were unfairly disqualified from the 2008 elections

Political pressure groups and leaders:

groups that generally support the Islamic Republic:

Ansar-e Hizballah-

Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Leader

Islamic Coalition Party (Motalefeh)

Islamic Engineers Society

Tehran Militant Clergy Association (MCA; Ruhaniyat)

active pro-reform student group:

Office of Strengthening Unity (OSU)

opposition groups:

Freedom Movement of Iran

Green Path movement [Mehdi KARUBI, Mir-Hosein MUSAVI]

Marz-e Por Gohar

National Front

various ethnic and monarchist organizations

armed political groups repressed by the government:

Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI)

Jundallah

Komala

Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

People's Fedayeen

People's Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK)

International organization participation:

CICA, CP, D-8, ECO, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, SAARC (observer), SCO (observer), UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)

Diplomatic representation in the US:

none; note - Iran has an Interests Section in the Pakistani Embassy; address: Iranian Interests Section, Pakistani Embassy, 2209 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007; telephone: [1] (202) 965-4990; FAX [1] (202) 965-1073

Diplomatic representation from the US:

none; note - the US Interests Section is located in the Embassy of Switzerland No. 39 Shahid Mousavi (Golestan 5th), Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran; telephone [98] 21 2254 2178/2256 5273; FAX [98] 21 2258 0432

Flag description:

three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red; the national emblem (a stylized representation of the word Allah in the shape of a tulip, a symbol of martyrdom) in red is centered in the white band; ALLAH AKBAR (God is Great) in white Arabic script is repeated 11 times along the bottom edge of the green band and 11 times along the top edge of the red band; green is the color of Islam and also represents growth, white symbolizes honesty and peace, red stands for bravery and martyrdom

National symbol(s):

lion

National anthem:

name: "Soroud-e Melli-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran" (National Anthem of the Islamic Republic of Iran)

 [PLAY ANTHEM](#)

lyrics/music: multiple authors/Hassan RIAHI

note: adopted 1990

Economy :: Iran

Economy - overview:

Iran's economy is marked by statist policies and an inefficient state sector, which create major distortions throughout the system, and reliance on oil, which provides a large share of government revenues. Price controls, subsidies, and other rigidities weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth. Private sector activity is typically limited to small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread. Tehran since the early 1990s has recognized the need to reduce these inefficiencies, and in December 2010 the Majles passed President Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD's Targeted Subsidies Law (TSL) to reduce state subsidies on food and energy. This was the most extensive economic reform since the government implemented gasoline rationing in 2007. Over a five-year period the legislation sought to phase out subsidies that previously cost Tehran \$60-\$100 billion annually and mostly benefited Iran's upper and middle classes. Cash payouts of \$45 per person to more than 90% of Iranian households mitigated initial widespread resistance to the TSL program. However, inflation in 2012 reached its highest level in four years, eroding the value of these cash payouts and motivating the Majles to halt planned price increases for the second half of 2012 through at least March 2013. New fiscal and monetary constraints on Tehran, following international sanctions in January against Iran's Central Bank and oil exports, significantly reduced Iran's oil revenue, forced government spending cuts, and fueled a 20% currency depreciation. Economic growth turned negative for the first time in two decades. Iran also continues to suffer from double-digit unemployment and underemployment. Underemployment among Iran's educated youth has convinced many to seek jobs overseas, resulting in a significant "brain drain."

GDP (purchasing power parity):

\$988.4 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 18

\$1.007 trillion (2011 est.)

\$977.7 billion (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

GDP (official exchange rate):

\$541.2 billion (2012 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

-1.9% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 208

3% (2011 est.)

5.9% (2010 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$13,000 (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 100

\$13,400 (2011 est.)

\$13,200 (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

Gross national saving:

30.3% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 24

36.6% of GDP (2011 est.)

34.7% of GDP (2010 est.)

GDP - composition, by end use:

household consumption: 45.9%

government consumption: 13.3%

investment in fixed capital: 30.6%

investment in inventories: 1.5%

exports of goods and services: 25.3%

imports of goods and services: -16.6%
(2012 est.)

GDP - composition, by sector of origin:

agriculture: 9.8%

industry: 46.2%

services: 44.1% (2012 est.)

Agriculture - products:

wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, sugarcane, fruits, nuts, cotton; dairy products, wool; caviar

Industries:

petroleum, petrochemicals, fertilizers, caustic soda, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), ferrous and non-ferrous metal fabrication, armaments

Industrial production growth rate:

-5.8% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 173

Labor force:

27.05 million

country comparison to the world: 23

note: shortage of skilled labor (2012 est.)

Labor force - by occupation:

agriculture: 25%

industry: 31%

services: 45% (June 2007)

Unemployment rate:

15.5% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 147

14.1% (2011 est.)

note: data are according to the Iranian Government

Population below poverty line:

18.7% (2007 est.)

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%: 2.6%

highest 10%: 29.6% (2005)

Distribution of family income - Gini index:

44.5 (2006)

country comparison to the world: 45

Budget:

revenues: \$79.69 billion

expenditures: \$92.63 billion (2012 est.)

Taxes and other revenues:

14.7% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 196

Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-):

-2.4% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 95

Public debt:

18.4% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 131

13.9% of GDP (2011 est.)

note: includes publicly guaranteed debt

Fiscal year:

21 March - 20 March

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

19.9% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 216

20.6% (2011 est.)

note: official Iranian estimate

Central bank discount rate:

NA%

Commercial bank prime lending rate:

11% (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 70

11.25% (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of narrow money:

\$42.91 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 50

\$40.06 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of broad money:

\$199.9 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 40

\$183.5 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of domestic credit:

\$77.74 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 59

\$77.6 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Market value of publicly traded shares:

\$107.2 billion (31 December 2011)

country comparison to the world: 43

\$86.62 billion (31 December 2010)

\$63.3 billion (31 December 2009)

Current account balance:

\$-9.307 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 174

\$59.38 billion (2011 est.)

Exports:

\$67.04 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 53

\$144.9 billion (2011 est.)

Exports - commodities:

petroleum 80%, chemical and petrochemical products, fruits and nuts, carpets

Exports - partners:

China 22.1%, India 11.9%, Turkey 10.6%, South Korea 7.6%, Japan 7.1% (2012)

Imports:

\$70.03 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 43

\$77.81 billion (2011 est.)

Imports - commodities:

industrial supplies, capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, technical services

Imports - partners:

UAE 33.2%, China 13.8%, Turkey 11.8%, South Korea 7.4% (2012)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold:

\$74.06 billion (31 December 2012 est.)
country comparison to the world: 29
 \$84.06 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Debt - external:

\$14.84 billion (31 December 2012 est.)
country comparison to the world: 86
 \$19.11 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - at home:

\$37.31 billion (31 December 2012 est.)
country comparison to the world: 57
 \$32.44 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad:

\$3.345 billion (31 December 2012 est.)
country comparison to the world: 67
 \$2.915 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Exchange rates:

Iranian rials (IRR) per US dollar -
 12,175.5 (2012 est.)
 10,616.3 (2011 est.)
 10,254.18 (2010 est.)
 9,864.3 (2009)
 9,142.8 (2008)

Energy :: Iran

Electricity - production:

220.3 billion kWh (2011 est.)
country comparison to the world: 20

Electricity - consumption:

182.7 billion kWh (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 20

Electricity - exports:

6.707 billion kWh (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 25

Electricity - imports:

3.015 billion kWh (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 46

Electricity - installed generating capacity:

62.09 million kW (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 15

Electricity - from fossil fuels:

86.2% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 86

Electricity - from nuclear fuels:

0% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 108

Electricity - from hydroelectric plants:

13.7% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 104

Electricity - from other renewable sources:

0.2% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)
country comparison to the world: 93

Crude oil - production:

3.589 million bbl/day (2012 est.)
country comparison to the world: 6

Crude oil - exports:

2.377 million bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 4

Crude oil - imports:

15,600 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 72

Crude oil - proved reserves:

154.6 billion bbl (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 4

Refined petroleum products - production:

1.712 million bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 13

Refined petroleum products - consumption:

1.694 million bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 14

Refined petroleum products - exports:

330,800 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 22

Refined petroleum products - imports:

180,400 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 29

Natural gas - production:

151.8 billion cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 4

Natural gas - consumption:

144.6 billion cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 5

Natural gas - exports:

9.05 billion cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 28

Natural gas - imports:

10.59 billion cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 30

Natural gas - proved reserves:

33.61 trillion cu m (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 2

Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy:

624.9 million Mt (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 8

Communications :: Iran

Telephones - main lines in use:

28.76 million (2012)

country comparison to the world: 12

Telephones - mobile cellular:

58.16 million (2012)

country comparison to the world: 24

Telephone system:

general assessment: currently being modernized and expanded with the goal of not only improving the efficiency and increasing the volume of the urban service but also bringing telephone service to several thousand villages, not presently connected

domestic: the addition of new fiber cables and modern switching and exchange systems installed by Iran's state-owned telecom company have improved and expanded the fixed-line network greatly; fixed-line availability has more than doubled to more than 27 million lines since 2000; additionally, mobile-cellular service has increased dramatically serving roughly 56 million subscribers in 2011; combined fixed and mobile-cellular subscribership now exceeds 100 per 100 persons

international: country code - 98; submarine fiber-optic cable to UAE with access to Fiber-Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG); Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber-optic line runs from Azerbaijan through the northern portion of Iran to Turkmenistan with expansion to Georgia and Azerbaijan; HF radio and

microwave radio relay to Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Syria, Kuwait, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; satellite earth stations - 13 (9 Intelsat and 4 Inmarsat) (2011)

Broadcast media:

state-run broadcast media with no private, independent broadcasters; Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB); the state-run TV broadcaster, operates 5 nationwide channels, a news channel, about 30 provincial channels, and several international channels; about 20 foreign Persian-language TV stations broadcasting on satellite TV are capable of being seen in Iran; satellite dishes are illegal and, while their use had been tolerated, authorities began confiscating satellite dishes following the unrest stemming from the 2009 presidential election; IRIB operates 8 nationwide radio networks, a number of provincial stations, and an external service; most major international broadcasters transmit to Iran (2009)

Internet country code:

.ir

Internet hosts:

197,804 (2012)

country comparison to the world: 72

Internet users:

8.214 million (2009)

country comparison to the world: 35

Transportation :: Iran

Airports:

319 (2013)

country comparison to the world: 22

Airports - with paved runways:

total: 140

over 3,047 m: 42

2,438 to 3,047 m: 29

1,524 to 2,437 m: 26

914 to 1,523 m: 36

under 914 m: 7 (2013)

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total: 179

over 3,047 m: 1

2,438 to 3,047 m: 2

1,524 to 2,437 m: 9

914 to 1,523 m: 135

under 914 m:

32 (2013)

Heliports:

26 (2013)

Pipelines:

condensate 7 km; condensate/gas 973 km; gas 20,794 km; liquid petroleum gas 570 km; oil 8,625 km; refined products 7,937 km (2013)

Railways:

total: 8,442 km

country comparison to the world: 24

broad gauge: 94 km 1.676-m gauge

standard gauge: 8,348 km 1.435-m gauge (148 km electrified) (2008)

Roadways:

total: 198,866 km

country comparison to the world: 26

paved: 160,366 km (includes 1,948 km of expressways)

unpaved: 38,500 km (2010)

Waterways:

850 km (on Karun River; some navigation on Lake Urmia) (2012)

country comparison to the world: 70

Merchant marine:

total: 76

country comparison to the world: 60

by type: bulk carrier 8, cargo 51, chemical tanker 3, container 4, liquefied gas 1, passenger/cargo 3, petroleum tanker 2, refrigerated cargo 2, roll on/roll off 2

foreign-owned: 2 (UAE 2)

registered in other countries: 71 (Barbados 5, Cyprus 10, Hong Kong 3, Malta 48, Panama 5) (2010)

Ports and terminals:

Bandar-e Asaluyeh, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Emam Khomeyni

Military:: Iran

Military branches:

Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force (IRIAF), Khatemolambia Air Defense Headquarters; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, IRGC): Ground Resistance Forces, Navy, Aerospace Force, Quds Force (special operations); Law Enforcement Forces (2011)

Military service age and obligation:

18 years of age for compulsory military service; 16 years of age for volunteers; 17 years of age for Law Enforcement Forces; 15 years of age for Basij Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); conscript military service obligation is 18 months; women exempt from military service (2012)

Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49: 23,619,215

females age 16-49: 22,628,341 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 20,149,222

females age 16-49: 19,417,275 (2010 est.)

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:

male: 715,111

female: 677,372 (2010 est.)

Military expenditures:

2.5% of GDP (2006)

country comparison to the world: 56

Transnational Issues:: Iran

Disputes - international:

Iran protests Afghanistan's limiting flow of dammed Helmand River tributaries during drought; Iraq's lack of a maritime boundary with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf; Iran and UAE dispute Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island, which are occupied by Iran; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea; Afghan and Iranian commissioners have discussed boundary monument densification and resurvey

Refugees and internally displaced persons:

refugees (country of origin): 2.4 million (1 million registered, 1.4 million undocumented) (Afghanistan); 42,500 (Iraq) (2013)

Trafficking in persons:




current situation: Iran is a presumed source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; Iranian and Afghan boys and girls are forced into prostitution domestically; Iranian women are subjected to sex trafficking in Iran, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe; Azerbaijani women and children are also sexually exploited in Iran; Afghan migrants and refugees and Pakistani men and women are subjected to conditions of forced labor in Iran; NGO reports indicate that criminal organizations play a significant role in human trafficking in Iran

tier rating: Tier 3 - Iran does not comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government does not share information on its anti-trafficking efforts, making it difficult to assess the country's human trafficking problem or the government's attempts to curb it; NGOs report that laws against human trafficking, forced labor, and debt bondage remain unenforced because of a lack of political will and widespread political corruption; there is no evidence that the government has a process to identify trafficking victims, refers victims to protective services, or has made efforts to prevent human trafficking (2013)

Illicit drugs:

despite substantial interdiction efforts and considerable control measures along the border with Afghanistan, Iran remains one of the primary transshipment routes for Southwest Asian heroin to Europe; suffers one of the highest opiate addiction rates in the world, and has an increasing problem with synthetic drugs; lacks anti-money laundering laws; has reached out to neighboring countries to share counter-drug intelligence

The World Factbook

**Africa :: Libya****Introduction :: Libya****Background:**

The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations. Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned a civil war that triggered UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community. After months of seesaw fighting between government and opposition forces, the QADHAFI regime was toppled in mid-2011 and replaced by a transitional government. Libya in 2012 formed a new parliament and elected a new prime minister.

Geography :: Libya**Location:**

Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria

Geographic coordinates:

25 00 N, 17 00 E

Map references:

Africa

Area:

total: 1,759,540 sq km

country comparison to the world: 17

land: 1,759,540 sq km

water: 0 sq km

Area - comparative:

slightly larger than Alaska

Land boundaries:

total: 4,348 km

border countries: Algeria 982 km, Chad 1,055 km, Egypt 1,115 km, Niger 354 km, Sudan 383 km, Tunisia 459 km

Coastline:

1,770 km

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 12 nm

note: Gulf of Sidra closing line - 32 degrees, 30 minutes north

exclusive fishing zone: 62 nm

Climate:

Mediterranean along coast; dry, extreme desert interior

Terrain:

mostly barren, flat to undulating plains, plateaus, depressions

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: Sabkhat Ghuzayil -47 m

highest point: Bikku Bitti 2.267 m

Natural resources:

petroleum, natural gas, gypsum

Land use:

arable land: 0.99%

permanent crops: 0.19%

other: 98.82% (2011)

Irrigated land:

4.700 sq km (2003)

Total renewable water resources:

0.7 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 4.33 cu km/yr (14%/3%/83%)

per capita: 796.1 cu m/yr (2000)

Natural hazards:

hot, dry, dust-laden ghibli is a southern wind lasting one to four days in spring and fall; dust storms, sandstorms

Environment - current issues:

desertification; limited natural freshwater resources; the Great Manmade River Project, the largest water development scheme in the world, brings water from large aquifers under the Sahara to coastal cities

Environment - international agreements:

party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea

Geography - note:

more than 90% of the country is desert or semidesert

People and Society :: Libya

Nationality:

noun: Libyan(s)

adjective: Libyan

Ethnic groups:

Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians)

Languages:

Arabic (official), Italian, English (all widely understood in the major cities); Berber (Nafusi, Ghadamis, Suknah, Awjilah, Tamasheq)

Religions:

Sunni Muslim (official) 97%, other 3%

Population:

6,002,347 (July 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 109

note: includes 166,510 non-nationals

Age structure:

0-14 years: 27.3% (male 837,984/female 800,423)

15-24 years: 18.6% (male 578,780/female 535,828)

25-54 years: 45.6% (male 1,432,265/female 1,302,187)

55-64 years: 4.6% (male 143,862/female 134,414)

65 years and over: 3.9% (male 120,043/female 116,561) (2013 est.)

Dependency ratios:

total dependency ratio: 52.1 %

youth dependency ratio: 44.8 %

elderly dependency ratio: 7.3 %

potential support ratio: 13.7 (2013)

Median age:

total: 27.1 years

male: 27.2 years

female: 26.9 years (2013 est.)

Population growth rate:

4.85% (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 1

Birth rate:

18.74 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 100**Death rate:**

3.56 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 213**Net migration rate:**

33.32 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 1**Urbanization:****urban population:** 77.7% of total population (2011)**rate of urbanization:** 1% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)**Major urban areas - population:**

TRIPOLI (capital) 1.095 million (2009)

Sex ratio:**at birth:** 1.05 male(s)/female**0-14 years:** 1.05 male(s)/female**15-24 years:** 1.09 male(s)/female**25-54 years:** 1.1 male(s)/female**55-64 years:** 1.06 male(s)/female**65 years and over:** 1.04 male(s)/female**total population:** 1.08 male(s)/female (2013 est.)**Maternal mortality rate:**

58 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)

country comparison to the world: 103**Infant mortality rate:****total:** 12.26 deaths/1,000 live births**country comparison to the world:** 128**male:** 13.25 deaths/1,000 live births**female:** 11.22 deaths/1,000 live births (2013 est.)**Life expectancy at birth:****total population:** 75.83 years**country comparison to the world:** 88**male:** 74.17 years**female:** 77.57 years (2013 est.)**Total fertility rate:**

2.09 children born/woman (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 112**Contraceptive prevalence rate:**

45.2% (1995)

Health expenditures:

3.9% of GDP (2010)

country comparison to the world: 170**Physicians density:**

1.9 physicians/1,000 population (2009)

Hospital bed density:

3.7 beds/1,000 population (2009)

Drinking water source:**improved:**

urban: 54% of population

rural: 55% of population

total: 54% of population

unimproved:

urban: 46% of population

rural: 45% of population

total: 46% of population (2000 est.)

Sanitation facility access:

improved:

urban: 97% of population

rural: 96% of population

total: 97% of population

unimproved:

urban: 3% of population

rural: 4% of population

total: 3% of population (2010 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

0.3% (2001 est.)

country comparison to the world: 90

HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:

10,000 (2001 est.)

country comparison to the world: 95

HIV/AIDS - deaths:

NA

Obesity - adult prevalence rate:

27.8% (2008)

country comparison to the world: 35

Children under the age of 5 years underweight:

5.6% (2007)

country comparison to the world: 84

Education expenditures:

NA

Literacy:

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 89.5%

male: 95.8%

female: 83.3% (2011 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):

total: 16 years

male: 16 years

female: 16 years (2003)

Government:: Libya**Country name:**

conventional long form: none

conventional short form: Libya

local long form: none

local short form: Libiya

Government type:

operates under a transitional government

Capital:

name: Tripoli (Tarabulus)

geographic coordinates: 32 53 N, 13 10 E

time difference: UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

daylight saving time: +1hr. begins last Friday in March; ends last Friday in October

note: on 10 November 2012, Libya changed its standard time from UTC+2 to UTC+1

Administrative divisions:

22 districts (shabiyat, singular - shabiyat); Al Butnan, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Jabal al Gharbi, Al Jafarah, Al Jufrah, Al Kufrah, Al Marj, Al Marqab, Al Wahat, An Nuqat al Khams, Az Zawiyah, Banghazi, Darnah, Ghat, Misratah, Murzuq, Nalut, Sabha, Surt, Tarabulus, Wadi al Hayat, Wadi ash Shati

Independence:

24 December 1951 (from UN trusteeship)

National holiday:

Liberation Day, 23 October (2011)

Constitution:

none: note - Libya has yet to draft a new constitution

Legal system:

Libya's post-revolution legal system is in flux and driven by state and non-state entities

International law organization participation:

has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt

Suffrage:

18 years of age, universal

Executive branch:

chief of state: President, General National Congress Nuri Abu SAHMAYN

head of government: Prime Minister Ali ZAYDAN (since 14 October 2012); Deputy Prime Ministers Awad Ibrik Ibrahim al-BARASI, Al-Sadiq Abd al-Karim Abd al-Rahman KARIM, Abd-al-Salam Muhammad al-Mahdi al-QADI

cabinet: new cabinet approved by the National Congress on 31 October 2012

(For more information visit the [World Leaders website](#))

elections: prime minister and National Congress president elected by the National Congress

election results: NA

Legislative branch:

unicameral General National Congress (200 seats; 120 individual seats elected from 69 constituencies and 80 party list seats elected from 20 constituencies; member term NA)

elections: first General National Congress election held on 7 July 2012 (next to be held NA)

election results: percent of vote for party list seats only - NFA 48.7%, JCP 21.3%, other parties 30%; list and constituent seats - NFA 39, JCP 17, other 24, independents 120

Judicial branch:

highest court(s): NA: note - government in transition

Political parties and leaders:

Al-Watan (Homeland) Party

Justice and Construction Party or JCP [Muhammad SAWAN]

National Front (initially the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, formed in 1981 as a diaspora opposition group)

National Forces Alliance or NFA [Mahmoud JIBRIL] (includes many political organizations, NGOs, and independents)

Union for the Homeland [Abd al-Rahman al-SUWAYHIL]

note: list includes some of the larger political parties and leaders

Political pressure groups and leaders:

NA

International organization participation:

ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, BDEAC, CAEU, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCs, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGRA, NAM, OAU, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)

Diplomatic representation in the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Suleiman ABULHI

chancery: 2600 Virginia Avenue NW, Suite 705, Washington, DC 20037

telephone: [1] (202) 944-9601

FAX: [1] (202) 944-9606

Diplomatic representation from the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador Deborah K. JONES

note: on 11 September 2012, US Ambassador Christopher STEVENS and three other American diplomats were killed in an attack by heavily armed militants on a US diplomatic post in the eastern city of Benghazi

embassy: Sidi Slim Area/Walid Al-Ahed Road, Tripoli

mailing address: US Embassy, 8850 Tripoli Place, Washington, DC 20521-8850

telephone: [218] (0) 91-220-3239

Flag description:

three horizontal bands of red (top), black (double width), and green with a white crescent and star centered on the black stripe; the National Transitional Council reintroduced this flag design of the former Kingdom of Libya (1951-1969) on 27 February 2011; it replaced the former all-green banner promulgated by the QADHAFI regime in 1977; the colors represent the three major regions of the country: red stands for Fezzan, black symbolizes Cyrenaica, and green denotes Tripolitania; the crescent and star represent Islam, the main religion of the country

National symbol(s):

star and crescent; hawk

National anthem:

name: "Allahu Akbar" (God Is Greatest)

lyrics/music: Mahmoud el-SHERIF/Abdalla Shams el-DIN

note: adopted 1969; the anthem was originally a battle song for the Egyptian Army in the 1956 Suez War

Economy:: Libya

Economy - overview:

Libya's economy is structured primarily around the nation's energy sector, which generates about 95% of export earnings, 80% of GDP, and 99% of government income. Substantial revenue from the energy sector coupled with a small population give Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa, but Tripoli largely has not used its significant financial resources to develop national infrastructure or the economy, leaving many citizens poor. In the final five years of QADHAFI's rule, Libya made some progress on economic reform as part of a broader campaign to reintegrate the country into the international fold. This effort picked up steam after UN sanctions were lifted in September 2003 and after Libya announced in December 2003 that it would abandon programs to build weapons of mass destruction. The process of lifting US unilateral sanctions began in the spring of 2004; all sanctions were removed by June 2006, helping Libya attract greater foreign direct investment, especially in the energy and banking sectors. Libyan oil and gas licensing rounds drew high international interest, but new rounds are unlikely to be successful until Libya establishes a more permanent government and is able to offer more attractive financial terms on contracts and increase security. Libya faces a long road ahead in liberalizing its primarily socialist economy, but the revolution has unleashed previously restrained entrepreneurial activity and increased the potential for the evolution of a more market-based economy. The service and construction sectors, which account for roughly 60% of GDP, expanded over the past five years and could become a larger share of GDP if Tripoli prioritizes capital spending on development projects once political and security uncertainty subside. Climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit agricultural output, and Libya imports about 80% of its food. Libya's primary agricultural water source is the Great Manmade River Project.

GDP (purchasing power parity):

\$78.63 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 83

\$38.45 billion (2011 est.)

\$101.4 billion (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

GDP (official exchange rate):

\$81.92 billion (2012 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

104.5% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 1

-62.1% (2011 est.)

5% (2010 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$12,300 (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 104

\$6,100 (2011 est.)

\$15,900 (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

Gross national saving:

40.8% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 10

8.2% of GDP (2011 est.)

33.9% of GDP (2010 est.)

GDP - composition, by end use:

household consumption: 42.9%

government consumption: 14.2%

investment in fixed capital: 4.7%

investment in inventories: 0.4%

exports of goods and services: 60.7%

imports of goods and services: -23%

(2012 est.)

GDP - composition, by sector of origin:

agriculture: 1.6%

industry: 43.5%

services: 54.9% (2012 est.)

Agriculture - products:

wheat, barley, olives, dates, citrus, vegetables, peanuts, soybeans; cattle

Industries:

petroleum, petrochemicals, aluminum, iron and steel, food processing, textiles, handicrafts, cement

Industrial production growth rate:

117% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 1

Labor force:

1.875 million (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 125

Labor force - by occupation:

agriculture: 17%
 industry: 23%
 services: 59% (2004 est.)

Unemployment rate:

30% (2004 est.)

country comparison to the world: 180

Population below poverty line:

NA%

note: about one-third of Libyans live at or below the national poverty line

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%: NA%

highest 10%: NA%

Budget:

revenues: \$57.58 billion

expenditures: \$35.07 billion (2012 est.)

Taxes and other revenues:

70.3% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 3

Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-):

27.5% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 2

Public debt:

3.5% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 154

10.2% of GDP (2011 est.)

Fiscal year:

calendar year

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

6.1% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 165

15.9% (2011 est.)

Central bank discount rate:

9.52% (31 December 2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 106

3% (31 December 2009 est.)

Commercial bank prime lending rate:

6% (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 141

6% (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of narrow money:

\$45.07 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 48

\$40.88 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of broad money:

\$42.39 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 71

\$44.76 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of domestic credit:

\$47.11 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 66

\$38.71 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Market value of publicly traded shares:

\$NA

Current account balance:

\$33.32 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 14

\$4.002 billion (2011 est.)

Exports:

\$52.12 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 58

\$15.03 billion (2011 est.)

Exports - commodities:

crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas, chemicals

Exports - partners:

Italy 23.5%, Germany 12.5%, China 11.3%, France 9.7%, Spain 7.6%, UK 4.7%, US 4.5% (2012)

Imports:

\$18.1 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 79

\$11.17 billion (2011 est.)

Imports - commodities:

machinery, semi-finished goods, food, transport equipment, consumer products

Imports - partners:

China 13.7%, Turkey 12.3%, Italy 8.7%, Tunisia 7.3%, South Korea 6.2%, Greece 5.4%, Germany 4.9% (2012)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold:

\$117.2 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 22

\$105 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Debt - external:

\$5.278 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 119

\$4.882 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - at home:

\$16.72 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 76

\$16.43 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad:

\$17.17 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 48

\$16.89 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Exchange rates:

Libyan dinars (LYD) per US dollar -

1.262 (2012 est.)

1.2242 (2011 est.)

1.2668 (2010 est.)

1.2535 (2009)

1.2112 (2008)

Energy:: Libya

Electricity - production:

28.6 billion kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 64

Electricity - consumption:

24.29 billion kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 67

Electricity - exports:

124 million kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 68

Electricity - imports:

73 million kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 97

Electricity - installed generating capacity:

6.766 million kW (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 66

Electricity - from fossil fuels:

100% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 22

Electricity - from nuclear fuels:

0% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 128

Electricity - from hydroelectric plants:

0% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 179

Electricity - from other renewable sources:

0% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 150

Crude oil - production:

502,400 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 30

Crude oil - exports:

1.039 million bbl/day (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 14

Crude oil - imports:

0 bbl/day (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 87

Crude oil - proved reserves:

48.08 billion bbl (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 9

Refined petroleum products - production:

309,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 43

Refined petroleum products - consumption:

314,000 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 43

Refined petroleum products - exports:

84,490 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 44

Refined petroleum products - imports:

575.3 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 200

Natural gas - production:

16.81 billion cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 35

Natural gas - consumption:

6.844 billion cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 54

Natural gas - exports:

9.97 billion cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 21

Natural gas - imports:

0 cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 90

Natural gas - proved reserves:

1.495 trillion cu m (1 January 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 22

Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy:

60.6 million Mt (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 55

Communications:: Libya

Telephones - main lines in use:

1 million (2011)

country comparison to the world: 78

Telephones - mobile cellular:

10 million (2011)

country comparison to the world: 77

Telephone system:

general assessment: telecommunications system is state-owned and service is poor, but investment is being made to upgrade; state retains monopoly in fixed-line services; mobile-cellular telephone system became operational in 1996

domestic: multiple providers for a mobile telephone system that is growing rapidly; combined fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity has soared

international: country code - 218; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat. NA Arabsat. and NA Intersputnik; submarine cable to France and Italy; microwave radio relay to Tunisia and Egypt; tropospheric scatter to Greece; participant in Medarabtel (2010)

Broadcast media:

state-funded and private TV stations; some provinces operate local TV stations; pan-Arab satellite TV stations are available; state-funded radio (2012)

Internet country code:

.ly

Internet hosts:

17,926 (2012)

country comparison to the world: 121

Internet users:

353,900 (2009)

country comparison to the world: 124

Transportation:: Libya**Airports:**

146 (2013)

country comparison to the world: 41

Airports - with paved runways:

total: 68

over 3,047 m: 23

2,438 to 3,047 m: 7

1,524 to 2,437 m: 30

914 to 1,523 m: 7

under 914 m: 1 (2013)

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total: 78

over 3,047 m: 2

2,438 to 3,047 m: 5

1,524 to 2,437 m: 14

914 to 1,523 m: 37

under 914 m:

20 (2013)

Heliports:

2 (2013)

Pipelines:

condensate 882 km; gas 3,743 km; oil 7,005 km (2013)

Roadways:

total: 100,024 km

country comparison to the world: 43

paved: 57,214 km

unpaved: 42,810 km (2003)

Merchant marine:

total: 23

country comparison to the world: 91

by type: cargo 2, chemical tanker 4, liquefied gas 3, petroleum tanker 13, roll on/roll off 1

foreign-owned: 2 (Kuwait 1, Norway 1)

registered in other countries: 6 (Hong Kong 1, Malta 5) (2010)

Ports and terminals:

Az Zawiyah, Marsa al Burayqah (Marsa el Brega), Ra's Lanuf, Tripoli

Military:: Libya**Military branches:**

note - in transition; government attempting to staff a new national army with anti-QADAFI militia fighters and former members of QADAFI's military (2008)

Military service age and obligation:

18 years of age for mandatory or voluntary service (2012)

Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49: 1,775,078

females age 16-49: 1,714,194 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 1,511,144

females age 16-49: 1,458,934 (2010 est.)

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:

male: 59,547

female: 57,070 (2010 est.)

Military expenditures:

3.1% of GDP (2012)

country comparison to the world: 39

Transnational Issues :: Libya

Disputes - international:

dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria and the FLN's assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco; various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya

Refugees and internally displaced persons:




IDPs: 74,000 (conflict between pro-Qadhafi and anti-Qadhafi forces; figure does not include displaced third-country nationals) (2012)

Trafficking in persons:

current situation: Libya is a destination and transit country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution; migrants who seek employment in Libya as laborers and domestic workers or transit Libya en route to Europe may be subject to forced labor; private employers also recruit migrants from detention centers as forced laborers on farms and construction sites; some sub-Saharan women are reportedly forced to work in Libyan brothels

tier rating: Tier 3 - the Libyan Government does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government has failed to demonstrate significant efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenders or to protect trafficking victims; policies and practices with respect to undocumented migrant workers has resulted in Libyan authorities detaining and punishing trafficking victims for unlawful acts that were committed as a result of being trafficked; no public anti-trafficking awareness campaigns are conducted; officials receive no training on trafficking issues (2013)

The World Factbook



Africa :: Somalia

Introduction :: Somalia

Background:

Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectorate to join with Italian Somaliland and form the new nation of Somalia. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed SIAD Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule characterized by the persecution, jailing, and torture of political opponents and dissidents. After the regime's collapse early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. In May 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable existence and continues efforts to establish a constitutional democracy, including holding municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections. The regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring semi-autonomous state of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998 but does not aim at independence; it has also made strides toward reconstructing a legitimate, representative government but has suffered some civil strife. Puntland disputes its border with Somaliland as it also claims portions of eastern Sool and Sanaag. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort (primarily in the south) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but when the UN withdrew in 1995, having suffered significant casualties, order still had not been restored. In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Djibouti resulted in the formation of an interim government, known as the Transitional National Government (TNG). When the TNG failed to establish adequate security or governing institutions, the Government of Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led a subsequent peace process that concluded in October 2004 with the election of Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed as President of a second interim government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic. The TFG included a 275-member parliamentary body, known as the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). President YUSUF resigned late in 2008 while United Nations-sponsored talks between the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) were underway in Djibouti. In January 2009, following the creation of a TFG-ARS unity government, Ethiopian military forces, which had entered Somalia in December 2006 to support the TFG in the face of advances by the opposition Islamic Courts Union (ICU), withdrew from the country. The TFP was doubled in size to 550 seats with the addition of 200 ARS and 75 civil society members of parliament. The expanded parliament elected Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed, the former ICU and ARS chairman as president in January 2009. The creation of the TFG was based on the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlined a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national elections. In 2009, the TFP amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate until 2011 and in 2011 Somali principals agreed to institute political transition by August 2012. The transition process ended in September 2012 when clan elders appointed 275 members to a new parliament replacing the TFP and the subsequent election, by parliament, of a new president.

Geography :: Somalia

Location:

Eastern Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, east of Ethiopia

Geographic coordinates:

10 00 N, 49 00 E

Map references:

Africa

Area:

total: 637,657 sq km

country comparison to the world: 44

land: 627,337 sq km

water: 10,320 sq km

Area - comparative:

slightly smaller than Texas

Land boundaries:

total: 2,340 km

border countries: Djibouti 58 km, Ethiopia 1,600 km, Kenya 682 km

Coastline:

3,025 km

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 200 nm

Climate:

principally desert; northeast monsoon (December to February), moderate temperatures in north and hot in south; southwest monsoon (May to October), torrid in the north and hot in the south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons

Terrain:

mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m

highest point: Shimbiris 2,416 m

Natural resources:

uranium and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, natural gas, likely oil reserves

Land use:

arable land: 1.73%

permanent crops: 0.05%

other: 98.23% (2011)

Irrigated land:

2,000 sq km (2003)

Total renewable water resources:

14.7 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 3.3 cu km/yr (0%/0%/99%)

per capita: 377.6 cu m/yr (2003)

Natural hazards:

recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; floods during rainy season

Environment - current issues:

famine; use of contaminated water contributes to human health problems; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification

Environment - international agreements:

party to: Biodiversity, Desertification, Endangered Species, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection

signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements

Geography - note:

strategic location on Horn of Africa along southern approaches to Bab el Mandeb and route through Red Sea and Suez Canal

People and Society :: Somalia

Nationality:

noun: Somali(s)

adjective: Somali

Ethnic groups:

Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)

Languages:

Somali (official), Arabic (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English

Religions:

Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter)

Population:

10,251,568 (July 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 85

note: this estimate was derived from an official census taken in 1975 by the Somali Government; population counting in Somalia is complicated by the large number of nomads and by refugee movements in response to famine and clan warfare

Age structure:

0-14 years: 44.3% (male 2,270,282/female 2,273,506)

15-24 years: 18.9% (male 978,197/female 955,253)

25-54 years: 31% (male 1,643,803/female 1,538,723)

55-64 years: 3.5% (male 165,408/female 188,992)

65 years and over: 2.3% (male 93,434/female 143,970) (2013 est.)

Dependency ratios:

total dependency ratio: 100.1 %
 youth dependency ratio: 94.4 %
 elderly dependency ratio: 5.7 %
 potential support ratio: 17.7 (2013)

Median age:

total: 17.7 years
 male: 17.8 years
 female: 17.6 years (2013 est.)

Population growth rate:

1.67% (2013 est.)
 country comparison to the world: 73

Birth rate:

41.45 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)
 country comparison to the world: 6

Death rate:

14.22 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)
 country comparison to the world: 9

Net migration rate:

-10.55 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2013 est.)
 country comparison to the world: 213

Urbanization:

urban population: 37.7% of total population (2011)
 rate of urbanization: 3.79% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

Major urban areas - population:

MOGADISHU (capital) 1.353 million (2009)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female
 0-14 years: 1 male(s)/female
 15-24 years: 1.02 male(s)/female
 25-54 years: 1.07 male(s)/female
 55-64 years: 0.84 male(s)/female
 65 years and over: 0.66 male(s)/female
 total population: 1.01 male(s)/female (2013 est.)

Maternal mortality rate:

1,000 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)
 country comparison to the world: 3

Infant mortality rate:

total: 101.91 deaths/1,000 live births
 country comparison to the world: 3
 male: 110.74 deaths/1,000 live births
 female: 92.82 deaths/1,000 live births (2013 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 51.19 years
 country comparison to the world: 217
 male: 49.22 years
 female: 53.23 years (2013 est.)

Total fertility rate:

6.17 children born/woman (2013 est.)
 country comparison to the world: 3

Contraceptive prevalence rate:

14.6% (2006)

Physicians density:

0.04 physicians/1,000 population (2006)

Drinking water source:

improved:
 urban: 66% of population
 rural: 7% of population
 total: 29% of population
 unimproved:
 urban: 34% of population

rural: 93% of population

total: 71% of population (2010 est.)

Sanitation facility access:

improved:

urban: 52% of population

rural: 6% of population

total: 23% of population

unimproved:

urban: 48% of population

rural: 94% of population

total: 77% of population (2010 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

0.7% (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 61

HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:

34,000 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 67

HIV/AIDS - deaths:

1,600 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 58

Major infectious diseases:

degree of risk: very high

food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever

vectorborne diseases: dengue fever, malaria, and Rift Valley fever

water contact disease: schistosomiasis

animal contact disease: rabies (2013)

Obesity - adult prevalence rate:

4.8% (2008)

country comparison to the world: 162

Children under the age of 5 years underweight:

32.8% (2006)

country comparison to the world: 11

Education expenditures:

NA

Literacy:

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 37.8%

male: 49.7%

female: 25.8% (2001 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):

total: 3 years

male: 3 years

female: 2 years (2007)

Child labor - children ages 5-14:

total number: 1,148,265

percentage: 49 % (2006 est.)

Government:: Somalia

Country name:

conventional long form: Federal Republic of Somalia

conventional short form: Somalia

local long form: Jamhuuriyadda Federaalkaa Soomaaliya

local short form: Soomaaliya

former: Somali Republic, Somali Democratic Republic

Government type:

in the process of building a federated parliamentary republic

Capital:

name: Mogadishu

geographic coordinates: 2 04 N, 45 20 E

time difference: UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

Administrative divisions:

18 regions (plural - NA, singular - gobolka): Awdal, Bakool, Banaadir, Bari, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiraan, Jubbada Dhexe (Middle Jubba), Jubbada Hoose (Lower Jubba), Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe (Middle Shabeelle), Shabeellaha Hoose (Lower Shabeelle), Sool, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed

Independence:

1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland that became independent from the UK on 26 June 1960 and Italian Somaliland that became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic)

National holiday:

Foundation of the Somali Republic, 1 July (1960); note - 26 June (1960) in Somaliland

Constitution:

Provisional Constitution for the Federal Republic of Somalia, approved by a constitutional assembly 1 August 2012

note: the Constitution will become permanent after a referendum before the end of Parliament's first term (date to be determined)

Legal system:

mixed legal system of civil law, Islamic law, and customary law (referred to as Xeer)

International law organization participation:

accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations; non-party state to the ICCt

Suffrage:

18 years of age; universal

Executive branch:

chief of state: President HASSAN SHEIKH Mahamud (since 10 September 2012)

head of government: Prime Minister Abdi Farrah SHIRDON Said (since 6 October 2012)

cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president approved by the National Parliament

(For more information visit the [World Leaders website](#))

elections: president elected by the National Parliament; election last held 10 September 2012

election results: HASSAN SHEIKH Mahamud elected president; National Parliament vote - HASSAN SHEIKH Mahamud 190, Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed

79; president chooses the prime minister, who is then elected by National Parliament

Legislative branch:

bicameral National Parliament consisting of the House of the People of the Federal Parliament (275 seats, elected by Somali citizens) and the Upper House of the Federal Parliament (54 seats, elected by people of the federal member states)

note: the inaugural House of the People in September 2012 was appointed by clan elders; as of January 2013, the Upper House has not been formed

Judicial branch:

highest court(s): Transitional Supreme Court (consists of the chief justice and 3 judges)

note: under the terms of the 2004 Transitional National Charter (TNC), a Supreme Court based in Mogadishu and an Appeal Court were established; yet most regions have reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular, traditional Somali customary law, or sharia Islamic law

judge selection and term of office: judges appointed by the president upon proposal of the Judicial Service Council, a 9-member judicial and administrative body; judge tenure NA

subordinate courts: Transitional Appeal Court; regional and district courts; sharia (Islamic courts)

Political parties and leaders:

none

Political pressure groups and leaders:

other: numerous clan and sub-clan factions exist both in support and in opposition to the transitional government

International organization participation:

ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, CAEU (candidate), FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCs, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, LAS, NAM, OIC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO

Diplomatic representation in the US:

Somalia does not have an embassy in the US (ceased operations on 8 May 1991); **note:** - the Transitional Federal Government is represented in the US through its Permanent Mission to the UN

Diplomatic representation from the US:

the US does not have an embassy in Somalia; US interests are represented by the US Special Representative for Somalia, James C. Swan operating out of the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya at United Nations Avenue, Nairobi; mailing address: Unit 64100, Nairobi; APO AE 09831; telephone: [254] (20) 363-6000; FAX [254] (20) 363-6157

Flag description:

light blue with a large white five-pointed star in the center; the blue field was originally influenced by the flag of the UN, but today is said to denote the sky and the neighboring Indian Ocean; the five points of the star represent the five regions in the horn of Africa that are inhabited by Somali people: the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland (which together make up Somalia), Djibouti, Ogaden (Ethiopia), and the North East Province (Kenya)

National symbol(s):

leopard

National anthem:

name: "Soomaaliyeey tooosoo" (Somalia Wake Up)

lyrics/music: Ali Mire AWALE and Yuusuf Xaaji Aadan Cilmi QABILLE

note: adopted 2000; written in 1947, the lyrics speak of creating unity and an end to fighting

Government - note:

regional and local governing bodies continue to exist and control various areas of the country, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia and the semi-autonomous State of Puntland in northeastern Somalia

Economy:: Somalia

Economy - overview:

Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy, largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Agriculture is the most important sector with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal, and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, qat, and machined goods are the principal imports. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal. Somalia's service sector has grown. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to \$1.6 billion in remittances annually. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to the newest electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Somalia's arrears to the IMF have continued to grow. Somalia's capital city - Mogadishu - has enjoyed a rebirth following the departure of al-Shabaab in August 2011. Mogadishu has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and flights between Europe (Istanbul-Mogadishu) since the collapse of central authority in 1991. This economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu.

GDP (purchasing power parity):

\$5.896 billion (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 165

\$5.75 billion (2009 est.)

\$5.607 billion (2008 est.)

note: data are in 2010 US dollars

GDP (official exchange rate):

\$2.372 billion (2010 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

2.6% (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 118

2.6% (2009 est.)

2.6% (2008 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$600 (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 225

\$600 (2009 est.)

\$600 (2008 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

GDP - composition, by sector of origin:

agriculture: 59.3%

industry: 7.2%

services: 33.5% (2012 est.)

Agriculture - products:

bananas, sorghum, corn, coconuts, rice, sugarcane, mangoes, sesame seeds, beans; cattle, sheep, goats; fish

Industries:

a few light industries, including sugar refining, textiles, wireless communication

Industrial production growth rate:

NA%

Labor force:

3.447 million (2007)

country comparison to the world: 99

Labor force - by occupation:

agriculture: 71%

industry and services: 29% (1975)

Unemployment rate:

NA%

Population below poverty line:

NA%

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%: NA%

highest 10%: NA%

Budget:

revenues: SNA

expenditures: SNA

Fiscal year:

NA

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

NA%

note: businesses print their own money, so inflation rates cannot be easily determined**Central bank discount rate:**

NA%

Commercial bank prime lending rate:

NA%

Exports:

\$515.8 million (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 171

\$594.3 million (2011 est.)

Exports - commodities:

livestock, bananas, hides, fish, charcoal, scrap metal

Exports - partners:

UAE 50.8%, Yemen 19%, Oman 12.8% (2012)

Imports:

\$1.263 billion (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 176

\$798 million (2006 est.)

Imports - commodities:

manufactures, petroleum products, foodstuffs, construction materials, qat

Imports - partners:

Djibouti 27.4%, India 12%, Kenya 7.2%, Pakistan 6.5%, China 6.1%, Egypt 5%, Oman 4.6%, UAE 4.5%, Yemen 4.4% (2012)

Debt - external:

\$3.05 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 137

\$2.942 billion (31 December 2010 est.)

Exchange rates:

Somali shillings (SOS) per US dollar -

1,600 (2012 est.)

Energy:: Somalia**Electricity - production:**

315 million kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 168

Electricity - consumption:

293 million kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 174

Electricity - exports:

0 kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 130

Electricity - imports:

0 kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 133

Electricity - installed generating capacity:

80,000 kW (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 172

Electricity - from fossil fuels:

93.8% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 70

Electricity - from nuclear fuels:

0% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 177

Electricity - from hydroelectric plants:

6.3% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 122

Electricity - from other renewable sources:

0% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 186

Crude oil - production:

0 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 188

Crude oil - exports:

0 bbl/day (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 184

Crude oil - imports:

1,000 bbl/day (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 83

Crude oil - proved reserves:

0 bbl (1 January 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 187

Refined petroleum products - production:

3,666 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 110

Refined petroleum products - consumption:

5,659 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 164

Refined petroleum products - exports:

1,109 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 106

Refined petroleum products - imports:

2,905 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 169

Natural gas - production:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 190

Natural gas - consumption:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 193

Natural gas - exports:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 180

Natural gas - imports:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 129

Natural gas - proved reserves:

5.663 billion cu m (1 January 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 88

Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy:

897,500 Mt (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 167

Communications:: Somalia

Telephones - main lines in use:

100,000 (2010)

country comparison to the world: 146

Telephones - mobile cellular:

655,000 (2011)

country comparison to the world: 161

Telephone system:

general assessment: the public telecommunications system was almost completely destroyed or dismantled during the civil war; private companies offer limited local fixed-line service and private wireless companies offer service in most major cities while charging the lowest international rates on the continent

domestic: local cellular telephone systems have been established in Mogadishu and in several other population centers with one company beginning to provide 3G services in late 2012

international: country code - 252; Mogadishu is a landing point for the EASSy fiber-optic submarine cable system linking East Africa with Europe and North America (2010)

Broadcast media:

2 private TV stations rebroadcast Al-Jazeera and CNN; Somaliland has 1 government-operated TV station and Puntland has 1 private TV station; the transitional government operates Radio Mogadishu; 1 SW and roughly 10 private FM radio stations broadcast in Mogadishu; several radio stations operate in central and southern regions; Somaliland has 1 government-operated radio station; Puntland has roughly a half dozen private radio stations; transmissions of at least 2 international broadcasters are available (2007)

Internet country code:

.so

Internet hosts:

186 (2012)

country comparison to the world: 202

Internet users:

106,000 (2009)

country comparison to the world: 159

Transportation:: Somalia**Airports:**

61 (2013)

country comparison to the world: 80

Airports - with paved runways:

total: 6

over 3,047 m: 4

2,438 to 3,047 m: 1

1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 (2013)

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total: 55

over 3,047 m: 1

2,438 to 3,047 m: 5

1,524 to 2,437 m: 20

914 to 1,523 m: 23

under 914 m:

6 (2013)

Roadways:

total: 22,100 km

country comparison to the world: 104

paved: 2,608 km

unpaved: 19,492 km (2000)

Merchant marine:

total: 1

country comparison to the world: 148

by type: cargo 1 (2008)

Ports and terminals:

Berbera, Kismaayo

Transportation - note:

despite a dramatic drop in the number of attacks in 2012, the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean as a region of significant risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships accounting for 25% of all attacks in 2012; 75 vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, were attacked or hijacked both at anchor and while underway compared with 237 in 2011; the number of hijackings off the coast of Somalia was reduced to 14 in 2012, down from 28 in 2011; as of April 2013, 77 vessels and 7 hostages were being held for ransom by Somali pirates; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, have reduced piracy incidents in that body of water; in response Somali-based pirates, using hijacked fishing trawlers as "mother ships" to extend their range, shifted operations as far south as the Mozambique Channel, eastward to the vicinity of the Maldives, and northeastward to the Strait of Hormuz

Military :: Somalia

Military branches:

National Security Force (NSF): Somali Army (2011)

Military service age and obligation:

18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service (2012)

Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49: 2,260,175

females age 16-49: 2,159,293 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 1,331,894

females age 16-49: 1,357,051 (2010 est.)

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:

male: 101,634

female: 101,072 (2010 est.)

Military expenditures:

0.9% of GDP (2005 est.)

country comparison to the world: 133

Transnational Issues :: Somalia



Disputes - international:

Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist Courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; "Somaliland" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera to landlocked Ethiopia and have established commercial ties with other regional states; "Puntland" and "Somaliland" "governments" seek international support in their secessionist aspirations and overlapping border claims; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading south across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists

Refugees and internally displaced persons:

IDPs: 1.1 million (civil war since 1988, clan-based competition for resources; 2011 famine; insecurity because of fighting between al-Shabaab and TFG allied forces) (2012)

The World Factbook



Africa :: Sudan

Introduction :: Sudan

Background:

Military regimes favoring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated national politics since independence from the UK in 1956. Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil wars during most of the remainder of the 20th century. These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of largely non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese. The first civil war ended in 1972 but broke out again in 1983. The second war and famine-related effects resulted in more than four million people displaced and, according to rebel estimates, more than two million deaths over a period of two decades. Peace talks gained momentum in 2002-04 with the signing of several accords. The final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, granted the southern rebels autonomy for six years followed by a referendum on independence for Southern Sudan. The referendum was held in January 2011 and indicated overwhelming support for independence. South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011. Since southern independence Sudan has been combating rebels from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. A separate conflict, which broke out in the western region of Darfur in 2003, has displaced nearly two million people and caused an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 deaths. The UN took command of the Darfur peacekeeping operation from the African Union in December 2007. Peacekeeping troops have struggled to stabilize the situation, which has become increasingly regional in scope and has brought instability to eastern Chad. Sudan also has faced large refugee influxes from neighboring countries primarily Ethiopia and Chad. Armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and lack of government support have chronically obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations.

Geography :: Sudan

Location:

north-eastern Africa, bordering the Red Sea, between Egypt and Eritrea

Geographic coordinates:

15 00 N, 30 00 E

Map references:

Africa

Area:

total: 1,861,484 sq km

country comparison to the world: 16

land: NA

water: NA

Area - comparative:

slightly less than one-fifth the size of the US

Land boundaries:

total: 6,751 km

border countries: Central African Republic 175 km, Chad 1,360 km, Egypt 1,275 km, Eritrea 605 km, Ethiopia 769 km, Libya 383 km, South Sudan 2,184 km

note: Sudan-South Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment; final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation; final sovereignty status of Abyei region pending negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan

Coastline:

853 km

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 12 nm

contiguous zone: 18 nm

continental shelf: 200 m depth or to the depth of exploitation

Climate:

hot and dry; arid desert; rainy season varies by region (April to November)

Terrain:

generally flat, featureless plain; desert dominates the north

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: Red Sea 0 m

highest point: Jabal Marrah 3,071 m

Natural resources:

petroleum; small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold; hydropower

Land use:

arable land: 6.76%

permanent crops: 0.07%

other: 93.17% (2011)

Irrigated land:

18,900 sq km (2010)

Total renewable water resources:

64.5 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 27.59 cu km/yr (4%/1%/95%)

per capita: 683.4 cu m/yr (2005)

Natural hazards:

dust storms and periodic persistent droughts

Environment - current issues:

inadequate supplies of potable water; wildlife populations threatened by excessive hunting; soil erosion; desertification; periodic drought

Environment - international agreements:

party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements

Geography - note:

dominated by the Nile and its tributaries

People and Society:: Sudan

Nationality:

noun: Sudanese (singular and plural)

adjective: Sudanese

Ethnic groups:

Sudanese Arab (approximately 70%), Fur, Beja, Nuba, Fallata

Languages:

Arabic (official), English (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, Fur

note: program of "Arabization" in process

Religions:

Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority

Population:

34,847,910

country comparison to the world: 36

Age structure:

0-14 years: 41.4% (male 7,337,924/female 7,104,702)

15-24 years: 20% (male 3,596,729/female 3,376,682)

25-54 years: 31.4% (male 5,316,659/female 5,639,494)

55-64 years: 3.8% (male 711,596/female 620,962)

65 years and over: 3.3% (male 629,312/female 513,850) (2013 est.)

Dependency ratios:

total dependency ratio: 79.9 %

youth dependency ratio: 74.1 %

elderly dependency ratio: 5.8 %

potential support ratio: 17.1 (2013)

Median age:

total: 18.9 years

male: 18.6 years

female: 19.1 years (2013 est.)

Population growth rate:

1.83% (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 65

Birth rate:

30.84 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 42

Death rate:

8.09 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 95

Net migration rate:

-4.44 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 190

Urbanization:

urban population: 33.2% of total population (2011)

rate of urbanization: 2.6% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

Major urban areas - population:

KHARTOUM (capital) 5.021 million (2009)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

0-14 years: 1.04 male(s)/female

15-24 years: 1.06 male(s)/female

25-54 years: 0.94 male(s)/female

55-64 years: 1.16 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 1.24 male(s)/female

total population: 1.02 male(s)/female (2013 est.)

Maternal mortality rate:

730 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)

country comparison to the world: 9

Infant mortality rate:

total: 54.23 deaths/1,000 live births

country comparison to the world: 35

male: 59.75 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 48.43 deaths/1,000 live births (2013 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 62.95 years

country comparison to the world: 185

male: 60.93 years

female: 65.07 years (2013 est.)

Total fertility rate:

4.05 children born/woman (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 39

Contraceptive prevalence rate:

9% (2010)

Health expenditures:

6.3% of GDP (2010)

country comparison to the world: 101

Physicians density:

0.28 physicians/1,000 population (2008)

Hospital bed density:

0.7 beds/1,000 population (2009)

Drinking water source:

improved:

urban: 67% of population

rural: 52% of population

total: 58% of population

unimproved:

urban: 33% of population

rural: 48% of population

total: 42% of population (2010 est.)

Sanitation facility access:

improved:

urban: 44% of population

rural: 14% of population

total: 26% of population

unimproved:

urban: 56% of population

rural: 86% of population

total: 74% of population (2010 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

1.1% (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 44

HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:

260,000 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 22

HIV/AIDS - deaths:

12,000 (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 23

Major infectious diseases:

degree of risk: very high

food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever

vectorborne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, and Rift Valley fever

water contact disease: schistosomiasis

respiratory disease: meningococcal meningitis

animal contact disease: rabies

note: highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among US citizens who have close contact with birds (2013)

Obesity - adult prevalence rate:

6% (2008)

country comparison to the world: 150

Children under the age of 5 years underweight:

31.7% (2006)

country comparison to the world: 12

Education expenditures:

NA

Literacy:

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 71.9%

male: 80.7%

female: 63.2%

note: pre-secession of South Sudan (2011 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):

total: 4 years (2000)

Government: Sudan

Country name:

conventional long form: Republic of the Sudan

conventional short form: Sudan

local long form: Jumhuriyat as-Sudan

local short form: As-Sudan

former: Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

Government type:

Federal republic ruled by the National Congress Party (the NCP), which came to power by military coup in 1989; the CPA-mandated Government of National Unity, which since 2005 provided a percentage of leadership posts to the south Sudan-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), was disbanded following the secession of South Sudan.

Capital:

name: Khartoum

geographic coordinates: 15 36 N, 32 32 E

time difference: UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

Administrative divisions:

17 states (wilayat, singular - wilayah): Al Bahr al Ahmar (Red Sea), Al Jazira (Gezira), Al Khartoum (Khartoum), Al Qadarif (Gedaref), An Nil al Abyad (White Nile), An Nil al Azraq (Blue Nile), Ash Shimaliyya (Northern), Gharb Darfur (Western Darfur), Janub Darfur (Southern Darfur), Janub Kurdufan (Southern Kordofan), Kassala, Nahr an Nil (River Nile), Sharq Darfur (Eastern Darfur), Shimal Darfur (Northern Darfur), Shimal Kurdufan (Northern Kordofan), Sinnar, Wasat Darfur (Central Darfur)

Independence:

1 January 1956 (from Egypt and the UK)

National holiday:

Independence Day, 1 January (1956)

Constitution:

the Government of Sudan is in the process of drafting a new constitution to replace the Interim National Constitution ratified 5 July 2005

Legal system:

mixed legal system of Islamic law and English common law

International law organization participation:

accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations; withdrew acceptance of ICCT jurisdiction in 2008

Suffrage:

17 years of age: universal

Executive branch:

chief of state: President Umar Hassan Ahmad al-BASHIR (since 16 October 1993); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government
head of government: President Umar Hassan Ahmad al-BASHIR (since 16 October 1993)

cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note - the NCP (formerly the National Islamic Front or NIF) dominates al-BASHIR's cabinet (For more information visit the [World Leaders website](#))

elections: election on 11-15 April 2010 (next to be held in 2015)

election results: Umar Hassan Ahmad al-BASHIR reelected president; percent of vote - Umar Hassan Ahmad al-BASHIR 68.2%, Yasir ARMAN 21.7%, Abdullah Deng NHIAL 3.9%, others 6.2%

note: al-BASHIR assumed power as chairman of Sudan's Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC) in June 1989 and served concurrently as chief of state, chairman of the RCC, prime minister, and minister of defense until mid-October 1993 when he was appointed president by the RCC; he was elected president by popular vote for the first time in March 1996

Legislative branch:

bicameral National Legislature consists of a Council of States (50 seats; members indirectly elected by state legislatures to serve six-year terms) and a National Assembly (450 seats; 60% from geographic constituencies, 25% from a women's list, and 15% from party lists; members to serve six-year terms)

elections: last held on 11-15 April 2010 (next to be held in 2016)

election results: National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA: seats by party - NCP 323, SPLM 99, PCP 4, DUP 4, UFP 3, URDP 2, DUPO 2, SPLM-DC 2, other 7, vacant 4; composition of National Assembly following South Sudan's independence - seats by party - NCP 317, SPLM 8, PCP 4, DUP 4, UFP 3, URDP 2, DUPO 1, UP 1, UNP 1, UCLP 1, MB 1, independent 3, vacant 8

note: the mandate of the members from the south was terminated upon independence by the Republic of South Sudan effective 9 July 2011 and membership in Sudan's National Assembly was reduced to 354; it is unclear whether this total will be retained for the next election or whether the previous total of 450 will be reconstituted

Judicial branch:

highest court(s): National Supreme Court (consists of 70 judges organized into panels of 3 judges; court includes 4 circuits that operate outside the capital); Constitutional Court (consists of 9 justices including the court president); note - the Constitutional Court resides outside the national judiciary

judge selection and term of office: National Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges appointed by the president of the republic upon the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission, an independent body chaired by the chief justice of the republic and members including other judges and judicial and legal officials; Supreme Court judge tenure NA; Constitutional Court judges appointed for 7 years

subordinate courts: National Court of Appeals; other national courts (not specified in the 2005 Interim National Constitution as to national or local authority); township and rural (peoples') courts

Political parties and leaders:

Democratic Unionist Party or DUP [Hatim al-SIR]

Democratic Unionist Party-Original or DUPO

Muslim Brotherhood or MB

National Congress Party or NCP [Umar Hassan al-BASHIR]

Popular Congress Party or PCP [Hassan al-TURABI]

Sudan People's Liberation Movement or SPLM

Sudan People's Liberation Movement for Democratic Change or SPLM-DC [Lam AKOL Ajawin]

Umma Party or UP

Umma Federal Party or UFP

Umma National Party or UNP

Umma Reform and Development Party or URDP

Umma Collective Leadership Party or UCLP

Political pressure groups and leaders:

Umma Party [SADIQ Siddiq al-Mahdi]

Popular Congress Party or PCP [Hassan al-TURABI]

Democratic Unionist Party [Muhammad Uthman al-MIRGHANI]

Darfur rebel groups including the Justice and Equality Movement or JEM [Jabril IBRAHIM and other factional leaders] and the Sudan Liberation Movement or SLM [various factional leaders]

International organization participation:

ABEDA, ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, CAEU, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)

Diplomatic representation in the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Elhafiz Eisa Abdulla ADAM

chancery: 2210 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008

telephone: [1] (202) 338-8565

FAX: [1] (202) 667-2406

Diplomatic representation from the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Joseph D. STAFFORD, III

embassy: Sharia Ali Abdul Latif Street, Khartoum

mailing address: P.O. Box 699, Kilo 10, Soba, Khartoum; APO AE 09829

telephone: [249] (187)-0-(22000)

FAX: [249] (183) 774-137

Flag description:

three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with a green isosceles triangle based on the hoist side: colors and design based on the Arab Revolt flag of World War I, but the meanings of the colors are expressed as follows: red signifies the struggle for freedom, white is the color of peace, light, and love, black represents Sudan itself (in Arabic 'Sudan' means black), green is the color of Islam, agriculture, and prosperity

National symbol(s):

secretary bird

National anthem:

name: "Nahnu Djundulla Djundulwatan" (We Are the Army of God and of Our Land)

 **PLAY ANTHEM**

lyrics/music: Sayed Ahmad Muhammad SALIH/Ahmad MURJAN

note: adopted 1956; the song originally served as the anthem of the Sudanese military

Economy:: Sudan

Economy - overview:

Sudan is an extremely poor country that has had to deal with social conflict, civil war, and the July 2011 secession of South Sudan - the region of the country that had been responsible for about three-fourths of the former Sudan's total oil production. The oil sector had driven much of Sudan's GDP growth since it began exporting oil in 1999. For nearly a decade, the economy boomed on the back of increases in oil production, high oil prices, and significant inflows of foreign direct investment. Following South Sudan's secession, Sudan has struggled to maintain economic stability, because oil earnings now provide a far lower share of the country's need for hard currency and for budget revenues. Sudan is attempting to generate new sources of revenues, such as from gold mining, while carrying out an austerity program to reduce expenditures. Agricultural production continues to employ 80% of the work force. Sudan introduced a new currency, still called the Sudanese pound, following South Sudan's secession, but the value of the currency has fallen since its introduction. Khartoum formally devalued the currency in June 2012, when it passed austerity measures that included gradually repealing fuel subsidies. Sudan also faces rising inflation, which reached 47% on an annual basis in November 2012. Ongoing conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile states, lack of basic infrastructure in large areas, and reliance by much of the population on subsistence agriculture ensure that much of the population will remain at or below the poverty line for years to come.

GDP (purchasing power parity):

\$86.67 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 78

\$90.66 billion (2011 est.)

\$92.4 billion (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

GDP (official exchange rate):

\$59.94 billion (2012 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

-4.4% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 216

-1.9% (2011 est.)

2.5% (2010 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$2,600 (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 182

\$2,800 (2011 est.)

\$2,300 (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

Gross national saving:

24.2% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 48

28.6% of GDP (2011 est.)

26.7% of GDP (2010 est.)

GDP - composition, by end use:

household consumption: 65.1%

government consumption: 10.9%

investment in fixed capital: 27.2%

investment in inventories: 3.3%

exports of goods and services: 7%

imports of goods and services: -13.4%
(2012 est.)

GDP - composition, by sector of origin:

agriculture: 27.6%

industry: 22.1%

services: 50.2% (2012 est.)

Agriculture - products:

cotton, groundnuts (peanuts), sorghum, millet, wheat, gum arabic, sugarcane, cassava (tapioca), mangoes, papaya, bananas, sweet potatoes, sesame; sheep and other livestock

Industries:

oil, cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling, shoes, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, armaments, automobile/light truck assembly

Industrial production growth rate:

-28.9% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 171

Labor force:

11.92 million (2007 est.)

country comparison to the world: 45

Labor force - by occupation:

agriculture: 80%

industry: 7%

services: 13% (1998 est.)

Unemployment rate:

20% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 162

18.7% (2002 est.)

Population below poverty line:

46.5% (2009 est.)

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%: 2.7%

highest 10%: 26.7% (2009 est.)

Budget:

revenues: \$3.934 billion

expenditures: \$7.627 billion (2012 est.)

Taxes and other revenues:

6.6% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 213

Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-):

-6.2% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 181

Public debt:

106.4% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 14

96.2% of GDP (2011 est.)

Fiscal year:

calendar year

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

31.9% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 221

18% (2011 est.)

Stock of narrow money:

\$5.853 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 91

\$9.272 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of broad money:

\$12.83 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 95

\$15.6 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of domestic credit:

\$8.591 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 107

\$14.63 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Market value of publicly traded shares:

\$NA

Current account balance:

-\$3.575 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 153

\$208.1 million (2011 est.)

Exports:

\$4.59 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 115

\$9.694 billion (2011 est.)

Exports - commodities:

gold; oil and petroleum products; cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts, gum arabic, sugar

Exports - partners:

UAE 63.2%, Saudi Arabia 9.2%, Ethiopia 5.3% (2012)

Imports:

\$6.217 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 119

\$8.205 billion (2011 est.)

Imports - commodities:

foodstuffs, manufactured goods, refinery and transport equipment, medicines and chemicals, textiles, wheat

Imports - partners:

Macau 18%, India 8.8%, Saudi Arabia 7.9%, Egypt 6.7%, UAE 5.2% (2012)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold:

\$297.9 million (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 154

\$295 million (31 December 2011 est.)

Debt - external:

\$39.63 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 66

\$38.63 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Exchange rates:

Sudanese pounds (SDG) per US dollar -

4.09 (2012 est.)

2.68 (2011 est.)

2.31 (2010 est.)

2.3 (2009)

2.1 (2008)

Energy :: Sudan

Electricity - production:

6.509 billion kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 107

Electricity - consumption:

4.611 billion kWh (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 117

Electricity - exports:

0 kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 132

Electricity - imports:

0 kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 135

Electricity - installed generating capacity:

2.338 million kW (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 96

Electricity - from fossil fuels:

30.7% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 178

Electricity - from nuclear fuels:

0% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 179

Electricity - from hydroelectric plants:

66.3% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 26

Electricity - from other renewable sources:

3% of total installed capacity (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 47

Crude oil - production:

120,000 bbl/day (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 47

Crude oil - exports:

370,700 bbl/day (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 22

Crude oil - imports:

0 bbl/day (2009 est.)

country comparison to the world: 123

Crude oil - proved reserves:

5 billion bbl (1 January 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 24

Refined petroleum products - production:

85,890 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 77

Refined petroleum products - consumption:

95,450 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 80

Refined petroleum products - exports:

14,950 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 81

Refined petroleum products - imports:

24,820 bbl/day (2008 est.)

country comparison to the world: 93

Natural gas - production:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 192

Natural gas - consumption:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 195

Natural gas - exports:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 182

Natural gas - imports:

0 cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 131

Natural gas - proved reserves:

84.95 billion cu m (1 January 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 59

Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy:

13.79 million Mt (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 91

Communications :: Sudan

Telephones - main lines in use:

483,600 (2011)

country comparison to the world: 100

Telephones - mobile cellular:

25.056 million (2011)

country comparison to the world: 42

Telephone system:

general assessment: well-equipped system by regional standards and being upgraded; cellular communications started in 1996 and have expanded substantially with wide coverage of most major cities

domestic: consists of microwave radio relay, cable, fiber optic, radiotelephone communications, tropospheric scatter, and a domestic satellite system with 14 earth stations

international: country code - 249; linked to the EASSy and FLAG fiber-optic submarine cable systems; satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean), 1 Arabsat (2010)

Broadcast media:

the Sudanese Government directly controls TV and radio, requiring that both media reflect government policies; TV has a permanent military censor; a private radio station is in operation (2007)

Internet country code:

.sd

Internet hosts:

99 (2012)

country comparison to the world: 210

Internet users:

4.2 million (2008)

country comparison to the world: 56

Transportation :: Sudan

Airports:

74 (2013)

country comparison to the world: 70

Airports - with paved runways:

total: 16

over 3,047 m: 2

2,438 to 3,047 m: 10

1,524 to 2,437 m: 2

under 914 m: 2 (2013)

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total: 58

2,438 to 3,047 m: 1

1,524 to 2,437 m: 17

914 to 1,523 m: 28

under 914 m:

12 (2013)

Heliports:

6 (2013)

Pipelines:

gas 156 km; oil 4,070 km; refined products 1.613 km (2013)

Railways:

total: 5,978 km

country comparison to the world: 30

narrow gauge: 4,578 km 1.067-m gauge; 1,400 km 0.600-m gauge for cotton plantations (2008)

Roadways:

total: 11,900 km

country comparison to the world: 130

paved: 4,320 km

unpaved: 7,580 km (2000)

Waterways:

4,068 km (1,723 km open year round on White and Blue Nile rivers) (2011)

country comparison to the world: 25

Merchant marine:

total: 2

country comparison to the world: 140

by type: cargo 2 (2010)

Ports and terminals:

Port Sudan

Military :: Sudan

Military branches:

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): Land Forces, Navy (includes Marines), Sudanese Air Force (Sikakh al-Jawwiya as-Sudaniya), Popular Defense Forces (2011)

Military service age and obligation:

18-33 years of age for male and female compulsory or voluntary military service; 1-2 year service obligation; a requirement that completion of national service was mandatory before entering public or private sector employment has been cancelled (2012)

Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49: 10,433,973

females age 16-49: 10,411,443 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 6,475,530

females age 16-49: 6,840,885 (2010 est.)

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:

male: 532,030

female: 512,476 (2010 est.)

Military expenditures:

4.2% of GDP (2012)

country comparison to the world: 24

Transnational Issues :: Sudan

Disputes - international:

the effects of Sudan's almost constant ethnic and rebel militia fighting since the mid-20th century have penetrated all of the neighboring states; Chad wishes to be a helpful mediator in resolving the Darfur conflict, and in 2010 established a joint border monitoring force with Sudan, which has helped to reduce cross-border banditry and violence; as of 2006, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda provided shelter for over a half million Sudanese refugees, which include 240,000 Darfur residents driven from their homes by Janjawid armed militia and Sudanese military forces; as of January 2011, Sudan, in turn, hosted about 138,700 Eritreans, 43,000 Chadians, and smaller numbers of Ethiopians; Sudan accuses Eritrea of supporting Sudanese rebel groups; efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia proceed slowly due to civil and ethnic fighting in eastern Sudan; Sudan claims but Egypt de facto administers security and economic development of Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary; periodic violent skirmishes with Sudanese residents over water and grazing rights persist among related pastoral populations along the border with the Central African Republic; South Sudan-Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment, final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation; final sovereignty status of Abyei Area pending negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan

Refugees and internally displaced persons:

refugees (country of origin): 112,283 (Eritrea); 32,220 (Chad) (2012)


IDPs: more than 2.4 million (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border) (2011)

Trafficking in persons:

current situation: Sudan is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; Sudanese women and girls, particularly those from rural areas or who are internally displaced, are vulnerable to forced labor as domestic workers in homes throughout the country; some of these women and girls are subsequently sexually abused by male occupants of the household or forced to engage in commercial sex acts; Sudanese women and girls are subjected to domestic servitude in Middle Eastern countries and to forced sex trafficking in European countries; some Sudanese men who voluntarily migrate to the Middle East as low-skilled laborers face conditions indicative of forced labor; Sudanese children in Saudi Arabia are used in forced begging and street vending; Sudan is a transit and destination country for Ethiopian and Eritrean women subjected to domestic servitude in Sudan and Middle Eastern countries; Sudan is a destination for Ethiopian, Somali, and possibly Thai women subjected to forced prostitution; Sudanese children in Darfur are forcibly conscripted, at times through abduction, and used by armed groups and government security forces

tier rating: Tier 3 - Sudan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; while the government has taken some initial steps to draft anti-trafficking legislation, prosecute suspected traffickers, demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers, and has convened its first workshop to discuss human trafficking, its efforts to combat human trafficking through law enforcement, protection, or prevention measures are undertaken in an ad hoc fashion, rather than as the result of strategic planning; the government has not employed a system for proactively identifying trafficking victims among vulnerable populations or a referral process for transferring victims to organizations providing care; its proxy militias reportedly unlawfully recruited and used child soldiers during the reporting period; the government has not taken action to conclude a proposed action plan with the UN to address the problem (2013)

The World Factbook



Middle East :: Syria

Introduction :: Syria

Background:

Following World War I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of Syria. The French administered the area as Syria until granting it independence in 1946. The new country lacked political stability, however, and experienced a series of military coups during its first decades. Syria united with Egypt in February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. In September 1961, the two entities separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In November 1970, Hafiz al-ASAD, a member of the socialist Ba'th Party and the minority Alawi sect, seized power in a bloodless coup and brought political stability to the country. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel. During the 1990s, Syria and Israel held occasional peace talks over its return. Following the death of President al-ASAD, his son, Bashar al-ASAD, was approved as president by popular referendum in July 2000. Syrian troops - stationed in Lebanon since 1976 in an ostensible peacekeeping role - were withdrawn in April 2005. During the July-August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hizballah. In May 2007 Bashar al-ASAD's second term as president was approved by popular referendum. Influenced by major uprisings that began elsewhere in the region, antigovernment protests broke out in the southern province of Dar'a in March 2011 with protesters calling for the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials. Since then demonstrations and unrest have spread to nearly every city in Syria, but the size and intensity of protests have fluctuated over time. The government responded to unrest with a mix of concessions - including the repeal of the Emergency Law and approving new laws permitting new political parties and liberalizing local and national elections - and force. However, the government's response has failed to meet opposition demands for ASAD to step down, and the government's ongoing security operations to quell unrest and widespread armed opposition activity have led to extended violent clashes between government forces and oppositionists. International pressure on the ASAD regime has intensified since late 2011, as the Arab League, EU, Turkey, and the United States have expanded economic sanctions against the regime. Lakhdar BRAHIMI, current Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, in October 2012 began meeting with regional heads of state to assist in brokering a cease-fire. In December 2012, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces was recognized by more than 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Unrest persists in 2013, and the death toll among Syrian Government forces, opposition forces, and civilians has topped 100,000.

Geography :: Syria

Location:

Middle East, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Lebanon and Turkey

Geographic coordinates:

35 00 N, 38 00 E

Map references:

Middle East

Area:

total: 185,180 sq km

country comparison to the world: 89

land: 183,630 sq km

water: 1,550 sq km

note: includes 1,295 sq km of Israeli-occupied territory

Area - comparative:

slightly larger than North Dakota

Land boundaries:

total: 2,253 km

border countries: Iraq 605 km, Israel 76 km, Jordan 375 km, Lebanon 375 km, Turkey 822 km

Coastline:

193 km

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 12 nm

contiguous zone: 24 nm

Climate:

mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters (December to February) along coast; cold weather with snow or sleet periodically in Damascus

Terrain:

primarily semiarid and desert plateau; narrow coastal plain; mountains in west

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: unnamed location near Lake Tiberias -200 m

highest point: Mount Hermon 2,814 m

Natural resources:

petroleum, phosphates, chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, iron ore, rock salt, marble, gypsum, hydropower

Land use:

arable land: 24.9%

permanent crops: 5.69%

other: 69.41% (2011)

Irrigated land:

13,410 sq km (2010)

Total renewable water resources:

16.8 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 16.76 cu km/yr (9%/4%/88%)

per capita: 867.4 cu m/yr (2005)

Natural hazards:

dust storms, sandstorms

volcanism: Syria's two historically active volcanoes, Es Safa and an unnamed volcano near the Turkish border have not erupted in centuries

Environment - current issues:

deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; water pollution from raw sewage and petroleum refining wastes; inadequate potable water

Environment - international agreements:

party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification

Geography - note:

the capital of Damascus - located at an oasis fed by the Barada River - is thought to be one of the world's oldest continuously inhabited cities; there are 41 Israeli settlements and civilian land use sites in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (2010 est.)

People and Society :: Syria

Nationality:

noun: Syrian(s)

adjective: Syrian

Ethnic groups:

Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%

Languages:

Arabic (official), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian (widely understood); French, English (somewhat understood)

Religions:

Sunni Muslim (Islam - official) 74%, other Muslim (includes Alawite, Druze) 16%, Christian (various denominations) 10%, Jewish (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo)

Population:

22,457,336 (July 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 54

note: approximately 18,900 Israeli settlers live in the Golan Heights (2012)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 33.9% (male 3,900,073/female 3,707,117)

15-24 years: 20.8% (male 2,387,006/female 2,285,496)

25-54 years: 36.9% (male 4,214,621/female 4,075,181)

55-64 years: 4.6% (male 504,422/female 517,413)

65 years and over: 3.9% (male 395,806/female 470,201) (2013 est.)

Dependency ratios:

total dependency ratio: 64.3 %

youth dependency ratio: 57.7 %

elderly dependency ratio: 6.7 %

potential support ratio: 15 (2013)

Median age:

total: 22.7 years

male: 22.5 years

female: 22.9 years (2013 est.)

Population growth rate:

0.15% (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 181

Birth rate:

23.01 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 73

Death rate:

3.67 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 212

Net migration rate:

-17.89 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 219

Urbanization:

urban population: 56.1% of total population (2011)

rate of urbanization: 2.36% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

Major urban areas - population:

Aleppo 2.985 million; DAMASCUS (capital) 2.527 million; Hims 1.276 million; Hamah 854,000 (2009)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female
0-14 years: 1.05 male(s)/female
15-24 years: 1.05 male(s)/female
25-54 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
55-64 years: 0.97 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.85 male(s)/female
total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2013 est.)

Maternal mortality rate:

70 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)
country comparison to the world: 88

Infant mortality rate:

total: 14.63 deaths/1,000 live births
country comparison to the world: 114
male: 16.83 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 12.31 deaths/1,000 live births (2013 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 75.14 years
country comparison to the world: 97
male: 72.74 years
female: 77.69 years (2013 est.)

Total fertility rate:

2.77 children born/woman (2013 est.)
country comparison to the world: 72

Contraceptive prevalence rate:

58.3% (2006)

Health expenditures:

3.7% of GDP (2011)
country comparison to the world: 172

Physicians density:

1.5 physicians/1,000 population (2008)

Hospital bed density:

1.5 beds/1,000 population (2010)

Drinking water source:

improved:

urban: 93% of population
rural: 86% of population
total: 90% of population

unimproved:

urban: 7% of population
rural: 14% of population
total: 10% of population (2010 est.)

Sanitation facility access:

improved:

urban: 96% of population
rural: 93% of population
total: 95% of population

unimproved:

urban: 4% of population
rural: 7% of population
total: 5% of population (2010 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

less than 0.1% (2001 est.)
country comparison to the world: 134

HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:

fewer than 500 (2003 est.)

country comparison to the world: 150

HIV/AIDS - deaths:

fewer than 200 (2003 est.)

country comparison to the world: 111

Obesity - adult prevalence rate:

27.1% (2008)

country comparison to the world: 41

Children under the age of 5 years underweight:

10.1% (2009)

country comparison to the world: 69

Education expenditures:

5.1% of GDP (2009)

country comparison to the world: 73

Literacy:

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 84.1%

male: 90.3%

female: 77.7% (2011 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):

total: 11 years

male: 12 years

female: 11 years (2007)

Child labor - children ages 5-14:

total number: 192,915

percentage: 4 % (2006 est.)

Unemployment, youth ages 15-24:

total: 19.2%

country comparison to the world: 62

male: 15.3%

female: 40.2% (2010)

Government:: Syria

Country name:

conventional long form: Syrian Arab Republic

conventional short form: Syria

local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Arabiyah as Suriyah

local short form: Suriyah

former: United Arab Republic (with Egypt)

Government type:

republic under an authoritarian regime

Capital:

name: Damascus

geographic coordinates: 33 30 N, 36 18 E

time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

daylight saving time: +1hr, begins midnight on the last Friday in March; ends at midnight on the first Friday in November

Administrative divisions:

14 provinces (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Al Hasakah, Al Ladhqiyyah (Latakia), Al Qunaytirah, Ar Raqqah, As Suwayda', Dar'a, Dayr az Zawr, Dimashq (Damascus), Halab, Hamah, Hims (Homs), Idlib, Rif Dimashq (Damascus Countryside), Tartus

Independence:

17 April 1946 (from League of Nations mandate under French administration)

National holiday:

Independence Day, 17 April (1946)

Constitution:

several previous; latest issued 15 February 2012, passed by referendum 26 February 2012

Legal system:

mixed legal system of civil and Islamic law (for family courts)

International law organization participation:

has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt

Suffrage:

18 years of age; universal

Executive branch:

chief of state: President Bashar al-ASAD (since 17 July 2000); Vice President Farouk al-SHARA (since 21 February 2006); Vice President Najah al-ATTAR (since 23 March 2006)

head of government: Prime Minister Wael al-HALQI (since 9 August 2012); Deputy Prime Ministers Fahd Jasim al-FURAYJ, Lt. Gen., Walid al-MUALEM

cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note - new Council appointed on 14 April 2011

(For more information visit the **World Leaders website** [☞](#))

elections: president approved by popular referendum for a second seven-year term (no term limits); referendum last held on 27 May 2007 (next to be held in May 2014); the president appoints the vice presidents, prime minister, and deputy prime ministers

election results: Bashar al-ASAD approved as president; percent of vote - Bashar al-ASAD 97.6%, other 2.4%

Legislative branch:

unicameral People's Assembly or Majlis al-Shaab (250 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)

elections: last held on 7 May 2012 (next to be held in 2016)

election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA

Judicial branch:

highest court(s): Court of Cassation (organized into civil, criminal, religious, and military divisions, each with 3 judges); Supreme Constitutional Court (consists of 4 members)

judge selection and term of office: Court of Cassation judges appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council or SJC, a judicial management body headed by the minister of justice with 7 members including the national president; judge tenure NA; Supreme Constitutional Court judges nominated by the president and appointed by the SJC; judges appointed for 4-year renewable terms

subordinate courts: courts of first instance; magistrates' courts; religious and military courts; Economic Security Court

Political parties and leaders:

legal parties:

National Progressive Front or NPF [President Bashar al-ASAD, Dr. Suleiman QADDAH] (includes Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party [President Bashar al-ASAD])

Socialist Unionist Democratic Party [Fadlallah Nasr al-DIN]

Syrian Arab Socialist Union or ASU [Safwan al-QUDSI]

Syrian Communist Party (two branches) [Wissal Farha BAKDASH, Yusuf Rashid FAYSAL]

Syrian Social Nationalist Party [As'ad HARDAN]

Unionist Socialist Party [Fayez ISMAIL])

Kurdish parties (considered illegal):

Kurdish Azadi Party

Kurdish Democratic Accord Party (al Wifaq)

Kurdish Democratic Party (al Parti-Ibrahim wing)

Kurdish Democratic Party (al Parti-Mustafa wing)

Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria or KDP-S

Kurdish Democratic Patriotic/National Party

Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party or KDPP-Darwish

Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party or KDPP-Muhammad

Kurdish Democratic Union Party or PYD [Salih Muslim MOHAMMAD]

Kurdish Democratic Unity Party
Kurdish Democratic Yekiti Party
Kurdish Future Party or KFP
Kurdish Future Party [Rezan HASSAN]
Kurdish Left Party
Kurdish Yekiti (Union) Party
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party

other parties: Syrian Democratic Party [Mustafa QALAAJI]

Political pressure groups and leaders:

Free Syrian Army

National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces or Syrian Opposition Coalition
[Mu'aaz al-KHATIB] (operates in exile in Cairo)

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood or SMB [Muhammad Riyad al-SHAQFAH] (operates in exile in London)

note: there are also hundreds of local groups that organize protests and stage armed attacks

International organization participation:

ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCs, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OAPC, OIC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)

Diplomatic representation in the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Mounir KOUDMANI

chancery: 2215 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008

telephone: [1] (202) 232-6313

FAX: [1] (202) 265-4585

Diplomatic representation from the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador Robert S. FORD (since 7 January 2011); note - on 6 February 2012, the US closed its embassy in Damascus

embassy: Abou Roumaneh, Al-Mansour Street, No. 2, Damascus

mailing address: P. O. Box 29, Damascus

telephone: [963] (11) 3391-4444

FAX: [963] (11) 3391-3999

Flag description:

three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black; two small, green, five-pointed stars in a horizontal line centered in the white band; the band colors derive from the Arab Liberation flag and represent oppression (black), overcome through bloody struggle (red), to be replaced by a bright future (white); identical to the former flag of the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) where the two stars represented the constituent states of Syria and Egypt; the current design dates to 1980

note: similar to the flag of Yemen, which has a plain white band, Iraq, which has an Arabic inscription centered in the white band, and that of Egypt, which has a gold Eagle of Saladin centered in the white band

National symbol(s):

hawk

National anthem:

name: "Humat ad-Diyar" (Guardians of the Homeland)

 **PLAY ANTHEM**

lyrics/music: Khalil Mardam BEY/Mohammad Salim FLAYFEL and Ahmad Salim FLAYFEL

note: adopted 1936, restored 1961; between 1958 and 1961, while Syria was a member of the United Arab Republic with Egypt, the country had a different anthem

Economy:: Syria

Economy - overview:

Despite modest economic growth and reform prior to the outbreak of unrest, Syria's economy continues to suffer the effects of the ongoing conflict that began in 2011. The economy further contracted in 2012 because of international sanctions and reduced domestic consumption and production, and inflation has risen sharply. The government has struggled to address the effects of economic decline, which include dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget and trade deficits, and the decreasing value of the Syrian pound. Prior to the unrest, Damascus began liberalizing economic policies, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items, and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange. The economy remains highly regulated by the government. Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, and increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, rapid population growth, industrial expansion, and water pollution.

GDP (purchasing power parity):

\$107.6 billion (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 70

\$110.1 billion (2010 est.)

\$110.9 billion (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2011 US dollars

GDP (official exchange rate):

\$64.7 billion (2011 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

NA% (2012 est.)

-2.3% (2011 est.)

3.4% (2010 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$5,100 (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 156

\$5,100 (2010 est.)

\$5,200 (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2011 US dollars

Gross national saving:

12.8% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 117

15% of GDP (2011 est.)

26.1% of GDP (2010 est.)

GDP - composition, by end use:

household consumption: 69.4%

government consumption: 17.2%

investment in fixed capital: 20.6%

investment in inventories: 8.4%

exports of goods and services: 13.9%

imports of goods and services: -29.4%
(2012 est.)

GDP - composition, by sector of origin:

agriculture: 16.5%

industry: 22.8%

services: 60.7% (2012 est.)

Agriculture - products:

wheat, barley, cotton, lentils, chickpeas, olives, sugar beets; beef, mutton, eggs, poultry, milk

Industries:

petroleum, textiles, food processing, beverages, tobacco, phosphate rock mining, cement, oil seeds crushing, car assembly

Industrial production growth rate:

-32.8% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 179

Labor force:

5.327 million (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 71

Labor force - by occupation:

agriculture: 17%

industry: 16%

services: 67% (2008 est.)

Unemployment rate:

18% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 156

14.9% (2011 est.)

Population below poverty line:

11.9% (2006 est.)

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%: NA%

highest 10%: NA%

Budget:

revenues: \$5.217 billion

expenditures: \$12.59 billion (2012 est.)

Taxes and other revenues:

8.1% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 211

Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-):

-11.4% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 205

Public debt:

52.4% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 58

35.4% of GDP (2011 est.)

Fiscal year:

calendar year

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

36.9% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 221

4.8% (2011 est.)

Central bank discount rate:

0.75% (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 69

5% (31 December 2011 est.)

Commercial bank prime lending rate:

11.7% (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 84

10.5% (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of narrow money:

\$16.78 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 65

\$21.88 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of broad money:

\$30.17 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 76

\$39.36 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of domestic credit:

\$17.41 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 85

\$27.2 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Market value of publicly traded shares:

\$NA

Current account balance:

\$-6.706 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 169

\$-7.726 billion (2011 est.)

Exports:

\$3.876 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 122

\$10.29 billion (2011 est.)

Exports - commodities:

crude oil, minerals, petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton fiber, textiles, clothing, meat and live animals, wheat

Exports - partners:

Iraq 58.4%, Saudi Arabia 9.7%, Kuwait 6.4%, UAE 5.5%, Libya 4.1% (2012)

Imports:

\$10.78 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 95

\$17.6 billion (2011 est.)

Imports - commodities:

machinery and transport equipment, electric power machinery, food and livestock, metal and metal products, chemicals and chemical products, plastics, yarn, paper

Imports - partners:

Saudi Arabia 22.8%, UAE 11.2%, Iran 8.3%, China 7.3%, Iraq 6.8% (2012)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold:

\$4.793 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 94

\$14.44 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Debt - external:

\$8.394 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 103

\$8.269 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Exchange rates:

Syrian pounds (SYP) per US dollar -

64.39 (2012 est.)

48.37 (2011 est.)

11.23 (2010 est.)

46.71 (2009)

46.53 (2008)

Energy :: Syria

Electricity - production:

43.76 billion kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 55

Electricity - consumption:

35.61 billion kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 57

Electricity - exports:

1.043 billion kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 55

Electricity - imports:

0 kWh (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 137

Electricity - installed generating capacity:

8.323 million kW (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 63

Electricity - from fossil fuels:

89.2% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 76

Electricity - from nuclear fuels:

0% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 181

Electricity - from hydroelectric plants:

10.8% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 112

Electricity - from other renewable sources:

0% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 125

Crude oil - production:

182,500 bbl/day (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 39

Crude oil - exports:

152,400 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 34

Crude oil - imports:

0 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 124

Crude oil - proved reserves:

2.5 billion bbl (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 33

Refined petroleum products - production:

253,600 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 50

Refined petroleum products - consumption:

258,800 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 49

Refined petroleum products - exports:

36,210 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 66

Refined petroleum products - imports:

104,800 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 50

Natural gas - production:

7.87 billion cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 46

Natural gas - consumption:

9.63 billion cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 48

Natural gas - exports:

0 cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 186

Natural gas - imports:

250 million cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 68

Natural gas - proved reserves:

240.7 billion cu m (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 45

Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy:

63.14 million Mt (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 54

Communications :: Syria

Telephones - main lines in use:

4.425 million (2012)

country comparison to the world: 36

Telephones - mobile cellular:

12.928 million (2012)

country comparison to the world: 66

Telephone system:

general assessment: fair system currently undergoing significant improvement and digital upgrades, including fiber-optic technology and expansion of the network to rural areas; the armed insurgency that began in 2011 has led to major disruptions to the network and has caused telephone and Internet outages throughout the country

domestic: the number of fixed-line connections has increased markedly since 2000; mobile-cellular service growing with telephone subscribership nearly 60 per 100 persons in 2011

international: country code - 963; submarine cable connection to Egypt, Lebanon, and Cyprus; satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) and 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region); coaxial cable and microwave radio relay to Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; participant in Medarabtel (2011)

Broadcast media:

state-run TV and radio broadcast networks; state operates 2 TV networks and a satellite channel; roughly two-thirds of Syrian homes have a satellite dish providing access to foreign TV broadcasts; 3 state-run radio channels; first private radio station launched in 2005; private radio broadcasters prohibited from transmitting news or political content (2007)

Internet country code:

.sy

Internet hosts:

416 (2012)

country comparison to the world: 187

Internet users:

4.469 million (2009)

country comparison to the world: 52

Transportation :: Syria

Airports:

90 (2013)

country comparison to the world: 62

Airports - with paved runways:

total: 29
 over 3,047 m: 5
 2,438 to 3,047 m: 16
 914 to 1,523 m: 3
 under 914 m: 5 (2013)

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total: 61
 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1
 914 to 1,523 m: 12
 under 914 m:
 48 (2013)

Heliports:

6 (2013)

Pipelines:

gas 3,170 km; oil 2,029 km (2013)

Railways:

total: 2,052 km
 country comparison to the world: 72
 standard gauge: 1,801 km 1.435-m gauge
 narrow gauge: 251 km 1.050-m gauge (2008)

Roadways:

total: 69,873 km
 country comparison to the world: 68
 paved: 63,060 km
 unpaved: 6,813 km (2010)

Waterways:

900 km (navigable but not economically significant) (2011)
 country comparison to the world: 69

Merchant marine:

total: 19
 country comparison to the world: 95
 by type: bulk carrier 4, cargo 14, carrier 1
 registered in other countries: 166 (Barbados 1, Belize 4, Bolivia 4, Cambodia 22, Comoros 5, Dominica 4, Georgia 24, Lebanon 2, Liberia 1, Malta 4, Moldova 5, North Korea 4, Panama 34, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 9, Sierra Leone 13, Tanzania 23, Togo 6, unknown 1) (2010)

Ports and terminals:

Baniyas, Latakia, Tartus

Military :: Syria

Military branches:

Syrian Armed Forces: Land Forces, Naval Forces, Air Forces (includes Air Defense Forces) (2013)

Military service age and obligation:

18 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscript service obligation is 18 months; women are not conscripted but may volunteer to serve; re-enlistment obligation 5 years, with retirement after 15 years or age 40 (enlisted) or 20 years or age 45 (NCOs) (2012)

Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49: 5,889,837
 females age 16-49: 5,660,751 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 5,055,510
 females age 16-49: 4,884,151 (2010 est.)

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:

male: 256,698
 female: 244,712 (2010 est.)

Military expenditures:

3.6% of GDP (2011)

country comparison to the world: 31

Transnational Issues :: Syria

Disputes - international:

Golan Heights is Israeli-occupied with the almost 1,000-strong UN Disengagement Observer Force patrolling a buffer zone since 1964; lacking a treaty or other documentation describing the boundary, portions of the Lebanon-Syria boundary are unclear with several sections in dispute; since 2000, Lebanon has claimed Shab'a Farms in the Golan Heights; 2004 Agreement and pending demarcation settles border dispute with Jordan

Refugees and internally displaced persons:

refugees (country of origin): 486,946 (Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)); 87,741 (Iraq) (2012)

IDPs: 6.5 million (ongoing civil war since 2011) (2013)

stateless persons: 221,000 (2012); note - Syria's stateless population is composed of Kurds and Palestinians; stateless persons are prevented from voting, owning land, holding certain jobs, receiving food subsidies or public healthcare, enrolling in public schools, or being legally married to Syrian citizens; in 1962, some 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship, rendering them and their descendants stateless; in 2011, the Syrian Government granted citizenship to thousands of Syrian Kurds as a means of appeasement; however, resolving the question of statelessness is not a priority given Syria's ongoing civil war

Trafficking in persons:




current situation: due to Syria's political uprising and violent unrest, hundreds of thousands of Syrians, foreign migrant workers, and refugees have fled the country and are vulnerable to human trafficking; the lack of security and inaccessibility of the majority of the country makes it impossible to conduct a thorough analysis of the ongoing conflict and the scope and magnitude of Syria's human trafficking situation; prior to the uprising, Syria was principally a destination country for women and children subjected to forced labor or sex trafficking; thousands of women - the majority from Indonesia, the Philippines, Somalia, and Ethiopia - were recruited to work as domestic servants but were subsequently subjected to forced labor; Filipina domestic workers continue to be sent to Syria and are vulnerable to forced labor; the Syrian armed forces and opposition forces are using Syrian children in combat and support roles and as human shields; Iraqi women and girls continue to be sexually exploited, and Syrian children still face conditions of forced labor

tier rating: Tier 3 - the government does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government does not demonstrate evidence of increasing efforts to investigate and punish trafficking offenses, provide protective services to victims, inform the public about human trafficking, or provide much-needed anti-trafficking training to law enforcement and social welfare officials; the government does not refer any victims to NGO-operated shelters and has failed to institute procedures for the identification, interview, and referral of trafficking victims; the status of the national plan of action against trafficking is unknown (2013)

Illicit drugs:

a transit point for opiates, hashish, and cocaine bound for regional and Western markets; weak anti-money-laundering controls and bank privatization may leave it vulnerable to money laundering

The World Factbook



Middle East :: Yemen

Introduction :: Yemen

Background:

North Yemen became independent of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became South Yemen. Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states. The two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to a delimitation of their border. Fighting in the northwest between the government and Huthi rebels, a group seeking a return to traditional Zaydi Islam, began in 2004 and has since resulted in six rounds of fighting - the last ended in early 2010 with a cease-fire that continues to hold. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2008 when a popular socioeconomic protest movement initiated the prior year took on political goals including secession. Public rallies in Sana'a against then President SALIH - inspired by similar demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in late April 2011, in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to heavy street fighting and his injury in an explosion in June 2011. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling on both sides to end the violence and complete a power transfer deal. In late November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC-brokered agreement to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following elections in February 2012, won by HADI, SALIH formally transferred his powers. In accordance with the GCC initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues in mid-March 2013.

Geography :: Yemen

Location:

Middle East, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, between Oman and Saudi Arabia

Geographic coordinates:

15 00 N, 48 00 E

Map references:

Middle East

Area:

total: 527,968 sq km

country comparison to the world: 50

land: 527,968 sq km

water: 0 sq km

note: includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)

Area - comparative:

slightly larger than twice the size of Wyoming

Land boundaries:

total: 1,746 km

border countries: Oman 288 km, Saudi Arabia 1,458 km

Coastline:

1,906 km

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 12 nm

contiguous zone: 24 nm

exclusive economic zone: 200 nm

continental shelf: 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin

Climate:

mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east

Terrain:

narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: Arabian Sea 0 m

highest point: Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb 3,760 m

Natural resources:

petroleum, fish, rock salt, marble; small deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper; fertile soil in west

Land use:

arable land: 2.2%

permanent crops: 0.55%

other: 97.25% (2011)

Irrigated land:

6,801 sq km (2004)

Total renewable water resources:

2.1 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 3.57 cu km/yr (7%/2%/91%)

per capita: 162.4 cu m/yr (2005)

Natural hazards:

sandstorms and dust storms in summer

volcanism: limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair (Jabal al-Tair, Jebel Teir, Jabal al-Tayr, Jazirat at-Tair) (elev. 244 m), which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century

Environment - current issues:

limited natural freshwater resources; inadequate supplies of potable water; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification

Environment - international agreements:

party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection

signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements

Geography - note:

strategic location on Bab el Mandeb, the strait linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes

People and Society :: Yemen

Nationality:

noun: Yemeni(s)

adjective: Yemeni

Ethnic groups:

predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asians, Europeans

Languages:

Arabic (official)

Religions:

Muslim (Islam - official) including Shaf'i (Sunni) and Zaydi (Shia), small numbers of Jewish, Christian, and Hindu

Population:

25,408,288 (July 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 48

Age structure:

0-14 years: 42% (male 5,433,121/female 5,235,891)

15-24 years: 21.1% (male 2,720,793/female 2,640,652)

25-54 years: 30.6% (male 3,974,091/female 3,797,543)

55-64 years: 3.7% (male 446,293/female 490,628)

65 years and over: 2.6% (male 315,141/female 354,135) (2013 est.)

Dependency ratios:

total dependency ratio: 75.6 %

youth dependency ratio: 70.6 %

elderly dependency ratio: 5.1 %

potential support ratio: 19.8 (2013)

Median age:

total: 18.5 years

male: 18.4 years

female: 18.6 years (2013 est.)

Population growth rate:

2.5% (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 31

Birth rate:

31.63 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 39

Death rate:

6.64 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 147

Net migration rate:

0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 75

Urbanization:

urban population: 32.3% of total population (2011)

rate of urbanization: 4.78% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

Major urban areas - population:

SANAA (capital) 2.229 million (2009)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

0-14 years: 1.04 male(s)/female

15-24 years: 1.03 male(s)/female

25-54 years: 1.05 male(s)/female

55-64 years: 0.92 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.9 male(s)/female

total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2013 est.)

Mother's mean age at first birth:

19.2

note: Median age at first birth among women 25-29 (1997 est.)

Maternal mortality rate:

200 deaths/100,000 live births (2010)

country comparison to the world: 57

Infant mortality rate:

total: 51.93 deaths/1,000 live births

country comparison to the world: 39

male: 56.33 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 47.31 deaths/1,000 live births (2013 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 64.47 years

country comparison to the world: 175

male: 62.39 years

female: 66.65 years (2013 est.)

Total fertility rate:

4.27 children born/woman (2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 34**Contraceptive prevalence rate:**

27.7% (2006)

Health expenditures:

5.5% of GDP (2011)

country comparison to the world: 122**Physicians density:**

0.2 physicians/1,000 population (2010)

Hospital bed density:

0.7 beds/1,000 population (2010)

Drinking water source:**improved:**

urban: 72% of population

rural: 47% of population

total: 55% of population

unimproved:

urban: 28% of population

rural: 53% of population

total: 45% of population (2010 est.)

Sanitation facility access:**improved:**

urban: 93% of population

rural: 34% of population

total: 53% of population

unimproved:

urban: 7% of population

rural: 66% of population

total: 47% of population (2010 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:

0.1% (2001 est.)

country comparison to the world: 139**HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS:**

12,000 (2001 est.)

country comparison to the world: 91**HIV/AIDS - deaths:**

NA

Major infectious diseases:**degree of risk:** high**food or waterborne diseases:** bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever**vectorborne diseases:** dengue fever and malaria**water contact disease:** schistosomiasis (2013)**Obesity - adult prevalence rate:**

14.5% (2008)

country comparison to the world: 121**Children under the age of 5 years underweight:**

43.1% (2003)

country comparison to the world: 3**Education expenditures:**

5.2% of GDP (2008)

country comparison to the world: 65**Literacy:****definition:** age 15 and over can read and write**total population:** 65.3%**male:** 82.1%**female:** 48.5% (2011 est.)**School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):**

total: 9 years
 male: 11 years
 female: 7 years (2005)

Child labor - children ages 5-14:

total number: 1,334,288
 percentage: 23 % (2006 est.)

Government :: Yemen

Country name:

conventional long form: Republic of Yemen

conventional short form: Yemen

local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Yamaniyah

local short form: Al Yaman

former: Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]

Government type:

republic

Capital:

name: Sanaa

geographic coordinates: 15 21 N, 44 12 E

time difference: UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

Administrative divisions:

20 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah) and 1 municipality*: Abyan, 'Adan (Aden), Ad Dali', Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Amanat al 'Asimah (Sanaa City)*, 'Amran, Dhamar, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'dah, San'a' (Sanaa), Shabwah, Ta'izz

Independence:

22 May 1990 (Republic of Yemen was established with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and the Marxist-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]); note - previously North Yemen became independent in November 1918 (from the Ottoman Empire) and became a republic with the overthrow of the theocratic Imamate in 1962; South Yemen became independent on 30 November 1967 (from the UK)

National holiday:

Unification Day, 22 May (1990)

Constitution:

adopted by referendum 16 May 1991 (following unification); amended several times, last in 2009; note - in early 2013, the Yemeni Government launched a National Dialogue to seek reforms and recommendations for a new constitution

Legal system:

mixed legal system of Islamic law, Napoleonic law, English common law, and customary law

International law organization participation:

has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt

Suffrage:

18 years of age; universal

Executive branch:

chief of state: President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (Field Marshal) (since 25 February 2012)

head of government: Prime Minister Muhammad Salim BA SINDWAH (since 27 November 2011)

cabinet: on 27 November 2011, Vice President HADI requested Interim Prime Minister Muhammad Salim BA SINDWAH to form a new government following the resignation of President SALIH on 24 November 2011 (For more information visit the [World Leaders website](#))

elections: president elected by popular vote for a seven-year term based on constitution; however a special election was held on 21 February 2012 to remove Ali Abdallah SALIH based on a GCC-mediated deal during the political crisis of 2011 (next election to be held in 2014); vice president appointed by the president but position is vacant; prime minister appointed by the president

election results: Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI elected as a consensus president with about 50% popular participation; no other candidates

Legislative branch:

bicameral legislature consisting of a Shura Council (111 seats; members appointed by the president) and House of Representatives (301 seats; members elected by popular vote in single-member constituencies to serve six-year terms)

elections: last held on 27 April 2003 (scheduled April 2009 election postponed)

election results: House of Representatives percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - GPC 238, Islah 47, YSP 6, Nasserite Unionist Party 3, National Arab Socialist Ba'th Party 2, independents 5

Judicial branch:

highest court(s): Supreme Court (consists of the president of the Court, 2 deputies, and nearly 50 judges; court organized into constitutional, civil, commercial, family, administrative, criminal, military, and appeals scrutiny divisions)

judge selection and term of office: judges appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, chaired by the president of the republic and consisting of 10 high-ranking judicial officers; judges appointed for life with mandatory retirement at age 65

subordinate courts: appeal courts; district or first instance courts; commercial courts

Political parties and leaders:

General People's Congress or GPC [Ali Abdallah SALIH, Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI]

Islamic Reform Grouping or Islah [Muhammed Abdallah al-YADUMI, Abdul Wahab al-ANSI]

Nasserite Unionist Party [Sultan al-ATWANI]

Yemeni Socialist Party or YSP [Yasin Said NU'MAN]

note: there are at least seven more active political parties

Political pressure groups and leaders:

Muslim Brotherhood

Women National Committee

other: conservative tribal groups; Huthis, southern secessionist groups; al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

International organization participation:

AFESD, AMF, CAEU, CD, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MINURSO, MONUSCO, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)

Diplomatic representation in the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Adel Ali Ahmed AL-SUNAINI

chancery: 2319 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008

telephone: [1] (202) 965-4760

FAX: [1] (202) 337-2017

Diplomatic representation from the US:

chief of mission: Ambassador Gerald M. FEIERSTEIN (since 17 July 2010)

embassy: Sa'awan Street, Sanaa

mailing address: P. O. Box 22347, Sanaa

telephone: [967] (1) 755-2000 ext. 2153 or 2266

FAX: [967] (1) 303-182

Flag description:

three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black; the band colors derive from the Arab Liberation flag and represent oppression (black), overcome through bloody struggle (red), to be replaced by a bright future (white)

note: similar to the flag of Syria, which has two green stars in the white band, and of Iraq, which has an Arabic inscription centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of Egypt, which has a heraldic eagle centered in the white band

National symbol(s):

golden eagle

National anthem:

name: "al-qumhuriyatu l-muttahida" (United Republic)

 [PLAY ANTHEM](#)

lyrics/music: Abdullah Abdulwahab NOA'MAN/Ayyoab Tarish ABSI

note: adopted 1990; the music first served as the anthem for South Yemen before unification with North Yemen in 1990

Economy :: Yemen**Economy - overview:**

Yemen is a low income country that is highly dependent on declining oil resources for revenue. Petroleum accounts for roughly 25% of GDP and 70% of government revenue. Yemen has tried to counter the effects of its declining oil resources by diversifying its economy through an economic reform program initiated in 2006 that is designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In October 2009, Yemen exported its first liquefied natural gas as part of this diversification effort. In January 2010, the international community established the Friends of Yemen group that aims to support Yemen's efforts toward economic and political reform. In 2012, the Friends of Yemen pledged over \$7 billion in assistance to Yemen. The Yemeni Government also endorsed a Mutual Accountability Framework to facilitate the efficient implementation of donor aid. The unrest that began in early 2011 caused GDP to plunge more than 15% in 2011, and about 2% in 2012. Availability of basic services, including electricity, water, and fuel, has

improved since the transition, but progress toward achieving more sustainable economic stability has been slow and uneven. Yemen continues to face difficult long-term challenges, including declining water resources, high unemployment, and a high population growth rate.

GDP (purchasing power parity):

\$58.27 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 90

\$56.91 billion (2011 est.)

\$65.2 billion (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

GDP (official exchange rate):

\$34.9 billion (2012 est.)

GDP - real growth rate:

2.4% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 125

-12.7% (2011 est.)

7.7% (2010 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP):

\$2,300 (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 187

\$2,300 (2011 est.)

\$2,700 (2010 est.)

note: data are in 2012 US dollars

Gross national saving:

11.9% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 119

8.2% of GDP (2011 est.)

9.4% of GDP (2010 est.)

GDP - composition, by end use:

household consumption: 84.3%

government consumption: 13.2%

investment in fixed capital: 18.8%

investment in inventories: -4.4%

exports of goods and services: 21%

imports of goods and services: -33%
(2012 est.)

GDP - composition, by sector of origin:

agriculture: 8.7%

industry: 35.7%

services: 55.6% (2012 est.)

Agriculture - products:

grain, fruits, vegetables, pulses, qat, coffee, cotton; dairy products, livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, camels), poultry; fish

Industries:

crude oil production and petroleum refining; small-scale production of cotton textiles and leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; small aluminum products factory; cement; commercial ship repair; natural gas production

Industrial production growth rate:

-1% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 146

Labor force:

7.158 million (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 63

Labor force - by occupation:

note: most people are employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force

Unemployment rate:

35% (2003 est.)

country comparison to the world: 185

Population below poverty line:

45.2% (2003)

Household income or consumption by percentage share:

lowest 10%: 2.9%

highest 10%: 30.8% (2005)

Distribution of family income - Gini index:

37.7 (2005)

country comparison to the world: 74

33.4 (1998)

Budget:

revenues: \$8.461 billion

expenditures: \$10.97 billion (2012 est.)

Taxes and other revenues:

24.2% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 133

Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-):

-7.2% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 186

Public debt:

41.8% of GDP (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 83

35.3% of GDP (2011 est.)

Fiscal year:

calendar year

Inflation rate (consumer prices):

9.9% (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 200

19.5% (2011 est.)

Central bank discount rate:

NA%

Commercial bank prime lending rate:

23% (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 11

25% (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of narrow money:

\$5.142 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 100

\$4.645 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of broad money:

\$10.59 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 105

\$10.17 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of domestic credit:

\$9.576 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 100

\$7.662 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Market value of publicly traded shares:

\$NA

Current account balance:

\$-985 million (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 117

\$-1.663 billion (2011 est.)

Exports:

\$7.57 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 103

\$8.662 billion (2011 est.)

Exports - commodities:

crude oil, coffee, dried and salted fish, liquefied natural gas

Exports - partners:

China 37.2%, Thailand 15.7%, South Korea 11.4%, India 10.7%, UAE 5.5% (2012)

Imports:

\$11.36 billion (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 92

\$8.248 billion (2011 est.)

Imports - commodities:

food and live animals, machinery and equipment, chemicals

Imports - partners:

China 15.5%, UAE 14.7%, India 9.6%, Saudi Arabia 6.9%, Kuwait 5.2% (2012)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold:

\$6.158 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 85

\$4.531 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Debt - external:

\$7.419 billion (31 December 2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 107

\$6.418 billion (31 December 2011 est.)

Stock of direct foreign investment - at home:

\$NA

Exchange rates:

Yemeni rials (YER) per US dollar -

214.35 (2012 est.)

213.8 (2011 est.)

219.59 (2010 est.)

202.85 (2009)

199.76 (2008)

Energy :: Yemen**Electricity - production:**

7.292 billion kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 106

Electricity - consumption:

5.515 billion kWh (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 112

Electricity - exports:

0 kWh (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 151

Electricity - imports:

0 kWh (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 151

Electricity - installed generating capacity:

1.334 million kW (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 118

Electricity - from fossil fuels:

100% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 2

Electricity - from nuclear fuels:

0% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 207

Electricity - from hydroelectric plants:

0% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 151

Electricity - from other renewable sources:

0% of total installed capacity (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 143

Crude oil - production:

156,500 bbl/day (2012 est.)

country comparison to the world: 43

Crude oil - exports:

175,200 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 31

Crude oil - imports:

0 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 145

Crude oil - proved reserves:

3 billion bbl (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 31

Refined petroleum products - production:

86,330 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 78

Refined petroleum products - consumption:

177,000 bbl/day (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 61

Refined petroleum products - exports:

14,330 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 78

Refined petroleum products - imports:

59,050 bbl/day (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 62

Natural gas - production:

9.62 billion cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 43

Natural gas - consumption:

950 million cu m (2010 est.)

country comparison to the world: 90

Natural gas - exports:

8.75 billion cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 29

Natural gas - imports:

0 cu m (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 82

Natural gas - proved reserves:

478.5 billion cu m (1 January 2013 est.)

country comparison to the world: 33

Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy:

23.75 million Mt (2011 est.)

country comparison to the world: 80

Communications :: Yemen

Telephones - main lines in use:

1.1 million (2012)

country comparison to the world: 72

Telephones - mobile cellular:

13.9 million (2012)

country comparison to the world: 60

Telephone system:

general assessment: since unification in 1990, efforts have been made to create a national telecommunications network

domestic: the national network consists of microwave radio relay, cable, tropospheric scatter, GSM and CDMA mobile-cellular telephone systems; fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity remains low by regional standards

international: country code - 967; landing point for the international submarine cable Fiber-Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG); satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2006)

Broadcast media:

state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed (2007)

Internet country code:

.ye

Internet hosts:

33,206 (2012)

country comparison to the world: 105

Internet users:

2.349 million (2009)

country comparison to the world: 71

Transportation :: Yemen

Airports:

57 (2013)

country comparison to the world: 83

Airports - with paved runways:

total: 17

over 3,047 m: 4

2,438 to 3,047 m: 9

1,524 to 2,437 m: 3

914 to 1,523 m: 1 (2013)

Airports - with unpaved runways:

total: 40

over 3,047 m: 3

2,438 to 3,047 m: 5

1,524 to 2,437 m: 7

914 to 1,523 m: 16

under 914 m:

9 (2013)

Pipelines:

gas 641 km; liquid petroleum gas 22 km; oil 1,370 km (2013)

Roadways:

total: 71,300 km

country comparison to the world: 67

paved: 6,200 km

unpaved: 65,100 km (2005)

Merchant marine:

total: 5

country comparison to the world: 126

by type: chemical tanker 2, petroleum tanker 2, roll on/roll off 1

registered in other countries: 14 (Moldova 4, Panama 4, Sierra Leone 2, Togo 1, unknown 3) (2010)

Ports and terminals:

Aden, Al Hudaydah, Al Mukalla

Transportation - note:

the International Maritime Bureau reports offshore waters in the Gulf of Aden are high risk for piracy; numerous vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; crew, passengers, and cargo are held for ransom; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators reduced the incidence of piracy in that body of water by more than half in 2010

Military :: Yemen

Military branches:

Land Forces, Naval and Coastal Defense Forces (includes Marines), Air and Air Defense Force (al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Yemeniya), Border Guards, Strategic Reserve Forces (2013)

Military service age and obligation:

18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription; 2-year service obligation (2012)

Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49: 5,652,256

females age 16-49: 5,387,160 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49: 4,056,944

females age 16-49: 4,116,895 (2010 est.)

Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually:

male: 287,141

female: 277,612 (2010 est.)

Military expenditures:

6.6% of GDP (2006)

country comparison to the world: 8

Military - note:

a Coast Guard was established in 2002

Transnational Issues :: Yemen

Disputes - international:

Saudi Arabia has reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities

Refugees and internally displaced persons:

refugees (country of origin): 5,221 (Ethiopia) (2012); 229,447 (Somalia) (2013)

IDPs: 306,964 (conflict in Sa'ada governorate; clashes between AQAP and government forces) (2013)

Trafficking in persons:

current situation: Yemen is a source and, to a much lesser extent, transit and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; some Yemeni children, mostly boys, migrate to Yemeni cities or across the border to Saudi Arabia and, less frequently Oman, where they end up as forced laborers in domestic service or small shops, beggars, or prostitutes; some of the large number of child workers in Yemen also face conditions of forced labor; other Yemeni children are conscripted into the government's armed forces or tribal or rebel militias; to a lesser degree, Yemen is a country of origin for girls trafficked within country or to Saudi Arabia to work as prostitutes in hotels and clubs; additionally, Yemen is a destination and transit country for women and children from the Horn of Africa who are looking for work or have received false job offers in the Gulf states but are subjected to sexual exploitation or forced labor upon arrival; reports indicate that adults and children are still sold or inherited as slaves in Yemen

tier rating: Tier 3 - Yemen does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; prolonged political, economic, and security crises impeded the government's modest anti-trafficking efforts; the government has not instituted formal procedures to identify and protect victims of trafficking or investigate or prosecute officials complicit in trafficking-related crimes; no known efforts have been made to investigate or punish the practice of chattel slavery; the government has taken some steps to prevent the recruitment of children in the armed forces, but it is unclear if efforts have been made to remove child soldiers from the military and provide them with protective or rehabilitative services; no progress has been made in implementing Yemen's 2008 national action plan on trafficking (2013)

EXHIBIT 44

Where Do Terrorists Come From? Not the Nations Named in Trump Ban

N newsweek.com/where-do-terrorists-come-not-seven-countries-named-550581

Alex Nowrasteh

1/31/2017

This article first appeared on the Cato Institute site.

The first sentence of President Donald Trump's executive order to temporarily ban all visas for people from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan and Somalia, among other actions, is to "protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States." However, the countries that Trump chose to temporarily ban are not serious terrorism risks.

I compiled a list of foreign-born people who committed or were convicted of attempting to commit a terrorist attack on U.S. soil from 1975 through 2015. Below is a table with the distribution of their countries of origin (Figure 1).

The first seven countries are those to be initially and, hopefully, temporarily denied visas. During the time period analyzed here, 17 foreign-born folks from those nations were convicted of carrying out or attempting to carry out a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and they killed zero people. Zero Libyans or Syrians intended to carry out an attack on U.S. soil during this time.

Figure 1

Foreign-Born Terrorist Country of Origin, 1975-2015

Foreign-Born Terrorist Country of Origin, 1975-2015

Country ▼	Terrorists	Murders	Terrorists (percent)	Murders (percent)
Afghanistan	3	0	1.90	0
Algeria	4	0	2.6	0
Armenia	6	1	3.90	0
Australia	1	0	0.60	0
Bangladesh	2	0	1.3	0
Bosnia	1	0	0.60	0
Croatia	9	1	5.80	0
Cuba	11	3	7.10	0.1
Dominican Republic	1	0	0.60	0
Egypt	11	162	7.10	5.4
Ethiopia	1	0	0.60	0
France	1	0	0.60	0

Ghana	1	0	0.60	0
Guyana	2	0	1.3	0
Haiti	3	0	1.90	0
India	2	0	1.3	0
Iran	6	0	3.90	0
Iraq	2	0	1.3	0
Japan	1	0	0.60	0
Jordan	4	0	2.6	0
Kazakhstan	1	0	0.60	0
Kosovo	2	0	1.3	0
Kuwait	2	6	1.3	0.2
Kyrgyzstan	2	3	1.3	0.1
Lebanon	4	159	2.6	5.2
Libya	0	0	0	0
Macedonia	3	0	1.90	0
Mexico	1	0	0.60	0
Morocco	3	0	1.90	0
Nigeria	1	0	0.60	0
Pakistan	14	3	9.1	0.1
Palestine	5	2	3.2	0.1
Saudi Arabia	19	2.37	12.3	78.30
Serbia	2	0	1.3	0
Somalia	2	0	1.3	0
South Korea	1	0	0.60	0
Sudan	6	0	3.90	0
Syria	0	0	0	0
Taiwan	1	1	0.60	0
Total	154	3.02	100	100

Trinidad and Tobago	2	1	1.3	0
Turkey	1	0	0.60	0
United Arab Emirates	2	314	1.3	10.4
United Kingdom	3	0	1.90	0
Uzbekistan	3	0	1.90	0
Vietnam	1	0	0.60	0
Yemen	1	0	0.60	0

[Get the data](#)

Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, "Spreadsheet of Muslim-American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015," University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; New America Foundation; Mother Jones; Senator Jeff Sessions; various news sources; court documents.

Attempting or committing a terrorist attack on U.S. soil is not the only terrorist offense. Materially supporting foreign terrorist organizations, seeking to join a foreign terrorist group overseas, plotting or carrying out terrorist attacks in other countries and others are also terrorism offenses.

I excluded foreign-born people convicted of those offenses because Trump is concerned with "making America safe again," not with making other countries safe or with a global war on terrorism. A terrorist attack in another country doesn't kill Americans inside of the United States and these threats are not what concern American voters nearly as much as terrorism on U.S. soil. You can call this an America First weighting of terrorism offenses.

Trump's executive order cites the "hundreds of foreign-born individuals [who] have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes" as another reason for a visa ban for these countries. He likely got the "hundreds of foreign-born individuals" from a news release and list put out by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) that purportedly shows all 580 "terrorism-related" convictions since 9/11 with at least 380 of them as immigrants.

It is disturbing that Sessions's flawed list of terrorism convictions is the basis for much of this executive order. There are at least two major problems with the list.

First, you might get the impression that all of those convictions were for terrorist attacks planned on U.S. soil, but only 40, or 6.8 percent, were.

Second, 241 of the 580 convictions, or 42 percent, were not even for terrorism offenses. Many of the investigations started based on terrorisms tips like, for instance, the suspect wanting to buy a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. However, the tip turned out to be groundless and the legal saga ended with only a mundane conviction of receiving stolen cereal. According to Sessions's list, that cereal thief is a terrorist.

In the little over 13 years covered in the Sessions list, there were about three convictions per year for planning or committing an attack on U.S. soil. For every one of them, there were six non-terrorism convictions counted as

terrorism and 4.5 convictions for supporting, joining or planning a terrorist attack overseas. In short, the list provided by Senator Jeff Sessions does not show a daunting terrorist threat to American lives in the homeland.

Trump's executive order goes on to argue that "deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter our country." Presumably, the goal is to reduce American deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil, so the deadliness of terrorist attacks matters more than the number of terrorists.

For instance, 114 of the 154 foreign-born terrorists from 1975 to the end of 2015 didn't kill anybody. The three countries where the deadliest terrorists came to the United States from were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Together they all accounted for 94.1 percent of all American deaths in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil committed by the foreign-born. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not beset by any of the supposedly terrorism-increasing problems that are described in this order.

Egyptians account for 5.4 percent of all terrorist victims but their attacks occurred between 1993 and 2002, when Egypt was a more stable country than it is today. The only exception to this might be Lebanon, which accounts for 5.2 percent of all terrorist victims but nearly all of those were committed by Ziad Jarrah on 9/11—a single data point. Meanwhile, foreign-born people from Syria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Iran and Yemen have not successfully killed anybody in a U.S. terrorist attack.

Trump's executive order goes on to say that the United States "cannot, and should not, admit into our country those who do not support the U.S. Constitution." Virtually nobody in the world, including most Americans, supports the U.S. Constitution and it seems peculiar to block tourists who want to visit Disneyland from entering because they "do not support the U.S. Constitution."

My guesses are that whoever wrote this executive order is either confused about the difference between immigrants and non-immigrants or it is just sloppily drafted. Temporary visitors should not have to swear allegiance or express support for the Constitution any more than an American should have to swear allegiance to or express my support for monarchy when visiting the United Kingdom.

In terms of support for the Constitution, all that matters is that immigrants who naturalize take an oath to do so—as they are currently required to under U.S. law.

The order also directs the government to find a way to identify immigrants "with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission." Blocking immigrants who intend to commit crimes or terrorist attacks is a wonderful idea—so wonderful that the government already does it.

However, the line that seeks to identify those who "are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission" is hopelessly vague. There is a risk greater than zero that virtually anybody is a risk subsequent to their admission, so this type of broad, ill-defined dictate could theoretically screen out everybody. More likely, it will just be used to capriciously target individuals for political or personal reasons.

A later line in the executive order provides some context for the "risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission" line. It orders DHS to regularly publish "information regarding the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States."

Presumably, DHS will use that information to build a detailed risk profile of immigrants to exclude those who could become radicalized. One worrying term is "terrorism-related organizations." I couldn't find any mentions or definition of a "terrorism-related organization" in U.S. law. There are no mentions of "terrorism-related convictions" either. If "terrorism-related organizations" is defined as broadly as "terrorism-related convictions" has been in Jeff Sessions's terrorist list, then many non-terrorist organizations will be included for flimsy reasons. This is like the no-fly list but with far graver consequences.

The order also says there should be a "process to evaluate the applicant's likelihood of becoming a positive contributing member of society, and the applicant's ability to make contributions to the national interest."

The immigration law already does the former by excluding criminals, national security threats and numerous other categories of excludable people, while the broad immigrant and non-immigrant work visas supposedly identify which foreigners are most valuable. At best this line in the executive order is redundant and at worst it signals the government's intent to be even more involved in planning the labor market by selecting winners and losers through the immigration system.

The seven countries temporarily banned under this executive order represent a small percentage of all green cards and entries into the United States (the latter estimated by I-94s per country). In 2015, the government issued 52,365 green cards to immigrants born in those seven countries, which amount to just 4.98 percent of all green cards issued that year and 29.4 percent of all green cards issued to nationals from Muslim countries (Table 2). In the same year, there were 86,236 non-immigrant entries from those countries, which accounted for 0.11 percent of all entries although they comprised 4.5 percent of all entries for Islamic countries (Table 2).

The economic cost of a temporary ban, or even a permanent one, is small because so few green cards and nonimmigrant visas are issued to folks from those seven countries. However, the danger of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by citizens of those countries has also been very low historically, with only 17 convictions from 1975 through 2015 and zero Americans killed in domestic attacks. Future terrorists could come from different countries than terrorists did in the past but, based on current evidence, this ban is still a net loss because it will likely stop few terrorists, prevent zero deaths and slightly reduce immigration and tourism. All minor economic pain, no gain.

Table 2

Number of Green Cards and Entries per Country, 2015

	Green Cards	Entries (I-94)
Iran	13,114	35,266
Iraq	21,107	21,381
Libya	734	2,879
Somalia	6,796	359
Sudan	3,580	4,792
Syria	3,840	16,010
Yemen	3,194	5,549
All Countries	1,051,031	76,638,236
Islamic Countries (OIC)		
	178,015	1,896,383

Source: Department of Homeland Security

Related Stories

If President Trump was committed to banning immigrants from certain countries in order to reduce the already small risk of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by the foreign-born, then he would not just ban nationals from these seven

countries. For this reason, I expect his administration to expand the list of countries banned in the near future.

Section 3, subsections c, d, e and f clarify that the president can extend these bans to other countries or make them permanent. This is a warning about additional bans on migrants and immigrants to come as well as the process by which those bans will be enacted.

Alex Nowrasteh is the immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity.

EXHIBIT 45



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RESEARCH AREAS

JANUARY 30, 2017

Key facts about refugees to the U.S.

BY JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD ([HTTP://WWW.PEWRESEARCH.ORG/AUTHOR/JKROGSTAD/](http://www.pewresearch.org/author/jkrogstad/)) AND JYNNAH RADFORD ([HTTP://WWW.PEWRESEARCH.ORG/AUTHOR/JRADFORD/](http://www.pewresearch.org/author/jradford/))



Syrian refugees take notes during their vocational ESL class at the International Rescue Committee center in San Diego on Aug. 31, 2016. (Frederic J. Brown/AFP/Getty Images)

An executive order (<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/refugee-muslim-executive-order-trump.html>) signed Jan. 27 by President Donald Trump suspends refugee admissions for 120 days while security procedures are reviewed, though the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities may continue during this time on a case-by-case basis. Under the plan, the maximum number of refugees allowed into the U.S. in fiscal 2017 will likely decline from 110,000 to 50,000. Separately, admission of Syrian refugees will be suspended pending a revision of security screening measures.

About 3 million refugees have been resettled in the U.S. since Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 (<https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/the-refugee-act>) , which created the Federal Refugee Resettlement Program and the current national standard for the screening and admission of refugees into the country.


This is not the first time U.S. refugee admissions have been stopped. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. largely suspended refugee resettlement for three months while security measures were examined. Today, the refugee admissions process (<https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/>) can take up to 18 to 24 months, and includes a review of applications by the State Department and other federal agencies, in-person interviews, health screenings and, for many, cultural orientations.

Here are key facts from our research about refugees entering the United States:

1 Historically, **the total number of refugees coming to the U.S. has fluctuated** (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/17/where-refugees-to-the-u-s-come-from/>) **along with global events and U.S. priorities.** From 1990 to 1995, an average of about 112,000 refugees arrived in the U.S. each year, with many coming from the former Soviet Union. However, refugee admissions dropped off to fewer than 27,000 in 2002 following the terrorist attacks in 2001. This number has since trended up.

The shifting origins of refugees to the U.S. over time

Number of refugees admitted to the U.S., by region of origin of principal applicant and fiscal year



Source: Refugee Processing Center, 1975-2016.

Note: Data do not include special immigrant visas and certain humanitarian parole entrants. Does not include refugees admitted under the Private Sector Initiative. Europe includes former Soviet Union states. Asia includes Middle Eastern and North African countries. Africa includes sub-Saharan Africa, but also Sudan and South Sudan. Latin America includes Caribbean. Data for fiscal 2017 are through Dec. 31, 2016; fiscal 2017 began Oct. 1, 2016.


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2 The U.S. admitted 84,995 refugees in the fiscal year ending in September 2016, the most in any year during the Obama administration. An additional 31,143 refugees have been admitted to the U.S. from Oct. 1 through Jan. 24, including more than 1,136 refugee admissions since Trump became president on Jan. 20. Though refugee admissions would drastically drop under Trump's proposal, the U.S. had been on pace to reach the Obama administration's goal of admitting 110,000 refugees (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/20/u-s-on-track-to-reach-obama-administrations-goal-of-resettling-110000-refugees-this-year/>) in fiscal 2017, which would have been the highest number since 1994.

3 In fiscal 2016, the highest number of refugees from any nation came from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Congo accounted for 16,370 refugees followed by Syria (12,587), Burma (aka Myanmar, with 12,347), Iraq (9,880) and Somalia (9,020). Over the past decade, the largest numbers of refugees have come from Burma (159,692) and Iraq (135,643).

U.S. admits its highest number of Muslim refugees on record in fiscal 2016

Number of refugees entering the U.S. by religious affiliation



Note: "Other religions" include Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and other religions. Data do not include special immigrant visas and certain humanitarian parole entrants. Fiscal years are Oct. 1 through Sept. 30 each year.


Source: U.S. State Department's Refugee Processing Center accessed Oct. 3, 2016.

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4 Nearly 39,000 Muslim refugees (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/u-s-admits-record-number-of-muslim-refugees-in-2016/>) **entered the U.S. in fiscal 2016, the highest number on record**, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of data from the State Department's Refugee Processing Center (http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/Interactive-Reporting/EnumType/Report?ItemPath=/rpt_WebArrivalsReports/MX%20-%20Arrivals%20by%20Nationality%20and%20Religion). Muslims made up nearly half (46%) of refugee admissions, a higher share than for Christians, who accounted for 44% of refugees admitted. Muslims exceeded Christians on this measure for the first time since 2006, when a large number of Somali refugees entered the U.S. From fiscal years 2002 to 2016, the U.S. admitted 399,677 Christian refugees and 279,339 Muslim refugees, meaning that 46% of all refugees who have entered the U.S. during this time have been Christian while 32% have been Muslim.

California, Texas and New York were the top states by number of refugees resettled in fiscal 2016

Number of refugees resettled in in fiscal year 2016



Note: Fiscal year began Oct. 1, 2015, and ended Sept. 30, 2016.
 Top 10 states by resettlement shown.
 Source: U.S. State Department's Refugee Processing Center
 accessed Nov 22, 2016.

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(http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/06/just-10-states-resettled-more-than-half-of-recent-refugees-to-u-s/ft_16-12-02_usrefugees_total/) **California, Texas and New York** (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/06/just-10-states-resettled-more-than-half-of-recent-refugees-to-u-s/>) **resettled nearly a quarter of all refugees in fiscal 2016**, together taking 20,738 refugees. Other states that received at least 3,000 refugees included Michigan, Ohio, Arizona, North Carolina, Washington, Pennsylvania and Illinois. By contrast, Arkansas, the District of Columbia and Wyoming each resettled fewer than 10 refugees. Delaware and Hawaii took in no refugees.


5 **6** **The U.S. public has seldom approved of accepting large numbers of refugees.** In October 2016, 54% of registered voters said the U.S. (<http://www.people-press.org/2016/10/27/7-opinions-on-u-s-international-involvement-free-trade-isis-and-syria-russia-and-china/>) does not have a responsibility to accept refugees from Syria, while 41% said it does. There was a wide partisan gap on this measure, with 87% of Trump supporters saying the U.S. doesn't have a responsibility to accept Syrians, compared with only 27% of Clinton supporters who said the same. U.S. public opinion polls (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/u-s-public-seldom-has-welcomed-refugees-into-country/>) from previous decades show Americans have largely opposed admitting large numbers of refugees from countries where people are fleeing war and oppression.

Over the Decades, American Public Generally Hasn't Welcomed Refugees

% who say ...


Hungarians, 1958

Would you approve or disapprove of a plan to permit **65,000** refugees who escaped the Communist regime in Hungary to come to the U.S.?




Indochinese, 1979

Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. gov't's plan to double the number of refugees from Indochina admitted, to **14,000 a month**?




Cubans, 1980

Many refugees from Cuba have come to the U.S. recently. Do you approve or disapprove of allowing most of these Cuban refugees to settle in the U.S.?



Ethnic Albanians, 1999

Several hundred ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo have been brought to the U.S. Do you support or oppose the decision to bring them here?



Source: Gallup (Hungarians, July-August 1958; Albanians, May 1999)
CBS/New York Times (Indochinese, July 1979; Cubans, June 1980)

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Note: This is an update of a post originally published on Jan. 27, 2017.



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POSTS | EMAIL

EXHIBIT 46

The New York Times | <https://nyti.ms/2mxaFWi>

The Opinion Pages | OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS

Don't Be Fooled, Trump's New Muslim Ban Is Still Illegal

By FARHANA KHERA and JOHNATHAN SMITH MARCH 6, 2017

President Trump's executive order barring immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries experienced nearly universal defeat in the federal courts. On Monday, he issued a revised version of that order, but it still suffers from a fundamental, and fatal, flaw: It constitutes unlawful religious discrimination.

On the surface, this revised order looks different from the first version. It explicitly exempts Iraq from the travel ban, thus reducing the number of affected countries to six, as well as lawful permanent residents (that is, green card holders) and people who have visas. It no longer categorically bars Syrian refugees or includes a religious test to determine which refugees may enter the country. And in a marked departure from the earlier order, it goes into effect in 10 days, so that the chaos that unfolded in airports around the world when the January order became effective presumably won't happen again.

These changes are, no doubt, intended to address the due process concerns that led the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to affirm a lower-court ruling that put a hold on part of the original order. But while these changes are important, they do not fix the core problem with the executive order: The administration is waging an all-out assault on Islam and Muslims.

That's because anti-Muslim bias and bigotry that characterized the original travel ban remain in this revised version. The order is still limited to only Muslim-majority countries: namely, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

Residents of those countries — and only those countries — will be severely restricted in their ability to travel into the United States for 90 days. Left off are the predominately Christian countries that the State Department lists as “Terrorist Safe Havens” like Colombia, the Philippines and Venezuela.

The revised order also continues to traffic in bigoted and largely false perceptions: By requiring the government to compile occurrences of “honor killings” by immigrants, it gives official recognition to an inflammatory and misleading trope of Islam that is perpetuated by anti-Muslim hate groups.

President Trump has not been subtle in his intentions. We need look no further than his own words to figure them out. On the campaign trail, he constantly conflated the vast majority of peaceful Muslims with the small handful of violent Muslims.

After the Paris attacks in November 2015, Mr. Trump said that “we’re going to have no choice” but to close some mosques in the United States, where “some really bad things are happening.” The next month, after the attack in San Bernardino, Calif., he called for a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” and released a factually dubious statement that “large segments of the Muslim population” have “great hatred towards Americans” and favor Shariah law. Astonishingly, that statement is still posted on Mr. Trump’s website.

In December, when a reporter asked whether he had reconsidered his stance on Islam, President-elect Trump replied: “You know my plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right.” This dark and wholly unsubstantiated worldview about Islam and the American Muslim community is shared by several of the president’s senior aides and advisers.

Let’s be clear: This revised order is a Muslim ban. All the countries he has excluded are more than 90 percent Muslim. Three of them — Iran, Somalia and Yemen — are more than 99 percent Muslim. Even though Mr. Trump tailored his order to survive legal challenges, as his former adviser Rudolph Giuliani conceded on national television, his objective is clearly to exclude Muslims.

The Trump administration argues that the ban protects the country. Yet by excluding Iraq from the order, Mr. Trump has cleared travel from one of the two countries from which Islamic State terrorists operates. Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security concluded last month that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.” Former national security officials from Democratic and Republican administrations have made clear that the January order does not make our country safer. Instead, the bigotry that Mr. Trump spews at news conferences and on Twitter have been a boon for terrorists’ recruitment efforts.

The twisted worldview does not match reality. Muslims have been part of America for centuries, since the first slave ships arrived in the 17th century. Today, Muslims represent 1 percent of the United States population: They are our teachers, doctors, neighbors and co-workers.

American Muslims will suffer a particular harm from this executive order: Those who have ties to the banned countries won’t be able to see their family members and close friends. American Muslims will also be deprived of the instruction from the leading Islamic scholars who are from those countries.

Thousands of Muslim men and women serve in the armed forces; many have given their lives defending our nation and our ideals. They contribute to the diversity that has always been our nation’s pride and strength. President George W. Bush paid tribute to this in the weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks when he said, “There are thousands of Muslims who proudly call themselves Americans, and they know what I know — that the Muslim faith is based upon peace and love and compassion.”

President Trump and his top advisers would be wise to listen to President Bush. The Muslim ban and President Trump’s relentless attacks on Islam are not just an assault on thousands of patriotic, innocent Americans — they violate our Constitution and our most fundamental American values and beliefs.

Farhana Khera (@farhanakhera) is the president and executive director of Muslim Advocates, a civil rights legal organization, where Johnathan Smith (@Smith_JohnJ) is the legal director.

EXHIBIT 47

By Aziz Huq

Friday, March 10, 2017 at 9:14 AM



The White House’s March 6 executive order “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States” (the March EO or the new EO) is a telling blend of change from and continuity with its January 27 precursor. Its changes signal the (current) strength of traditional institutional resistance from courts and bureaucrats to an insurgent, populist presidency. Its continuities are intriguing hints as to how that insurgent presidency might (in the future) seek to tame those institutional bulwarks that currently impede its agenda. How those efforts unfurl will shape the nature of the separation of powers in coming years.

On its face, this week’s order seems a substantial recession from the January 27 order *as a direct result* of the constitutional concerns aired by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Eastern District of Virginia. Section 1(i) states that the new order “expressly excludes from the suspensions categories of aliens that have prompted judicial concerns.” And section 1(iv) repudiates “animus toward any religion” as the basis for January EO, a nod to concerns about religious discrimination raised by both courts.

Notwithstanding Stephen Miller’s widely discussed comments on judicial review, the new EO opens with an explicit recognition of the federal courts’ authority. Courts—and constitutional law—are expressly identified as a constraint on a president who has mocked the courts.

The constraining role of *law* in earlier regimes has been observed by many commentators, such as Rick Pildes and myself, in scholarly work published before the 2016 election. Indeed, a range of recent academic work has illuminated the ways in which lawyers within the executive have shaped policy.

But this effect of *law* (as applied by executive branch insiders) is quite distinct from the notion that *courts* can stand in the way of a high-profile White House policy initiative in the national security domain. Indeed, for scholars of American judicial review or the separation of powers, the story so far should be rather striking: Against a backdrop of pervasive scholarly anxiety over the efficacy of judicial intervention against presidential over-reaching, here is a case in which courts were not just willing to act, but in which judicial intervention seems to have had direct and fairly unmediated effect.

The efficacy of judicial review is all the more striking when set against the courts' recent record in remedying harms flowing from national security policy. As James Pfander has explained in a terrific new book, this score-card is replete with government wins, with few consolations for injured plaintiffs. And what victories do obtain quickly prove hollow comfort. As I explore in a forthcoming article, the Court's landmark decision in Boumediene v. Bush in fact had scant effect on executive-branch practice.

The effect of judicial review is evident in what the new EO both does and doesn't change. The Ninth Circuit underscored centrally Due Process concerns, and the new EO in sections 3(a) and (b) excludes categories of noncitizens most likely to raise such constitutional worries: green-card holders and existing visa-holders. (Dual nationals with a nationality not among the new list of proscribed countries are also excluded from the new EO's reach, although they might not raise the same Due Process concerns).

Under section 12(b), those who had valid visas revoked under the January EO are entitled to a "travel document confirming that the individual is permitted to travel to the United States and seek entry." Asylum seekers are also no longer barred from pressing their claim to refuge from persecution under the same section.

But not all the new order's responses to Due Process concerns are an unmitigated good for migrants. Certain noncitizens, notwithstanding their lack of a current visa, with "significant contacts" with the U.S., or in need of "urgent medical care" can seek a case-by-case waiver at the discretion of Customs and Border Patrol (CPB) officials under Section 3(c) of the new order. But they must show "undue hardship" to qualify, a term that might be read in parallel to the very onerous "extreme hardship" standard for waivers of deportation. Further, the noncitizen's entry must "not pose a threat to national security" and "be in the national interest." Given that section 1(h) of the order cites the case of a Somali admitted as a child refugee who turned to violence only after becoming an adult, CBP officials might plausibly gloss the order to bar waivers unless a noncitizen can demonstrate that they won't be threat today, tomorrow—and also twenty years from now. Finally, the waiver power in Section 3(c) might be used strategically to moot litigation by granting relief to named plaintiffs, hence deflecting further judicial review of the order.

The Eastern District of Virginia, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, emphasized concerns about the motivating force of animus against Muslims. The new EO recognizes this concern, but its response is far more ambiguous in effect. A central question in the litigation that will be ongoing on behalf of Washington, Hawaii, and other plaintiffs is whether the concern about animus has in fact dissipated.

To be sure, the new order's preamble expressly disavows animus, and its body omits a priority rule for religious minorities in refugee admissions. This was earlier perceived as an implicit thumb on the scales in favor of Christian over Muslim refugees given President Trump's statements on the topic.

The scaling back of language that links Islam to violence and terrorism is, however, partial. The January EO contained preamble language citing "violent ideologies [placed] over American law." It subtly linked that ambiguous phrase to Islam by citing "honor killings," which are often (if incorrectly) assumed to be motivated by Islamic beliefs. Contrary to the administration's claims, that order was thus *not* neutral on its face, but rather betrayed the same orientation toward Islam that the President and his team had vocalized repeatedly in both the campaign and in office.

In this regard, it is striking that section 11(iii) of the new EO again invokes "honor killing" again as an axiomatic form of "gender-based violence" as a distinctively important threat. But is that so? One in three women suffers physical violence at an intimate's hands during their lifetime (quite apart from physical assaults by "grabbing" strangers). In this context, it is odd (and unexplained) why so rare a form of iniquitous violence would be singled out given the pervasiveness of immoral and illegal violence against women.

Perhaps then, the most interesting element of the litigation likely to continue will turn on claims of religious animus. In the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has been willing to think closely about how intervening state action can dissipate an unconstitutional motive. (Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, and Micah Schwartzmann have written about that case law here). But the First Amendment is not the only context in which state actor rescind and repromulgate slightly amended rules to escape motive-based constitutional invalidation. In a series of cases from the early twentieth

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century, the Supreme Court invalidated a sequence of Texas efforts to block African-Americans from voting. The so-called White Primary Cases demonstrate that even relatively conservative courts can police the attempted circumvention of constitutional norms via the tactic of withdrawing and reissuing rules on a purported clean slate.

By contrast to the constitutional claims raised by the Ninth Circuit and the Eastern District of Virginia, the statutory basis for the order has received little refinement. (Of course, the fact that an executive action is authorized by statute doesn't mean that it is necessarily compliant with rights-related or other restrictions in the Constitution.). The order rests on two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act that grant the president authority to regulate "entry," which is distinct from the statutory power to regulate visas. The latter, however, is cabined with a rule against national-origin discrimination. This gap, eloquently discussed by Ian Samuels, remains in the absence of close judicial attention to the scope of statutory authority. The brief filed on Thursday by the state of Hawaii, however, places these statutory arguments front and center—making them more likely to receive review in the coming litigation.

If the order is a testament of sorts to the institutional strength of the federal judiciary, it also provides hints of how both the judiciary and the bureaucracy can be circumvented by an administration determined to pursue populist ends in two different ways.

First, the express recognition of judicial constraint may be a way for the White House to lay the groundwork for blaming federal courts for any new terrorist violence. This is probably true, but also probably not especially important. I find it hard to believe that this White House would not take an extremely bellicose approach to judges, hostile legislators, and critics in the general public in the event of another terrorist attack regardless of what happens with the travel ban. The presence or absence of language in the new order will ultimately not matter much given this White House's temperamental quality and its scant regard for nuance or factual detail.

Second, the new EO invokes the authority of the White House to justify the selection of six countries for special scrutiny and restraint. But there remains a puzzling gap between the facts as asserted by the President, and the facts as supported by the known bureaucratic record. This gap is a way for the White House to test its ability to exploit longstanding norms of judicial deference to executive-branch expertise when state power is used not on the basis of epistemic competence but instead deployed from a logic of populist outrage

The gap arises between the proffered justification for selecting six countries (all of the originally proscribed nations minus Iraq) and the known strength of that justification. The new EO quite literally (and expressly) cribbs text from the Department of State's 2015 Country Reports on terrorism to explain why those countries' "nationals continue to present heightened risks to the security of the United States." The borrowed language is boilerplate. It largely concerns country-wide security conditions. It does not focus on the question whether the entry or immigration of citizens of those countries has, historically, posed an incrementally greater risk of terrorism than the entry of other countries' citizens.

But, as many others have noted, recent reporting has suggested that the Department of Homeland Security has analyzed terrorism-related risks of different nationalities and found no reason to single out the six countries in the revised order. State Department databases apparently tell a similar story. Hence, the government's own security agencies fail to find a security justification for the ban, and so the ban on its face falls back on anodyne boilerplate claims about the general security situation in relevant nations.

Given this gap between institutional expertise and asserted fact, it seems fair to ask whether the security justifications given on the face of the report are pretextual. And it also seems worth asking whether the animus so sharply and clearly evinced by many members of the administration, and so starkly evident to those who saw the January EO's rollout, has been dissipated by the deployment of some legalistic language and a dash (however tepid) of the interagency.

But courts typically give the executive a measure of what Bobby Chesney (in an excellent and incisive academic work) has called "national security fact deference." If the White House can secure that deference even when there is no colorable basis for such deference—indeed, even when the Administration's own experts reject the factual premises of a policy—this will make a substantial victory for the populist insurgency. For it create a degree of freedom for the White

Case 1:17-cv-00537-TSC Document 34-21 Filed 04/11/17 Page 5 of 5
House from the internal constraints of more cautious, fact-bound bureaucratic hands. It will, ironically, be a defeat of the administrative state at the hands of judicial doctrines cultivated assiduously by the ecosystem of federal agencies since the 1932 case of Crowell v. Benson. The bureaucracy would become its own gravedigger.

The new EO, in short, affirms that the White House may be willing to exercise its wide discretion in a way that asserts expertise and knowledge while circumventing the actual centers of expertise within the federal government. So much has been clear from the treatment of expert agencies such as the EPA so far. It also shows that the Administration may just be canny enough to leverage the deference doctrines developed in the national security and immigration contexts in particular so as to undermine the authority and power of internal expertise. This sort of strategic capture of the high ground of administrative expertise to pursue populist ends at the expense of well-warranted fact, would be a form of legitimation that would powerfully serve this White House in coming years.

Image: Eduardo Munoz Alvarez/Getty.

Tags: Anti-Muslim discrimination, Congress, First Amendment, Guest Post, immigration, Muslim ban, Religion, Trump Administration

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EXHIBIT 48

President Trump Signs New Travel Ban Executive Order

 lawnewz.com/high-profile/breaking-president-trump-signs-new-executive-order-on-immigration-ends-indefinite-ban-on-syrian-refugees/

By Ronn Blitzer

After losing numerous court decisions over his travel ban, President **Donald Trump** vowed to keep the legal battle going. However, in addition to this, the administration had indicated that Trump would also sign a new order to supplement the old one so that it would have a better chance of passing legal muster. Finally, after weeks of rumored drafts and delays, Trump signed a new order on Monday.

The original order put a temporary stop to all refugees coming into the country, with an indefinite block on refugees from Syria. It also halted all incoming travel from seven countries with Muslim majorities. The new order clarifies that the ban only applies to people who do not currently have valid visas and did not have visas when the original order was signed on January 27. It specifies that it does not apply to legal permanent residents of the United States, or people who were admitted after the order was signed, or those who were already granted refugee or asylum status before the order.

Furthermore, Iraq is no longer on the list of countries specified in a general travel ban. The Pentagon and State Department had [pushed to remove](#) Iraq from that list, since the country has been a valuable ally in the fight against ISIS.

The new order also does not call for an indefinite hold on Syrian refugees, who will face the same treatment as refugees from other countries. When the temporary ban on refugees is lifted, the number of those ultimately admitted into the U.S. will have a maximum of 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal year.

While the order is in effect, the administration will work to put in place new standards for screening individuals entering the U.S.

The new order is meant to work alongside the original one instead of repeal it, as repealing the initial order would end the legal battles surrounding it. The administration still believes they can win those fights instead of having decisions against them remain on the books. RNC member and Trump campaign surrogate **Randy Evans** said in February that the administration is expected to try to [drag out the legal fight](#) until a new Supreme Court justice, preferably **Neil Gorsuch**, is confirmed.

Trump had insisted that his original order was indeed legal, but even if he ultimately could have won the battle in federal court, he would have had to wait for the case to be resolved for it to take effect again. By ditching that order and drafting a new one that is geared to be more favorable in the eyes of the judiciary, it allows the President to immediately move forward with his security measures.

EXHIBIT 49

National Security

DHS report casts doubt on need for Trump travel ban

By **Matt Zapotosky** February 24

A Department of Homeland Security report assessing the terrorist threat posed by people from the seven countries covered by President Trump's travel ban casts doubt on the necessity of the executive order, concluding that citizenship is an "unreliable" threat indicator and that people from the seven countries have rarely been implicated in U.S.-based terrorism.

The document — first reported by the Associated Press and later confirmed to the Washington Post — relies on public materials, and a Department of Homeland Security spokeswoman said it was "clear on its face that it is an incomplete product." Still, it could prove another hurdle in the administration's effort to restore the travel ban, undermining the White House's argument that the measure is necessary for national security reasons.

The report was prepared at the request of the acting secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and does not represent the official position of the Department of Homeland Security.

Gillian M. Christensen, a Homeland Security spokeswoman, said in a statement that it had "not been subject to the extensive interagency review process required of finished intelligence products" and did not "include data from other intelligence community sources." She confirmed there was debate over the matter, as CNN reported, but disputed that debate was because of political concerns.

"Allegations by opponents of the president's policies that senior DHS intelligence officials would politicize intelligence is unfortunate and untrue," she said. "The dispute with this product was over sources and quality, not politics."

The report is three pages long and does not address head-on whether the temporary ban on people entering the United States from Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and Libya is an effective measure. But it asserts that citizens from those countries are "rarely implicated in U.S.-based terrorism," and citizenship itself is an "unreliable indicator of terrorist threat to the United States."

Based on an analysis of Justice Department press releases, it says of 82 people "who died in the pursuit of or were convicted of any terrorism-related federal offense," more than half were U.S.-born citizens.

The report referenced eight people from Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Sudan and Yemen who it said were convicted of or died in pursuit of terrorism. It said none had done so from Syria and did not specifically mention Libya. It also excluded those merely traveling or attempting to travel to join a foreign terrorist organization.

The report also concludes that while terror groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen pose a threat of attacks in the United States, the other four countries are “regionally focused.” That conclusion is based on another, non-classified report.

Trump has said he plans to re-write his executive order — which courts have ordered frozen — and a White House official has said the new version is expected next week. Those suing over the matter said the original order represents an unconstitutional targeting of Muslims, disguised as a national security measure. In one court case, 10 former high-ranking diplomatic and national security officials attached their names to an affidavit declaring there was “no national security purpose” for a complete barring of people from the seven affected countries, which are all Muslim-majority.

The new report could prove a boon to those challenging Trump’s ban, as they seek to demonstrate it was motivated not by national security concerns, but by religious animosity. They also will likely be able to use as evidence comments by Trump himself and ally Rudy Giuliani suggesting the administration wanted to ban Muslims from entering the United States.

Though not addressing that directly, Christensen offered a defense of the ban’s national security purpose.

“The seven countries were identified by the previous administration as being countries of concern for foreign terrorist travel to the United States. Consequently, these countries were the focus of this administration’s initial efforts to enhance vetting for foreign travel to the United States,” she said. “It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”

Matt Zapposky covers the Justice Department for the Washington Post's National Security team.

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EXHIBIT 50

National politics

http://www.stltoday.com/news/national/govt-and-politics/trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judge-over-ruling-on-travel/article_40fcf6cf-8dd3-5ff1-a561-d0897195aec0.html

Trump lashes out at federal judge over ruling on travel ban

By DARLENE SUPERVILLE Associated Press Feb 4, 2017

PALM BEACH, Fla. • President Donald Trump lashed out Saturday at "this so-called judge" who put a nationwide hold on his executive order denying entry to the U.S. to refugees and people from seven predominantly Muslim countries. The ruling set in motion another weekend of confusion and chaos around the country.

The White House pledged to swiftly appeal the federal judge's ruling late Friday, but that didn't appear to be enough for Trump, who vented his frustrations on Twitter.

"The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!" Trump said.

Trump has said the travel ban, which he enacted by executive order on Jan. 27, will keep Americans safe by keeping potential terrorists from entering the country.

He also said Saturday on Twitter that "when a country is no longer able to say who can and who cannot come in & out, especially for reasons of safety & security — big trouble!"

U.S. District Judge James Robart in Seattle ruled late Friday against government lawyers' claims that Washington state and Minnesota, which sued over the ban, lacked the legal grounds to challenge Trump's order. Robart said the states showed that their case was likely to succeed.

White House press secretary Sean Spicer said late Friday that the Justice Department would appeal the "outrageous" order "at the earliest possible time. Spicer quickly issued an amended statement that deleted "outrageous."

"The president's order is intended to protect the homeland and he has the constitutional authority and responsibility to protect the American people," Spicer said, calling the order both lawful and appropriate.

Trump billed the action as necessary to stop "radical Islamic terrorists" from coming to the U.S.

The order included a 90-day ban on travel to the U.S. by citizens of Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia or Yemen, a 120-day suspension of the U.S. refugee program, and an indefinite bar against admitting Syrian refugees.

The decision sparked protests nationwide and confusion at airports as some travelers were detained. More protests were planned for this weekend, including at Trump's estate in Palm Beach, Florida, where he is spending the weekend.

Last week, U.S. District Judge Ann Donnelly in New York issued an emergency order after lawyers for the American Civil Liberties Union filed a court petition on behalf of people from the seven countries who were detained at airports nationwide as the ban took effect.

Donnelly's order addressed only a portion of Trump's order, and barred U.S. border agents from removing anyone who arrived in the U.S. with a valid visa from the seven countries. Robart's decision was more sweeping in scope.

Saturday was not the first instance of Trump criticizing a federal judge, a member of an independent branch of the government.

During the presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly criticized the federal judge who was presiding over a lawsuit brought by former students of Trump University. Trump claimed that U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who was born in Indiana, had an "absolute conflict" in handling the case because he is "of Mexican heritage." Trump launched his presidential campaign with a harsh description of Mexican immigrants as rapists and drug dealers.

Trump recently agreed to pay \$25 million to settle the lawsuits against Trump University.

Follow Darlene Superville on Twitter: <http://www.twitter.com/dsupervilleap>

EXHIBIT 51

SPECIAL REPORT: BRITISH POLICE RESPOND TO 'FIREARMS INCIDENT' OUTSIDE U.K.
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NEWSMAR 6 2017, 7:37 AM ET

Donald Trump Expected to Sign New Immigration Order: A Timeline

by PHIL MCCAUSLAND and HALLIE JACKSON

SHARE



Two senior White House officials told NBC News that President Donald Trump plans to sign a revised version of his executive order that restricted travel from seven Muslim-majority nations on Monday.

Since a federal judge in Seattle issued a temporary restraining order on it in early February, different White House officials and the president have stated numerous times that the new executive order would be signed soon. But more than a month after it was barred, the revised version has not been realized.

The delay would seem to undercut the White House's original argument for its swift execution, which created confusing travel situations and immigration statuses for hundreds of people the weekend it was implemented. When its necessity and legality was challenged, the president and senior administration officials emphasized the need for travel restrictions because they believed the nation would be at risk without them.

These are the developments since the executive order was first signed.

Jan. 27: The executive order restricting travel from seven Muslim-majority nations is signed by President Trump.

Jan. 30: On "Fox and Friends," senior policy adviser Stephen Miller said the executive order was an urgent priority because "if we waited five days, 10 days, six months to begin establishing the first series of controls," then the administration would be leaving "the homeland unnecessarily vulnerable."

Feb. 3: A federal judge in Seattle issued a nationwide temporary restraining order, effectively blocking the executive order.

Feb. 4: President Trump tweeted that the judge's action means "many very bad and dangerous people may be pouring into our country."

Related: Trump Travel Ban Makes America Less Safe: Ex-Top Security, State Officials

Feb 10: At a press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, President Trump hinted at new executive order "sometime next week," stating that "we'll be doing something very rapidly having to do with additional security for our country. You'll be seeing that sometime next week."

Feb. 16: President Trump, at a news conference in the East Room, told reporters: "We're issuing a new executive action next week that will comprehensively protect our country."

Feb. 20: A senior White House official told NBC News that a new order is expected later in the week.

Feb. 23: Press Secretary Sean Spicer says: "It's not a question of delaying, it's a question of getting it right. We've taken the Court's opinions and concerns into consideration, but the order is finalized. It's now awaiting implementation."

Feb. 28: Prior to the joint address to Congress, a senior administration official told NBC News President Trump is expected to sign the executive order on March 1 at the Department of Justice.

Feb. 28: After the joint address to Congress, a senior official said the signing would be delayed in order let the president's joint address breathe.

March 1: Press Secretary Sean Spicer told reporters that when the president is ready to make a decision on the timing of the revised immigration executive order, they'll let reporters know "and we're not there yet."

March 4: Two senior administration officials said the president plans to sign the revised executive order on Monday.

PHIL MCCAUSLAND  



HALLIE JACKSON 

TOPICS U.S. NEWS, DONALD TRUMP, WHITE HOUSE

FIRST PUBLISHED MAR 5 2017, 6:54 PM ET



by Taboola


EXHIBIT 52



Trump delays new travel ban after well-reviewed speech

By [Laura Jarrett](#), [Ariane de Vogue](#) and [Jeremy Diamond](#), CNN

🕒 Updated 6:01 AM ET, Wed March 1, 2017



Immigration violations: The one thing to know 01:15

Story highlights

The new travel ban will exclude legal permanent residents and existing visa holders

Two sources also expect that the President will formally revoke the previous executive order

said.

Washington (CNN) — President Donald Trump has delayed plans to sign a reworked travel ban in the wake of positive reaction to his first address to Congress, a senior administration official told CNN.

The decision came late Tuesday night as [positive reviews flooded in for Trump's speech](#), which struck a largely optimistic and unifying tone.

Signing the executive order Wednesday, as originally indicated by the White House, would have undercut the favorable coverage. The official didn't deny the positive reception was part of the administration's calculus in pushing back the travel ban announcement.

"We want the (executive order) to have its own 'moment,'" the official

The sudden change of plans came as Trump and his top advisers returned to the White House after his address to a joint session of Congress on Tuesday night.

Trump's original executive order, signed a week after he took office, banned citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US and temporarily suspended the entry of all refugees. A federal court issued a temporary stay that halted implementation of the travel ban earlier this month, a decision that was later upheld by a federal appeals court.

The new travel ban will exclude legal permanent residents and existing visa holders from the ban entirely, sources familiar with the plans told CNN earlier Tuesday.

While sources caution that the document has not yet been finalized and is still subject to change, there will be major changes:

- The new executive order will make clear that legal permanent residents (otherwise known as green card holders) are excluded from any travel ban.
- Those with validly issued visas will also be exempt from the ban.
- The new order is expected to revise or exclude language prioritizing the refugee claims of certain religious minorities.

Speaking in Munich, Germany, earlier this month, Department of Homeland Secretary John Kelly promised a "phased-in" approach to minimize disruption this time around.

But what remains to be seen are the other key aspects of the new executive order, especially in terms of refugees, including:

- What happens to the suspension of the refugee program for 120 days?
- Will Syrian nationals still be barred indefinitely?
- Will the cap on the number of refugees change? The first version of the executive order caps it at 50,000 for fiscal year 2017.

Two sources also expect that the President will formally revoke the earlier executive order, despite repeated statements from White House press secretary Sean Spicer that the two orders would co-exist on a "dual track."

The administration could potentially argue that the existing challenges to the original executive order are moot, but the challengers tell CNN the legal battles will likely continue even after the new order is signed.

"Exempting lawful permanent residents and current visa holders will not cure the core legal problem -- that the ban was motivated by religious discrimination, as evidenced by the President's repeated statements calling for a Muslim ban," ACLU attorney Lee Gelernt explained. "That discriminatory taint cannot be removed simply by eliminating a few words or clever tinkering by lawyers."

EXHIBIT 53

the WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP



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The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 06, 2017

Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States

EXECUTIVE ORDER

PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and section 301

of title 3, United States Code, and to protect the Nation from terrorist activities by foreign nationals admitted to the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, including those committed by foreign nationals. The screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) play a crucial role in detecting foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism and in preventing those individuals from entering the United States. It is therefore the policy of the United States to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and the USRAP.

(b) On January 27, 2017, to implement this policy, I issued Executive Order 13769 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States).

(i) Among other actions, Executive Order 13769 suspended for 90 days the entry of certain aliens from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. These are countries that had already been identified as presenting heightened concerns about terrorism and travel to the United States. Specifically, the suspension applied to countries referred to in, or designated under, section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), in which Congress restricted use of the Visa Waiver Program for nationals of, and aliens recently present in, (A) Iraq or Syria, (B) any country designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of terrorism (currently Iran, Syria, and Sudan), and (C) any other country designated as a country of concern by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence. In 2016, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Libya, Somalia, and Yemen as additional countries of concern for travel purposes, based on consideration of three statutory factors related to terrorism and national security: "(I) whether the presence of an alien in the country or area increases the likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to the national security of the United States; (II) whether a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence in the country or area; and (III) whether the country or area is a safe haven for terrorists." 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12)(D)(ii). Additionally, Members of Congress have expressed concerns about screening and vetting procedures following recent terrorist attacks in this country and in Europe.

(ii) In ordering the temporary suspension of entry described in subsection (b)(i) of this section, I exercised my authority under Article II of the Constitution and under section 212(f) of the INA, which provides in relevant part: "Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate." 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). Under these authorities, I determined that, for a brief period of 90 days, while existing screening and vetting procedures were under review, the entry into the United States of certain aliens from the seven identified countries -- each afflicted by terrorism in a manner that compromised the ability of the United States to rely on normal decision-making procedures about travel to the United States -- would be detrimental to the

interests of the United States. Nonetheless, I permitted the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to grant case-by-case waivers when they determined that it was in the national interest to do so.

(iii) Executive Order 13769 also suspended the USRAP for 120 days. Terrorist groups have sought to infiltrate several nations through refugee programs. Accordingly, I temporarily suspended the USRAP pending a review of our procedures for screening and vetting refugees. Nonetheless, I permitted the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly grant case-by-case waivers when they determined that it was in the national interest to do so.

(iv) Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion. While that order allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities -- whoever they are and wherever they reside -- to avail themselves of the USRAP in light of their particular challenges and circumstances.

(c) The implementation of Executive Order 13769 has been delayed by litigation. Most significantly, enforcement of critical provisions of that order has been temporarily halted by court orders that apply nationwide and extend even to foreign nationals with no prior or substantial connection to the United States. On February 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to stay or narrow one such order pending the outcome of further judicial proceedings, while noting that the "political branches are far better equipped to make appropriate distinctions" about who should be covered by a suspension of entry or of refugee admissions.

(d) Nationals from the countries previously identified under section 217(a)(12) of the INA warrant additional scrutiny in connection with our immigration policies because the conditions in these countries present heightened threats. Each of these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones. Any of these circumstances diminishes the foreign government's willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States. Moreover, the significant presence in each of these countries of terrorist organizations, their members, and others exposed to those organizations increases the chance that conditions will be exploited to enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to travel to the United States. Finally, once foreign nationals from these countries are admitted to the United States, it is often difficult to remove them, because many of these countries typically delay issuing, or refuse to issue, travel documents.

(e) The following are brief descriptions, taken in part from the Department of State's Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (June 2016), of some of the conditions in six of the previously designated countries that demonstrate why their nationals continue to present heightened risks to the security of the United States:

(i) Iran. Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and continues to support various terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and terrorist groups in Iraq. Iran has also been linked to support for al-Qa'ida and has permitted al-Qa'ida to transport funds and fighters through Iran to Syria and South Asia. Iran does not cooperate with the United States in counterterrorism efforts.

(ii) Libya. Libya is an active combat zone, with hostilities between the internationally recognized government and its rivals. In many parts of the country, security and law enforcement functions are provided by armed militias rather than state institutions. Violent extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have exploited these conditions to expand their presence in the country. The Libyan government provides some cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts, but it is unable to secure thousands of miles of its land and maritime borders, enabling the illicit flow of weapons, migrants, and foreign terrorist fighters. The United States Embassy in Libya suspended its operations in 2014.

(iii) Somalia. Portions of Somalia have been terrorist safe havens. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qa'ida-affiliated terrorist group, has operated in the country for years and continues to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries. Somalia has porous borders, and most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents. The Somali government cooperates with the United States in some counterterrorism operations but does not have the capacity to sustain military pressure on or to investigate suspected terrorists.

(iv) Sudan. Sudan has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993 because of its support for international terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas. Historically, Sudan provided safe havens for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups to meet and train. Although Sudan's support to al-Qa'ida has ceased and it provides some cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts, elements of core al-Qa'ida and ISIS-linked terrorist groups remain active in the country.

(v) Syria. Syria has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979. The Syrian government is engaged in an ongoing military conflict against ISIS and others for control of portions of the country. At the same time, Syria continues to support other terrorist groups. It has allowed or encouraged extremists to pass through its territory to enter Iraq. ISIS continues to attract foreign fighters to Syria and to use its base in Syria to plot or encourage attacks around the globe, including in the United States. The United States Embassy in Syria suspended its operations in 2012. Syria does not cooperate with the United States' counterterrorism efforts.

(vi) Yemen. Yemen is the site of an ongoing conflict between the incumbent government and the Houthi-led opposition. Both ISIS and a second group, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have exploited this conflict to expand their presence in Yemen and to carry out hundreds of attacks. Weapons and other materials smuggled across Yemen's porous borders are used to finance AQAP and other terrorist activities. In 2015, the United States Embassy in Yemen suspended its operations, and embassy staff were relocated out of

the country. Yemen has been supportive of, but has not been able to cooperate fully with, the United States in counterterrorism efforts.

(f) In light of the conditions in these six countries, until the assessment of current screening and vetting procedures required by section 2 of this order is completed, the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security of the United States is unacceptably high. Accordingly, while that assessment is ongoing, I am imposing a temporary pause on the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, subject to categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers, as described in section 3 of this order.

(g) Iraq presents a special case. Portions of Iraq remain active combat zones. Since 2014, ISIS has had dominant influence over significant territory in northern and central Iraq. Although that influence has been significantly reduced due to the efforts and sacrifices of the Iraqi government and armed forces, working along with a United States-led coalition, the ongoing conflict has impacted the Iraqi government's capacity to secure its borders and to identify fraudulent travel documents. Nevertheless, the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected Iraqi government, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq's commitment to combat ISIS justify different treatment for Iraq. In particular, those Iraqi government forces that have fought to regain more than half of the territory previously dominated by ISIS have shown steadfast determination and earned enduring respect as they battle an armed group that is the common enemy of Iraq and the United States. In addition, since Executive Order 13769 was issued, the Iraqi government has expressly undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and the return of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of removal. Decisions about issuance of visas or granting admission to Iraqi nationals should be subjected to additional scrutiny to determine if applicants have connections with ISIS or other terrorist organizations, or otherwise pose a risk to either national security or public safety.

(h) Recent history shows that some of those who have entered the United States through our immigration system have proved to be threats to our national security. Since 2001, hundreds of persons born abroad have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States. They have included not just persons who came here legally on visas but also individuals who first entered the country as refugees. For example, in January 2013, two Iraqi nationals admitted to the United States as refugees in 2009 were sentenced to 40 years and to life in prison, respectively, for multiple terrorism-related offenses. And in October 2014, a native of Somalia who had been brought to the United States as a child refugee and later became a naturalized United States citizen was sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction as part of a plot to detonate a bomb at a crowded Christmas-tree-lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The Attorney General has reported to me that more than 300 persons who entered the United States as refugees are currently the subjects of counterterrorism investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(i) Given the foregoing, the entry into the United States of foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism remains a matter of grave concern. In light of the Ninth Circuit's

observation that the political branches are better suited to determine the appropriate scope of any suspensions than are the courts, and in order to avoid spending additional time pursuing litigation, I am revoking Executive Order 13769 and replacing it with this order, which expressly excludes from the suspensions categories of aliens that have prompted judicial concerns and which clarifies or refines the approach to certain other issues or categories of affected aliens.

Sec. 2. Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall conduct a worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat. The Secretary of Homeland Security may conclude that certain information is needed from particular countries even if it is not needed from every country.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the worldwide review described in subsection (a) of this section, including the Secretary of Homeland Security's determination of the information needed from each country for adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 20 days of the effective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy of the report to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence.

(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national security concerns referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections 212 (f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United States of nationals of those six countries be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of this order, subject to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set forth in sections 3 and 12 of this order.

(d) Upon submission of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the information needed from each country for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request that all foreign governments that do not supply such information regarding their nationals begin providing it within 50 days of notification.

(e) After the period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, shall submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested until they do so or until the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so, or has adequately shared information through other means. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland

Security may also submit to the President the names of additional countries for which any of them recommends other lawful restrictions or limitations deemed necessary for the security or welfare of the United States.

(f) At any point after the submission of the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for similar treatment, as well as the names of any countries that they recommend should be removed from the scope of a proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section.

(g) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 60 days of the effective date of this order, a second report within 90 days of the effective date of this order, a third report within 120 days of the effective date of this order, and a fourth report within 150 days of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 3. Scope and Implementation of Suspension.

(a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any waiver under subsection (c) of this section, the suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this order shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:

- (i) are outside the United States on the effective date of this order;
- (ii) did not have a valid visa at 5:00 p.m., eastern standard time on January 27, 2017; and
- (iii) do not have a valid visa on the effective date of this order.

(b) Exceptions. The suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this order shall not apply to:

- (i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
- (ii) any foreign national who is admitted to or paroled into the United States on or after the effective date of this order;
- (iii) any foreign national who has a document other than a visa, valid on the effective date of this order or issued on any date thereafter, that permits him or her to travel to the United States and seek entry or admission, such as an advance parole document;
- (iv) any dual national of a country designated under section 2 of this order when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a non-designated country;
- (v) any foreign national traveling on a diplomatic or diplomatic-type visa, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visa, C-2 visa for travel to the United Nations, or G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 visa; or
- (vi) any foreign national who has been granted asylum; any refugee who has already been admitted to the United States; or any individual who has been granted withholding of removal, advance parole, or protection under the Convention Against Torture.

(c) Waivers. Notwithstanding the suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this order, a consular officer, or, as appropriate, the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or the Commissioner's delegatee, may, in the consular officer's or the CBP official's discretion, decide on a case-by-case basis to authorize the issuance of a visa to, or to permit the entry of, a foreign national for whom entry is otherwise suspended if the foreign national has demonstrated to the officer's satisfaction that denying entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship, and that his or her entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest. Unless otherwise specified by the Secretary of Homeland Security, any waiver issued by a consular officer as part of the visa issuance process will be effective both for the issuance of a visa and any subsequent entry on that visa, but will leave all other requirements for admission or entry unchanged. Case-by-case waivers could be appropriate in circumstances such as the following:

- (i) the foreign national has previously been admitted to the United States for a continuous period of work, study, or other long-term activity, is outside the United States on the effective date of this order, seeks to reenter the United States to resume that activity, and the denial of reentry during the suspension period would impair that activity;
- (ii) the foreign national has previously established significant contacts with the United States but is outside the United States on the effective date of this order for work, study, or other lawful activity;
- (iii) the foreign national seeks to enter the United States for significant business or professional obligations and the denial of entry during the suspension period would impair those obligations;
- (iv) the foreign national seeks to enter the United States to visit or reside with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent) who is a United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien lawfully admitted on a valid nonimmigrant visa, and the denial of entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship;
- (v) the foreign national is an infant, a young child or adoptee, an individual needing urgent medical care, or someone whose entry is otherwise justified by the special circumstances of the case;
- (vi) the foreign national has been employed by, or on behalf of, the United States Government (or is an eligible dependent of such an employee) and the employee can document that he or she has provided faithful and valuable service to the United States Government;
- (vii) the foreign national is traveling for purposes related to an international organization designated under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), 22 U.S.C. 288 et seq., traveling for purposes of conducting meetings or business with the United States Government, or traveling to conduct business on behalf of an international organization not designated under the IOIA;

(viii) the foreign national is a landed Canadian immigrant who applies for a visa at a location within Canada; or

(ix) the foreign national is traveling as a United States Government-sponsored exchange visitor.

Sec. 4. Additional Inquiries Related to Nationals of Iraq. An application by any Iraqi national for a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit should be subjected to thorough review, including, as appropriate, consultation with a designee of the Secretary of Defense and use of the additional information that has been obtained in the context of the close U.S.-Iraqi security partnership, since Executive Order 13769 was issued, concerning individuals suspected of ties to ISIS or other terrorist organizations and individuals coming from territories controlled or formerly controlled by ISIS. Such review shall include consideration of whether the applicant has connections with ISIS or other terrorist organizations or with territory that is or has been under the dominant influence of ISIS, as well as any other information bearing on whether the applicant may be a threat to commit acts of terrorism or otherwise threaten the national security or public safety of the United States.

Sec. 5. Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All Immigration Programs. (a) The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence shall implement a program, as part of the process for adjudications, to identify individuals who seek to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis, who support terrorism, violent extremism, acts of violence toward any group or class of people within the United States, or who present a risk of causing harm subsequent to their entry. This program shall include the development of a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures, such as in-person interviews; a database of identity documents proffered by applicants to ensure that duplicate documents are not used by multiple applicants; amended application forms that include questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to ensure that applicants are who they claim to be; a mechanism to assess whether applicants may commit, aid, or support any kind of violent, criminal, or terrorist acts after entering the United States; and any other appropriate means for ensuring the proper collection of all information necessary for a rigorous evaluation of all grounds of inadmissibility or grounds for the denial of other immigration benefits.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President an initial report on the progress of the program described in subsection (a) of this section within 60 days of the effective date of this order, a second report within 100 days of the effective date of this order, and a third report within 200 days of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 6. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The Secretary of State shall suspend travel of refugees into the United States under the USRAP, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall suspend decisions on applications for refugee status, for 120 days after the effective date of this order, subject to waivers pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of

Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication processes to determine what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional procedures. The suspension described in this subsection shall not apply to refugee applicants who, before the effective date of this order, have been formally scheduled for transit by the Department of State.

The Secretary of State shall resume travel of refugees into the United States under the USRAP 120 days after the effective date of this order, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall resume making decisions on applications for refugee status only for stateless persons and nationals of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that the additional procedures implemented pursuant to this subsection are adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.

(b) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, I hereby proclaim that the entry of more than 50,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and thus suspend any entries in excess of that number until such time as I determine that additional entries would be in the national interest.

(c) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as they determine that the entry of such individuals as refugees is in the national interest and does not pose a threat to the security or welfare of the United States, including in circumstances such as the following: the individual's entry would enable the United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement or arrangement, or the denial of entry would cause undue hardship.

(d) It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law and as practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of determining the placement or settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be admitted to the United States as refugees. To that end, the Secretary of State shall examine existing law to determine the extent to which, consistent with applicable law, State and local jurisdictions may have greater involvement in the process of determining the placement or resettlement of refugees in their jurisdictions, and shall devise a proposal to lawfully promote such involvement.

Sec. 7. Rescission of Exercise of Authority Relating to the Terrorism Grounds of Inadmissibility.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, consider rescinding the exercises of authority permitted by section 212(d)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(B), relating to the terrorism grounds of inadmissibility, as well as any related implementing directives or guidance.

Sec. 8. Expedited Completion of the Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entry exit tracking system for in-scope travelers to the United States, as recommended by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the President periodic reports on the progress of the directive set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The initial report shall be submitted within 100 days of the effective date of this order, a second report shall be submitted within 200 days of the effective date of this order, and a third report shall be submitted within 365 days of the effective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit further reports every 180 days thereafter until the system is fully deployed and operational.

Sec. 9. Visa Interview Security. (a) The Secretary of State shall immediately suspend the Visa Interview Waiver Program and ensure compliance with section 222 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1202, which requires that all individuals seeking a nonimmigrant visa undergo an in-person interview, subject to specific statutory exceptions. This suspension shall not apply to any foreign national traveling on a diplomatic or diplomatic-type visa, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visa, C-2 visa for travel to the United Nations, or G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 visa; traveling for purposes related to an international organization designated under the IOIA; or traveling for purposes of conducting meetings or business with the United States Government.

(b) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows Program, including by substantially increasing the number of Fellows, lengthening or making permanent the period of service, and making language training at the Foreign Service Institute available to Fellows for assignment to posts outside of their area of core linguistic ability, to ensure that nonimmigrant visa-interview wait times are not unduly affected.

Sec. 10. Visa Validity Reciprocity. The Secretary of State shall review all nonimmigrant visa reciprocity agreements and arrangements to ensure that they are, with respect to each visa classification, truly reciprocal insofar as practicable with respect to validity period and fees, as required by sections 221(c) and 281 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(c) and 1351, and other treatment. If another country does not treat United States nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas in a truly reciprocal manner, the Secretary of State shall adjust the visa validity period, fee schedule, or other treatment to match the treatment of United States nationals by that foreign country, to the extent practicable.

Sec. 11. Transparency and Data Collection. (a) To be more transparent with the American people and to implement more effectively policies and practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall, consistent with applicable law and national security, collect and make publicly available the following information:

- (i) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; convicted of terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity, affiliation with or provision of material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national-security-related reasons;
- (ii) information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and who have engaged in terrorism-

related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States;

(iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called "honor killings," in the United States by foreign nationals; and

(iv) any other information relevant to public safety and security as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals charged with major offenses.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall release the initial report under subsection (a) of this section within 180 days of the effective date of this order and shall include information for the period from September 11, 2001, until the date of the initial report. Subsequent reports shall be issued every 180 days thereafter and reflect the period since the previous report.

Sec. 12. Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of the actions directed in this order.

(b) In implementing this order, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including, as appropriate, those providing an opportunity for individuals to claim a fear of persecution or torture, such as the credible fear determination for aliens covered by section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A).

(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the effective date of this order shall be revoked pursuant to this order.

(d) Any individual whose visa was marked revoked or marked canceled as a result of Executive Order 13769 shall be entitled to a travel document confirming that the individual is permitted to travel to the United States and seek entry. Any prior cancellation or revocation of a visa that was solely pursuant to Executive Order 13769 shall not be the basis of inadmissibility for any future determination about entry or admissibility.

(e) This order shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture, consistent with the laws of the United States.

Sec. 13. Revocation. Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017, is revoked as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 14. Effective Date. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern daylight time on March 16, 2017.

Sec. 15. Severability. (a) If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

(b) If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements.

Sec. 16. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 6, 2017.



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EXHIBIT 54



CATO AT LIBERTY

JANUARY 26, 2017 12:03PM

Guide to Trump's Executive Order to Limit Migration for "National Security" Reasons

By ALEX NOWRASTEH

President Trump is expected to sign an executive order shortly to temporarily ban all visas for people from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia among other actions. An advanced copy of this order was available earlier this week. The first sentence of his order states that it is to "protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States." However, the countries that Trump chose to temporarily ban are not serious terrorism risks.

I compiled a list of foreign-born people who committed or were convicted of attempting to commit a terrorist attack on U.S. soil from 1975 through 2015. Below is a table with the distribution of their countries of origin (Figure 1). The first seven countries are those to be initially and, hopefully, temporarily denied visas. During the time period analyzed here, 17 foreign-born folks from those nations were convicted of carrying out or attempting to carry out a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and they killed zero people. Zero Libyans or Syrians intended to carry out an attack on U.S. soil during this time.

Figure 1

Foreign-Born Terrorist Country of Origin, 1975-2015

Country	Terrorists	Murders	Terrorists (percent)	Murders (percent)
Iran	6	0	3.9%	0.0%
Iraq	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
Libya	0	0	0.0%	0.0%
Somalia	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
Sudan	6	0	3.9%	0.0%
Syria	0	0	0.0%	0.0%
Yemen	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Afghanistan	3	0	1.9%	0.0%
Algeria	4	0	2.6%	0.0%
Armenia	6	1	3.9%	0.0%
Australia	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Bangladesh	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
Bosnia	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Croatia	9	1	5.8%	0.0%
Cuba	11	3	7.1%	0.1%
Dominican Republic	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Egypt	11	162	7.1%	5.4%
Ethiopia	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
France	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Ghana	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Guyana	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
Haiti	3	0	1.9%	0.0%
India	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
Japan	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Jordan	4	0	2.6%	0.0%
Kazakhstan	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Kosovo	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
Kuwait	2	6	1.3%	0.2%
Kyrgyzstan	2	3	1.3%	0.1%

Lebanon	4	158.5	2.6%	5.2%
Macedonia	3	0	1.9%	0.0%
Mexico	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Morocco	3	0	1.9%	0.0%
Nigeria	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Pakistan*	14	3	9.1%	0.1%
Palestine	5	2	3.2%	0.1%
Saudi Arabia*	19	2,369	12.3%	78.3%
Serbia	2	0	1.3%	0.0%
South Korea	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Taiwan	1	1	0.6%	0.0%
Trinidad and Tobago	2	0.5	1.3%	0.0%
Turkey	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
United Arab Emirates	2	314	1.3%	10.4%
United Kingdom	3	0	1.9%	0.0%
Uzbekistan	3	0	1.9%	0.0%
Vietnam	1	0	0.6%	0.0%
Total	154	3,024	100.0%	100.0%

Sources: John Mueller, ed., Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Center on National Security; Charles Kurzman, “Spreadsheet of Muslim-American Terrorism Cases from 9/11 through the End of 2015,” University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; New America Foundation; Mother Jones; Senator Jeff Sessions; Various news sources; Court documents.

**San Bernardino shooter Tashfeen Malik was born in Pakistan but mostly resided in Saudi Arabia from the time she was an infant. She physically met her U.S. born husband in Saudi Arabia. I counted her as Saudi but one could reasonably count her as Pakistani because she was born in Pakistan and she held a Pakistani passport. Doing so would transfer 14 terrorist murders from the Saudi Arabia’s row to Pakistan’s row.*

Attempting or committing a terrorist attack on U.S. soil is not the only terrorist offense. Materially supporting foreign terrorist organizations, seeking to join a foreign terrorist group overseas, plotting or carrying out terrorist attacks in other countries, and others are also terrorism offenses. I excluded foreign-born people convicted of those offenses because Trump is concerned with "making America safe again," not with making other countries safe or with a global war on terrorism. A terrorist attack in another country doesn't kill Americans inside of the United States and these threats are not what concern American voters nearly as much as terrorism on U.S. soil. You can call this an America First weighting of terrorism offenses.

Trump's executive order cites the "[h]undreds of foreign-born individuals [who] have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes" as another reason for a visa ban for these countries. He likely got the "hundreds of foreign-born individuals" from a [news release](#) and list put out by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) that purportedly shows all 580 "terrorism-related" convictions since 9/11 with at least 380 of them as immigrants.

It is disturbing that Sessions' flawed list of terrorism convictions is the basis for much of this executive order. There are at least two major problems with the list. First, you might get the impression that all of those convictions were for terrorist attacks planned on U.S.-soil but only 40, or 6.8 percent, were. Second, 241 of the 580 convictions, or 42 percent, were not even for terrorism offenses. Many of the investigations started based on a terrorism tip like, for instance, the suspect wanting to buy a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. However, the tip turned out to be groundless and the legal saga ended with only a mundane conviction of [receiving stolen cereal](#). According to Sessions' list, that cereal thief is a terrorist.

In the little over 13 years covered in the Sessions' list, there were about three convictions per year for planning or committing an attack on U.S. soil. For every one of them, there were six non-terrorism convictions counted as terrorism and 4.5 convictions for supporting, joining, or planning a terrorist attack overseas. In short, the list provided by Senator Jeff Sessions does not show a daunting terrorist threat to American lives in the homeland.

Trump's executive order goes on to argue that "[d]eteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter our country." Presumably, the goal is to reduce American deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil so the deadliness of terrorist at-

tacks matters more than the number of terrorists. For instance, 114 of the 154 foreign-born terrorists from 1975 to the end of 2015 didn't kill anybody. The three countries where the deadliest terrorists came to the United States from were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Together they all accounted for 94.1 percent of all American deaths in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil committed by the foreign-born. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not beset by any of the supposedly-terrorism increasing problems that are described in this order. Egyptians account for 5.4 percent of all terrorist victims but their attacks occurred between 1993 and 2002 when Egypt was a more stable country than it is today. The only exception to this might be Lebanon which accounts for 5.2 percent of all terrorist victims but nearly all of those were committed by Ziad Jarrah on 9/11 – a single data point. Meanwhile, foreign-born people from Syria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Iran, and Yemen have not successfully killed anybody in a U.S. terrorist attack.

Trump's executive order then continues to say that the United States "cannot, and should not, admit into our country those who do not support the U.S. Constitution." Virtually nobody in the world, including most Americans, supports the U.S. Constitution and it seems peculiar to block tourists who want to visit Disneyland from entering because they "do not support the U.S. Constitution." My guesses are that whoever wrote this executive order is either confused about the difference between immigrants and non-immigrants, it is just sloppily drafted, or this is an earlier draft. Temporary visitors should not have to swear allegiance or express support for the Constitution any more than an American should have to swear allegiance to or express my support for monarchy when visiting the United Kingdom. In terms of support for the Constitution, all that matters is that immigrants who naturalize take an oath to do so – as they are currently required to under U.S. law.

The order also directs the government to find a way to identify immigrants "with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission." Blocking immigrants who intend to commit crimes or terrorist attacks is a wonderful idea – so wonderful that the government already does it. However, the line that seeks to identify those who "are at risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission" is hopelessly vague. There is a risk greater than zero that virtually anybody is a risk subsequent to their admission so this type of broad, ill-defined dictate could theoretically screen out everybody. More likely, it will just be used to capriciously target individuals for political or personal reasons.

A later line in the executive order provides some context for the “risk of causing harm subsequent to their admission” line. It orders DHS to regularly publish “information regarding the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States.” Presumably, DHS will use that information to build a detailed risk profile of immigrants to exclude those who could become radicalized. One worrying term is “terrorism-related organizations.” I couldn’t find any mentions or definition of a “terrorism-related organization” in U.S. law. There are no mentions of “terrorism-related convictions” either. If “terrorism-related organizations” is defined as broadly as “terrorism-related convictions” has been in Jeff Sessions’ terrorist list then many non-terrorist organizations will be included for flimsy reasons. This is like the no-fly list but with far graver consequences.

The order also says there should be a “process to evaluate the applicant’s likelihood of becoming a positive contributing member of society, and the applicant’s ability to make contributions to the national interest.” The immigration law already does the former by excluding criminals, national security threats, and numerous other categories of excludable people while the broad immigrant and non-immigrant work visas supposedly identify which foreigners are most valuable. At best this line in the executive order is redundant and at worst it signals the government’s intent to be even more involved in planning the labor market by selecting winners and losers through the immigration system.

The seven countries temporarily banned under this executive order represent a small percent of all green cards and entries into the United States (the latter estimated by I-94s per country). In 2015, the government issued 52,365 green cards to immigrants born in those seven countries which amount to just 4.98 percent of all green cards issued that year and 29.4 percent of all green cards issued to nationals from Muslim countries (Table 2). In the same year, there were 86,236 non-immigrant entries from those countries which accounted for 0.11 percent of all entries although they comprised 4.5 percent of all entries for Islamic countries (Table 2).

The economic cost of a temporary ban, or even a permanent one, is small because so few green cards and nonimmigrant visas are issued to folks from those seven countries. However, the danger of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by citizens of those countries has also been very low historically with only 17 convictions from 1975

through 2015 and zero Americans killed in domestic attacks. Future terrorists could come from different countries than terrorists did in the past but, based on current evidence, this ban is still a net loss because it will likely stop few terrorists, prevent zero deaths, and slightly reduce immigration and tourism. All minor economic pain, no gain.

Table 2

Number of Green Cards and Entries per Country, 2015

	Green Cards	Entries (I-94)
Iran	13,114	35,266
Iraq	21,107	21,381
Libya	734	2,879
Somalia	6,796	359
Sudan	3,580	4,792
Syria	3,840	16,010
Yemen	3,194	5,549
All Countries	1,051,031	76,638,236
Islamic Countries (OIC)	178,015	1,896,383

Source: Department of Homeland Security

If President Trump was committed to banning immigrants from certain countries in order to reduce the already small risk of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by the foreign-born then he would not just ban nationals from these seven countries. For this reason, I expect his administration to expand the list of countries banned in the near future. Section 3, subsections c, d, e, and f clarify that the president can extend these bans to other countries or make them permanent. This is a warning about additional bans on migrants and immigrants to come as well as the process by which those bans will be enacted.

Topics: [International Economics](#), [Development & Immigration](#)

Tags: [terrorism](#), [Trump](#), [Executive Action](#), [migration](#), [bans](#), [Muslim country](#)

EXHIBIT 55

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"The various people who have, in fact, committed terrorist acts in this country, from 9/11 on, none of them came from any of the seven countries that are the subject of the president's executive order."

— [Jerrold Nadler](#) on Saturday, January 28th, 2017 in a CNN interview



No terrorist attacks post 9/11 by people from countries in Trump's travel ban?

By [Miriam Valverde](#) on Sunday, January 29th, 2017 at 5:42 p.m.

On Jan. 28, an Iraqi immigrant was freed after being detained at one of New York's airports, just after President Donald Trump's executive order on immigration was put into action.

President Donald Trump's executive order temporarily suspending the admission into the United States of people from seven Muslim-majority countries and indefinitely banning refugees from war-torn Syria stirred an uproar across the nation, with protesters gathering at the nation's largest airports.

Rep. Jerrold Nadler, D-N.Y., said in a CNN interview from New York's John F. Kennedy Airport that it was important to protect the United States from people who want to harm the country. But he argued that refugees are heavily vetted by the U.S. government and that recent attacks have not been from nationals of the countries singled out by Trump.

"The various people who have, in fact, committed terrorist acts in this country, from 9/11 on, none of them came from any of the seven countries that are the subject of the president's executive order," Nadler [said](#) in a CNN interview Jan. 28. "If you really want to protect this country, why are Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey left out of the order? Most of the 9/11 conspirators came from Saudi Arabia."

Trump's [executive order](#) signed Jan. 27, called "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States," suspended for 90 days the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of people from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

Individuals from those seven countries who are U.S. lawful permanent residents are also stopped from re-entering the country (though exemptions may apply), the [New York Times reported](#), attributing the information to the Department of Homeland Security.

We wondered if Nadler was correct by saying that since 9/11, terrorist acts in the United States have not been carried out by people from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

Experts told us no fatal attack has been attributed to nationals from those countries, but that there have been a few non-deadly acts by individuals from two of those countries.

Increased homegrown terrorism

According to New America, a think tank [compiling information on terrorist activities](#) in the United States since 9/11, [94 people](#) have been killed by jihadists in the past 15 years.

But in its overview of who are the individuals committing the attacks, New America says the majority of attackers come from within.

"Far from being foreign infiltrators, the large majority of jihadist terrorists in the United States have been American citizens or legal residents. Moreover, while a range of citizenship statuses are represented, every jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or legal resident," the [New America study](#) says. "In addition about a quarter of the extremists are converts, further confirming that the challenge cannot be reduced to one of immigration."

"It's certainly the case that none of the major, deadly attacks carried out in the United States were carried out by people from these countries," said Erin Miller, who manages the Global Terrorism Database for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.

Other experts agreed.

"Since 9/11, no one has been killed in this country in a terrorist attack by anyone who emigrated from any of the seven countries," added William C. Banks, director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University College of Law.

In June 2016, [Omar Mateen](#), born in the United States to Afghan parents, killed 49 people and wounded 53 others in an Orlando nightclub shooting. In [December 2015](#), a Pakistani woman, [Tashfeen Malik](#), and her husband killed 14 people in San Bernardino, Calif. The husband, Syed Rizwan Farook, was born in the United States to Pakistani parents.

However, there have been [at least three non-deadly attacks](#) in which the perpetrators [were from Iran](#) or [Somalia](#), said John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State University, expert on terrorism and a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute.

One of those examples includes the [November 2016](#) attack at Ohio State University by a [Somali refugee](#) who had lived in Pakistan before coming to the United States. [Abdul Razak Ali Artan](#), 18, was shot dead by a police officer after he slammed his car into pedestrians and injured others with a butcher knife. The FBI said it would investigate the attack as a "[potential act of terrorism](#)."

In September 2016, [Dahir Adan](#) was shot dead after stabbing nine people in a Minnesota shopping mall. Adan was identified by his father as [Somali but born in Kenya, moving to the United States](#) when he was a child.

Another incident was in 2006, when Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar ran a Jeep Cherokee into a crowd of people at his alma mater, the University of North Carolina. Thinking he would be killed during the attack, Taheri-Azar left a letter in his apartment saying he wanted revenge for the deaths of Muslims across the world caused by the United States, the [AP reported](#). A naturalized citizen born in Iran, Taheri-Azar in 2008 plead guilty to [nine counts of attempted first-degree murder](#) and was [sentenced for up to 33 years in prison](#).

On ABC's *This Week*, Trump's press secretary, Sean Spicer, said the president's order covered countries that the Obama administration had identified as needing further travel restrictions.

"What the president did was take the first step through this executive order of insuring that we're looking at the entire system of who's coming in, refugees that

are coming in, people who are coming in from places that have a history or that our intelligence suggests that we need to have further extreme vetting for," [Spicer said Jan. 29](#).

Starting in early 2016, individuals from countries that participate in the [visa waiver program](#) (that is, people allowed to travel to the United States without a visa) and who had also been in [Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Libya or Somalia](#) recently (with exceptions for diplomatic or military purposes) were no longer permitted to come to the United States without a visa. They were not banned from traveling, but they did need to apply for a visa and be vetted.

People who were nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria were also no longer able to come to the United States without a visa.

Our ruling

Nadler said, "The various people who have, in fact, committed terrorist acts in this country, from 9/11 on, none of them came from any of the seven countries that are the subject of the president's executive order."

Experts on terrorism tell us that since 9/11 no one in the United States has been killed in a terrorist attack by someone from the seven countries for which Trump's executive order temporarily suspends admission. Those countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

But there have been at least three non-deadly cases in which the perpetrator was connected to Iran or Somalia.

Nadler's statement is partially accurate but leaves out important details. We rate it Half True.

Share The Facts

Jerrold Nadler

Democratic representative from New York



"The various people who have, in fact, committed terrorist acts in this country, from 9/11 on, none of them came from any of the seven countries that are the subject of the president's executive order."

POLITIFACT

in a CNN interview – Saturday, January 28, 2017

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About this statement:

Published: Sunday, January 29th, 2017 at 5:42 p.m.

Researched by: [Miriam Valverde](#)

Edited by: [Angie Drobnie Holan](#)

Subjects: [Homeland Security](#), [Immigration](#)

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Videos

EXHIBIT 56

Trump Spars With Republican Senators McCain and Graham After They Criticize Travel Ban

 abcnews.go.com/Politics/handful-gop-senators-representatives-criticize-trump-travel-ban/story

Two leading GOP senators, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, joined other Republican officials on Sunday in criticizing President Trump's executive order on immigration and refugees.

McCain of Arizona and Graham of South Carolina issued a joint statement saying, "Our government has a responsibility to defend our borders."

"It is clear from the confusion at our airports across the nation that President Trump's executive order was not properly vetted," the two senators said. "We are particularly concerned by reports that this order went into effect with little to no consultation with the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. We fear this executive order may do more to help terrorist recruitment than improve our security."

They continued, "We must do so in a way that makes us safer and upholds all that is decent and exceptional about our nation."

Trump responded in a series of tweets from his personal account, calling the two senators "wrong" and "sadly weak on immigration."

Shortly after the president tweeted, Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee released a statement to ABC News.

"We all share a desire to protect the American people, but this executive order has been poorly implemented, especially with respect to green card holders," said Corker. "The administration should immediately make appropriate revisions, and it is my hope that following a thorough review and implementation of security enhancements that many of these programs will be improved and reinstated."

Corker is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Rep. Michael McCaul of Texas, an adviser to Trump on counter-terrorism during the presidential campaign, broke with the White House on green card restrictions.

"We should not simply turn away individuals who already have lawful U.S. visas or green cards—like those who have risked their lives serving alongside our forces overseas or who call America their home," McCaul said in a statement.

Some leading Republicans said they support the order but criticized its implementation.

The order signed Friday immediately suspends immigration from seven predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and Africa -- Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran and Libya -- for 90 days. It also blocks refugees from entering the country for 120 days; refugees from Syria are barred indefinitely.

"President Trump has finally taken necessary national security and public safety measures regarding refugees and non-immigrants seeking entry," according to a statement from Rep. Raul Labrador of Idaho. But, he said, "Inadequate review and poor implementation of this executive action threatens to undermine otherwise sound policy. I remain a strong supporter of President Trump's bold efforts to keep America safe, but they must be legally sound and uniformly enforced." look forward to working with the president on these issues."

A handful of other Republicans over the weekend slammed the order, many of them expressing concern that the order is too broad and questioning its effectiveness in reducing the threat of [terrorism](#).

Sen. Ben Sasse of Nebraska, a member of [the Senate](#) Armed Services Committee, issued a statement Saturday titled "[Border Security](#) and Muslim Nations" in which he said the ban was too far-reaching.

"The president is right to focus attention on the obvious fact that borders matter," he said. "At the same time, while not technically a Muslim ban, this order is too broad."

Sasse, who was critical of Trump during the presidential campaign but now supports him, also questioned if the order was the most effective way to fight jihadism.

"There are two ways to lose our generational battle against jihadism by losing touch with reality," he said. "The first is to keep pretending that jihadi terrorism has no connection to [Islam](#) or to certain countries. That's been a disaster. And here's the second way to fail: If we send a signal to the Middle East that the U.S. sees all Muslims as jihadis, the terrorist recruiters win by telling kids that America is banning Muslims and that this is America versus one religion. Both approaches are wrong, and both will make us less safe. Our generational fight against jihadism requires wisdom."

[Arizona](#) Sen. [Jeff Flake](#) also suggested that the travel ban is too broad.

"President Trump and his administration are right to be concerned about [national security](#), but it's unacceptable when even legal permanent residents are being detained or turned away at airports and ports of entry," Flake said in a statement Saturday. "Enhancing long-term national security requires that we have a clear-eyed view of radical Islamic terrorism without ascribing radical Islamic terrorist views to all Muslims."

As for GOP members of the House of Representatives, Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania echoed Sasse's and Flake's concerns.

"This order appears to have been rushed through without full consideration to the wide-ranging impacts it will have," Dent said in a statement to ABC News. "As a result, I fear that this order may imperil lives, divide families, and create uncertainty for many American businesses that operate internationally."

He added, "This is unacceptable and I urge the Administration to halt enforcement of the order until a more thoughtful and deliberate policy can be instated."

Dent also said that he had been working to assist a Syrian Christian family who held valid visas but were detained at Philadelphia International Airport and forced to leave the country.

Rep. Justin Amash of Michigan, a libertarian whose parents immigrated to the U.S. from the Middle East, wrote a series of tweets Saturday slamming Trump and the executive order.

"Like Pres. Obama's executive actions on immigration, Pres. Trump's executive order overreaches and undermines our constitutional system," he wrote, adding, "It's not lawful to ban immigrants on basis of nationality. If the president wants to change [immigration law](#), he must work with Congress."

In another pair of tweets, Amash wrote, "The president's denial of entry to lawful permanent residents of the United States (green card holders) is particularly troubling. ... Green card holders live in the United States as our neighbors and serve in our Armed Forces. They deserve better."

His final tweet read, "While EO allows admittance of immigrants, nonimmigrants, and refugees 'on a case-by-case basis,' arbitrariness would violate Rule of Law."

GOP Reps. Mike Coffman of Colorado and Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania also questioned the effectiveness of the administration's order.

Fitzpatrick, a former FBI special agent, said in a statement the action "entirely misses the mark," while Coffman said

he opposed a travel ban based on "ethnic or religious grounds."

Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, said in a statement the order is "overly broad" and called its implementation "immediately problematic."

"For example, it could interfere with the immigration of Iraqis who worked for American forces in Iraq as translators and body guards -- people who literally saved the lives of our troops and diplomats during the last decade and whose lives are at risk if they remain in Iraq," she said.

Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, called on Trump to modify the order to reduce "unnecessary burdens on the vast majority of visa-seekers that present a promise - not a threat -- to our nation."

ABC News' Alexander Mallin contributed to this report.

EXHIBIT 57

The Washington Post

Opinions

Trump's travel ban is a gift to Iran's rulers

By Hadi Ghaemi January 29

Hadi Ghaemi is the founder and executive director of the Campaign for Human Rights in Iran.

President Trump's travel ban on Iranians is a gift to the Islamic republic and its hard-line rulers. It will not deter terrorism on U.S. soil. Not a single terrorist involved in the 9/11 attacks or other fatal terrorist attacks in the United States since then has been of Iranian origin.

Instead, Trump's policy is a collective punishment of a diverse and changing nationality, and will ironically serve the purposes of Iran's hard-line rulers.

Who are the Iranians who will be harmed by this policy?

I have been helping Iranian refugees reach safety for more than a decade. A recent case is that of Reza, his wife and their 3-year-old daughter. Reza, whose full name I cannot use for security reasons, is a victim of torture at the hands of Iranian Revolutionary Guards at Tehran's notorious Kahrizak prison.

Reza fled to Turkey in 2013, and after years waiting, he and his family were recently approved for resettlement in the United States. He hoped to arrive sometime this year, once security vetting by U.S. agencies was complete.

His hopes are shattered. He and his family are suddenly rendered effectively stateless and homeless, with nowhere to turn. Instead of welcoming a regime opponent to the United States, we are effectively throwing Reza and his family back into the treacherous hands of Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

The Iranian refugees who have settled in the United States over the past decade are chiefly victims of the regime's harsh crackdowns, including students, journalists, women's rights activists and lawyers. These are the Iranians who have vocally and ferociously opposed the Islamic republic.

Another Iranian who was on her way to the United States — but now will likely never reach here — is a young women's rights activist. For years she has led a movement to change Iran's discriminatory practices toward women, anonymously through social media.

Her dream is to strengthen her activism and knowledge base by attending a U.S. human rights program, and she has just been accepted to an Ivy League university. Without the travel ban, she would be on her way to fulfilling her dream and upon return to Iran would bring back valuable experience and knowledge for her fight against gender discrimination.

But now the door has been slammed in her face. She and her generation of women's rights activists in Iran will continue their work, make no mistake, but they will have to struggle harder to break out of their isolation and confront their oppressive rulers.

Indeed, the people who are most likely to travel between Iran and the United States — the people most affected by any ban — are Iranians who hold Western values of moderation and tolerance and believe in open political and economic systems. It's in the interest of the United States to strengthen these values in Iran however it can.

Isolating Iran from engagement with the West is not the way to fortify the forces of moderation in Iran — and it is exactly the opposite of strategy adopted by previous presidents, such as Ronald Reagan, who conscientiously encouraged nongovernmental and cultural interaction between citizens of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries and the United States, even at the height of the Cold War.

The Iranian government thrives on isolating its population and choking off criticism. But Iran's young population has been striving to break free of this isolation. In Iran, public opinion of the United States is much more favorable than in any other country in the Middle East and North Africa.

By excluding all Iranians, Trump is only making it harder for the most promising elements of Iranian society to stand up to their repressive system and change their country for the better.

This policy will extend the Islamic republic's longevity, disrupt the lives of 1.5 million Iranian Americans and fan the flames of anti-Americanism in the region. None of these developments will help secure our country from terrorism.

Read more:

[The Post's View: President Trump's refugee ban is an affront to American values](#)

[Matt Zeller: Trump shuts the door on men and women who have sacrificed for America](#)

[Daoud Kuttab: When America was great](#)

[Ruth Marcus: Trump's erratic first week was among the most alarming in history](#)

[Adam Jentleson: Senate Democrats have the power to stop Trump. All they have to do is use it.](#)

EXHIBIT 58



Death toll in Yemen conflict passes 10,000

UN humanitarian aid office says 40,000 people also injured in the conflict while 10 million need 'urgent assistance'.

Comment



The UN ranks the conflict in Yemen as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises [Reuters]



The United Nations' humanitarian aid official in Yemen has said that the civilian death toll in the nearly two-year conflict has reached 10,000.

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The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Jamie McGoldrick said that the figure is based on lists of victims gathered by health facilities and the actual number might be higher.

McGoldrick also said that up to 10 million people need "urgent assistance to protect their safety, dignity and basic rights", according to a separate social media post early on Tuesday.

[READ MORE: Yemen's orphans face 'catastrophe' as fighting rages](#)

The announcement marks the first time a UN official has confirmed such a high death toll in Yemen, the Arab world's poorest nation.

"This once more underscores the need to resolve the situation in Yemen without any further delay," UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq said in New York.

"There's been a huge humanitarian cost."

The Yemen conflict pits Houthi rebels and allied forces against an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia.

The coalition began an air campaign in March 2015 to restore the internationally recognised government that fled the country after Houthis seized the capital Sanaa.

On Monday, reports said 34 people were killed and 16 others wounded during clashes between Houthis and pro-government forces in the southern Shabwa province.



McGoldrick was in the Yemeni capital Sanaa to get updates on the ongoing conflict [AP]



New peace plan



Witnesses: McGoldrick's remarks come as UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Ismail

- ▼ Ould Cheikh Ahmed, held talks with Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, president of Yemen, in the southern city of Aden.

Ould Cheikh Ahmed is hoping to revive peace prospects in Yemen after Hadi rejected his proposed plan. He is due to report to the UN Security Council later this month.

The plan provides for a new unity government in Yemen and a rebel withdrawal from the capital and other cities.

"A peace agreement, including a well-articulated security plan and the formation of an inclusive government, is the only way to end the war that has fuelled the development of terrorism in

Yemen and the region," Ould Cheikh Ahmed said in a statement.

WATCH: [Children bear the brunt of Yemen's ongoing war \(2:14\)](#)

"I asked the president to act swiftly and engage constructively with the UN's proposal for the sake of the country's future."

"The current political stalemate is causing death and destruction every day. The only way to stop this is through the renewal of the cessation of hostilities followed by consultations to develop a comprehensive agreement."

Under the proposal, Hadi's powers would be dramatically diminished in favour of a new vice president who would oversee the formation of the interim government that will lead a transition to elections.

The envoy has been holding talks in the Gulf region in recent weeks, including in Riyadh, where he met Yemen's central bank governor to ease a cash crisis in rebel-held areas.

One of the poorest countries in the Arab world, Yemen slid deeper into chaos when the Saudi-led coalition intervened in 2015 to push back the rebels who had seized Sanaa and other parts of the country.

The United Nations ranks the conflict in Yemen as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.



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Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies

Middle East Yemen



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EXHIBIT 59

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Trump's 'Muslim lockdown': What is the Center for Security Policy?

By Joel Gunter
BBC News

8 December 2015 | [US & Canada](#)



Raising the bar once again for US political controversy, Donald Trump called on Monday for "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States".

The Republican presidential frontrunner claimed that research by the respected Pew organisation showed a "great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population" - but he did not refer to any specific study to support that claim, and we can't find one that does.

Mr Trump did cite a specific a study by the Center for Security Policy - "very highly respected people, who I know, actually" - which he said showed that 25% of Muslims in the US believed violence against America was justified "as part of the global jihad".

Mr Trump's press release:

Republican road to the White House

How do you debate Donald Trump?

Clinton v Trump v Merkel v Putin

50 Trump fans explain why they love him

How Donald Trump captures the White House

TRUMP

MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!

Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration

(New York, NY) December 7th, 2015, -- Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on. According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population. Most recently, a poll from the Center for Security Policy released data showing "25% of those polled agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad" and 51% of those polled, "agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to Shariah." Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against non-believers who won't convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to Americans, especially women.

Mr. Trump stated, "Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life. If I win the election for President, we are going to Make America Great Again." - *Donald J. Trump*

But what exactly is the Center for Security Policy, and just how highly respected is it?

It's a conservative think-tank

The CSP was founded in 1988 by Frank Gaffney Jr, a former staffer in the Ronald Reagan administration who has been accused of Islamophobia. On its website, the centre calls itself a "Special Forces in the War of Ideas" which offers "maximum bang for the buck" to its donors.

The CSP does not publish information about who those donors are, but according to a **2013 report by Salon** they include some of the US's biggest aviation and defence companies - Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and General Electric.

Promoted on the organisation's website are reports and books with titles such as Star Spangled Sharia, Civilisation Jihad, and Muslim Colonisation of America. Responding to the controversy over Mr Trump's remarks, the CSP said it was "necessary to respond to the threat posed by jihadist terror in a way that ... calls it what it is".

It's not very highly respected

The CSP has been criticised across the political spectrum - by high-profile Republicans as well as Democrats - and by organisations which monitor extremist groups. Terri Johnson, executive director of the Center for New Community and J Richard Cohen, president of the Southern Poverty Law Center, **called it** "an extremist think-tank" led by an "anti-Muslim conspiracist".

The group was heavily criticised in 2012 after it repeatedly accused Huma Abedin, an aide to Hillary Clinton, of being a secret member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Leading Republicans including John McCain and John Boehner **denounced** the accusations.

REUTERS

Huma Abedin (centre) has been accused by Frank Gaffney of secret ties to the Muslim Brotherhood

The CSP has been criticised by a wide range of extremism monitoring organisations, including the Anti-Defamation League, and Center for Democratic Values at City University of New York.

Does its research stand up?

Arguably, no. According to the **Bridge Initiative**, a Georgetown University Islamophobia research project, the CSP survey was an online, self-selecting poll of 600 people, meaning respondents opted in to taking part.

Self-selecting internet surveys are less reliable than more traditional, random polling methods, because the opt-in element can lead to bias. Then there are the existing views of the organisation commissioning the poll - the CSP - which may have influenced the outcome.

Donald Trump calls for "shutdown of Muslims"

The **Washington Post** called the poll "shoddy". According to the Post, the question had an agree/disagree answer format with agree in each case linked to the more controversial option - favouring Sharia law or supporting violence. Researchers say this format is affected by "acquiescence response bias" - we are generally more likely to favour agree options.

The CSP said in a statement on Sunday that its research methods were "consistent with international industry standards".

Who is Frank Gaffney Jr?

Mr Gaffney Jr served in the Reagan administration during the 1980s but left in 1988 to form the CSP, after his nomination as assistant secretary of defence was rejected by the Senate.

GETTY IMAGES

Frank Gaffney Jr has been widely accused of Islamophobia

"Once a respectable Washington insider," according to the Southern Poverty Law Centre, which monitors US hate groups and extremists, Mr Gaffney Jr became "one of America's most notorious Islamophobes", the SPLC said.

Mr Gaffney Jr has repeatedly accused parts of America's Muslim population of what he calls "civilisational jihad". He has also called for Muslims to be investigated by a "new and improved" House Un-American Activities Committee - a highly controversial Cold War-era body which questioned and blacklisted US citizens accused of being communists.

Related Topics

Donald Trump

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EXHIBIT 60

Trump Calls for Ban on Muslims, Cites Deeply Flawed Poll

Posted on December 7, 2015 at 6:48 am .

Written by Bridge Initiative Team (<http://bridge.georgetown.edu/author/admin/>)



UPDATE (DECEMBER 7, 2015)

In a press release today, GOP frontrunner [Donald Trump](http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#DonaldTrump) (<http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#DonaldTrump>) called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims (<https://www.yahoo.com/politics/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-214105912.html>) entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”

His statement also cites a deeply flawed poll conducted by the Center for Security Policy (CSP), a group with a history of fear mongering about Islam and Muslims.

In June, when the poll was released and circulated widely on networks like Fox News, we debunked its findings, writing:

This survey (<http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/06/23/nationwide-poll-of-us-muslims-shows-thousands-support-shariah-jihad/>) should not be taken seriously. It comes from an organization with a history of producing dubious claims and “studies” about the threat of shariah, and was administered using an unreliable methodology. Its proponents seize upon its shoddy findings, exaggerating and misrepresenting them to American audiences, and falsely claim that the survey data represents the views of Muslims nationwide.

Donald Trump is only the latest proponent of CSP’s dubious claims. In an interview with MSNBC, Saba Ahmed recounted how GOP presidential candidate Ben Carson told her that Frank Gaffney, CSP’s director, advised him on issues related to Islam. Numerous other GOP candidates, like [Ted Cruz](http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#TedCruz) (<http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#TedCruz>) and [George Pataki](http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#GeorgePataki) (<http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/#GeorgePataki>), have [attended](http://bridge.georgetown.edu/presidential-candidates-set-to-appear-at-event-hosted-by-anti-muslim-conspiracy-theorist/) (<http://bridge.georgetown.edu/presidential-candidates-set-to-appear-at-event-hosted-by-anti-muslim-conspiracy-theorist/>) and spoken at CSP’s national summits.

Trump’s comment about banning Muslims is only the latest in a series of troubling remarks about Muslims made by Trump and other GOP presidential candidates. These comments are documented in our “[Islamophobia and the 2016 Elections](http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/) (<http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/>)” resource.

Original article (Published June 26, 2015)

On June 24, 2015, the Center for Security Policy (CSP), a Washington, D.C. think tank run by former Reagan official Frank Gaffney released a [survey](http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/06/23/nationwide-poll-of-us-muslims-shows-thousands-support-shariah-jihad/) (<http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/06/23/nationwide-poll-of-us-muslims-shows-thousands-support-shariah-jihad/>) of 600 Muslims living in the United States. Its takeaway, captured in a headline on the CSP website, is this: “Poll of US Muslims Reveals Ominous Levels of Support For Islamic Supremacists’ Doctrine of Shariah, Jihad.”

The poll gained quick traction online and in the media. On the evening of its release, Fox News host Bill O'Reilly (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bnhi03bWIA) also lent credence to its findings and cast doubt upon American Muslims' loyalty to their country.

Among the poll's findings are:

- "A majority (51%) agreed that 'Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to shariah.'"
- "Nearly a quarter of the Muslims polled believed that, 'It is legitimate to use violence to punish those who give offense to Islam by, for example, portraying the prophet Mohammed.'"
- "Nearly one-fifth of Muslim respondents said that the use of violence in the United States is justified in order to make shariah the law of the land in this country."

But this survey (<http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/06/23/nationwide-poll-of-us-muslims-shows-thousands-support-shariah-jihad/>) should not be taken seriously. It comes from an organization with a history of producing dubious claims and "studies" about the threat of shariah, and was administered using an unreliable methodology. Its proponents seize upon its shoddy findings, exaggerating and misrepresenting them to American audiences, and falsely claim that the survey data represents the views of Muslims nationwide.

Here are the details.

CSP'S HISTORY OF BASELESS FEAR Mongering

In recent years, many groups have raised questions about the objectivity and intentions of Frank Gaffney. His tendency to posit conspiracies about Barack Obama and the Muslim Brotherhood is well documented, and has earned him sharp critique across the political spectrum. The Center for American Progress labels (https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia_chapter2.pdf) him a "misinformation expert," while the Conservative Political Action Committee banned (<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/cpac-banned-frank-gaffney-over-baseless-anti-muslim-charges>) him from their 2011 conference for peddling false accusations about GOP connections to Muslim extremists. It was his organization, CSP, that was behind the unfounded rumor (<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/23/bachmann-gaffney-and-the-gop-s-anti-muslim-culture-of-conspiracy.html>) that Hillary Clinton's chief of staff, Huma Abedin, was linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and once floated the false idea (<http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2011/04/28/161792/frank-gaffney-david-petraeus-sharia/>) that General David Petraeus had "submitted" to shariah.

Since the early 2000s, CSP has generated dozens of occasional papers, blogs, and reports that fixate on shariah or other allegedly nefarious topics related to Islam. Often, they are loosely sourced (http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/egyptians-who-jeered-clinton-cite-american-conservatives-to-argue-u-s-secretly-supports-islamists/?_r=0) or entirely unsubstantiated (<http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/02/25/83953/missile-defense-logo-conspiracy/>), relying

instead on a turtive web of connections or, in one case, a 24-year-old document written by a lone (http://www.alternet.org/story/150444/welcome_to_the_shari%27ah_conspiracy_theory_industry) Muslim activist that has since been roundly discredited.

FALSE STATISTICS AND FALSE CLAIMS

Both Gaffney and O'Reilly claim that the poll's findings are representative of nationwide Muslim public opinion. But this assertion is untrue.

CSP's survey was a non-probability based, opt-in online survey, administered by the conservative group, the Polling Company/Woman Trend, a small Washington-based agency that has collaborated with CSP on other occasions to produce surveys about Islam and Muslims. (We learned this after reaching out to the Polling Company to get more details about their methodology, which wasn't released to the public when Gaffney began promoting the survey's findings.)

According to the body that sets ethical standards for polling, the American Association for Public Opinion Research (<http://www.aapor.org/AAPORKentico/Communications/Press-Releases/Understanding-a-credibility-interval%E2%80%9D-and-how-it-d.aspx>) (AAPOR), opt-in surveys cannot be considered representative of the intended population, in this case Muslims. The AAPOR says that in these cases (<http://www.aapor.org/AAPORKentico/Education-Resources/For-Researchers/Poll-Survey-FAQ/Why-Sampling-Works.aspx>), "the pollster has no idea who is responding to the question" and that these kind (<http://www.aapor.org/AAPORKentico/Communications/Press-Releases/Understanding-a-credibility-interval%E2%80%9D-and-how-it-d.aspx>) of "polls do not have such a 'grounded statistical tie' to the population."

So when O'Reilly and guest Zuhdi Jasser pointed to this survey and made claims about what "25% of three million, which is hundreds of thousands of Muslims" believe, it's not only a misleading statement—it's outright false.

This survey does not represent the views of American Muslims. It only represents the views of the 600 Muslims that it polled.

LOADED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Another problem with this poll is the way that questions and answers are phrased. Often, they are not neutral but are imbued with assumptions, and replicate, in an interrogative form, statements that Gaffney and CSP have declared as fact for years. In one question, respondents are asked: "Do you believe the Muslim Brotherhood in America accurately represents your views?" Packed into this question is the assertion that the Brotherhood indeed exists in the United States —something that Gaffney has long propagated. Those who answer "yes" confirm his suspicions, while those who answer "no" acknowledge nonetheless that the group is present here. They're put into a lose-lose situation.

In several questions that are asked about shariah, the content of what shariah actually is remains unexamined. Even when Gaffney's survey appears to be more nuanced by asking Muslims how they would "characterize shariah," it only offers options about how broadly sharia—whatever it is—should be applied. Answers ranging from "guide to the personal practice of Islam" to Gaffney's (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqV8syZPPT4>) preferred option ("the Muslim God Allah's law that Muslims must follow and impose worldwide via jihad") still don't allow Muslims to express about what they believe about shariah.

Respondents' likely answered questions on shariah based on their understanding of the concept, but those views were not measured in the survey, nor communicated to the Fox News audience. Instead viewers are left to believe that Muslim Americans support shariah as Gaffney and O'Reilly have portrayed it for years: a "brutally repressive" law hostile to non-Muslims (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNsQjN4vpqk>). At the end of the day, Gaffney and O'Reilly make it look like Muslims support things they actually don't.

SELECTIVE READING AND EXAGGERATIONS

Sixty-percent of respondents agreed that "shariah as interpreted by Islamic authorities is compatible with the U.S. Constitution, including freedom of speech and other rights," and 51% chose this definition of jihad: "Muslims' peaceful, personal struggle to be more religious." These rare but helpful nuances are not even alluded to in the promotion and coverage of the survey's findings in conservative outlets like Fox News.

O'Reilly also makes exaggerations that the already-flawed data doesn't support. "Fifty-one percent [of Muslims] say sharia law should be the reigning law," he said. But that language is nowhere in the survey data he's likely referencing, which says that "a majority (51%) agreed that 'Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to shariah.'"

Despite its unreliability, the survey and its findings have spread quickly, with generalizations (http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/06/poll_shows_high_levels_of_support_for_shariah_law_and_violence_am) about American Muslims ricocheting (<http://www.frontpagemag.com/2015/dgreenfield/1-in-5-us-muslims-support-violence-to-enforce-islamic-law/>) across the Internet and social media (<https://twitter.com/ProgsToday/status/613782066354765824>), and bleeding into more mainstream outlets. Unfortunately, the general public is not equipped with the tools or knowledge to dissect such claims and is left to accept them at face value. This is especially so when they're touted by a trusted personality, like Bill O'Reilly, and confirm pre-existing beliefs about Muslims.

Though the public may not see it, the problems with this poll are numerous: CSP has a history of fabricating fear about Islam and Muslims; the survey's questions and answers are loaded with bias; and its creators and proponents falsely claim that its findings represent the views of all American Muslims.

The American public shouldn't trust this poll.

EXHIBIT 61

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Says 25 percent of U.S. Muslims "agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad."

— [Donald Trump](#) on Monday, December 7th, 2015 in a campaign statement



Trump cites shaky survey in call to ban Muslims from entering US

By [Lauren Carroll](#), [Louis Jacobson](#) on Wednesday, December 9th, 2015 at 3:48 p.m.





Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks during a rally in Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Dec. 7, 2015. (AP Photo/Mic Smith)

Donald Trump turned to polling data to justify his proposal to temporarily ban all Muslims from entering the United States.

"According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population," the Republican presidential candidate said in a [Dec. 7 statement](#). "Most recently, a poll from the Center for Security Policy released data showing 25 percent of those polled agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad, and 51 percent of those polled agreed that Muslims in America should have the choice of being governed according to shariah."

There's a lot packed into that quote, but we decided to focus on Trump's claim that 25 percent of Muslims polled by the Center for Security Policy agree that global jihad justifies violence against Americans.

While the study Trump cited does exist, it's not at all clear that it supports his argument that "there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population." There are several important problems with the survey that call into question whether the results are representative of the entire U.S. Muslim population.

Trump's poll

The Center for Security Policy, a hawkish think tank, surveyed 600 Muslims and released findings in June [under the headline](#), "Poll of U.S. Muslims Reveals Ominous Levels Of Support For Islamic Supremacists' Doctrine of Shariah, Jihad."

Among the findings is 25 percent of respondents agreed either slightly or strongly with the statement "Violence against Americans here in the United States can be justified as part of the global jihad." About 64 percent disagreed.

The first problem with the Center for Security policy poll has to do with methodology. It was an online, opt-in survey, which tend to produce less reliable samples because respondents choose to participate. In traditional polling methods, everyone in a population has a chance of being selected for the survey, meaning the results generally reflect the country's demographics.

Numerous respected polling groups, like Survey Monkey, use opt-in surveys, said Christopher C. Hull, a former adjunct professor at Georgetown University who now works with the Center for Security Policy and answered an inquiry from PolitiFact on the group's behalf. He added that the method is useful for reaching small populations, such as U.S. Muslims, who only make up about [1 percent of the population](#).

Hull did caution, however, that "one cannot extrapolate directly from an online, opt-in survey to the broader U.S. population."

One notable finding buried in the full survey data: It found that 23 percent of the U.S. Muslims surveyed said they are "not at all familiar with" the terrorist group known as the Islamic State, and 18 percent said they are not familiar with al-Qaida. Experts said it seems illogical that such a large percentage of American Muslims would not have knowledge of the two groups.

"The al-Qaida number seems entirely implausible and likely a canary in a coal mine as to the unrepresentativeness of this survey," said David Dutwin, executive vice president and chief methodologist at SSRS, a research firm.

There may be further problems with the poll, including the reality that many American Muslims are immigrants and not fluent in English, and that the survey asked leading questions with limited response choices, according to a critique by the *Washington Post*'s [Philip Bump](#).

It's also worth noting that the head of the Center for Security Policy, [Frank Gaffney](#), has articulated a variety of theories about Muslim extremists that verge on conspiracy, such as the idea that the [Muslim Brotherhood has infiltrated](#) the United States government and the [false narrative](#) that President Barack Obama is Muslim.

Robert Oldendick, executive director of the Institute for Public Service and Policy Research at the University of South Carolina, reviewed the survey methodology made available by the Center for Security Policy but said he still didn't have enough information to assess whether it's a good or bad poll. The group has not disclosed how the surveyors targeted participants and what the response rate was.

"I would view these results very cautiously," Oldendick said. "It may be right, but it may not be. But the information to identify the quality of the sample is just not there."

Compared with Pew

Trump also mentioned research by the Pew Research Center as support for his proposal.

On a key point, the results of the Center for Security Policy study diverge from the results of a 2011 [Pew Research](#) study, a traditional telephone survey of 1,033 U.S. Muslims. The methodology of the Pew poll, and the organization's reputation, is considered solid by public-opinion experts.

The Pew survey asked whether "suicide bombing/other violence against civilians is justified to defend Islam from its enemies." Just 1 percent said it is "often" justified, while 12 percent said it is "sometimes" or "rarely" justified. Eighty-one percent said it is "never" justified.

According to Pew in 2011, about 13 percent of American Muslims said they believe that violence in the name of Islam is justifiable. That's half the rate of the Center for Security Policy finding of 25 percent.

The 2011 Pew study also found that a "significant minority" -- 21 percent -- of American Muslims feel that there is a great deal or a fair amount of support for extremism in the American Muslim community.

The Center for Security Policy survey results do not directly back up Trump's proposal to stop Muslims from entering the United States, said Kellyanne Conway, president of the Polling Company, which conducted the survey on the center's behalf.

"We did not -- nor would we -- ask whether the U.S. should ban all Muslims," she said.

The Center for Security Policy poll has touched a nerve because it "asked questions that other polling firms are refusing to ask," Hull said, defending the results.

"When people do not like the results of a poll, they attack the poll's methodology and sponsor," he said. "This situation is no different."

Our ruling

Trump said that 25 percent of U.S. Muslims "agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified as a part of the global jihad."

Trump is referring to a poll conducted by the Center for Security Policy. However, polling experts raise numerous questions about the validity of the poll's results, including its "opt-in" methodology and the dubiously large percentages of respondents who said they were unaware of ISIS or al-Qaida. Moreover, an official with the Center for Security Policy cautioned against generalizing the poll results to the entire Muslim-American community.

Another survey, which experts consider credible, found levels about half as high as what the Center for Security Policy poll found.

We rate Trump's claim Mostly False.

EXHIBIT 62

GAFFNEY: America's first Muslim president?

By - *The Washington Times* - Tuesday, June 9, 2009

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

COMMENTARY:

During his White House years, William Jefferson Clinton — someone Judge Sonia Sotomayor might call a “white male” — was dubbed “America’s first black president” by a black admirer. Applying the standard of identity politics and pandering to a special interest that earned Mr. Clinton that distinction, Barack Hussein Obama would have to be considered America’s first Muslim president.

This is not to say, necessarily, that Mr. Obama actually is a Muslim any more than Mr. Clinton actually is black. After his five months in office, and most especially after his just-concluded visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, however, a stunning conclusion seems increasingly plausible: The man now happy to have his Islamic-rooted middle name featured prominently has engaged in the most consequential bait-and-switch since Adolf Hitler duped Neville Chamberlain over Czechoslovakia at Munich.

What little we know about Mr. Obama’s youth certainly suggests that he not only had a Kenyan father who was Muslim, but spent his early, formative years as one in Indonesia. As the president likes to say, “much has been made” — in this case by him and his campaign handlers — of the fact that he became a Christian as an adult in Chicago, under the now-notorious Pastor Jeremiah A. Wright.

With Mr. Obama’s unbelievably ballyhooed address in Cairo Thursday to what he calls “the Muslim world” (hereafter known as “the Speech”), there is mounting evidence that the president not only identifies with Muslims, but actually may still be one himself. Consider the following indicators:

- Mr. Obama referred four times in his speech to “the Holy Koran.” Non-Muslims — even pandering ones — generally don’t use that Islamic formulation.

- Mr. Obama established his firsthand knowledge of Islam (albeit without mentioning his reported upbringing in the faith) with the statement, "I have known Islam on three continents before coming to the region where it was first revealed." Again, "revealed" is a depiction Muslims use to reflect their conviction that the Koran is the word of God, as dictated to Muhammad.

- Then the president made a statement no believing Christian — certainly not one versed, as he professes to be, in the ways of Islam — would ever make. In the context of what he euphemistically called the "situation between Israelis, Palestinians and Arabs," Mr. Obama said he looked forward to the day "... when Jerusalem is a secure and lasting home for Jews and Christians and Muslims, and a place for all of the children of Abraham to mingle peacefully together as in the story of Isra, when Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (peace be upon them) joined in prayer."

Now, the term "peace be upon them" is invoked by Muslims as a way of blessing deceased holy men. According to Islam, that is what all three were - dead prophets. Of course, for Christians, Jesus is the living and immortal Son of God.

In the final analysis, it may be beside the point whether Mr. Obama actually is a Muslim. In the Speech and elsewhere, he has aligned himself with adherents to what authoritative Islam calls Shariah — notably, the dangerous global movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood — to a degree that makes Mr. Clinton's fabled affinity for blacks pale by comparison.

For example, Mr. Obama has — from literally his inaugural address onward — inflated the numbers and, in that way and others, exaggerated the contemporary and historical importance of Muslim-Americans in the United States. In the Speech, he used the Brotherhood's estimates of "nearly 7 million Muslims" in this country, at least twice the estimates from other, more reputable sources. (Who knows? By the time Mr. Obama's friends in the radical Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now (ACORN) perpetrate their trademark books-cooking as deputy 2010 census takers, the official count may well claim considerably more than 7 million Muslims are living here.)

Even more troubling were the commitments the president made in Cairo to promote Islam in America. For instance, he declared: "I consider it part of my responsibility as president of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear." He vowed to ensure that women can cover their heads, including, presumably, when having their photographs taken for passports, driver's licenses or other identification purposes. He also pledged to enable Muslims to engage in

zakat, their faith's requirement for tithing, even though four of the eight types of charity called for by Shariah can be associated with terrorism. Not surprisingly, a number of Islamic "charities" in this country have been convicted of providing material support for terrorism.

Particularly worrying is the realignment Mr. Obama has announced in U.S. policy toward Israel. While he pays lip service to the "unbreakable" bond between America and the Jewish state, the president has unmistakably signaled that he intends to compel the Israelis to make territorial and other strategic concessions to Palestinians to achieve the hallowed two-state solution. In doing so, he ignores the inconvenient fact that both the Brotherhood's Hamas and Abu Mazen's Fatah remain determined to achieve a one-state solution, whereby the Jews will be driven "into the sea."

Whether Mr. Obama actually is a Muslim or simply plays one in the presidency may, in the end, be irrelevant. What is alarming is that in aligning himself and his policies with those of Shariah-adherents such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the president will greatly intensify the already enormous pressure on peaceful, tolerant American Muslims to submit to such forces - and heighten expectations, here and abroad, that the rest of us will do so as well.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy.

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THE REPUBLICAN TICKET: TRUMP AND PENCE

Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and his running mate, Indiana Gov. Mike Pence, speak to Lesley Stahl in their first joint interview

2016 JUL 17 CORRESPONDENT **LESLEY STAHL** COMMENTS **215** FACEBOOK TWITTER STUMBLE

The following is a script from "The Republican Ticket" which aired on July 17, 2016. Lesley Stahl is the correspondent. Richard Bonin and Ruth Streeter, producers.

The Republican National Convention that begins tomorrow in Cleveland will star Donald Trump and his chosen running mate the governor of Indiana, Mike Pence.

The Republican leadership has praised Pence as a good choice to unite the party. He's known as a reliable conservative with close ties to the religious right and he also has good relations with Republicans in Congress, having served six terms in the House of Representatives.



60 MINUTES OVERTIME
WHAT KIND OF VICE PRESIDENT WOULD MIKE PENCE BE?

But there are significant areas in terms of values and policy where he has differed with Mr. Trump in the past.

We had the chance to ask the two of them about that in their first and only interview together, yesterday afternoon in New York, in Trump's three-story penthouse apartment in the Trump Tower.

Lesley Stahl: First of all, Governor Pence, congratulations.

60 MINUTES ALL ACCESS



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Mike Pence: Thank you.

"IT'S VERY, VERY HUMBLING AND I COULDN'T BE MORE HONORED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RUN WITH, AND SERVE WITH, THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES."

Lesley Stahl: This has probably come as a huge, life-changing moment for you.

Mike Pence: It has. It's very, very humbling and I couldn't be more honored to have the opportunity to run with, and serve with, the next president of the United States.

Lesley Stahl: Before we actually talk about the politics, you know, there've been so many major world events very recently, in the last week. I don't know if you can remember the last time we have seen a world this much in chaos. You even said, "It's spinning apart." Are you ready for this world that we are facing today?



Donald Trump: We're both ready. I've no doubt. We need toughness. We need strength. Obama's weak, Hillary's weak. And part of it is that, a big part of it. We need law and order. We need strong borders.

Lesley Stahl: But all reactions to what's been going on aren't muscular. For example, look what happened in Turkey. There was a military coup in a democratic country; a NATO ally. How would you respond to that?

Donald Trump: Well, as a president, I'm going to be-- you know, they've been an ally and I stay with our allies. They have been an ally. But that was a quick coup. I was actually surprised to see how well it was handled. And you know who really handled it? The people. So, I mean, we can say what we want, but the people handled it. When they surrounded the army tanks and without the people, you would've never had it. The military would've taken over.

"WE'RE BOTH READY. I'VE NO DOUBT. WE NEED TOUGHNESS. WE NEED STRENGTH. OBAMA'S WEAK, HILLARY'S WEAK."

Mike Pence: But I truly do believe that the larger issue here is declining American power in the world. I truly do believe that history teaches that weakness arouses evil and whether it be the horrific attack in France, the inspired attacks here in the United States, the instability in Turkey that led to a coup. I think that is all a result of a foreign policy of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama that has led from behind and that has sent an inexact, unclear message about American resolve. One of the reasons why I said yes in a heartbeat to run with this man, is because he embodies American strength, and I know that he will provide that kind of broad-shouldered American strength on the global stage as well.

Lesley Stahl: Let's talk about what happened in Nice, horrendous, carnage, horrible--

Donald Trump: Horrible.

Lesley Stahl: Horrible. You said you would declare war against ISIS. What exactly do you have--

Donald Trump: It is war. By the way, it is war.

Lesley Stahl: No, but does that-- when you say, "Declare war," do you want to send American troops in there? Is that what you mean?

Donald Trump: Look, we have people that hate us. We have people that want to wipe us out. We're gonna declare war against ISIS. We have to wipe out ISIS. These are people that--



Lesley Stahl: With troops on the ground?

60 MINUTES ALL ACCESS

Donald Trump: I am going to have very few troops on the ground. We're going to have unbelievable intelligence, which we need; which, right now, we don't have. We don't have the people over there. We are going to use--

Lesley Stahl: You want to send Americans--

Donald Trump: Excuse me-- and we're going to have surrounding states and, very importantly, get NATO involved because we support NATO far more than we should, frankly, because you have a lot of countries that aren't doing what they're supposed to be doing. And we have to wipe out ISIS. And speaking of Turkey, Turkey is an ally. Turkey can do it by themselves. But they have to be incentivized. For whatever reason, they're not. So we have no choice.

Lesley Stahl: But I still don't know if you're going to send troops over--

Donald Trump: Very little. I'm gonna--

Lesley Stahl: But declare war--

Donald Trump: --get neighboring states and I'm going to get-- we are going to get NATO; we're going to wipe 'em out. We're gonna--

Lesley Stahl: But declare war?

Mike Pence: Lesley--

Lesley Stahl: What does that mean--


Mike Pence: This is-- this is the kind-- this is the kind of leadership that America needs and it--

Lesley Stahl: But what--

Mike Pence: --and it begins with deciding to destroy the enemies of our freedom.

Lesley Stahl: How?

Mike Pence: And how we do that? I have every confidence. You-- you remember I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee. And I'm very confident that when Donald Trump becomes president of the United States, he'll give a directive to our military commanders, bring together other nations, and we will use the enormous resources of the United States to destroy that enemy.



Donald Trump: Now look, we are going to get rid of ISIS, big league. And we're going to get rid of 'em fast. And we're going to use surrounding states. We're going to use NATO, probably. And we're going to declare war. It is war. When the World Trade Center comes tumbling down, with thousands of people being killed, people are still-- I have friends that are still--

Lesley Stahl: But we did go to war, if you remember. We went to Iraq.

Donald Trump: Yeah, you went to Iraq, but that was handled so badly. And that was a war-- by the way, that was a war that we shouldn't have entered because Iraq did not knock down-- excuse me

Lesley Stahl: Your running mate--

Donald Trump: Iraq did not--

Lesley Stahl: --voted for it.

Donald Trump: I don't care.

Lesley Stahl: What do you mean you don't care that he voted for?

Donald Trump: It's a long time ago. And he voted that way and they were also misled. A lot of information was given to people.

Lesley Stahl: But you've harped on this.

Donald Trump: But I was against the war in Iraq from the beginning.

Lesley Stahl: Yeah, but you've used that vote of Hillary's that was the same as Governor Pence as the example of her bad judgment.



60 MINUTES OVERTIME
**TRUMP OK WITH PENCE'S VOTE
FOR IRAQ WAR, BUT NOT CLINTON'S**

Donald Trump: Many people have, and frankly, I'm one of the few that was right on Iraq.

Lesley Stahl: Yeah, but what about he--

Donald Trump: He's entitled to make a mistake every once in a while.

Lesley Stahl: But she's not? OK, come on--

Donald Trump: But she's not--

Lesley Stahl: She's not?

Donald Trump: No. She's not.

Lesley Stahl: Got it.

Lesley Stahl: I have to move on or we're never gonna find out why he chose you. Why did you pick him? You had other candidates--

Donald Trump: OK, I did. I had a lot of people that wanted it; a lot more people than anybody--

Lesley Stahl: That came to you and begged you for it?

Donald Trump: That called me and came to me and wanted it badly. And you know, the press didn't report that. The press said, "Well, maybe he's having hard time picking--"

Lesley Stahl: Well, what about the governor? Did he want it like that?

Donald Trump: I actually brought it up to him.

Lesley Stahl: OK.

Donald Trump: I got to know him during the-- when I was in Indiana during the primaries, and I did very well in Indiana, like I did just about everywhere else in all fairness. But-- I got to know him very well and I gained great respect for him. And I looked at the numbers, meaning the financials, which we would say in business. But I looked at the numbers. Unemployment? What a great job he did. Jobs? What a great job he did. Triple-A rating on his bonds.

Lesley Stahl: --but you went to him and said--

Donald Trump: I did--

Lesley Stahl: Would you want to be considered--

Donald Trump: I broached it.

Lesley Stahl: He didn't -- And then he said, "I-- I really want it." So why did you pick him?

Donald Trump: I would say that he thought about it a little bit. And about two seconds later, he called me, with his incredible wife, and said--

Lesley Stahl: That I'd like to be-- but what--

Donald Trump: Like many others.

Lesley Stahl: How does he help you? How does he help you win in terms of groups of people? And what is your weakness that he compensates for and so forth--

Donald Trump: Well, I went for the quality individual rather than I'm gonna win a state, because I'm doing very well in Indiana, and I guess I'm a lot up. And I think I'm gonna win Indiana. I have a great relationship and Bobby Knight helped me so much with Indiana. Indiana's a great place; great state.

Lesley Stahl: Why didn't you pick him? No, I'm joking -- moving on.

Donald Trump: He would've been very good. But he's a terrific guy. But-- but I really like him as an individual.

Lesley Stahl: So you must've considered, obviously, by the reaction to your choice, a lot of the conservatives are very happy.

Donald Trump: Very happy.

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Lesley Stahl: Was that part of the--

Donald Trump: Yes, it was party unity. I'm an outsider. I am a person that used to be establishment when I'd give them hundreds of thousands of dollars. But when I decided to run, I became very anti-establishment because I understand the system--

Lesley Stahl: Is he establishment?

Donald Trump: --than anybody else. He's very establishment, in many ways, and that's not a bad thing. But I will tell you--

Lesley Stahl: That's kind of interesting --

Donald Trump: --I have seen more people that, frankly, did not like me so much, and now they're saying, "What a great pick." You see the kinda reaction. He has helped bring the party together. I understand. Look, I got more votes than anybody, but I also understand there's a faction--

Lesley Stahl: Is it already unified, do you think?

Donald Trump: I think it's very close to unified. And I will say--

Lesley Stahl: Just because of this pick?

Donald Trump: No. I think it's be-- I think it was much more unified than people thought. You saw that with the recent vote where we won in a landslide. You saw that with the big vote, the primary vote. I think it's far more unified than the press lets on. But having Governor Mike Pence has really-- people that I wasn't necessarily liking or getting along are loving this pick, because they have such respect for him.

Lesley Stahl: And that was--

Donald Trump: And the party unity is OK. You know, I think it's OK to say I picked somebody, because I-- as one of the things. But I really believe the main reason I picked him is the incredible job he's done. Just look at the economics of Indiana--

Lesley Stahl: Indiana--

Donald Trump: --and what's going on.

Lesley Stahl: But what about the chemistry between you two? You don't really know each other that well. You're -- at least I've read, a very low-key, very religious, you're a brash New Yorker--

Donald Trump: Religious.

Lesley Stahl: Religious?

Donald Trump: Religious--

Lesley Stahl: Are you?

Donald Trump: Yea, religious.

Lesley Stahl: --you wouldn't--

Donald Trump: Hey, I won the evangelicals. The evangelicals--

Lesley Stahl: That doesn't--

Mike Pence: You know, nobody thought--

Donald Trump: --well, I think it means a lot. I don't think they think I'm perfect, and they would get up and they would say, "You know, he's not perfect," but--

Lesley Stahl: They'd point to the --

Donald Trump: --they like me--

Lesley Stahl: --divorces--

Donald Trump: --but I won-- I won states with evangelicals that nobody thought I'd even come close to--

Lesley Stahl: Well, that's true--

Donald Trump:--and I won--

Lesley Stahl: --so you didn't (UNINTEL)--

Donald Trump: --with landslides--

Lesley Stahl: --need him for the evangelicals?

60 MINUTES ALL ACCESS

Donald Trump: I think it helps. But I don't think I needed him, no, because--I won with evangelicals.

Mike Pence: But I think we have more in common--

Lesley Stahl: Yeah, tell me--

Mike Pence: --than--

Lesley Stahl: --what you think you have in common.

Donald Trump: --what might be immediately obvious.

Lesley Stahl: Besides issues. Values and things like that.

Donald Trump: I think we will have very, very good chemistry. I feel that. And I can feel that pretty early on. I don't think you need to be with somebody for two years to find that out. My feeling is--

Lesley Stahl: Your gut feeling.

Donald Trump: I knew him during the primaries, during many trips to Indiana, I'd be with him. I think we have a great chemistry.

Lesley Stahl: I want to ask you though about something you've said about negative campaigning.

Donald Trump: Yeah.

Lesley Stahl: You said negative campaigning is wrong, and a campaign ought to demonstrate the basic decency of the candidate.

Mike Pence: Right.

Lesley Stahl: With that in mind, what do you think about your running mate's campaign and the tone and the negativity of it?

Mike Pence: I think this is a good man who's been talking about the issues the American people care about.

Lesley Stahl: But name-calling?

Mike Pence: In that--

Lesley Stahl: "Lyin' Ted?"

Mike Pence: --in the essay that I wrote a long time ago, I said campaigns oughta be about something more important than just one candidate's election. And-- and this campaign and Donald Trump's candidacy has been about the issues the American people care about.

Lesley Stahl: --but what about--

Donald Trump: Lesley, Lesley--

Lesley Stahl: --the negative side? He apologized for being a negative--

Donald Trump: We're different people. I understand that. I'll give you an example. Hillary Clinton is a liar. Hillary Clinton-- that was just proven--

Lesley Stahl: That's--

Donald Trump: --last week.

Lesley Stahl: --that's negative--

Donald Trump: Hillary Clinton--

Lesley Stahl: By the way --

Donald Trump: --you better believe it. Hillary Clinton is a crook.

Lesley Stahl: That's negative--

Donald Trump: I call her "Crooked Hillary." She's crooked Hillary. He won't-- I-- I don't-- I didn't ask him to do it, but I don't think he should do it because it's different for him.

Lesley Stahl: But-- he--

Donald Trump: He's not that kind of a--

Lesley Stahl: He probably--

Donald Trump: --person. We're different people--

Lesley Stahl: --don't you think he--

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Donald Trump: --to me she's--

Lesley Stahl: --thinks that's--

Donald Trump: --Crooked Hillary.

Lesley Stahl: --wrong?

Donald Trump: I don't think he should use that term. I've never said one way or the other. But to him, I don't think it would sound right, but he will say how dishonest she is by going over the facts.

Lesley Stahl: But would you go to him-- let's say you won, you're the vice president, your office is, I assume, down the hall, and you go in and you say, "You know, you shouldn't be saying-- name-calling." Would you do that? Would you go in and say, "You crossed the line, I think you should apologize?" Would you do something like that?

Mike Pence: Look, I--

Lesley Stahl: He's laughing.

Mike Pence: --it's probably-- it's-- it's probably--

Lesley Stahl: It's OK.

Mike Pence: --obvious to people that our styles are different. But I promise you, our vision is exactly the same.

Lesley Stahl: No, but would you--

Mike Pence: And let me be--

Lesley Stahl: --will--

Mike Pence: --clear--

Lesley Stahl: --will you answer that? Would you go in --

Mike Pence: Well the-- one of the things I found out about this man is he appreciates candor. And--

Lesley Stahl: So you would go in--

Mike Pence: --I-- I--

Donald Trump: I'd like him to if he thinks I was doing something wrong--

Lesley Stahl: Would you listen--

Donald Trump: --just say--

Lesley Stahl: --to him--

Mike Pence: Yeah.

Lesley Stahl: --if he said you--

Donald Trump: Absolutely--

Lesley Stahl: --crossed the line.

Donald Trump: --absolutely. I might not apologize. You know, you said apologize, but--

Lesley Stahl: I did say apologize.

Donald Trump: But I might not do that, but I would absolutely want him to come in-- if he thinks I'm doing something wrong, Mike, I would want him to come in and say, really, you're doing, you gotta-- and that's OK. I accept that from my consultants and my people and if Mike came in and told me, you know, "I think you should do this or that--

Lesley Stahl: Back off that.

Donald Trump: I would listen and very likely listen to him.

Lesley Stahl: Do you think John McCain is not a hero because he was captured?

Mike Pence: I have a great deal of respect for John McCain, and--

Lesley Stahl: Do you think he went too far?

Donald Trump: You could say yes. I-- that's OK.

Donald Trump: That one, you could say yes, I mean, you're not--it's fine - hey, look, I like John McCain. But we have to take care of our vets.

Lesley Stahl: No, but I wanna know if--

Donald Trump: OK, but I'm just--

Lesley Stahl:-Mr. Pence would go in and--

Donald Trump:-I'm just saying, that's--

Lesley Stahl: --say to you--

Donald Trump: --why not that many people are that upset--

Lesley Stahl: What are you -- what did you say? You know, would you do something like that?

Mike Pence: I promise you that when the circumstances arise where I have a difference on policy or on presentation, I have-- I can tell you in my heart, I know-- I would have no hesitation, were I privileged to be vice president, to walk into the president's office, close the door, and share my heart. And I also know this good man would listen, and has the leadership qualities to draw from the people around him.

Lesley Stahl: Let's talk about-- some of the issues. Because there seems to be some daylight between you two, and we can just tick-- go quickly through these. Immigration. Mr. Trump, you have called for a temporary ban on Muslims entering the United States. Do you agree with that?

Mike Pence: I do. In fact, in Indiana we suspended the Syrian refugee program in the wake of the terrorist attack. We have no higher priority than the safety and security of the people of this country, and Donald Trump--

Lesley Stahl: Now--

Mike Pence: --is right to--

Lesley Stahl: --in December--

Mike Pence: --articulate that view.

Lesley Stahl: --in December you tweeted, and I quote you, "Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional."

Donald Trump: So you call it territories. OK? We're gonna do territories. We're gonna not let people come in from Syria that nobody knows who they are. Hillary Clinton wants 550 percent more people to come in than Obama--

Lesley Stahl: So you--

Donald Trump: --who doesn't know what he's--

Lesley Stahl: --so you're changing--

Donald Trump: --so we're going to--

Lesley Stahl: --your position.

Donald Trump: --no, I-- call it whatever you want. We'll call it territories, OK?

Lesley Stahl: So not Muslims?

Donald Trump: You know-- the Constitution -- there's nothing like it. But it doesn't necessarily give us the right to commit suicide, as a country, OK? And I'll tell you this. Call it whatever you want, change territories, but there are territories and terror states and terror nations that we're not gonna allow the people to come into our country. And we're gonna have a thing called "Extreme vetting." And if people wanna come in, there's gonna be extreme vetting. We're gonna have extreme vetting. They're gonna come in and we're gonna know where they came from and who they are.

Mike Pence: You just asked me--if I'm comfortable with that--

Mike Pence: --and I am. What-- what Donald--

Lesley Stahl: You're on the same--

Mike Pence: Which--

Lesley Stahl: --page on that?

Mike Pence: --clearly-- clearly this man is not a politician. He doesn't speak like a politician--

Lesley Stahl: He's done pretty well.

Mike Pence: --he-- he speaks from his--

Mike Pence: --heart--

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Donald Trump: Is that a good thing? I think that's a good thing.

Mike Pence: --he speaks from his heart. And--

Lesley Stahl: Well, I--

Donald Trump: Well, I-- I speak from my heart and my brain. Just so we understand.

Mike Pence: Right.

Donald Trump: This is (points to head) maybe more important.

Lesley Stahl: Let's go to trade. You have voted for every trade agreement when you were in Congress--

Mike Pence: I have.

Lesley Stahl: --that came before you. You're supporting the Trans-Pacific partnership that Mr. Trump says would rape this country. Now, are you gonna be able to go out and campaign in support of his protectionist positions?

Mike Pence: I support free trade, and so does Donald Trump.

Lesley Stahl: Not really--

Donald Trump: I do. I'm free trade, but I wanna make good deals. No, no, I'm all for free--

Lesley Stahl: You've talked

Donald Trump: --trade. You--

Lesley Stahl: --about--

Donald Trump: --know I'm not an isolationist. A lot of people think because I wanna make good deals--

Lesley Stahl: You wanna undo--

Donald Trump: --these are stupid people--

Lesley Stahl: --these--

Donald Trump: --wait a minute Lesley, these are stupid people that think that. I wanna make great deals for our country. We have deals like the deal signed by Bill Clinton, NAFTA, one of the worst things that ever happened to this country in terms of trade, in terms of economics.

Lesley Stahl: What do you think about NAFTA?

Mike Pence: You're absolutely right. I've supported free trade throughout my career. But--

Lesley Stahl: OK.

Mike Pence: --the truth of the matter is NAFTA has provisions in that law that call for it to be reviewed, that have never been-- never been-- initiated. What-- what I hear Donald Trump saying is let's-- let's look at these trade agreements and reconsider them and renegotiate them. And--

Lesley Stahl: And you're OK with--

Mike Pence: --with regard to--

Lesley Stahl: --that?

Mike Pence: --and with regard to other trade agreements, we've talked about this. I-- I really do believe when the American people elect one of the best negotiators in the world as president of the United States, we would do well--

Donald Trump: We're gonna bring back jobs--

Mike Pence: --to negotiate individually with countries.

Donald Trump: We're gonna bring back our jobs, we're gonna bring back our wealth, we're gonna take care of our people. Very simple.

Lesley Stahl: OK. More issues. Waterboarding. Mr. Trump wants to bring back waterboarding, and quote, "A hell of a lot more." Are you comfortable with bringing back waterboarding?

Mike Pence: I don't think we should ever tell our enemy what our tactics are.

Lesley Stahl: But what about that? What--

Mike Pence: I don't--

Lesley Stahl: --about-- he's publicly--

Donald Trump: I like that answer.

Lesley Stahl: --said that--

Mike Pence: I don't think we should-- I-- I think--

Lesley Stahl: But are you OK with the idea of--

Mike Pence: --I think--

Lesley Stahl: --waterboarding?

Mike Pence: --I think enhanced interrogation saved lives.

Lesley Stahl: And you're OK with--

Mike Pence: I--

Lesley Stahl: --that?

Mike Pence: --what I'm OK with-- what I'm OK with is protecting the American people. What I'm OK with is when people have the intent to come to this country and take American lives, that-- that we are-- that we are prepared to do what's necessary to gain the information to protect the people of this country--

Donald Trump: But Lesley, let's step further. We have an enemy, ISIS and others, who chop off heads, who drown people in steel cages and we can't do waterboarding--

Lesley Stahl: OK, but, but why--

Donald Trump: OK, they're not playing--

Lesley Stahl: --would you use their--

Donald Trump: --under -- because you know--

Lesley Stahl: --techniques?

Donald Trump: --what, those techniques get information. I don't care what anyone says.

Lesley Stahl: Are you agreeing with him?

Mike Pence: I am--

Donald Trump: And get information--

Mike Pence: --what I--

Donald Trump: --using those things.

Mike Pence: --what I can tell you is enhanced information gleaned information that saved American lives and, I was informed, prevented incoming terrorist attacks on this country from being successful. The American people expect the president of the United States to be prepared to support action to protect the people of this nation, and I know Donald Trump will.

Lesley Stahl: Have you answered me?

Mike Pence: I have.

Lesley Stahl: Let's talk about the convention. You're a showman. What are you going to do to keep it from being a snooze-o-rama, as some have happened.

Donald Trump: Well, I think we're gonna have an exciting time. We've got some wonderful speakers. We have some very talented people. My family's gonna speak.

Lesley Stahl: Worried about violence outside? This is an open-carry state. People can carry guns. There'll be demonstrators. They've already said they're going to carry assault rifles. Are you worried? And would you call on people not to carry their guns?

Donald Trump: I have great faith in law enforcement. If they don't want to take their guns, I think that's fantastic. But I have great confidence in law enforcement. The police like Donald Trump. It's law and order. And I have great confidence that they will do a great job.

Lesley Stahl: There's no question in anybody's mind that you want to win this election. I don't think anyone would doubt that. But what about being president? Do you really want to be president of the United States?

Donald Trump: I want to make America great again. Honestly. I want to make Am-- I'm not doing this because-- I'm sacrificing tremendous things. I could be doing other things. It's

lovely to sit down with you and be grilled. That's okay. But I could be doing other things right now. And I have some of the greatest properties in the world. I could be out there--

Lesley Stahl: Would you rather be out there?

Donald Trump: I tell you what. I've really enjoyed this process. I've gotten to know the people of this country. I've gotten to know places that I didn't know, that I read about, but I didn't know. I've also gotten to see the problems. And it's a movement.

Donald Trump: Now, when you ask me the question, do I wanna be?

Lesley Stahl: Yeah.

Donald Trump: I wanna be for one reason. I wanna make America safe again, and I wanna make America great again. That's why I'm doing this. And I love it.

Lesley Stahl: And you wanna govern? I mean it--

Donald Trump: I do wanna govern.

Lesley Stahl: It is different--

Donald Trump: I do--

Lesley Stahl: --building a movement--

Donald Trump: I govern my-- I--

Lesley Stahl: --and than-- going in there with the nitty gritty and--

Lesley Stahl: --all that tough decision making.

Donald Trump: Sure. No, no I wanna govern

Lesley Stahl: OK, this is my absolute final question.

Donald Trump: OK.

Lesley Stahl: You're not known to be a humble man. But I wonder--

Donald Trump: I think I am, actually humble. I think I'm much more humble than you would understand.

Lesley Stahl: As you think about-- prospect of running this country in these tough times where the world is spinning apart-- are you awed? Are you intimidated? Are you humbled by the enormity of this?

Donald Trump: You just said it best.

Mike Pence: Mmm.

Donald Trump: In a world that's spinning apart. That's what I'm thinking of. I'm not thinking of, "Oh gee, isn't this wonderful? Isn't this great what I've done?" I've had people that said, "It doesn't matter if you win or lose, what you've done has never been done before. You're gonna go down in the history books." You know what I say to 'em?" I say, "You're wrong." I will consider it, 'cause I funded my own primaries, I'm funding now a lot of this campaign. I'm putting in, you know-- I've spent \$55 million in the primaries. I'm spending a fortunate now. I'll tell you, it is spinning. Our world is spinning out of control. Our country's spinning out of control. That's what I think about. And I'll stop that.

Lesley Stahl: Not-- humbled or-- awe.

Mike Pence: I can say to 'ya-- what--

Lesley Stahl: Go ahead.

Mike Pence: Talking with him in private settings, I love the words you used because this man is awed with the American people, and he is not intimidated by the world. And Donald Trump, this good man, I believe, will be a great president of the United States.

Donald Trump: I love what he just said.

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Lesley Stahl

One of America's most recognized and experienced broadcast journalists, Lesley Stahl has been a 60 Minutes correspondent since 1991.

EXHIBIT 64



John Woolley and Gerhard Peters

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PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

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Presidential Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri
October 9, 2016

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PARTICIPANTS:

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (D) and
Businessman Donald Trump (R)

MODERATORS:

Anderson Cooper (CNN) and
Martha Raddatz (ABC News)

RADDATZ: Ladies and gentlemen the Republican nominee for president, Donald J. Trump, and the Democratic nominee for president, Hillary Clinton. [applause]

COOPER: Thank you very much for being here. We're going to begin with a question from one of the members in our town hall. Each of you will have two minutes to respond to this question. Secretary Clinton, you won the coin toss, so you'll go first. Our first question comes from Patrice Brock. Patrice?

QUESTION: Thank you, and good evening. The last debate could have been rated as MA, mature audiences, per TV parental guidelines. Knowing that educators assign viewing the presidential debates as students' homework, do you feel you're modeling appropriate and positive behavior for today's youth?

CLINTON: Well, thank you. Are you a teacher? Yes, I think that that's a very good question, because I've heard from lots of teachers and parents about some of their concerns about some of the things that are being said and done in this campaign.

And I think it is very important for us to make clear to our children that our country really is great because we're good. And we are going to respect one another, lift each other up. We are going to be looking for ways to celebrate our diversity, and we are going to try to reach out to every boy and girl, as well as every adult, to bring them in to working on behalf of our country.

I have a very positive and optimistic view about what we can do together. That's why the slogan of my campaign is "Stronger Together," because I think if we work together, if we overcome the divisiveness that sometimes sets Americans against one another, and instead we make some big goals—and I've set forth some big goals, getting the economy to work for everyone, not just those at the top, making sure that we have the best education system from preschool through college and making it affordable, and so much else.

If we set those goals and we go together to try to achieve them, there's nothing in my opinion that America can't do. So that's why I hope that we will come together in this campaign. Obviously, I'm hoping to earn your vote, I'm hoping to be elected in November, and I can promise you, I will work with every American.

I want to be the president for all Americans, regardless of your political beliefs, where you come from, what you look like, your religion. I want us to heal our country and bring it together because that's, I think, the best way for us to get the future that our children and our grandchildren deserve.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, thank you. Mr. Trump, you have two minutes.

TRUMP: Well, I actually agree with that. I agree with everything she said. I began this campaign because I was so tired of seeing such foolish things happen to our country. This is a great country. This is a great land. I've gotten to know the people of the country over the last year-and-a-half that I've been doing this as a politician. I cannot believe I'm saying that about myself, but I guess I have been a politician.

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And my whole concept was to make America great again. When I watch the deals being made, when I watch what's happening with some horrible things like Obamacare, where your health insurance and health care is going up by numbers that are astronomical, 68 percent, 59 percent, 71 percent, when I look at the Iran deal and how bad a deal it is for us, it's a one-sided transaction where we're giving back \$150 billion to a terrorist state, really, the number one terror state, we've made them a strong country from really a very weak country just three years ago.

When I look at all of the things that I see and all of the potential that our country has, we have such tremendous potential, whether it's in business and trade, where we're doing so badly. Last year, we had almost \$800 billion trade deficit. In other words, trading with other countries. We had an \$800 billion deficit. It's hard to believe. Inconceivable.

You say who's making these deals? We're going to make great deals. We're going to have a strong border. We're going to bring back law and order. Just today, policemen was shot, two killed. And this is happening on a weekly basis. We have to bring back respect to law enforcement. At the same time, we have to take care of people on all sides. We need justice.

But I want to do things that haven't been done, including fixing and making our inner cities better for the African-American citizens that are so great, and for the Latinos, Hispanics, and I look forward to doing it. It's called make America great again.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump. The question from Patrice was about are you both modeling positive and appropriate behavior for today's youth? We received a lot of questions online, Mr. Trump, about the tape that was released on Friday, as you can imagine. You called what you said locker room banter. You described kissing women without consent, grabbing their genitals. That is sexual assault. You bragged that you have sexually assaulted women. Do you understand that?

TRUMP: No, I didn't say that at all. I don't think you understood what was—this was locker room talk. I'm not proud of it. I apologize to my family. I apologize to the American people. Certainly I'm not proud of it. But this is locker room talk.

You know, when we have a world where you have ISIS chopping off heads, where you have—and, frankly, drowning people in steel cages, where you have wars and horrible, horrible sights all over, where you have so many bad things happening, this is like medieval times. We haven't seen anything like this, the carnage all over the world.

And they look and they see. Can you imagine the people that are, frankly, doing so well against us with ISIS? And they look at our country and they see what's going on.

Yes, I'm very embarrassed by it. I hate it. But it's locker room talk, and it's one of those things. I will knock the hell out of ISIS. We're going to defeat ISIS. ISIS happened a number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of bad judgment. And I will tell you, I will take care of ISIS.

COOPER: So, Mr. Trump...

TRUMP: And we should get on to much more important things and much bigger things.

COOPER: Just for the record, though, are you saying that what you said on that bus 11 years ago that you did not actually kiss women without consent or grope women without consent?

TRUMP: I have great respect for women. Nobody has more respect for women than I do.

COOPER: So, for the record, you're saying you never did that?

TRUMP: I've said things that, frankly, you hear these things I said. And I was embarrassed by it. But I have tremendous respect for women.

COOPER: Have you ever done those things?

TRUMP: And women have respect for me. And I will tell you: No, I have not. And I will tell you that I'm going to make our country safe. We're going to have borders in our country, which we don't have now. People are pouring into our country, and they're coming in from the Middle East and other places.

We're going to make America safe again. We're going to make America great again, but we're going to make America safe again. And we're going to make America wealthy again, because if you don't do that, it just—it sounds harsh to say, but we have to build up the wealth of our nation.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

TRUMP: Right now, other nations are taking our jobs and they're taking our wealth.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

TRUMP: And that's what I want to talk about.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, do you want to respond?

CLINTON: Well, like everyone else, I've spent a lot of time thinking over the last 48 hours about what we heard and saw. You know, with prior Republican nominees for president, I disagreed with them on politics, policies, principles, but I never questioned their fitness to serve.

Donald Trump is different. I said starting back in June that he was not fit to be president and commander-in-chief. And many Republicans and independents have said the same thing. What we all saw and heard on Friday was Donald talking about women, what he thinks about women, what he does to women. And he has said that the video doesn't represent who he is.

But I think it's clear to anyone who heard it that it represents exactly who he is. Because we've seen this throughout the campaign. We have seen him insult women. We've seen him rate women on their appearance, ranking them from one to ten. We've seen him embarrass women on TV and on Twitter. We saw him after the first debate spend nearly a week denigrating a former Miss Universe in the harshest, most personal terms.

So, yes, this is who Donald Trump is. But it's not only women, and it's not only this video that raises questions about his fitness to be our president, because he has also targeted immigrants, African-Americans, Latinos, people with disabilities, POWs, Muslims, and so many others.

So this is who Donald Trump is. And the question for us, the question our country must answer is that this is not who we are. That's why—to go back to your question—I want to send a message—we all should—to every boy and girl and, indeed, to the entire world that America already is great, but we are great because we are good, and we will respect one another, and we will work with one another, and we will celebrate our diversity.

These are very important values to me, because this is the America that I know and love. And I can pledge to you tonight that this is the America that I will serve if I'm so fortunate enough to become your president.

RADDATZ: And we want to get to some questions from online...

TRUMP: Am I allowed to respond to that? I assume I am.

RADDATZ: Yes, you can respond to that.

TRUMP: It's just words, folks. It's just words. Those words, I've been hearing them for many years. I heard them when they were running for the Senate in New York, where Hillary was going to bring back jobs to upstate New York and she failed.

I've heard them where Hillary is constantly talking about the inner cities of our country, which are a disaster education-wise, jobwise, safety-wise, in every way possible. I'm going to help the African-Americans. I'm going to help the Latinos, Hispanics. I am going to help the inner cities.

She's done a terrible job for the African-Americans. She wants their vote, and she does nothing, and then she comes back four years later. We saw that firsthand when she was United States senator. She campaigned where the primary part of her campaign...

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, Mr. Trump—I want to get to audience questions and online questions.

TRUMP: So, she's allowed to do that, but I'm not allowed to respond?

RADDATZ: You're going to have—you're going to get to respond right now.

TRUMP: Sounds fair.

RADDATZ: This tape is generating intense interest. In just 48 hours, it's become the single most talked about story of the entire 2016 election on Facebook, with millions and millions of people discussing it on the social network. As we said a moment ago, we do want to bring in questions from voters around country via social media, and our first stays on this topic. Jeff from Ohio asks on Facebook, "Trump says the campaign has changed him. When did that happen?" So, Mr. Trump, let me add to that. When you walked off that bus at age 59, were you a different man or did that behavior continue until just recently? And you have two minutes for this.

TRUMP: It was locker room talk, as I told you. That was locker room talk. I'm not proud of it. I am a person who has great respect for people, for my family, for the people of this country. And certainly, I'm not proud of it. But that was something that happened.

If you look at Bill Clinton, far worse. Mine are words, and his was action. His was what he's done to women. There's never been anybody in the history politics in this nation that's been so abusive to women. So you can say any way you want to say it, but Bill Clinton was abusive to women.

Hillary Clinton attacked those same women and attacked them viciously. Four of them here tonight. One of the women, who is a wonderful woman, at 12 years old, was raped at 12. Her client she represented got him off, and she's seen laughing at two separate occasions, laughing at the girl who was raped. Kathy Shelton, that young woman is here with us tonight.

So don't tell me about words. I am absolutely—I apologize for those words. But it is things that people say. But what President Clinton did, he was impeached, he lost his license to practice law. He had to pay an \$850,000 fine to one of the women. Paula Jones, who's also here tonight.

And I will tell you that when Hillary brings up a point like that and she talks about words that I said 11 years ago, I think it's disgraceful, and I think she should be ashamed of herself, if you want to know the truth. *[applause]*

RADDATZ: Can we please hold the applause? Secretary Clinton, you have two minutes.

CLINTON: Well, first, let me start by saying that so much of what he's just said is not right, but he gets to run his campaign any way he chooses. He gets to decide what he wants to talk about. Instead of answering people's questions, talking about our agenda, laying out the plans that we have that we think can make a better life and a better country, that's his choice.

When I hear something like that, I am reminded of what my friend, Michelle Obama, advised us all: When they go low, you go high. *[applause]*

And, look, if this were just about one video, maybe what he's saying tonight would be understandable, but everyone can draw their own conclusions at this point about whether or not the man in the video or the man on the stage respects women. But he never apologizes for anything to anyone.

He never apologized to Mr. and Mrs. Khan, the Gold Star family whose son, Captain Khan, died in the line of duty in Iraq. And Donald insulted and attacked them for weeks over their religion.

He never apologized to the distinguished federal judge who was born in Indiana, but Donald said he couldn't be trusted to be a judge because his parents were, quote, "Mexican."

He never apologized to the reporter that he mimicked and mocked on national television and our children were watching. And he never apologized for the racist lie that President Obama was not born in the United States of America. He owes the president an apology, he owes our country an apology, and he needs to take responsibility for his actions and his words.

TRUMP: Well, you owe the president an apology, because as you know very well, your campaign, Sidney Blumenthal—he's another real winner that you have—and he's the one that got this started, along with your campaign manager, and they were on television just two weeks ago, she was, saying exactly that. So you really owe him an apology. You're the one that sent the pictures around your campaign, sent the pictures around with President Obama in a certain garb. That was long before I was ever involved, so you actually owe an apology.

Number two, Michelle Obama. I've gotten to see the commercials that they did on you. And I've gotten to see some of the most vicious commercials I've ever seen of Michelle Obama talking about you, Hillary.

So, you talk about friend? Go back and take a look at those commercials, a race where you lost fair and square, unlike the Bernie Sanders race, where you won, but not fair and square, in my opinion. And all you have to do is take a look at WikiLeaks and just see what they say about Bernie Sanders and see what Deborah Wasserman Schultz had in mind, because Bernie Sanders, between super-delegates and Deborah Wasserman Schultz, he never had a chance. And I was so surprised to see him sign on with the devil.

But when you talk about apology, I think the one that you should really be apologizing for and the thing that you should be apologizing for are the 33,000 e-mails that you deleted, and that you acid washed, and then the two boxes of e-mails and other things last week that were taken from an office and are now missing.

And I'll tell you what. I didn't think I'd say this, but I'm going to say it, and I hate to say it. But if I win, I am going to instruct my attorney general to get a special prosecutor to look into your situation, because there has never been so many lies, so much deception. There has never been anything like it, and we're going to have a special prosecutor.

When I speak, I go out and speak, the people of this country are furious. In my opinion, the people that have been long-term workers at the FBI are furious. There has never been anything like this, where e-mails—and you get a subpoena, you

get a subpoena, and after getting the subpoena, you delete 33,000 e-mails, and then you acid wash them or bleach them, as you would say, very expensive process.

So we're going to get a special prosecutor, and we're going to look into it, because you know what? People have been—their lives have been destroyed for doing one-fifth of what you've done. And it's a disgrace. And honestly, you ought to be ashamed of yourself.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, I want to follow up on that.

[*crosstalk*]

RADDATZ: I'm going to let you talk about e-mails.

CLINTON: ... because everything he just said is absolutely false, but I'm not surprised.

TRUMP: Oh, really?

CLINTON: In the first debate...[*laughter*]

RADDATZ: And really, the audience needs to calm down here.

CLINTON: ... I told people that it would be impossible to be fact-checking Donald all the time. I'd never get to talk about anything I want to do and how we're going to really make lives better for people.

So, once again, go to HillaryClinton.com. We have literally Trump—you can fact check him in real time. Last time at the first debate, we had millions of people fact checking, so I expect we'll have millions more fact checking, because, you know, it is—it's just awfully good that someone with the temperament of Donald Trump is not in charge of the law in our country.

TRUMP: Because you'd be in jail. [*applause*]

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton...

COOPER: We want to remind the audience to please not talk out loud. Please do not applaud. You're just wasting time.

RADDATZ: And, Secretary Clinton, I do want to follow up on e- mails. You've said your handing of your e-mails was a mistake. You disagreed with FBI Director James Comey, calling your handling of classified information, quote, "extremely careless." The FBI said that there were 110 classified e-mails that were exchanged, eight of which were top secret, and that it was possible hostile actors did gain access to those e-mails. You don't call that extremely careless?

CLINTON: Well, Martha, first, let me say—and I've said before, but I'll repeat it, because I want everyone to hear it—that was a mistake, and I take responsibility for using a personal e-mail account. Obviously, if I were to do it over again, I would not. I'm not making any excuses. It was a mistake. And I am very sorry about that.

But I think it's also important to point out where there are some misleading accusations from critics and others. After a year-long investigation, there is no evidence that anyone hacked the server I was using and there is no evidence that anyone can point to at all—anyone who says otherwise has no basis—that any classified material ended up in the wrong hands.

I take classified materials very seriously and always have. When I was on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I was privy to a lot of classified material. Obviously, as secretary of state, I had some of the most important secrets that we possess, such as going after bin Laden. So I am very committed to taking classified information seriously. And as I said, there is no evidence that any classified information ended up in the wrong hands.

RADDATZ: OK, we're going to move on.

TRUMP: And yet she didn't know the word—the letter C on a document. Right? She didn't even know what that word—what that letter meant.

You know, it's amazing. I'm watching Hillary go over facts. And she's going after fact after fact, and she's lying again, because she said she—you know, what she did with the e-mail was fine. You think it was fine to delete 33,000 e-mails? I don't think so.

She said the 33,000 e-mails had to do with her daughter's wedding, number one, and a yoga class. Well, maybe we'll give three or three or four or five or something. 33,000 e-mails deleted, and now she's saying there wasn't anything wrong.

And more importantly, that was after getting a subpoena. That wasn't before. That was after. She got it from the United States Congress. And I'll be honest, I am so disappointed in congressmen, including Republicans, for allowing this to happen.

Our Justice Department, where our husband goes on to the back of a airplane for 39 minutes, talks to the attorney general days before a ruling is going to be made on her case. But for you to say that there was nothing wrong with you deleting 39,000 e-mails, again, you should be ashamed of yourself. What you did—and this is after getting a subpoena from the United States Congress.

COOPER: We have to move on.

TRUMP: You did that. Wait a minute. One second.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, you can respond, and then we got to move on.

RADDATZ: We want to give the audience a chance.

TRUMP: If you did that in the private sector, you'd be put in jail, let alone after getting a subpoena from the United States Congress.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, you can respond. Then we have to move on to an audience question.

CLINTON: Look, it's just not true. And so please, go to...

TRUMP: Oh, you didn't delete them?

COOPER: Allow her to respond, please.

CLINTON: It was personal e-mails, not official.

TRUMP: Oh, 33,000? Yeah.

CLINTON: Not—well, we turned over 35,000, so...

TRUMP: Oh, yeah. What about the other 15,000?

COOPER: Please allow her to respond. She didn't talk while you talked.

CLINTON: Yes, that's true, I didn't.

TRUMP: Because you have nothing to say.

CLINTON: I didn't in the first debate, and I'm going to try not to in this debate, because I'd like to get to the questions that the people have brought here tonight to talk to us about.

TRUMP: Get off this question.

CLINTON: OK, Donald. I know you're into big diversion tonight, anything to avoid talking about your campaign and the way it's exploding and the way Republicans are leaving you. But let's at least focus...

TRUMP: Let's see what happens...[*crosstalk*]

COOPER: Allow her to respond.

CLINTON: ... on some of the issues that people care about tonight. Let's get to their questions.

COOPER: We have a question here from Ken Karpowicz. He has a question about health care. Ken?

TRUMP: I'd like to know, Anderson, why aren't you bringing up the e-mails? I'd like to know. Why aren't you bringing...

COOPER: We brought up the e-mails.

TRUMP: No, it hasn't. It hasn't. And it hasn't been finished at all.

COOPER: Ken Karpowicz has a question.

TRUMP: It's nice to—one on three.

QUESTION: Thank you. Affordable Care Act, known as Obamacare, it is not affordable. Premiums have gone up. Deductibles have gone up. Copays have gone up. Prescriptions have gone up. And the coverage has gone down. What will you do to bring the cost down and make coverage better?

COOPER: That first one goes to Secretary Clinton, because you started out the last one to the audience.

CLINTON: If he wants to start, he can start. No, go ahead, Donald.

TRUMP: No, I'm a gentlemen, Hillary. Go ahead. *[laughter]*

COOPER: Secretary Clinton?

CLINTON: Well, I think Donald was about to say he's going to solve it by repealing it and getting rid of the Affordable Care Act. And I'm going to fix it, because I agree with you. Premiums have gotten too high. Copays, deductibles, prescription drug costs, and I've laid out a series of actions that we can take to try to get those costs down.

But here's what I don't want people to forget when we're talking about reining in the costs, which has to be the highest priority of the next president, when the Affordable Care Act passed, it wasn't just that 20 million got insurance who didn't have it before. But that in and of itself was a good thing. I meet these people all the time, and they tell me what a difference having that insurance meant to them and their families.

But everybody else, the 170 million of us who get health insurance through our employees got big benefits. Number one, insurance companies can't deny you coverage because of a pre-existing condition. Number two, no lifetime limits, which is a big deal if you have serious health problems.

Number three, women can't be charged more than men for our health insurance, which is the way it used to be before the Affordable Care Act. Number four, if you're under 26, and your parents have a policy, you can be on that policy until the age of 26, something that didn't happen before.

So I want very much to save what works and is good about the Affordable Care Act. But we've got to get costs down. We've got to provide additional help to small businesses so that they can afford to provide health insurance. But if we repeal it, as Donald has proposed, and start over again, all of those benefits I just mentioned are lost to everybody, not just people who get their health insurance on the exchange. And then we would have to start all over again.

Right now, we are at 90 percent health insurance coverage. That's the highest we've ever been in our country.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, your time is up.

CLINTON: So I want us to get to 100 percent, but get costs down and keep quality up.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, you have two minutes.

TRUMP: It is such a great question and it's maybe the question I get almost more than anything else, outside of defense. Obamacare is a disaster. You know it. We all know it. It's going up at numbers that nobody's ever seen worldwide. Nobody's ever seen numbers like this for health care.

It's only getting worse. In '17, it implodes by itself. Their method of fixing it is to go back and ask Congress for more money, more and more money. We have right now almost \$20 trillion in debt.

Obamacare will never work. It's very bad, very bad health insurance. Far too expensive. And not only expensive for the person that has it, unbelievably expensive for our country. It's going to be one of the biggest line items very shortly.

We have to repeal it and replace it with something absolutely much less expensive and something that works, where your plan can actually be tailored. We have to get rid of the lines around the state, artificial lines, where we stop insurance companies from coming in and competing, because they want—and President Obama and whoever was working on it—they want to leave those lines, because that gives the insurance companies essentially monopolies. We want competition.

You will have the finest health care plan there is. She wants to go to a single-payer plan, which would be a disaster, somewhat similar to Canada. And if you haven't noticed the Canadians, when they need a big operation, when something happens, they come into the United States in many cases because their system is so slow. It's catastrophic in certain ways.

But she wants to go to single payer, which means the government basically rules everything. Hillary Clinton has been after this for years. Obamacare was the first step. Obamacare is a total disaster. And not only are your rates going up by numbers that nobody's ever believed, but your deductibles are going up, so that unless you get hit by a truck, you're never going to be able to use it.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, your time...

TRUMP: It is a disastrous plan, and it has to be repealed and replaced.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, let me follow up with you. Your husband called Obamacare, quote, "the craziest thing in the world," saying that small-business owners are getting killed as premiums double, coverage is cut in half. Was he mistaken or was the mistake simply telling the truth?

CLINTON: No, I mean, he clarified what he meant. And it's very clear. Look, we are in a situation in our country where if we were to start all over again, we might come up with a different system. But we have an employer-based system. That's where the vast majority of people get their health care.

And the Affordable Care Act was meant to try to fill the gap between people who were too poor and couldn't put together any resources to afford health care, namely people on Medicaid. Obviously, Medicare, which is a single-payer system, which takes care of our elderly and does a great job doing it, by the way, and then all of the people who were employed, but people who were working but didn't have the money to afford insurance and didn't have anybody, an employer or anybody else, to help them.

That was the slot that the Obamacare approach was to take. And like I say, 20 million people now have health insurance. So if we just rip it up and throw it away, what Donald's not telling you is we just turn it back to the insurance companies the way it used to be, and that means the insurance companies...

COOPER: Secretary Clinton...

CLINTON: ... get to do pretty much whatever they want, including saying, look, I'm sorry, you've got diabetes, you had cancer, your child has asthma...

COOPER: Your time is up.

CLINTON: ... you may not be able to have insurance because you can't afford it. So let's fix what's broken about it, but let's not throw it away and give it all back to the insurance companies and the drug companies. That's not going to work.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, let me follow up on this.

TRUMP: Well, I just want—just one thing. First of all, Hillary, everything's broken about it. Everything. Number two, Bernie Sanders said that Hillary Clinton has very bad judgment. This is a perfect example of it, trying to save Obamacare, which is a disaster.

COOPER: You've said you want to end Obamacare...

TRUMP: By the way...

COOPER: You've said you want to end Obamacare. You've also said you want to make coverage accessible for people with pre-existing conditions. How do you force insurance companies to do that if you're no longer mandating that every American get insurance?

TRUMP: We're going to be able to. You're going to have plans...

COOPER: What does that mean?

TRUMP: Well, I'll tell you what it means. You're going to have plans that are so good, because we're going to have so much competition in the insurance industry. Once we break out—once we break out the lines and allow the competition to come...

COOPER: Are you going—are you going to have a mandate that Americans have to have health insurance?

TRUMP: President Obama—Anderson, excuse me. President Obama, by keeping those lines, the boundary lines around each state, it was almost gone until just very toward the end of the passage of Obamacare, which, by the way, was a fraud. You know that, because Jonathan Gruber, the architect of Obamacare, was said—he said it was a great lie, it was a big lie. President Obama said you keep your doctor, you keep your plan. The whole thing was a fraud, and it doesn't work.

But when we get rid of those lines, you will have competition, and we will be able to keep pre-existing, we'll also be able to help people that can't get—don't have money because we are going to have people protected.

And Republicans feel this way, believe it or not, and strongly this way. We're going to block grant into the states. We're going to block grant into Medicaid into the states...

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

TRUMP: ... so that we will be able to take care of people without the necessary funds to take care of themselves.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

RADDATZ: We now go to Gorbah Hamed with a question for both candidates.

QUESTION: Hi. There are 3.3 million Muslims in the United States, and I'm one of them. You've mentioned working with Muslim nations, but with Islamophobia on the rise, how will you help people like me deal with the consequences of being labeled as a threat to the country after the election is over?

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, you're first.

TRUMP: Well, you're right about Islamophobia, and that's a shame. But one thing we have to do is we have to make sure that—because there is a problem. I mean, whether we like it or not, and we could be very politically correct, but whether we like it or not, there is a problem. And we have to be sure that Muslims come in and report when they see something going on. When they see hatred going on, they have to report it.

As an example, in San Bernardino, many people saw the bombs all over the apartment of the two people that killed 14 and wounded many, many people. Horribly wounded. They'll never be the same. Muslims have to report the problems when they see them.

And, you know, there's always a reason for everything. If they don't do that, it's a very difficult situation for our country, because you look at Orlando and you look at San Bernardino and you look at the World Trade Center. Go outside. Look at Paris. Look at that horrible—these are radical Islamic terrorists.

And she won't even mention the word and nor will President Obama. He won't use the term "radical Islamic terrorism." Now, to solve a problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is or at least say the name. She won't say the name and President Obama won't say the name. But the name is there. It's radical Islamic terror. And before you solve it, you have to say the name.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton?

CLINTON: Well, thank you for asking your question. And I've heard this question from a lot of Muslim-Americans across our country, because, unfortunately, there's been a lot of very divisive, dark things said about Muslims. And even someone like Captain Khan, the young man who sacrificed himself defending our country in the United States Army, has been subject to attack by Donald.

I want to say just a couple of things. First, we've had Muslims in America since George Washington. And we've had many successful Muslims. We just lost a particular well-known one with Muhammad Ali.

My vision of America is an America where everyone has a place, if you're willing to work hard, you do your part, you contribute to the community. That's what America is. That's what we want America to be for our children and our grandchildren.

It's also very short-sighted and even dangerous to be engaging in the kind of demagogic rhetoric that Donald has about Muslims. We need American Muslims to be part of our eyes and ears on our front lines. I've worked with a lot of different Muslim groups around America. I've met with a lot of them, and I've heard how important it is for them to feel that they are wanted and included and part of our country, part of our homeland security, and that's what I want to see.

It's also important I intend to defeat ISIS, to do so in a coalition with majority Muslim nations. Right now, a lot of those nations are hearing what Donald says and wondering, why should we cooperate with the Americans? And this is a gift to ISIS and the terrorists, violent jihadist terrorists.

We are not at war with Islam. And it is a mistake and it plays into the hands of the terrorists to act as though we are. So I want a country where citizens like you and your family are just as welcome as anyone else.

RADDATZ: Thank you, Secretary Clinton.

Mr. Trump, in December, you said this. "Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what the hell is going on. We have no choice. We have no choice." Your running mate said this week that the Muslim ban is no longer your position. Is that correct? And if it is, was it a mistake to have a religious test?

TRUMP: First of all, Captain Khan is an American hero, and if I were president at that time, he would be alive today, because unlike her, who voted for the war without knowing what she was doing, I would not have had our people in Iraq. Iraq was disaster. So he would have been alive today.

The Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into an extreme vetting from certain areas of the world. Hillary Clinton wants to allow hundreds of thousands—excuse me. Excuse me..

RADDATZ: And why did it morph into that? No, did you—no, answer the question. Do you still believe...

TRUMP: Why don't you interrupt her? You interrupt me all the time.

RADDATZ: I do.

TRUMP: Why don't you interrupt her?

RADDATZ: Would you please explain whether or not the Muslim ban still stands?

TRUMP: It's called extreme vetting. We are going to areas like Syria where they're coming in by the tens of thousands because of Barack Obama. And Hillary Clinton wants to allow a 550 percent increase over Obama. People are coming into our country like we have no idea who they are, where they are from, what their feelings about our country is, and she wants 550 percent more. This is going to be the great Trojan horse of all time.

We have enough problems in this country. I believe in building safe zones. I believe in having other people pay for them, as an example, the Gulf states, who are not carrying their weight, but they have nothing but money, and take care of people. But I don't want to have, with all the problems this country has and all of the problems that you see going on, hundreds of thousands of people coming in from Syria when we know nothing about them. We know nothing about their values and we know nothing about their love for our country.

RADDATZ: And, Secretary Clinton, let me ask you about that, because you have asked for an increase from 10,000 to 65,000 Syrian refugees. We know you want tougher vetting. That's not a perfect system. So why take the risk of having those refugees come into the country?

CLINTON: Well, first of all, I will not let anyone into our country that I think poses a risk to us. But there are a lot of refugees, women and children—think of that picture we all saw of that 4-year-old boy with the blood on his forehead because he'd been bombed by the Russian and Syrian air forces.

There are children suffering in this catastrophic war, largely, I believe, because of Russian aggression. And we need to do our part. We by no means are carrying anywhere near the load that Europe and others are. But we will have vetting that is as tough as it needs to be from our professionals, our intelligence experts and others.

But it is important for us as a policy, you know, not to say, as Donald has said, we're going to ban people based on a religion. How do you do that? We are a country founded on religious freedom and liberty. How do we do what he has advocated without causing great distress within our own country? Are we going to have religious tests when people fly into our country? And how do we expect to be able to implement those?

So I thought that what he said was extremely unwise and even dangerous. And indeed, you can look at the propaganda on a lot of the terrorists sites, and what Donald Trump says about Muslims is used to recruit fighters, because they want to create a war between us.

And the final thing I would say, this is the 10th or 12th time that he's denied being for the war in Iraq. We have it on tape. The entire press corps has looked at it. It's been debunked, but it never stops him from saying whatever he wants to say.

TRUMP: That's not been debunked.

CLINTON: So, please...

TRUMP: That has not been debunked.

CLINTON: ... go to HillaryClinton.com and you can see it.

TRUMP: I was against—I was against the war in Iraq. Has not been debunked. And you voted for it. And you shouldn't have. Well, I just want to say...

RADDATZ: There's been lots of fact-checking on that. I'd like to move on to an online question...

TRUMP: Excuse me. She just went about 25 seconds over her time.

RADDATZ: She did not.

TRUMP: Could I just respond to this, please?

RADDATZ: Very quickly, please.

TRUMP: Hillary Clinton, in terms of having people come into our country, we have many criminal illegal aliens. When we want to send them back to their country, their country says we don't want them. In some cases, they're murderers, drug lords, drug problems. And they don't want them.

And Hillary Clinton, when she was secretary of state, said that's OK, we can't force it into their country. Let me tell you, I'm going to force them right back into their country. They're murderers and some very bad people.

And I will tell you very strongly, when Bernie Sanders said she had bad judgment, she has really bad judgment, because we are letting people into this country that are going to cause problems and crime like you've never seen. We're also letting drugs pour through our southern border at a record clip. At a record clip. And it shouldn't be allowed to happen.

ICE just endorsed me. They've never endorsed a presidential candidate. The Border Patrol agents, 16,500, just recently endorsed me, and they endorsed me because I understand the border. She doesn't. She wants amnesty for everybody. Come right in. Come right over. It's a horrible thing she's doing. She's got bad judgment, and honestly, so bad that she should never be president of the United States. That I can tell you.

RADDATZ: Thank you, Mr. Trump. I want to move on. This next question from the public through the Bipartisan Open Debate Coalition's online forum, where Americans submitted questions that generated millions of votes. This question involves WikiLeaks release of purported excerpts of Secretary Clinton's paid speeches, which she has refused to release, and one line in particular, in which you, Secretary Clinton, purportedly say you need both a public and private position on certain issues. So, Tu, from Virginia asks, is it OK for politicians to be two-faced? Is it acceptable for a politician to have a private stance on issues? Secretary Clinton, your two minutes.

CLINTON: Well, right. As I recall, that was something I said about Abraham Lincoln after having seen the wonderful Steven Spielberg movie called "Lincoln." It was a master class watching President Lincoln get the Congress to approve the 13th Amendment. It was principled, and it was strategic.

And I was making the point that it is hard sometimes to get the Congress to do what you want to do and you have to keep working at it. And, yes, President Lincoln was trying to convince some people, he used some arguments, convincing other people, he used other arguments. That was a great—I thought a great display of presidential leadership.

But, you know, let's talk about what's really going on here, Martha, because our intelligence community just came out and said in the last few days that the Kremlin, meaning Putin and the Russian government, are directing the attacks, the hacking on American accounts to influence our election. And WikiLeaks is part of that, as are other sites where the Russians hack information, we don't even know if it's accurate information, and then they put it out.

We have never in the history of our country been in a situation where an adversary, a foreign power, is working so hard to influence the outcome of the election. And believe me, they're not doing it to get me elected. They're doing it to try to influence the election for Donald Trump.

Now, maybe because he has praised Putin, maybe because he says he agrees with a lot of what Putin wants to do, maybe because he wants to do business in Moscow, I don't know the reasons. But we deserve answers. And we should demand that Donald release all of his tax returns so that people can see what are the entanglements and the financial relationships that he has...

RADDATZ: We're going to get to that later. Secretary Clinton, you're out of time.

CLINTON: ... with the Russians and other foreign powers.

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump?

TRUMP: Well, I think I should respond, because—so ridiculous. Look, now she's blaming—she got caught in a total lie. Her papers went out to all her friends at the banks, Goldman Sachs and everybody else, and she said things—WikiLeaks that just came out. And she lied. Now she's blaming the lie on the late, great Abraham Lincoln. That's one that I haven't...
[laughter]

OK, Honest Abe, Honest Abe never lied. That's the good thing. That's the big difference between Abraham Lincoln and you. That's a big, big difference. We're talking about some difference.

But as far as other elements of what she was saying, I don't know Putin. I think it would be great if we got along with Russia because we could fight ISIS together, as an example. But I don't know Putin.

But I notice, anytime anything wrong happens, they like to say the Russians are—she doesn't know if it's the Russians doing the hacking. Maybe there is no hacking. But they always blame Russia. And the reason they blame Russia because they think they're trying to tarnish me with Russia. I know nothing about Russia. I know—I know about Russia, but I know nothing about the inner workings of Russia. I don't deal there. I have no businesses there. I have no loans from Russia.

I have a very, very great balance sheet, so great that when I did the Old Post Office on Pennsylvania Avenue, the United States government, because of my balance sheet, which they actually know very well, chose me to do the Old Post Office,

between the White House and Congress, chose me to do the Old Post Office. One of the primary area things, in fact, perhaps the primary thing was balance sheet. But I have no loans with Russia. You could go to the United States government, and they would probably tell you that, because they know my sheet very well in order to get that development I had to have.

Now, the taxes are a very simple thing. As soon as I have—first of all, I pay hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes. Many of her friends took bigger deductions. Warren Buffett took a massive deduction. Soros, who's a friend of hers, took a massive deduction. Many of the people that are giving her all this money that she can do many more commercials than me gave her—took massive deductions.

I pay hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes. But—but as soon as my routine audit is finished, I'll release my returns. I'll be very proud to. They're actually quite great.

RADDATZ: Thank you, Mr. Trump.

COOPER: We want to turn, actually, to the topic of taxes. We have a question from Spencer Maass. Spencer?

QUESTION: Good evening. My question is, what specific tax provisions will you change to ensure the wealthiest Americans pay their fair share in taxes?

COOPER: Mr. Trump, you have two minutes.

TRUMP: Well, one thing I'd do is get rid of carried interest. One of the greatest provisions for people like me, to be honest with you, I give up a lot when I run, because I knock out the tax code. And she could have done this years ago, by the way. She's a United States—she was a United States senator.

She complains that Donald Trump took advantage of the tax code. Well, why didn't she change it? Why didn't you change it when you were a senator? The reason you didn't is that all your friends take the same advantage that I do. And I do. You have provisions in the tax code that, frankly, we could change. But you wouldn't change it, because all of these people gave you the money so you can take negative ads on Donald Trump.

But—and I say that about a lot of things. You know, I've heard Hillary complaining about so many different things over the years. "I wish you would have done this." But she's been there for 30 years she's been doing this stuff. She never changed. And she never will change. She never will change.

We're getting rid of carried interest provisions. I'm lowering taxes actually, because I think it's so important for corporations, because we have corporations leaving—massive corporations and little ones, little ones can't form. We're getting rid of regulations which goes hand in hand with the lowering of the taxes.

But we're bringing the tax rate down from 35 percent to 15 percent. We're cutting taxes for the middle class. And I will tell you, we are cutting them big league for the middle class.

And I will tell you, Hillary Clinton is raising your taxes, folks. You can look at me. She's raising your taxes really high. And what that's going to do is a disaster for the country. But she is raising your taxes and I'm lowering your taxes. That in itself is a big difference. We are going to be thriving again. We have no growth in this country. There's no growth. If China has a GDP of 7 percent, it's like a national catastrophe. We're down at 1 percent. And that's, like, no growth. And we're going lower, in my opinion. And a lot of it has to do with the fact that our taxes are so high, just about the highest in the world. And I'm bringing them down to one of the lower in the world. And I think it's so important—one of the most important things we can do. But she is raising everybody's taxes massively.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, you have two minutes. The question was, what specific tax provisions will you change to ensure the wealthiest Americans pay their fair share of taxes?

CLINTON: Well, everything you've heard just now from Donald is not true. I'm sorry I have to keep saying this, but he lives in an alternative reality. And it is sort of amusing to hear somebody who hasn't paid federal income taxes in maybe 20 years talking about what he's going to do.

But I'll tell you what he's going to do. His plan will give the wealthy and corporations the biggest tax cuts they've ever had, more than the Bush tax cuts by at least a factor of two. Donald always takes care of Donald and people like Donald, and this would be a massive gift. And, indeed, the way that he talks about his tax cuts would end up raising taxes on middle-class families, millions of middle-class families.

Now, here's what I want to do. I have said nobody who makes less than \$250,000 a year—and that's the vast majority of Americans as you know—will have their taxes raised, because I think we've got to go where the money is. And the money is with people who have taken advantage of every single break in the tax code.

And, yes, when I was a senator, I did vote to close corporate loopholes. I voted to close, I think, one of the loopholes he took advantage of when he claimed a billion-dollar loss that enabled him to avoid paying taxes.

I want to have a tax on people who are making a million dollars. It's called the Buffett rule. Yes, Warren Buffett is the one who's gone out and said somebody like him should not be paying a lower tax rate than his secretary. I want to have a surcharge on incomes above \$5 million.

We have to make up for lost times, because I want to invest in you. I want to invest in hard-working families. And I think it's been unfortunate, but it's happened, that since the Great Recession, the gains have all gone to the top. And we need to reverse that.

People like Donald, who paid zero in taxes, zero for our vets, zero for our military, zero for health and education, that is wrong.

COOPER: Thank you, Secretary.

CLINTON: And we're going to make sure that nobody, no corporation, and no individual can get away without paying his fair share to support our country.

COOPER: Thank you. I want to give you—Mr. Trump, I want to give you the chance to respond. I just wanted to tell our viewers what she's referring to. In the last month, taxes were the number-one issue on Facebook for the first time in the campaign. The New York Times published three pages of your 1995 tax returns. They show you claimed a \$916 million loss, which means you could have avoided paying personal federal income taxes for years. You've said you pay state taxes, employee taxes, real estate taxes, property taxes. You have not answered, though, a simple question. Did you use that \$916 million loss to avoid paying personal federal income taxes for years?

TRUMP: Of course I do. Of course I do. And so do all of her donors, or most of her donors. I know many of her donors. Her donors took massive tax write-offs.

COOPER: So have you paid personal federal income tax?

TRUMP: A lot of my—excuse me, Anderson—a lot of my write-off was depreciation and other things that Hillary as a senator allowed. And she'll always allow it, because the people that give her all this money, they want it. That's why.

See, I understand the tax code better than anybody that's ever run for president. Hillary Clinton—and it's extremely complex—Hillary Clinton has friends that want all of these provisions, including they want the carried interest provision, which is very important to Wall Street people. But they really want the carried interest provision, which I believe Hillary's leaving. Very interesting why she's leaving carried interest.

But I will tell you that, number one, I pay tremendous numbers of taxes. I absolutely used it. And so did Warren Buffett and so did George Soros and so did many of the other people that Hillary is getting money from. Now, I won't mention their names, because they're rich, but they're not famous. So we won't make them famous.

COOPER: So can you—can you say how many years you have avoided paying personal federal income taxes?

TRUMP: No, but I pay tax, and I pay federal tax, too. But I have a write-off, a lot of it's depreciation, which is a wonderful charge. I love depreciation. You know, she's given it to us.

Hey, if she had a problem—for 30 years she's been doing this, Anderson. I say it all the time. She talks about health care. Why didn't she do something about it? She talks about taxes. Why didn't she do something about it? She doesn't do anything about anything other than talk. With her, it's all talk and no action.

COOPER: In the past...

TRUMP: And, again, Bernie Sanders, it's really bad judgment. She has made bad judgment not only on taxes. She's made bad judgments on Libya, on Syria, on Iraq. I mean, her and Obama, whether you like it or not, the way they got out of Iraq, the vacuum they've left, that's why ISIS formed in the first place. They started from that little area, and now they're in 32 different nations, Hillary. Congratulations. Great job.

COOPER: Secretary—I want you to be able to respond, Secretary Clinton.

CLINTON: Well, here we go again. I've been in favor of getting rid of carried interest for years, starting when I was a senator from New York. But that's not the point here.

TRUMP: Why didn't you do it? Why didn't you do it?

COOPER: Allow her to respond.

CLINTON: Because I was a senator with a Republican president.

TRUMP: Oh, really?

CLINTON: I will be the president and we will get it done. That's exactly right.

TRUMP: You could have done it, if you were an effective—if you were an effective senator, you could have done it. If you were an effective senator, you could have done it. But you were not an effective senator.

COOPER: Please allow her to respond. She didn't interrupt you.

CLINTON: You know, under our Constitution, presidents have something called veto power. Look, he has now said repeatedly, "30 years this and 30 years that." So let me talk about my 30 years in public service. I'm very glad to do so.

Eight million kids every year have health insurance, because when I was first lady I worked with Democrats and Republicans to create the Children's Health Insurance Program. Hundreds of thousands of kids now have a chance to be adopted because I worked to change our adoption and foster care system. After 9/11, I went to work with Republican mayor, governor and president to rebuild New York and to get health care for our first responders who were suffering because they had run toward danger and gotten sickened by it. Hundreds of thousands of National Guard and Reserve members have health care because of work that I did, and children have safer medicines because I was able to pass a law that required the dosing to be more carefully done.

When I was secretary of state, I went around the world advocating for our country, but also advocating for women's rights, to make sure that women had a decent chance to have a better life and negotiated a treaty with Russia to lower nuclear weapons. Four hundred pieces of legislation have my name on it as a sponsor or cosponsor when I was a senator for eight years.

I worked very hard and was very proud to be re-elected in New York by an even bigger margin than I had been elected the first time. And as president, I will take that work, that bipartisan work, that finding common ground, because you have to be able to get along with people to get things done in Washington.

COOPER: Thank you, secretary.

CLINTON: I've proven that I can, and for 30 years, I've produced results for people.

COOPER: Thank you, secretary.

RADDATZ: We're going to move on to Syria. Both of you have mentioned that.

TRUMP: She said a lot of things that were false. I mean, I think we should be allowed to maybe...

RADDATZ: No, we can—no, Mr. Trump, we're going to go on. This is about the audience.

TRUMP: Excuse me. Because she has been a disaster as a senator. A disaster.

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, we're going to move on. The heart-breaking video of a 5-year-old Syrian boy named Omran sitting in an ambulance after being pulled from the rubble after an air strike in Aleppo focused the world's attention on the horrors of the war in Syria, with 136 million views on Facebook alone.

But there are much worse images coming out of Aleppo every day now, where in the past few weeks alone, 400 people have been killed, at least 100 of them children. Just days ago, the State Department called for a war crimes investigation of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad and its ally, Russia, for their bombardment of Aleppo.

So this next question comes through social media through Facebook. Diane from Pennsylvania asks, if you were president, what would you do about Syria and the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo? Isn't it a lot like the Holocaust when the U.S. waited too long before we helped? Secretary Clinton, we will begin with your two minutes.

CLINTON: Well, the situation in Syria is catastrophic. And every day that goes by, we see the results of the regime by Assad in partnership with the Iranians on the ground, the Russians in the air, bombarding places, in particular Aleppo, where there are hundreds of thousands of people, probably about 250,000 still left. And there is a determined effort by the Russian air force to destroy Aleppo in order to eliminate the last of the Syrian rebels who are really holding out against the Assad regime.

Russia hasn't paid any attention to ISIS. They're interested in keeping Assad in power. So I, when I was secretary of state, advocated and I advocate today a no-fly zone and safe zones. We need some leverage with the Russians, because they are not going to come to the negotiating table for a diplomatic resolution, unless there is some leverage over them. And we have to work more closely with our partners and allies on the ground.

But I want to emphasize that what is at stake here is the ambitions and the aggressiveness of Russia. Russia has decided that it's all in, in Syria. And they've also decided who they want to see become president of the United States, too, and it's not me. I've stood up to Russia. I've taken on Putin and others, and I would do that as president.

I think wherever we can cooperate with Russia, that's fine. And I did as secretary of state. That's how we got a treaty reducing nuclear weapons. It's how we got the sanctions on Iran that put a lid on the Iranian nuclear program without firing a single shot. So I would go to the negotiating table with more leverage than we have now. But I do support the effort to investigate for crimes, war crimes committed by the Syrians and the Russians and try to hold them accountable.

RADDATZ: Thank you, Secretary Clinton. Mr. Trump?

TRUMP: First of all, she was there as secretary of state with the so-called line in the sand, which...

CLINTON: No, I wasn't. I was gone. I hate to interrupt you, but at some point...

TRUMP: OK. But you were in contact—excuse me. You were...

CLINTON: At some point, we need to do some fact-checking here.

TRUMP: You were in total contact with the White House, and perhaps, sadly, Obama probably still listened to you. I don't think he would be listening to you very much anymore.

Obama draws the line in the sand. It was laughed at all over the world what happened.

Now, with that being said, she talks tough against Russia. But our nuclear program has fallen way behind, and they've gone wild with their nuclear program. Not good. Our government shouldn't have allowed that to happen. Russia is new in terms of nuclear. We are old. We're tired. We're exhausted in terms of nuclear. A very bad thing.

Now, she talks tough, she talks really tough against Putin and against Assad. She talks in favor of the rebels. She doesn't even know who the rebels are. You know, every time we take rebels, whether it's in Iraq or anywhere else, we're arming people. And you know what happens? They end up being worse than the people.

Look at what she did in Libya with Gadhafi. Gadhafi's out. It's a mess. And, by the way, ISIS has a good chunk of their oil. I'm sure you probably have heard that. It was a disaster. Because the fact is, almost everything she's done in foreign policy has been a mistake and it's been a disaster.

But if you look at Russia, just take a look at Russia, and look at what they did this week, where I agree, she wasn't there, but possibly she's consulted. We sign a peace treaty. Everyone's all excited. Well, what Russia did with Assad and, by the way, with Iran, who you made very powerful with the dumbest deal perhaps I've ever seen in the history of deal-making, the Iran deal, with the \$150 billion, with the \$1.7 billion in cash, which is enough to fill up this room.

But look at that deal. Iran now and Russia are now against us. So she wants to fight. She wants to fight for rebels. There's only one problem. You don't even know who the rebels are. So what's the purpose?

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, Mr. Trump, your two minutes is up.

TRUMP: And one thing I have to say.

RADDATZ: Your two minutes is up.

TRUMP: I don't like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS. And Iran is killing ISIS. And those three have now lined up because of our weak foreign policy.

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, let me repeat the question. If you were president...[laughter]...what would you do about Syria and the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo? And I want to remind you what your running mate said. He said provocations by Russia need to be met with American strength and that if Russia continues to be involved in air strikes along with the Syrian government forces of Assad, the United States of America should be prepared to use military force to strike the military targets of the Assad regime.

TRUMP: OK. He and I haven't spoken, and I disagree. I disagree.

RADDATZ: You disagree with your running mate?

TRUMP: I think you have to knock out ISIS. Right now, Syria is fighting ISIS. We have people that want to fight both at the same time. But Syria is no longer Syria. Syria is Russia and it's Iran, who she made strong and Kerry and Obama made into a very powerful nation and a very rich nation, very, very quickly, very, very quickly.

I believe we have to get ISIS. We have to worry about ISIS before we can get too much more involved. She had a chance to do something with Syria. They had a chance. And that was the line. And she didn't.

RADDATZ: What do you think will happen if Aleppo falls?

TRUMP: I think Aleppo is a disaster, humanitarian-wise.

RADDATZ: What do you think will happen if it falls?

TRUMP: I think that it basically has fallen. OK? It basically has fallen. Let me tell you something. You take a look at Mosul. The biggest problem I have with the stupidity of our foreign policy, we have Mosul. They think a lot of the ISIS leaders are in Mosul. So we have announcements coming out of Washington and coming out of Iraq, we will be attacking Mosul in three weeks or four weeks.

Well, all of these bad leaders from ISIS are leaving Mosul. Why can't they do it quietly? Why can't they do the attack, make it a sneak attack, and after the attack is made, inform the American public that we've knocked out the leaders, we've had a tremendous success? People leave. Why do they have to say we're going to be attacking Mosul within the next four to six weeks, which is what they're saying? How stupid is our country?

RADDATZ: There are sometimes reasons the military does that. Psychological warfare.

TRUMP: I can't think of any. I can't think of any. And I'm pretty good at it.

RADDATZ: It might be to help get civilians out.

TRUMP: And we have General Flynn. And we have—look, I have 200 generals and admirals who endorsed me. I have 21 Congressional Medal of Honor recipients who endorsed me. We talk about it all the time. They understand, why can't they do something secretly, where they go in and they knock out the leadership? How—why would these people stay there? I've been reading now...

RADDATZ: Tell me what your strategy is.

TRUMP: ... for weeks—I've been reading now for weeks about Mosul, that it's the harbor of where—you know, between Raqqa and Mosul, this is where they think the ISIS leaders are. Why would they be saying—they're not staying there anymore. They're gone. Because everybody's talking about how Iraq, which is us with our leadership, goes in to fight Mosul.

Now, with these 200 admirals and generals, they can't believe it. All I say is this. General George Patton, General Douglas MacArthur are spinning in their grave at the stupidity of what we're doing in the Middle East.

RADDATZ: I'm going to go to Secretary Clinton. Secretary Clinton, you want Assad to go. You advocated arming rebels, but it looks like that may be too late for Aleppo. You talk about diplomatic efforts. Those have failed. Cease-fires have failed. Would you introduce the threat of U.S. military force beyond a no-fly zone against the Assad regime to back up diplomacy?

CLINTON: I would not use American ground forces in Syria. I think that would be a very serious mistake. I don't think American troops should be holding territory, which is what they would have to do as an occupying force. I don't think that is a smart strategy.

I do think the use of special forces, which we're using, the use of enablers and trainers in Iraq, which has had some positive effects, are very much in our interests, and so I do support what is happening, but let me just...

RADDATZ: But what would you do differently than President Obama is doing?

CLINTON: Well, Martha, I hope that by the time I—if I'm fortunate...

TRUMP: Everything.

CLINTON: I hope by the time I am president that we will have pushed ISIS out of Iraq. I do think that there is a good chance that we can take Mosul. And, you know, Donald says he knows more about ISIS than the generals. No, he doesn't.

There are a lot of very important planning going on, and some of it is to signal to the Sunnis in the area, as well as Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, that we all need to be in this. And that takes a lot of planning and preparation.

I would go after Baghdadi. I would specifically target Baghdadi, because I think our targeting of Al Qaida leaders—and I was involved in a lot of those operations, highly classified ones—made a difference. So I think that could help.

I would also consider arming the Kurds. The Kurds have been our best partners in Syria, as well as Iraq. And I know there's a lot of concern about that in some circles, but I think they should have the equipment they need so that Kurdish and Arab fighters on the ground are the principal way that we take Raqqa after pushing ISIS out of Iraq.

RADDATZ: Thank you very much. We're going to move on...

TRUMP: You know what's funny? She went over a minute over, and you don't stop her. When I go one second over, it's like a big deal.

RADDATZ: You had many answers.

TRUMP: It's really—it's really very interesting.

COOPER: We've got a question over here from James Carter. Mr. Carter?

QUESTION: My question is, do you believe you can be a devoted president to all the people in the United States?

COOPER: That question begins for Mr. Trump.

TRUMP: Absolutely. I mean, she calls our people deplorable, a large group, and irredeemable. I will be a president for all of our people. And I'll be a president that will turn our inner cities around and will give strength to people and will give economics to people and will bring jobs back.

Because NAFTA, signed by her husband, is perhaps the greatest disaster trade deal in the history of the world. Not in this country. It stripped us of manufacturing jobs. We lost our jobs. We lost our money. We lost our plants. It is a disaster. And now she wants to sign TPP, even though she says now she's for it. She called it the gold standard. And by the way, at the last debate, she lied, because it turned out that she did say the gold standard and she said she didn't say it. They actually said that she lied. OK? And she lied. But she's lied about a lot of things.

I would be a president for all of the people, African-Americans, the inner cities. Devastating what's happening to our inner cities. She's been talking about it for years. As usual, she talks about it, nothing happens. She doesn't get it done.

Same with the Latino Americans, the Hispanic Americans. The same exact thing. They talk, they don't get it done. You go into the inner cities and—you see it's 45 percent poverty. African- Americans now 45 percent poverty in the inner cities. The education is a disaster. Jobs are essentially nonexistent.

I mean, it's—you know, and I've been saying at big speeches where I have 20,000 and 30,000 people, what do you have to lose? It can't get any worse. And she's been talking about the inner cities for 25 years. Nothing's going to ever happen.

Let me tell you, if she's president of the United States, nothing's going to happen. It's just going to be talk. And all of her friends, the taxes we were talking about, and I would just get it by osmosis. She's not doing any me favors. But by doing all the others' favors, she's doing me favors.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, thank you.

TRUMP: But I will tell you, she's all talk. It doesn't get done. All you have to do is take a look at her Senate run. Take a look at upstate New York.

COOPER: Your two minutes is up. Secretary Clinton, two minutes?

TRUMP: It turned out to be a disaster.

COOPER: You have two minutes, Secretary Clinton.

CLINTON: Well, 67 percent of the people voted to re-elect me when I ran for my second term, and I was very proud and very humbled by that.

Mr. Carter, I have tried my entire life to do what I can to support children and families. You know, right out of law school, I went to work for the Children's Defense Fund. And Donald talks a lot about, you know, the 30 years I've been in public service. I'm proud of that. You know, I started off as a young lawyer working against discrimination against African-American children in schools and in the criminal justice system. I worked to make sure that kids with disabilities could get a public education, something that I care very much about. I have worked with Latinos—one of my first jobs in politics was down in south Texas registering Latino citizens to be able to vote. So I have a deep devotion, to use your absolutely correct word, to making sure that an every American feels like he or she has a place in our country.

And I think when you look at the letters that I get, a lot of people are worried that maybe they wouldn't have a place in Donald Trump's America. They write me, and one woman wrote me about her son, Felix. She adopted him from Ethiopia

when he was a toddler. He's 10 years old now. This is the only one country he's ever known. And he listens to Donald on TV and he said to his mother one day, will he send me back to Ethiopia if he gets elected?

You know, children listen to what is being said. To go back to the very, very first question. And there's a lot of fear—in fact, teachers and parents are calling it the Trump effect. Bullying is up. A lot of people are feeling, you know, uneasy. A lot of kids are expressing their concerns.

So, first and foremost, I will do everything I can to reach out to everybody.

COOPER: Your time, Secretary Clinton.

CLINTON: Democrats, Republicans, independents, people across our country. If you don't vote for me, I still want to be your president.

COOPER: Your two minutes is up.

CLINTON: I want to be the best president I can be for every American.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, your two minutes is up. I want to follow up on something that Donald Trump actually said to you, a comment you made last month. You said that half of Donald Trump's supporters are, quote, "deplorables, racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic." You later said you regretted saying half. You didn't express regret for using the term "deplorables." To Mr. Carter's question, how can you unite a country if you've written off tens of millions of Americans?

CLINTON: Well, within hours I said that I was sorry about the way I talked about that, because my argument is not with his supporters. It's with him and with the hateful and divisive campaign that he has run, and the inciting of violence at his rallies, and the very brutal kinds of comments about not just women, but all Americans, all kinds of Americans.

And what he has said about African-Americans and Latinos, about Muslims, about POWs, about immigrants, about people with disabilities, he's never apologized for. And so I do think that a lot of the tone and tenor that he has said—I'm proud of the campaign that Bernie Sanders and I ran. We ran a campaign based on issues, not insults. And he is supporting me 100 percent.

COOPER: Thank you.

CLINTON: Because we talked about what we wanted to do. We might have had some differences, and we had a lot of debates...

COOPER: Thank you, Secretary.

TRUMP: ... but we believed that we could make the country better. And I was proud of that.

COOPER: I want to give you a minute to respond.

TRUMP: We have a divided nation. We have a very divided nation. You look at Charlotte. You look at Baltimore. You look at the violence that's taking place in the inner cities, Chicago, you take a look at Washington, D.C.

We have an increase in murder within our cities, the biggest in 45 years. We have a divided nation, because people like her—and believe me, she has tremendous hate in her heart. And when she said deplorables, she meant it. And when she said irredeemable, they're irredeemable, you didn't mention that, but when she said they're irredeemable, to me that might have been even worse.

COOPER: She said some of them are irredeemable.

TRUMP: She's got tremendous—she's got tremendous hatred. And this country cannot take another four years of Barack Obama, and that's what you're getting with her.

COOPER: Mr. Trump, let me follow up with you. In 2008, you wrote in one of your books that the most important characteristic of a good leader is discipline. You said, if a leader doesn't have it, quote, "he or she won't be one for very long." In the days after the first debate, you sent out a series of tweets from 3 a.m. to 5 a.m., including one that told people to check out a sex tape. Is that the discipline of a good leader?

TRUMP: No, there wasn't check out a sex tape. It was just take a look at the person that she built up to be this wonderful Girl Scout who was no Girl Scout.

COOPER: You mentioned sex tape.

TRUMP: By the way, just so you understand, when she said 3 o'clock in the morning, take a look at Benghazi. She said who is going to answer the call at 3 o'clock in the morning? Guess what? She didn't answer it, because when Ambassador Stevens...

COOPER: The question is, is that the discipline of a good leader?

TRUMP: ... 600—wait a minute, Anderson, 600 times. Well, she said she was awake at 3 o'clock in the morning, and she also sent a tweet out at 3 o'clock in the morning, but I won't even mention that. But she said she'll be awake. Who's going—the famous thing, we're going to answer our call at 3 o'clock in the morning. Guess what happened? Ambassador Stevens—Ambassador Stevens sent 600 requests for help. And the only one she talked to was Sidney Blumenthal, who's her friend and not a good guy, by the way. So, you know, she shouldn't be talking about that.

Now, tweeting happens to be a modern day form of communication. I mean, you can like it or not like it. I have, between Facebook and Twitter, I have almost 25 million people. It's a very effective way of communication. So you can put it down, but it is a very effective form of communication. I'm not un-proud of it, to be honest with you.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, does Mr. Trump have the discipline to be a good leader?

CLINTON: No.

TRUMP: I'm shocked to hear that. *[laughter]*

CLINTON: Well, it's not only my opinion. It's the opinion of many others, national security experts, Republicans, former Republican members of Congress. But it's in part because those of us who have had the great privilege of seeing this job up close and know how difficult it is, and it's not just because I watched my husband take a \$300 billion deficit and turn it into a \$200 billion surplus, and 23 million new jobs were created, and incomes went up for everybody. Everybody. African-American incomes went up 33 percent.

And it's not just because I worked with George W. Bush after 9/11, and I was very proud that when I told him what the city needed, what we needed to recover, he said you've got it, and he never wavered. He stuck with me.

And I have worked and I admire President Obama. He inherited the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. That was a terrible time for our country.

COOPER: We have to move along.

CLINTON: Nine million people lost their jobs.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, we have to...

CLINTON: Five million homes were lost.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, we're moving.

CLINTON: And \$13 trillion in family wealth was wiped out. We are back on the right track. He would send us back into recession with his tax plans that benefit the wealthiest of Americans.

RADDATZ: Secretary Clinton, we are moving to an audience question. We're almost out of time. We have another...

TRUMP: We have the slowest growth since 1929.

RADDATZ: We're moving to an audience question.

TRUMP: It is—our country has the slowest growth and jobs are a disaster.

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, Secretary Clinton, we want to get to the audience. Thank you very much both of you. *[laughter]*

We have another audience question. Beth Miller has a question for both candidates.

QUESTION: Good evening. Perhaps the most important aspect of this election is the Supreme Court justice. What would you prioritize as the most important aspect of selecting a Supreme Court justice?

RADDATZ: We begin with your two minutes, Secretary Clinton.

CLINTON: Thank you. Well, you're right. This is one of the most important issues in this election. I want to appoint Supreme Court justices who understand the way the world really works, who have real-life experience, who have not just been in a big law firm and maybe clerked for a judge and then gotten on the bench, but, you know, maybe they tried some more cases, they actually understand what people are up against.

Because I think the current court has gone in the wrong direction. And so I would want to see the Supreme Court reverse Citizens United and get dark, unaccountable money out of our politics. Donald doesn't agree with that.

I would like the Supreme Court to understand that voting rights are still a big problem in many parts of our country, that we don't always do everything we can to make it possible for people of color and older people and young people to be able to exercise their franchise. I want a Supreme Court that will stick with Roe v. Wade and a woman's right to choose, and I want a Supreme Court that will stick with marriage equality.

Now, Donald has put forth the names of some people that he would consider. And among the ones that he has suggested are people who would reverse Roe v. Wade and reverse marriage equality. I think that would be a terrible mistake and would take us backwards.

I want a Supreme Court that doesn't always side with corporate interests. I want a Supreme Court that understands because you're wealthy and you can give more money to something doesn't mean you have any more rights or should have any more rights than anybody else.

So I have very clear views about what I want to see to kind of change the balance on the Supreme Court. And I regret deeply that the Senate has not done its job and they have not permitted a vote on the person that President Obama, a highly qualified person, they've not given him a vote to be able to be have the full complement of nine Supreme Court justices. I think that was a dereliction of duty.

I hope that they will see their way to doing it, but if I am so fortunate enough as to be president, I will immediately move to make sure that we fill that, we have nine justices that get to work on behalf of our people.

RADDATZ: Thank you, Secretary Clinton. Thank you. You're out of time. Mr. Trump?

TRUMP: Justice Scalia, great judge, died recently. And we have a vacancy. I am looking to appoint judges very much in the mold of Justice Scalia. I'm looking for judges—and I've actually picked 20 of them so that people would see, highly respected, highly thought of, and actually very beautifully reviewed by just about everybody.

But people that will respect the Constitution of the United States. And I think that this is so important. Also, the Second Amendment, which is totally under siege by people like Hillary Clinton. They'll respect the Second Amendment and what it stands for, what it represents. So important to me.

Now, Hillary mentioned something about contributions just so you understand. So I will have in my race more than \$100 million put in—of my money, meaning I'm not taking all of this big money from all of these different corporations like she's doing. What I ask is this.

So I'm putting in more than—by the time it's finished, I'll have more than \$100 million invested. Pretty much self-funding money. We're raising money for the Republican Party, and we're doing tremendously on the small donations, \$61 average or so.

I ask Hillary, why doesn't—she made \$250 million by being in office. She used the power of her office to make a lot of money. Why isn't she funding, not for \$100 million, but why don't you put \$10 million or \$20 million or \$25 million or \$30 million into your own campaign?

It's \$30 million less for special interests that will tell you exactly what to do and it would really, I think, be a nice sign to the American public. Why aren't you putting some money in? You have a lot of it. You've made a lot of it because of the fact that you've been in office. Made a lot of it while you were secretary of state, actually. So why aren't you putting money into your own campaign? I'm just curious.

CLINTON: Well...[crosstalk]

RADDATZ: Thank you very much. We're going to get on to one more question.

CLINTON: The question was about the Supreme Court. And I just want to quickly say, I respect the Second Amendment. But I believe there should be comprehensive background checks, and we should close the gun show loophole, and close the online loophole.

COOPER: Thank you.

RADDATZ: We have—we have one more question, Mrs. Clinton.

CLINTON: We have to save as many lives as we possibly can.

COOPER: We have one more question from Ken Bone about energy policy. Ken?

QUESTION: What steps will your energy policy take to meet our energy needs, while at the same time remaining environmentally friendly and minimizing job loss for fossil power plant workers?

COOPER: Mr. Trump, two minutes?

TRUMP: Absolutely. I think it's such a great question, because energy is under siege by the Obama administration. Under absolutely siege. The EPA, Environmental Protection Agency, is killing these energy companies. And foreign companies are now coming in buying our—buying so many of our different plants and then re-jiggering the plant so that they can take care of their oil.

We are killing—absolutely killing our energy business in this country. Now, I'm all for alternative forms of energy, including wind, including solar, et cetera. But we need much more than wind and solar.

And you look at our miners. Hillary Clinton wants to put all the miners out of business. There is a thing called clean coal. Coal will last for 1,000 years in this country. Now we have natural gas and so many other things because of technology. We have unbelievable—we have found over the last seven years, we have found tremendous wealth right under our feet. So good. Especially when you have \$20 trillion in debt.

I will bring our energy companies back. They'll be able to compete. They'll make money. They'll pay off our national debt. They'll pay off our tremendous budget deficits, which are tremendous. But we are putting our energy companies out of business. We have to bring back our workers.

You take a look at what's happening to steel and the cost of steel and China dumping vast amounts of steel all over the United States, which essentially is killing our steelworkers and our steel companies. We have to guard our energy companies. We have to make it possible.

The EPA is so restrictive that they are putting our energy companies out of business. And all you have to do is go to a great place like West Virginia or places like Ohio, which is phenomenal, or places like Pennsylvania and you see what they're doing to the people, miners and others in the energy business. It's a disgrace.

COOPER: Your time is up. Thank you.

TRUMP: It's an absolute disgrace.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton, two minutes.

CLINTON: And actually—well, that was very interesting. First of all, China is illegally dumping steel in the United States and Donald Trump is buying it to build his buildings, putting steelworkers and American steel plants out of business. That's something that I fought against as a senator and that I would have a trade prosecutor to make sure that we don't get taken advantage of by China on steel or anything else.

You know, because it sounds like you're in the business or you're aware of people in the business—you know that we are now for the first time ever energy-independent. We are not dependent upon the Middle East. But the Middle East still controls a lot of the prices. So the price of oil has been way down. And that has had a damaging effect on a lot of the oil companies, right? We are, however, producing a lot of natural gas, which serves as a bridge to more renewable fuels. And I think that's an important transition.

We've got to remain energy-independent. It gives us much more power and freedom than to be worried about what goes on in the Middle East. We have enough worries over there without having to worry about that.

So I have a comprehensive energy policy, but it really does include fighting climate change, because I think that is a serious problem. And I support moving toward more clean, renewable energy as quickly as we can, because I think we can be the 21st century clean energy superpower and create millions of new jobs and businesses.

But I also want to be sure that we don't leave people behind. That's why I'm the only candidate from the very beginning of this campaign who had a plan to help us revitalize coal country, because those coal miners and their fathers and their grandfathers, they dug that coal out. A lot of them lost their lives. They were injured, but they turned the lights on and they powered their factories. I don't want to walk away from them. So we've got to do something for them.

COOPER: Secretary Clinton...

CLINTON: But the price of coal is down worldwide. So we have to look at this comprehensively.

COOPER: Your time is up.

CLINTON: And that's exactly what I have proposed. I hope you will go to HillaryClinton.com and look at my entire policy.

COOPER: Time is up. We have time for one more...

RADDATZ: We have...

COOPER: One more audience question.

RADDATZ: We've sneaked in one more question, and it comes from Karl Becker.

QUESTION: Good evening. My question to both of you is, regardless of the current rhetoric, would either of you name one positive thing that you respect in one another? [*applause*]

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump, would you like to go first?

CLINTON: Well, I certainly will, because I think that's a very fair and important question. Look, I respect his children. His children are incredibly able and devoted, and I think that says a lot about Donald. I don't agree with nearly anything else he says or does, but I do respect that. And I think that is something that as a mother and a grandmother is very important to me.

So I believe that this election has become in part so—so conflict-oriented, so intense because there's a lot at stake. This is not an ordinary time, and this is not an ordinary election. We are going to be choosing a president who will set policy for not just four or eight years, but because of some of the important decisions we have to make here at home and around the world, from the Supreme Court to energy and so much else, and so there is a lot at stake. It's one of the most consequential elections that we've had.

And that's why I've tried to put forth specific policies and plans, trying to get it off of the personal and put it on to what it is I want to do as president. And that's why I hope people will check on that for themselves so that they can see that, yes, I've spent 30 years, actually maybe a little more, working to help kids and families. And I want to take all that experience to the White House and do that every single day.

RADDATZ: Mr. Trump?

TRUMP: Well, I consider her statement about my children to be a very nice compliment. I don't know if it was meant to be a compliment, but it is a great—I'm very proud of my children. And they've done a wonderful job, and they've been wonderful, wonderful kids. So I consider that a compliment.

I will say this about Hillary. She doesn't quit. She doesn't give up. I respect that. I tell it like it is. She's a fighter. I disagree with much of what she's fighting for. I do disagree with her judgment in many cases. But she does fight hard, and she doesn't quit, and she doesn't give up. And I consider that to be a very good trait.

RADDATZ: Thanks to both of you.

COOPER: We want to thank both the candidates. We want to thank the university here. This concludes the town hall meeting. Our thanks to the candidates, the commission, Washington University, and to everybody who watched.

RADDATZ: Please tune in on October 19th for the final presidential debate that will take place at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Good night, everyone.

Citation: Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri," October 9, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119038>.

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Evan Vuori

By **MATT SHUHAM** Published JANUARY 27, 2017, 4:56 PM EDT

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President Donald Trump on Friday signed an executive order to implement “new vetting measures” after the ceremonial swearing-in of Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis.

“I’m establishing new vetting measures to keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America,” he said after congratulating Mattis on his appointment. “We want to ensure that we are not admitting into our country the very threats our soldiers are fighting overseas. We only want to admit those into our country who will support our country and love deeply our people.”

On the campaign trail, Trump promised “extreme vetting” of people traveling to the United States from “terror-prone” countries, all of them majority-Muslim. But exactly what “new vetting measures” the order laid out were not immediately clear.

Before actually signing the order, Trump said, “this is the protection of the nation from foreign terrorist entry into the United States.”

“We all know what that means,” he added.

Trump also signed an executive order he said would “begin a great rebuilding of the armed services.”

The order would develop “a plan for new planes, new ships, new resources and new tools for our men and women in uniform,” Trump said.

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Donald J. Trump 
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If the ban were announced with a one week notice, the "bad" would rush into our country during that week. A lot of bad "dudes" out there!

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EXHIBIT 67



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Everybody is arguing whether or not it is a BAN. Call it what you want, it is about keeping bad people (with bad intentions) out of country!

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EXHIBIT 68



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Christians in the Middle-East have been executed in large numbers. We cannot allow this horror to continue!

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EXHIBIT 69



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RESEARCH AREAS

OCTOBER 5, 2016

U.S. admits record number of Muslim refugees in 2016

BY PHILLIP CONNOR ([HTTP://WWW.PEWRESEARCH.ORG/STAFF/PHILLIP-CONNOR/](http://www.pewresearch.org/staff/philip-connor/))

A total of 38,901 Muslim refugees entered the U.S. in fiscal year 2016, making up almost half (46%) of the nearly 85,000 refugees who entered the country in that period, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of data from the State Department's Refugee Processing Center ([http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/Interactive-Reporting/EnumType/Report?](http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/Interactive-Reporting/EnumType/Report?ItemPath=/rpt_WebArrivalsReports/MX%20-%20Arrivals%20by%20Nationality%20and%20Religion)

[ItemPath=/rpt_WebArrivalsReports/MX%20-%20Arrivals%20by%20Nationality%20and%20Religion](http://ireports.wrapsnet.org/Interactive-Reporting/EnumType/Report?ItemPath=/rpt_WebArrivalsReports/MX%20-%20Arrivals%20by%20Nationality%20and%20Religion)). That means the U.S. has admitted the highest number of Muslim refugees of any year since data on self-reported religious affiliations first became publicly available in 2002.

([http://www.pewresearch.org/ft_16-10-](http://www.pewresearch.org/ft_16-10-03_muslimrefugees/)

[03_muslimrefugees/](http://www.pewresearch.org/ft_16-10-03_muslimrefugees/)) Almost the same number of Christian (37,521) as Muslim refugees were admitted in fiscal 2016, which ended Sept. 30. A slightly lower share of 2016's refugees were Christian (44%) than Muslim, the first time that has happened since fiscal 2006, when a large number of Somali refugees

([http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora/)

[tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora/](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora/)) entered the U.S.


People seeking to enter the U.S. as refugees are processed overseas. As part of the process, they are asked a series of questions, including their religious affiliation. When their applications are approved, refugees travel to the U.S. to be resettled by nonprofit groups associated with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr>).

Refugees to the U.S. are different from asylum seekers, who claim asylum after already being in the U.S. or crossing into the U.S. via an airport or land border.

Refugees make up a small percentage (about one-in-ten) of the roughly 1 million immigrants granted lawful permanent residency in the U.S. each year. Because the U.S. government does not

U.S. admits its highest number of Muslim refugees on record in fiscal 2016

Number of refugees entering the U.S. by religious affiliation



Note: "Other religions" include Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and other religions. Data do not include special immigrant visas and certain humanitarian parole entrants. Fiscal years are Oct. 1 through Sept. 30 each year.

Source: U.S. State Department's Refugee Processing Center accessed Oct. 3, 2016.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

keep track of the religion of new legal immigrants, it is not possible to say what share of all recent immigrants are Muslim. A 2013 Center report (<http://www.pewforum.org/2013/05/17/the-religious-affiliation-of-us-immigrants/>), however, estimated that as of 2012, roughly six-in-ten new legal immigrants were Christian, compared with one-in-ten who were Muslim.

Just two countries – Syria (12,486) and Somalia (9,012) – were the source of more than half of fiscal 2016’s Muslim refugees. The rest are from Iraq (7,853), Burma (Myanmar) (3,145), Afghanistan (2,664) and other countries (3,741).

Overall, a far larger total number of Christian refugees than Muslim refugees have entered the U.S. since fiscal 2002. During the past 15 years, the U.S. has admitted 399,677 Christian refugees and 279,339 Muslim refugees, meaning that 46% of all refugees who have entered the U.S. during this time have been Christian while 32% have been Muslim.

In the just-ended fiscal year, about 8,120 refugees (10%) were members of faiths other than Islam or Christianity. More than 3,000 belonged to Buddhist traditions while nearly 2,000 more were Hindu. A much lower number of refugees in 2016 were atheists or claimed no religious affiliation (449 refugees overall, or less than 1% of the year’s refugees).

(http://www.pewresearch.org/ft_16-10-03_muslimrefugees_countries/)


The U.S. received 84,995 refugees in fiscal year 2016, effectively meeting the 85,000 ceiling (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/presidential-determination-presidential-determination-refugee-admissions>) set by the Obama administration at the beginning of the year. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (16,370), Syria (12,587) and Burma (Myanmar) (12,347) were the top origin countries of refugees in 2016. Together, refugees from these three nations represented nearly half (49%) of all refugees admitted to the U.S. over the past year.

The administration set the goal of resettling 10,000 Syrian refugees (<http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/05/488896247/u-s-is-on-target-to-accept-and-resettle-10-000-syrian-refugees>) in the U.S. in the fiscal year. This goal was exceeded, and refugee status was given to 12,587 Syrians. Nearly all of them (99%) were Muslim and less than 1% were Christian. As a point of comparison, Pew Research Center estimated (http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2050/percent/Middle_East-North_Africa/) Syria’s religious composition to be 93% Muslim and 5% Christian in 2010.

Note: This post, originally published Aug. 16, 2016, has been updated to include data for all of fiscal year 2016.

Nearly half of U.S. refugees in 2016 were from D.R. Congo, Syria and Burma (Myanmar)

Number of refugees entering the U.S. in fiscal 2016, by origin country



Note: Data do not include special immigrant visas and certain humanitarian parole entrants.

Source: U.S. State Department’s Refugee Processing Center accessed Oct. 3, 2016.

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EXHIBIT 70

POLITICO



White House press secretary Sean Spicer said Tuesday that President Donald Trump will not rescind the original order. | Getty

White House creates confusion about future of Trump's travel ban

By **MATTHEW NUSSBAUM**, **JOSH GERSTEIN** and **CRISTIANO LIMA** | 02/21/17 05:06 PM EST | Updated 02/21/17 08:15 PM EST

The White House is sending mixed signals as to whether or not it will rescind President Donald Trump's controversial travel ban even as officials seek to craft a new order that will be less vulnerable to legal challenge.

The Justice Department told the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals last week that Trump will "rescind...and replace" the original order, which remains largely on hold after an appeals court panel upheld a lower court's broad injunction.

But White House press secretary Sean Spicer said at the conclusion of his daily briefing Tuesday that Trump will not rescind the original order. Instead, the first order is being updated, Spicer insisted.

The contradictory statements sowed further confusion about the fate of Trump's original order, which bars immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries and halts the entry of refugees.

"The new order is going to be very much tailored to what I consider to be a very bad decision," Trump said last week.



White House creates confusion about future of Trump's travel ban

An excerpt of Sean Spicer's remarks on Tuesday.

02/21/17 05:30 PM EST

Spicer said the administration remains confident in the legality of its original order, but is also working with Cabinet agencies to prepare a new one.

His statements seemed to leave open the possibility that there could be two orders in effect at once — a situation that could complicate efforts to defend the new order in court.

ADVERTISING

The White House said Tuesday afternoon it intended to issue a clarification about the conflicting statements.

But a statement from the administration — released on Tuesday evening — did little to clear up any confusion.

"The administration continues to defend the President's national security Executive Order in court, and though we believe it to be fully lawful, we are simultaneously finalizing a revised policy tailored to the Ninth Circuit's ruling," White House spokesman Michael Short said in a written statement.

During an appearance on Fox News Tuesday, White House aide Stephen Miller similarly left the door open for the initial order to remain in place, adding only that the new policy would be "responsive" to recent court rulings.

"These are mostly minor technical differences, fundamentally," he said of the forthcoming revised order. "You are still going to have the same basic policy outcome for the country but you are going to have a lot of technical issues brought up by the court."

Miller added that the administration would be rolling out the details of the revised order "in the next few days."

He also stood by the original executive order's constitutionality, despite the flurry of legal challenges to it.

"The president's actions were clearly legal and constitutional and consistent with the long-standing traditions of presidents in the past to exercise the authority in the Immigration and Nationality Act to suspend immigration when it poses a threat to our security," he said.

EXHIBIT 71

DHS memo contradicts threats cited by Trump's travel ban

Rick Jervis, USA TODAY Published 7:09 p.m. ET Feb. 24, 2017 | Updated 3:36 p.m. ET Feb. 25, 2017



(Photo: Andres Kudacki, AP)

Refugees seeking asylum in the USA from the seven countries listed under President Trump's controversial travel ban do not pose a significant terrorism threat to the United States, according to an internal Department of Homeland Security memo.

The three-page memo, titled "Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States" and obtained by the Associated Press, was drafted in response to a White House request and contradicts assertions by the Trump administration that the travel ban was necessary to keep Americans safe.

Trump cited terrorism concerns for implementing the travel ban from seven mostly Muslim countries — Syria, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Yemen. Earlier this month, a panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals blocked enforcement of the travel order, upholding an earlier decision by a federal judge in Seattle.

Trump and his advisers attacked the court order and vowed to continue the fight in court.

"This is a judicial usurpation of power," White House policy adviser Stephen Miller told *Fox News Sunday* shortly after the court's decision. "It is a violation of judges' proper roles in litigating disputes. We will fight it."

[Trump blasts FBI for 'leaks' during ongoing Russia investigation](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-reince-prieus-fbi/98344644/)

(<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-reince-prieus-fbi/98344644/>)

[White House holds restricted news briefing, objections mount](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-sean-spicer/98362348/)

(<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-sean-spicer/98362348/>)

In the Homeland Security memo, analysts show through statistics and reports that relatively few people from the seven countries listed in the travel ban have carried out or been involved in terrorism-related activities in the USA since Syria's war started in 2011.

It said more than half of the 82 people the government determined were inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or try to carry out an attack in the United States were U.S. citizens born in the USA. The others were from 26 countries, with Pakistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq and Uzbekistan leading the pack.

The memo also asserted that relatively few people from the seven banned countries are given access to the U.S. None of the seven countries accounted for more than 7% of the U.S. visas granted in their region in Fiscal Year 2015, it said.

Homeland Security spokeswoman Gillian Christensen told the Associated Press the memo was from a single intelligence source and not the final comprehensive review requested by the White House. "The ... report does not include data from other intelligence community sources," she said. "It is incomplete."

The assessment drew from unclassified information from Justice Department press releases on terrorism-related convictions and terrorist attack perpetrators killed in the act, State Department visa statistics, the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.

The travel ban sparked protests by thousands of people across the nation and drew condemnation from leaders in countries like Britain, France, Australia

and Canada.

Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States

Scope Note: This paper was prepared at the request of the DHS Acting Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. It assesses the international terrorist threat to the United States and worldwide by citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Citizens of these seven countries were impacted by Section 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) 13769 "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States." The assessment relies on unclassified information from Department of Justice press releases on terrorism-related convictions and terrorist attack perpetrators killed in the act, Department of State visa statistics, the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, and the Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2015. This paper does not assess the threat of domestic terrorism.

Key Findings

- DHS I&A assesses that country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in March 2011, the foreign-born primarily US-based individuals who were inspired by a foreign terrorist organization to participate in terrorism-related activity were citizens of 26 different countries, with no one country representing more than 13.5 percent of the foreign-born total.
- Relatively few citizens of the seven countries impacted by E.O. 13769, compared to neighboring countries, maintain access to the United States.
- Terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen pose a threat of attacks in the United States while groups in Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan remain regionally focused.

Citizens of Countries Affected by E.O. 13769 Rarely Implicated in US-Based Terrorism

DHS I&A assesses that country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in March 2011, at least 82 primarily US-based individuals, who died in the pursuit of or were convicted of any terrorism-related federal offense inspired by a foreign terrorist organization, according to a DHS study of Department of Justice press releases on convictions and terrorist attack perpetrators killed in the act.¹ Of the 82 individuals we identified, slightly more than half were native-born United States citizens. Of the foreign-born individuals, they came from 26 different countries, with no one country representing more than 13.5 percent of the foreign-born total.

- The top seven origin countries of the foreign-born individuals are: Pakistan (5), Somalia (3), and Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan (2).

¹ For the purposes of this paper, we limited our data to individuals prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 133B in support of or inspired by a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). We excluded traveling or attempting to travel overseas to join a FTO and activities unrelated to FTOs, to include purely domestic terrorism.

- Of the seven countries impacted by E.O. 13769 that are not listed above: Iran, Sudan, and

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EXHIBIT 72

The Washington Post**Social Issues**

Federal judge in Hawaii freezes President Trump's new entry ban

By Matt Zapotosky, Kalani Takase and Maria Sacchetti March 16

A federal judge in Hawaii on Wednesday issued a sweeping freeze of President Trump's new executive order hours before it would have temporarily barred the issuance of new visas to citizens of six Muslim-majority countries and suspended the admission of new refugees.

In a blistering 43-page opinion, U.S. District Judge Derrick K. Watson pointed to Trump's own comments and those of his close advisers as evidence that his order was meant to discriminate against Muslims and declared there was a "strong likelihood of success" that those suing would prove the directive violated the Constitution.

Watson declared that "a reasonable, objective observer — enlightened by the specific historical context, contemporaneous public statements, and specific sequence of events leading to its issuance — would conclude that the Executive Order was issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular religion."

He lambasted the government, in particular, for asserting that because the ban did not apply to all Muslims in the world, it could not be construed as discriminating against Muslims.

"The illogic of the Government's contentions is palpable," Watson wrote. "The notion that one can demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by targeting all of them at once is fundamentally flawed."

Early Thursday, a federal judge in Maryland issued a second, narrower injunction against the measure — suspending only the portion that stopped the issuance of visas to citizens of six Muslim-majority countries. In that case, U.S. District Judge Theodore D. Chuang also pointed to statements by Trump and his advisers made that, in Chuang's opinion, indicated the executive order was "the realization of the long-envisioned Muslim ban."

"These statements, which include explicit, direct statements of President Trump's animus toward Muslims and intention to impose a ban on Muslims entering the United States, present a convincing case that the First Executive Order was issued to accomplish, as nearly as possible, President Trump's promised Muslim ban," Chuang wrote.

At a rally in Nashville on Wednesday, Trump called the Hawaii court ruling "terrible" and asked a cheering crowd whether the ruling was "done by a judge for political reasons." He said the administration would fight the case "as far as it needs to go," including up to the Supreme Court, and rued that he had been persuaded to sign a "watered-down version" of his first travel ban.

"Let me tell you something, I think we ought to go back to the first one and go all the way," Trump said. "The danger is clear, the law is clear, the need for my executive order is clear."

Sarah Isgur Flores, a spokeswoman for the Justice Department, said in a statement: "The Department of Justice strongly disagrees with the federal district court's ruling, which is flawed both in reasoning and in scope. The President's Executive Order falls squarely within his lawful authority in seeking to protect our Nation's security, and the Department will continue to defend this Executive Order in the courts."

Watson was one of three federal judges to hear arguments Wednesday about the ban, though he was the first to issue an opinion.

A ruling was also expected from a federal judge in Washington.

As the ruling in Hawaii was being handed down, James L. Robart, the federal judge in Washington state who froze Trump's first travel ban, was hearing arguments about whether he should freeze the second. He said he did not think his first freeze was still in effect, though he did not immediately rule on whether he should issue a new one.

Watson's decision might not be the last word. He was considering only a request for a temporary restraining order, and while that required him to assess whether challengers of the ban would ultimately succeed, his ruling is not final on that question. The Justice Department could appeal the ruling or wage a longer-term court battle before the judge in Hawaii.

Watson's decision came in response to a lawsuit filed by Hawaii. Lawyers for the state alleged that the new entry ban, much like the old, violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment because it was essentially a Muslim ban, hurt the ability of state businesses and universities to recruit top talent, and damaged the state's robust tourism industry.

They pointed to the case of Ismail Elshikh, the imam of the Muslim Association of Hawaii, whose mother-in-law's application for an immigrant visa was still being processed. Under the new executive order, attorneys for Hawaii said, Elshikh feared that his mother-in-law, a Syrian national, would ultimately be banned from entering the United States.

"Dr. Elshikh certainly has standing in this case. He, along with all of the Muslim residents in Hawaii, face higher hurdles to see family because of religious faith," lawyer Colleen Roh Sinz dak said at a hearing Wednesday. "It is not merely a harm to the Muslim residents of the state of Hawaii, but also is a harm to the United States as a whole and is against the First Amendment itself."

Elshikh is a U.S. citizen of Egyptian descent who has been a resident of Hawaii for over a decade. His wife is of Syrian descent and is also a resident of Hawaii.

Justice Department lawyers argued that Trump was well within his authority to impose the ban, which was necessary for national security, and that those challenging it had raised only speculative harms. "They bear the burden of showing irreparable harm ... and there is no harm at all," said the acting U.S. solicitor general, Jeffrey Wall, who argued on behalf of the government in Greenbelt, Md., in the morning and by phone in Hawaii in the afternoon.

Watson agreed with the state on virtually all the points. He ruled that the state had preliminarily demonstrated its universities and tourism industry would be hurt, and that harm could be traced to the executive order. He wrote that Elshikh had alleged "direct, concrete injuries to both himself and his immediate family."

And Watson declared that the government's assertion of the national security need for the order was "at the very least, 'secondary to a religious objective' of temporarily suspending the entry of Muslims." He pointed to Trump's own campaign trail comments and public statements by advisers as evidence.

"For instance, there is nothing 'veiled' about this press release: 'Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,'" Watson wrote. "Nor is there anything 'secret' about the Executive's motive specific to the issuance of the Executive Order. Rudolph Giuliani explained on television how the Executive Order came to be. He said: 'When [Mr. Trump] first announced it, he said, 'Muslim ban.' He called me up. He said, 'Put a commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.'"

Watson also pointed to a recent Fox News appearance by Stephen Miller, in which the president's senior policy adviser said the new ban would have "mostly minor technical differences" from the previous iteration frozen by the courts, and Americans would see "the same basic policy outcome for the country."

"These plainly-worded statements, made in the months leading up to and contemporaneous with the signing of the Executive Order, and, in many cases, made by the Executive himself, betray the Executive Order's stated secular purpose," Watson wrote.

Opponents of the ban across the country — including those who had argued against it in different cases on Wednesday — hailed Watson's ruling.

Bob Ferguson, the Washington state attorney general who asked Robart to block the measure, called the Hawaii ruling "fantastic news." Justin Cox, a staff attorney for the National Immigration Law Center who argued for a restraining order in the case in Maryland, said, "This is absolutely a victory and should be celebrated as such, especially because the court held that the plaintiffs, that Hawaii was likely to succeed on its establishment clause claim which essentially is that the primary purpose of the executive order is to discriminate against Muslims."

Cox said while the judge did not halt the order entirely, he blocked the crucial sections — those halting the issuance of new visas and suspending the refugee program. Left intact, Cox said, were lesser-known provisions, including one that orders Homeland Security and the U.S. attorney general to publicize information about foreign nationals charged with terrorism-related offenses and other crimes. He said the provision seems designed to whip up fear of Muslims.

"It's a shaming device that it's really a dehumanizing device," he said. "It perpetuates this myth, this damaging stereotype of Muslims as terrorists."

Trump's new entry ban had suspended the U.S. refugee program for 120 days and halted for 90 days the issuance of new visas to people from six Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Libya and Syria. It was different from the first entry ban in that it omitted Iraq from the list of affected countries, did not affect current visa or green-card holders and spelled out a robust list of people who might be able to apply for exceptions.

The administration could have defended the first ban in court — though it chose instead to rewrite the president's executive order in such a way that it might be more defensible. The next step might have been to persuade the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit to rehear the case en banc, after a three-judge panel with the court upheld the freeze on Trump's ban.

Hawaii is a part of the 9th Circuit, so the legal road could pass through the appeals court there again. Perhaps previewing the contentious fight ahead, five of the circuit's judges on Wednesday signed a dissenting opinion in the case over the original travel ban, declaring Trump's decision to issue the executive order was "well within the powers of the presidency." The judges wanted to wipe out a ruling by a three-judge panel declaring otherwise.

"Above all, in a democracy, we have the duty to preserve the liberty of the people by keeping the enormous powers of the national government separated," Judge Jay S. Bybee wrote for the dissenters. "We are judges, not Platonic Guardians. It is our duty to say what the law is, and the meta-source of our law, the U.S. Constitution, commits the power to make foreign policy, including the decisions to permit or forbid entry into the United States, to the President and Congress."

The dissent was signed by Judges Bybee, Sandra S. Ikuta, Consuelo M. Callahan and Carlos T. Bea, who all were appointed by President George W. Bush; and Judge Alex Kozinski, who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan. It seemed to represent a minority view. The circuit has 25 active judges, and the court said a majority had not voted in favor of reconsidering the three-judge panel's published opinion to keep Trump's first ban frozen.

That opinion was signed by Judges Michelle T. Friedland, who was appointed by President Obama; Richard R. Clifton, who was appointed by President George W. Bush; and Judge William C. Canby Jr., who was appointed by President Carter.

Judge Stephen Reinhardt, also a Carter appointee, formally joined their opinion Wednesday and remarked that only a "small number" of 9th Circuit judges wanted to overturn it.

Takase reported from Honolulu. Lornet Turnbull in Seattle contributed to this report.

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